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ABSTRACT 
The thesis is concerned with the consequences of 
military intervention and procurement for developing 
countries. 
The first part analyses the theoretical explanations 
from social science of military intervention and 
the related incidence of violence in the Third 
World. It argues in favour of the legitimacy thesis 
as an explanatory framework and discusses the 
evidence from independent states - Africa, the 
Middle East and Asia. An analysis of the factors 
conducive to non-intervention is also attempted. 
The second part discusses the problem of the competition 
between defence and welfare expenditures. It also 
goes on to analyse the economic impact of war on 
the development strategies of Nigeria, Israel, 
Egypt, Pakistan and Vietnam. 
The third part looks at the relationship between 
development and the arms trade. It places arms 
procurement in the context of the 
industrialisation 
strategy and finds a positive linkage 
between 
domestic and production and the expansion of 
the 
manufacturing base. 
The last section discusses the problem and prospects 
of disarmament. In so far as violence and military 
intervention reflect the rapid changes taking 
place within the Third World it is not feasible 
to conceive of disarmament being a productive 
contribution to political and social stability. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Nobody has yet devised a substitute for armed forces. 
According to Adam Smith, the first duty of the sovereign "that 
of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of . 
other independent societies, can be performed only by means of 
a military force". (! ) All countries in the world today 
implicitly accept this proposition and have prepared themselves 
to varying degrees of effectiveness to carry out this first 
duty if circumstances make it necessary. (2) At the same time 
there is considerable support among politicians, and citizens, 
for finding some other means of resolving differences between 
nations. To this end international organisations, such as the 
United Nations, have used up considerable man-hours in searching 
for alternative forms of securing peace. The major powers have 
also paralleled these efforts in searching for an operating 
formula that will give each other security. (W In the meantime 
the world is covered by violent challenges to the status quo, 
from within and between countries, and, as the search for non- 
violent means of reconciling irreconcialable differences 
continues without any end in sight, the powers concerned tend 
to resort to the traditional means of resolution of conflict) 
namely, organised violence. 
That part of the planet known as the Third World (4 is 
a violent world. All the forms of civilised savagery developed 
painstakingly in the European countries over many centuries are 
L 
a daily occurance in some part of the Third World. The mass 
bombing of civilian targets in the Second European War, 
introduced by the Nazis and perfected by the Allies, was 
repeated over and over again in Vietnam by the American air- 
force. (5) The horrors of the religous witch-hunts of 16th 
Century Europe have their mangled replicas in too many of the 
developing countries for them to be mere abberation. The 
elimination of opposition, the jails, the persecution, the 
lack of compassion and the apparatus of repression are too 
widespread among the newly 'liberated' countries for them to 
pass unnoticed except by apologists for dictators. That this 
takes place against a background of desperate poverty, technical 
backwardness and widespread ignorance, does not make the 
behaviour more acceptable. The elites of these countries, 
irrespective of their political persuasion, are neither poverty 
stricken nor ignorant. 
Military Government is the most common form of government 
in the Third World. The most common difficulty that these 
countries face is the structural obstacles between the will to 
develop and the road to development. The political structures, 
existant or left behind by the retreating European powers, have 
smashed themselves one after another against this problem. The 
regimes that have arisen on the wreckage of these political 
structures have taken several forms according to the circum- 
stances of the country, the personalities of the leaders, the 
proximity to super-power interests, and the achievements, if 
any, of the new government. 
I 
As often as not the new regime is challenged from within. 
Where the new elite has shallow roots it is vulnerable to 
competion from other elites within the society. Where violence 
is a norm these challenges are bound to be violent too and the 
pattern of conflict is endemic. Vilfredo Pareto described 
social violence in terms of the perennial struggle between 
elites - those that are established and those that are arriving. 
This circulation of elites is the means by which a society is 
renewed - either the established elite suppresses the challenge 
violently or it is overthrown. c(0) In some circumstances the 
challenge is absorbed - Britain in the industrial revolution 
(the aristocracy absorbed the bourgeoisie) or during the rise of 
the Labour Party (the bourgeoisie absorbed the proletariat). 
In the Third World the challenge to the elites is as old, 
or new, as the states themselves; it is not a cyclic phenomenon 
spread over centuries, or even decades. The rise and fall of 
the new elites in the Third World is compressed into a period 
of years or, in some cases, months. Survival is a risk that is 
taken seriously (dis settled violently. Living dangerously is 
a way of life for political leaders and aspirants. 
With this as the political context it. is surprising that a 
whole literature on the problems of development has grown up 
which largely ignores the reality of the world that the 
literature is written for? Serious scholars have produced many 
plans for development that might as well be written for another 
planet for all the relevance that they have for this one. For 
example a recent text-book on development economics begins 
with the following: 
"I think the importance of institutional barriers 
to development is often exaggerated... the desire 
for material improvement in less developed countries 
is very strong - certainly strong enough to counter 
any institutional barriers that may exist - and the 
evidence is not very convincing that basic institu- 
tional reform is a necessary precondition for 
accelerated growth. But, in any case it is my firm 
belief that the economist has something positive to 
offer by way of analysis unadulterated by sociological 
political and other non-economic variables. We now 
seem to me to be in the opposite danger of a great 
deal of woolly thinking about what raising living 
standards is all about. In the final analysis, growth 
must be considered as an economic process in the 
important practical sense that it is unlikely to 
proceed very far in the absence of an increase in the 
quality and quantity of the resources available for 
production. Even if we concede that the availability 
of the resources may depend on non-economic factors 
such as attitudes towards effort, saving and risk 
taking, and 'maximising' in general, this does not 
make non-economic factors prime determinants of 
development. Their impact is indirect. This is how 
economists tend to view the relation between 
) 
development and institutional environment... " (7) 
It is this search for 'unadulterated' economics that 
leads to the myths of production functions; that 
there is some arrangement of economic variables that 
will raise output according to a mathematical law. 
It is a great pity that development economists did 
not begin with a study of the development problem 
from as "adulterated" an angle as possible rather 
than joining the gaderene rush to apply pure analytical 
models to situations which are not remotely connected 
to any of the assumptions needed by the models. The 
contribution of social science to the development 
process may then have been more significant than it 
has been up to now. 
The allocation of resources is not a purely economic 
process even if it is an economic problem. Confusing the two 
has given economics an undeserved bad name. Resources are 
allocated as a part of a political bargaining process. A 
closer look at the political processes of developing countries 
will contribute more to an understanding of the economic 
problems than the search for the point of tangency between a 
production possibility curve and an iso-quant. 
The result of the exclusion of reality from the develop- 
ment economist's interests, and the concomittant exclusion of 
economics from the social scientist's work, has been that the 
study of the economic effects of political structures has 
fallen in between the two schools. Now this is a serious 
matter for social science. It means that a whole area of 
intervention in the development process is left unexplained. 
Unfortunately the majority of social scientists who work in 
the development field make snap judgements on the impact of 
the political structure on the countries concerned which when 
examined do not pass even the most elementary empirical tests? 
For example, Thirwallts book quoted from above, does not 
contain any analysis on the role of defence expenditures on 
development (and Thirwall's book is one of the better in this 
field)? 
Development economists have produced a whole literature 
on the effects of education on development. ($) Yet this is 
only one item on the budgets of developing countries. Defence 
spending, intimately connected with the violence of the Third 
World, is a most neglected area of public finance. The reason 
is that it is taken for granted in the main that defence 
expenditures are wasteful of resources. That this is insuffi- 
cient reason to ignore them is somehow lost in the general 
search for the missing e&JZi4r of self-sustained growth. 
Defence spending, where it is recognised as an important part 
of the budget, is usually regarded as a necessary evil to be 
minimised as much as possible so that the serious work of the 
analyst can be continued. The Third World is boiling with 
violence, institutionalised and revolutionary, and yet the 
organisation of resources to cope with this fact of life) is 
a neglected subject. Just how "unadulterated" can we get? 
On the other side of the social science fence, occupied 
by sociologists, political analysts, historians and so on, 
there has been a veritable boom in studies of the Third World, 
and especially, studies of the military regimes of a wide 
spectrum of countries. But these have tended to be exclusively 
concerned with the socio-political roles of the various military 
groups in these countries. Some attempts have bee made to 
delve into the economic aspects but, either the political and 
sociological aspects have been more interesting to the analysts, 
or, the economic tools have been insufficiently explored, that 
they tend to be limited to individual articles scattered in 
the professional academic journals, or to footnotes and small 
sections in books written for other purposes. 
This is a contribution to the discussion of the social 
sciences on the military in the Third World. 
The book divides into seventeen chapters. The violence 
of the Third World is examined in Chapters Two and Three, first 
dealing with some ideological issues and then taking up some of 
the factual relationships between violence and the political 
systems that exist in the Third World. The basic point made 
in these chapters is that the legitimacy crisis dominates the 
Third World, with a relatively faster circulation of elites 
than was the case in the same phase of European development. 
The tendency to set up military regimes itself is an expression 
of the fragility of the political systems in these countries. 
( 
If the allocative process is a political one then some 
study must be made of political processes. Military govern- 
ments are not all of a kind - there are wide variations in 
their composition, their programmes, their histories etc. 
But it is also important to understand the differences between 
Third World politics-as a whole and western political processes 
before the military can be put into perspective. In Chapter 
Four the relationship between legitimacy and the use of force 
is looked at and also the nature of the political party in 
these countries. This institution has the same name as its 
Western progenitor but it operates in an altogether different 
cultural milieu and for subtly different purposes. Many 
political parties have not got used to the idea of opposition 
and the fact that the fruits of office are so important to 
self esteem encourages resistance to change in this respect. 
This political tradition, left behind by the Europeans 
in the 1960's, is taken up in case studies of Sierra Leone, 
Nigeria and Ghana in Chapter Five. Then the role played by 
Colonel Nasser in the Middle-East is looked at in three studies 
of his influence in Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Arab military 
socialism has been a dynamic force in this region for over 
twenty years and it has by no means exhausted its capability 
for intervention. This theme is taken up in Chapter Six. 
Chapter Seven deals with military interventions in Pakistan 
and Indonesia. Pakistan is a contrast to its party state 
neighbour, India. Indonesia is another extraordinary country 
where the coup d'etat attempt of a political faction back- 
fired and gave power to the army. It is not always the 
eventual winners who set off the events that brings them to 
power (Pakistan and Nigeria are two other examples). 
The reasons for intervention are varied and they must 
also be compared with the examples of countries which have 
not had interventions. Mexico is the first case considered 
in Chapter Eight. Here the brilliant political fight between 
President Cardenas and the military is examined, showing how 
the Revolutionary Generals were consistently out-manoeuvred 
by the vigorous leadership of Cardenas until their last 
desperate attempt at a come-back only exposed their isolation 
from the new Mexico which they had themselves brought into 
existence in their youth. Turkey followed a similar path 
under Kemal Ataturk but here the position was reversed after 
the Second European War. The political structure left by 
Ataturk was exhausted and his heirs injected new dynamism 
(with consequent tensions) at a time when the military was 
rejuvenated from top to bottom by the Americans. The 1960 
coup was inevitable but the lessons from the period of 
exclusion are important. Israel is in every sense a special 
case. It is a vigorous democracy (for Israeli Jews) but also 
a one-party state; it has a highly professional army which is 
also a militia; it has a semi-permanent mobilised economy with 
the military reaching all levels of the state but the civilian 
government is in full control. 
I 
In Chapters Nine and Ten the effect of the defence 
budgets of developing countries on the welfare allocation is 
looked at. The point here is that the most common assumption 
about military spending is that it is competitive with welfare 
spending on education and health. This does not appear to be 
the case, however, and some suggestions are made as to the 
areas where it is more likely to be competitive such as private 
consumption. (9) 
Chapters Eleven and Twelve examine the economic impact of 
six wars on the countries affected by them. Chapter Eleven 
deals with some of the economic gainers from the wars in the 
Third World; Nigeria, Vietnam's neighbours and Israel. In each 
case hostilities have helped to improve the economic indicators 
of these countries. In Chapter Twelve Pakistan and Egypt's 
economic losses from the wars they have been involved in are 
looked at. Pakistan's 1965 war was a disastrous turning point 
for the country which narrowed the options facing the ruling 
group in Western Pakistan and led to the separatist movement 
in the East gaining real possibilities of success. As the 
West wing squeezed the East to make ends meet it drove the 
Bengalis into resistance and eventual revolt. In Egypt the 
economic managers have been unsuccessful since 1952 in getting 
the country moving towards growth. Managerial incompetence 
and continual purges of the already thin elite were accompanied 
by failures in the battlefield with Israel. On two counts the 
Nasserist regime failed; firstly, it did not lead to develop- 
ment on a superior scale to non-Nasserist governments (in 
comparisons with most countries it comes off worse) and 
secondly, its claimed military competence was never sub- 
stantiated in action (the incompetence of the previous regime 
was one of the alleged reasons for the Nasserist coup). 
The most important military connection between the Third 
World and the industrialised countries is through the arms 
trade. The political use of weapon supplies is an obvious 
linkage; the support and sustenance of competing sides in the 
conflicts that take place is another. The big powers clearly 
use their weapon supplies as counters in their diplomatic 
offensives but it is important to realise that it is not the 
suppliers who create the tensions (this is pure propaganda 
from the disarmament lobby) but the existence of tensions 
that enables the suppliers to exploit the demands for weapons. 
This is looked at in Chapter Thirteen. In Chapter Fourteen 
individual arms races are studied. 
An alternative to importing arms, and-a means to gain 
political independence, is to manufacture them domestically. 
Under a third of the developing countries manufacture some 
arms and only a handful manufacture aircraft. Chapters 
Fifteen and Sixteen examine this aspect of the arms business. 
The necessity for industrialisation, if development is to take 
place, is discussed and the role that arms production has in 
this process is considered. Arms present special problems 
for countries that manufacture them - for sophisticated weapons 
they involve high risk capital projects - but they also present 
some solutions to the development problem. How to set up 
domestic manufacturing capacity with limited markets is 
one obstacle to growth but the role of a government as a 
buyer of arms products is a way round this problem. In 
Chapter Sixteen the production of small arms, armour, naval 
craft and aircraft is studied in greater detail and this is 
linked to the use of skills which have civilian uses. 
The final chapter takes up the issues raised by disarma- 
ment and how this would effect the developing world. The 
problems of nuclear disarmament are something entirely 
separate from the problems faced by the developing world. The 
bulk of arms spending is accounted for in the developed world 
and therefore arrangements between the major powers on these 
matters may not be of direct material interest to the develop- 
ing world. The hope that this might lead to greater foreign 
aid is discussed and dismissed. Given the level of violence 
in the Third World and the independence of these countries 
from the developed powers it is not likely that disarmament 
will take place in the Third World in this century. That 
being the case, the Third World has to face up to the necessity 
for defence allocations and these must be taken into account in 
their development plans. 
The reason for using the term 'Third World' has already 
been explained. There are some other details that need 
explanation here. Several Third World countries are also 
excluded. The island countries of the Carrabean and the 
.1 
Pacific are not included in any of the tables. These would 
add to the numbers of countries but not necessarily to the 
indicators. This decision was made before any of the research 
was conducted and therefore was not a post-data adjustment - 
there is no question of an attempt to bias the results with 
inconvenient figures. It was assumed that the bias of 
including these countries would not be justified given their 
smallness. Thus we lose Cuba from the countries studied, as 
well-as Haitti, Dominican Republic (except for small arms 
production), Jamaica, Trinidad etc. But it would have been 
wrong to select these countries once a decision had been made 
that they were not wanted as a group. 
The current (1972) colonies were also excluded such as 
French and Dutch Guyana, British Honduras and Hong Kong) 
Portuguese Guinea, Mozambique and Argola. In the latter case 
there have been guerilla wars taking place and these are of 
interest to the theme of this thesis but we are concerned in 
the main with the independent countries of the Tbird World 
and not those under European direct influence. (10) Both 
South Africa and Rhodesia have also not been included for 
similar reasons (along with the land locked Black States of 
Lesotho, Bechuanaland etc. ). 
The communist countries have not been included and this 
is explained in Chapter Two. It might be argued that with so 
many exclusions of interesting experiences the study is bound 
to be deficient. In defence there are two points to be borne 
rý 
in mind: firstly, the countries included are extremely 
interesting in themselves and secondly, there is a limit to 
which interesting and important topics - such as Portugal's 
African wars or Rhodesia's guerilla and security problems - 
can be dealt with in one study without a total surrender to 
generality. To consider these topics and the communist 
experience would require a three volume study rather than one. 
Israel is included because of its relevance to the Arab 
countries, and Turkey as a comparison to the Latin America 
experience. Greece is not because it is more a European than 
a Third World experience. 
The four regions used in the thesis (except where other- 
wise noted) group the Third World in the following way: 
Black Africa: All African states south of the Sahara 
and north of the Zambesi. 
Middle East: All north African states, Arab states 
(including Sudan), Iran and Turkey. 
si : All countries from Pakistan to Taiwan. 
Latin America: All mainland countries south of 
Rio Grande. 
The United Nations and other organisations group the 
countries differently, The above groupings were chosen because 
of a mixture of geographical and political affinities between 
the countries in them. There is no ideal grouping of states 
/ 
and readers must judge whether different, or more, groupings 
would help clarify problems. 
Most of the monetary information is in United States 
dollars. The recent devaluations and currency adjustments 
have made this a less stable indicator then it used to be. 
As most of the detail refers to the use of dollars or Local 
currencies before 1970 this should not present too much of 
a problem. Few of the magnitudes involved in this thesis 
would be affected by 10% changes either way. The billion is 
the American billion, or a thousand million. 
CHAPTER TWO 
VIOLENCE AND IDEAOLOGY 
a) Introduction 
In this chapter we open the discussion on the patterns 
of violence in the developing countries and on the theoretical 
explanations that are competing for attention among students 
of the subject. The first theory that is discussed is the 
theory of permanent revolution«O This is a contribution from 
the Trotskyist school of Marxism, and, in spite of the 
vulgarity of the attempts to apply it consistently to the 
behaviour of political forces in the Third World, it has wide- 
spread support in its various forms among 'left-wing' students 
and political activists. 
(Z)An 
alternative theory is the 
legitimacy thesis, which is the theory most favoured by the 
author as an explanation of the patterns of violence and the 
interventions of the forces represented by the military and 
the insurgents in most parts of the Third World. 
b) The Permanent Revolution 
Long before Mao Tse Tung stated his famous thesis that 
"political power grows out of the barrel of a gun"(3a Prussian 
Emperor had his Guards armed with rifles upon which was 
engraved the warning: "The Final Word of the Emperor". The 
connection between violence and power had been learnt by 
rulers and rebels over many centuries; indeed it was practiced 
on a smaller scale by Al Capone et al in Chicago in the 1920's 
and the Mafia today. The so-called Maoist thesis is in fact 
a well publicised summation of human experience. 
Political change in the Third World is a violent process. 
Many of the countries achieved their independent political 
status after violence was offered against the ruling European. 
power 
e 
In some cases this violence was pushing against an 
open door as the European power concerned was willing to leave 
(e. g. Aden). In other cases the door was (and in some cases 
still is) firmly shut and considerable violence was (and will 
be) needed to break the resolve to sta( The violence in 
Indo-China, for example, against the French took from 1946 
to 195+ to force the French to quit and this was followed by 
the violence of the Algerian war before De Gaulle arraged a 
withdrawa1c In Portuguese Africa there has been a 5er1 es of 
violent conflicts for some years, though to date, the 
insurgency has not reached comparable levels to that 
in French 
Indo-China or Algeriaý') Pareto's concepts of circulating elites 
and the role of violence applied to the French former 
ý ý, 
possessions and the current Portuguese overseas territories, 
would explain the transfer of power in Indo-China and Algeria 
as being brought about by the inability of the French ruling 
elite to use violence effectively against insurgents (the 
rising elite) and, by similar reasoning, it would suggest that 
the Portuguese successes in this matter reflects their 
effective mobilisation of violence against the forces directed 
at their power in these countries. Because, for a number of 
reasons, the Black armies that are engaging the Portuguese and 
low are less skillful (and more 
fractionalised) than those that the French had to face, the 
poorer and less developed Portuguese are able to do what the 
powerful and rich French were unable to accomplish with all 
their advantagej7)Whether the processes of violent change 
are in some way historic (as some believe) or merely episodic 
(as historical information on the decline and fall of elites 
and their empires suggest) is a central difference between 
the theoretical explanations of the violence of the conflicts 
these and other parts of the Third World. 
Since 1960 alone there have been over 200 military coup 
d'etats in the four regions of the Third World. (Z) (see the 
Appendix). There has also been a whole series of insurrections, 
guerilla wars, civil wars and violent disturbances()here have 
been several large-scale military confrontations in the Middle- 
East2 India, Asia and Africa. The level of violence of the 
anti-colonial wars in the post-war years to 1960 has, if any- 
thing, increased after independence was gained by the majority 
of countries. The termination, for example, of the anti- 
French struggle in Indo-China in 195+ and its division into 
four separate independent countries, Laos, Cambodia, north 
Vietnam and south Vietnam, was in no way a prelude to peaceful 
relations within and between each country. The withdrawal of 
the French left some fatal issues unresolved, such as the 
re-unification of the two Vietnams and the political complexions 
of the governments left in command. But these were not issues 
which could be resolved anywhere else but in the countries 
themselves. Hence the violence continued and intensified, 
dragging in the United States and the massive military power 
at its disposal. But it is important to recognise the 1951+ 
withdrawal of the French as a turning point in the violent 
history of the region from anti-colonial struggle to internal 
political struggle. They were not the same wars, fought for 
the same reasons but different wars. The American role in 
Vietnam obscures this fact for many people. (IO) 
The persistence of violence forms the empirical basis of 
such theories as the 'permanent revolution'. This is an 
extention of the Marxist concepts of the class struggle and 
was originally developed by Leon Trotsky. It was put forward 
in the early part of this century as a conceptual model to 
direct the revolutionary activity of the Russian marxists. 
The basic points in the argument were that the position of the 
Russian proletariat in the crisis of the Russian capitalism 
gave it an opportunity to lead the peasantry to overthrow 
capitalist forms of production and establish a workers' state, 
--) I ') 
rather than the contrary view that the Russian proletariat 
was too isolated and too weak to conduct such a strategy. 
Russian capitalism had first to exhaust itself (i. e. develop 
into a modern capitalist economy) before socialism was 
possible. Trotsky's view was that the proletarian state 
could 'leap over' the mature capitalist phase and become a 
bulwark of revolution against the capitalist states of the 
West. (11) 
The peasantry in Russia was driven to revolution against 
the systems of capitalist property relations. The proletariat 
was suppressed by the Tzarist state which because it was a 
minor power in the capitalist world was forced to hold down 
its proletariat with violence because it could not 'bribe' it 
with the fruits of imperialist empire as in Britain. The 
proletariat could win the support of the peasantry by offering 
land to them. The deomocratic revolution against Tzarist 
autocracy could not even be led by the Russian Bourgeoisie - 
it was tied intimately to the landowning classes and the Tzarist 
state; it was also an extremely weak social class incorporating 
none of the vigour and revolutionary thrust of the European 
bourgeoisie that had developed Europe and north America. In 
the class struggle between the workers and peasants and the 
reactionary classes in Russia the bourgeoisie would side with 
raction and their class affinities with the European 
bourgeoisie would express themselves in hostility to even the 
democratic demands of the proletariat and peasantry. Unable 
z' 
to press its own interests against Tzarism, hostile to the 
demands of the other social classes poised against Tzarism 
and vaciliating between domestic reaction and international 
capitalism, the bourgeoisie was written off as a progressive 
social force. Thus a revolutionary socialist leadership was 
able to place itself at the head of the oppressed classes, 
and 'steal' the leadership of the democratic revolution from 
the bourgeoisie, and to pass over to the socialist revolution, 
even in a backward country. 
The developing countries in the middle-off the 20th 
Century, it is argued, are analogous to the situation in Russia 
at the turn of the century. The proletariat of these countries 
is situated at the fulcrum of the class struggles in these 
countries. The bourgeoisie of the former colonial world has 
created some identity for itself because of the racial nature 
of imperialism but it is still totally unequiped to carry out 
the democratic tasks of the revolution and universally hostile 
to the social tasks left behind, such as the agrarian reform, 
socialisation of production and the continuing struggle against 
imperialism. The nationalist bourgeoisie arrived with too 
little, too late to be anything but a transmission belt for 
imperialist and reactionary class interests. The continuing 
violence of the Third World is a manifestation of the 
necessity of the permanent revolution operating against the 
worn out or aborted social formations that imperialism has 
placed in the way of the revolutionary parties. 
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In its original, Trotskyist, formulation the theory 
required that the democratic revolution in the backward 
country be led by the revolutionary proletariat, or more 
correctly, the vanguard party of the revolutionary proletariat 2 
namely the Communist Party. () Even though the proletariat 
was a miniscule portion of the total population (as in Russia) 
because it represents, in the context of marxian theory, the 
only developing social formation that has a future it is 
capable of exerting a revolutionary leverage far in excess of 
its numbers. It was also a theoretical justification for the 
small Bolshevik forces exerting their monopoly of the revolu- 
tionary leadership and for them utilising their forces of 
violence against other competing groups. Lenin, who at first 
disagreed with Trotsky's theory of the development of the 
revolution adopted Trotsky's view immediately before the 
Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917. Combined with the Leninist 
concept of the 'withering away of the state' after the victory 
of socialism, (12) it gave the Bolshevik Party a firm self- 
justification; on the one had it justified its monopoly role 
as the leadership of the leading social class, the proletariat) 
and on the other hand it justified the state terror against 
dissident groups, classes and individuals as a necessary 
prelude to the success of the revolution and the commIng 
'withering away', of the instruments of repression. 
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The problem for the theory of the permanent revolution 
is the experiences of the revolutions since it was'formulated. 
None of them were led by a proletarian party. In China, the 
Maoist Communist party turned away from the urban proletariat 
in 1929 (after a series of disasters) towards establishing 
bases in the remote countryside. The revolution, when it 
came-in 1949, was in the form of a succession of military 
victories against the Koumintang armies with a minimal role 
played by Chinese workers in the cities. The Chinese Communist 
Party may be represented as the Chinese proletariat only by an 
extreme vagueness of language; indeed the Maoist leadership 
had purged the party of 'Trotskyists', and anybody with 
'Trotskyist' (i. e. permanent revolution) thoughts, in the mid- 
thirties. In eastern Europe the 'revolutions' were carried 
out by the imported functionaries of the imported Communist 
Parties, and were aided by the fortuitous presence of the 
Soviet Army. Yugoslavia is an exception to this experience. 
There the Communist Party was an indigeneous force that gained 
its experience in the guerilla war against the Germany army of 
occupation. But again Tito's forces were not a revolutionary 
proletariat as envisaged in the theory. In Cuba the communist 
party was left behind by events when the Castroite (CIA backed) 
revolution occured. It was only after the revolution and the 
fall out with the United States that the leadership moved over 
to a socialist, and later communist, political position. The 
whole of the Third World has been swept by an anti-colonial 
struggle and in only two countries, China and Cuba, has the 
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revolution passed into a Marxist camp, and neither of these 
countries was led by parties supporting the thesis of 
permanent revolution. (13) 
Moreover the Leninist thesis of the eventual withering 
away of the state has no empirical support whatsoever. Indeed, 
quite the opposite has taken place. The victory of Marxian 
parties does not remove succession struggles from the Party. 
In the Soviet Union the first twelve years of the revolution 
were taken up by a bitter contest for power between Stalin and 
Trotsky and a further ten years in a struggle between Stalin 
and the Old Guard Bolsheviks. (t In China there has been a 
continuous struggle between Mao Tse Tung and various opponents, 
reaching its zenith in the Cultural Revolution. The struggle 
between factions in the European Communist states has reached 
such levels of fundamental discord that the Soviets army has 
had to be used to settle the issue. Thus, years after the 
victory of the revolution'the resources allocated to state 
security show no sign of withering away and a vast apparatus 
is consolidated to preserve and protect the party leadership 
both from internal dissension and popular revolt. 
The communist states form a separate group of states in 
the developing world. They are not Party States in the 
conventional sense that a political party (or parties) forms 
the foundation for political rule according to a set of 
procedures inherited or developed for continuity and succession. 
Party States have armies and police forces but the role of 
i 
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these state instruments is independent of the party systems. 
In Communist states the party is armed; they are Armed-Party 
States rather than Party States-with armies. In them the 
army and the instruments of state security are integrated 
into the Party and have no independent existence. They are 
not designed to be 'above' politics. The role of leading 
cadres in these forces is partly security and partly political; 
many of the key positions are held by party cadres chosen 
primarily on political grounds - the gifted professional is 
as suspect as a person from an unreliable social class. 
There are differences in some of the Armed Party states 
between the relationship of the security forces and the Party, 
representing the different experiences of the communist states 
in the struggle for power. The European states came into 
existence without indgenous movements and their armies were 
created after the revolution. These states are modeled on the 
stalinist state but the armed forces are probably less reliable 
than either the-Soviet Army or the revolutionary armies of 
other communist states. The armies operate in parallel to 
the party apparatus and both the army and the party are sub- 
ordinate to the political aims and perceptions of the Soviet 
leaders. They have not been engaged in action outside their 
own borders, with the purely nominal exception of their minor 
role in the 1968 invasion of Czeckoslovakia, and have functions 
not much more complex than that of reserve frontier guards. 
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The revolutionary movements of China and Vietnam are 
altogether different. There the army and party are a mono- 
lithic whole 
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While the post-Mao succession struggle will 
probably see a more independent political line from the 
Chinese Red Army this will be from the point of view of the 
Red Army as a militant force within the Chinese Communist 
Party rather than as an extra-Party force(14)The armies of 
China and Vietnam have been engaged in warfare with outside 
forces as well as with forces within their countries; The 
Chinese armies have fought the Japanese (1936-45)2 the United 
Nations (1951-5+) and India (1962); the Vietnamese have 
fought the Japanese (1942-45), the French (1945-5+) and the 
Americans and their allies (1961-72). The Koreans have also 
fought the United Nations in the Korean War. 
This thesis does not include the communist states (which 
are worth a study in themselves) and they are discussed here 
only to draw attention to the experiences of these countries. 
Many of the features of these experiences have been reproduced 
in Third World countries and suggest a continuity rather than 
a separation. It might suit a particular ideology to see a 
linear process by which development proceeds from regimes less 
social progressive to regimes more socially progressive but 
this is a conceptual gloss over what is an essentially identi- 
cal content. throughout the whole experience of these countries. 
Support for repressive measures in regimes that conform to a 
particular approved ideology and opposition to the same 
measures in regimes that are not approved of is surely of 
dubious merit. It does not contribute to an analysis of the 
political struggles of developing countries, nor to the 
varying social and economic impacts of these political 
struggles, to use selective criteria to asses political 
systems. The continuing violence in the Third World may be 
an expression of a 'permanent revolution', if that it the 
thesis that one wants to establish; it might just as credably 
be argued that the continuing violence is a product of the 
cultural inability of the people of these countries to mediate 
their differences peacefully; such a thesis would conform to a 
racialist world view. But the evidence that this study will 
examine is much more consistent with the legitimacy thesis 
than with that of permanent evolution. 
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c) The Legitimacy Thesis 
The number of independent states has increased since the 
end of the second war. These state 
of all states, namely, to establish 
M. Lipset defined legitimacy as the 
system to engender and maintain the 
political institutions are the most 
for society". (tj) Different states 
s face the central problem 
their legitimacy. Seymour 
"capacity of a political 
belief that existing 
appropriate or proper ones 
and political systems 
ensure their legitimacy, and by this the quiescence of their 
subjects, by different means. In a parliamentary legitimacy 
is inferred from the Government's majority resting on the 
electoral mandate won in a freely contested election. In a 
socialist country the legitimacy of the ruling Party is tied 
to the theory of a vanguard party representing the historic 
interests of the proletariat and the revered moC1 values of 
socialism. In some forms of totalitarian states the alleged 
genius of the Leader is the legitimising force. The extent 
to which a regime is secure in its legitimacy could be measured 
by the relative size of its internal security budgets; the 
stronger the sense of legitimacy that a Government has in 
the minds of its citizens the less it will need to enforce its 
rule by intensive sanctions against dissidents and would-be 
dissidents. It is not entirely an accurate measure (nor are 
these budgets readily available for measurement) because a well 
organised and alienated minority in a society, and particularly 
the urban industrialised societies, can disrupt the process of 
government to such an extent that extraordinary measures of 
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security are required to enforce the will of the majority. (It 
For these reasons the effectiveness of a regime may be as 
important as its legitimacy. Various vectors of the two forces 
are possible; a regime can be effective but illegitimate or 
ineffective and legitimate, and, of course, there can be com- 
binations of the two qualities. (101) Administrative incompetence 
can erode a regime's legitimacy which may have been earned by 
activity in a previous time period. For example, the enormous 
prestige of some of the anti-colonial leaders (Nasser, Sukarno) 
N. Krumma) was compromised to some extent by the general 
inefficiency of their administrations. In the latter cases 
this contributed to the coups against them, though the 
resilience of the Sukarno myth survived even when grave doubts 
existed as to his role in the September 30th coup against the 
army. (20) Illegitimate regimes that are ineffective have a 
smaller chance of survival than legitimate regimes that are 
effective. The legitimacy of the regime can be diluted as 
the people develop new ideas as to political rights and 
obligations and, if this coincides with gradual or dramatic 
evidence of a regime's ineffectiveness, it is likely to create 
the conditions for revolutionary disorder. The classic example 
of this situation is Farouk's Egypt, where the military 
reverses of the Egyptians in the 1948 Israeli war, contributed 
to the questioning of the legitimacy of the regime. The Free 
Officers had no faith that their aspirations for Egypt could 
be realised by the monarchy. It is noticeable that even after 
the Coup in 1952 the Free Officers did not erradicate the 
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monarchy at a stroke but ruled as 'regents' for the Heir for 
twelve months, until the Republic was declared in June 1953. 
(Symbolically the coup leaders authorised a 21-gun salute for 
Farouk when he sailed into exile). (2-1) 
New governments face an additional problem in asserting 
their legitimacy - they do not have the burden of precedent 
working in their favour. They are untried and inexperienced. 
They may have aroused the expectations of the masses to a level 
which they cannot satisfy. The Governments of the Third World 
(excluding Latin America) are, in the main, in charge of 
political structures that are little older than a decade or 
two. Many of them, coming to power in military coups, have 
cut the effective history of the political structure in their 
country to a handful of years. Each military coup re-starts 
the' constitutional clock so to speak, and makes more difficult 
the task of achieving legitimacy. In the older republics of 
Latin America, which have been prone to military intervention 
for many-decades2 the legitimacy crisis is almost institution- 
alised - each military coup occurs when the illigitimacy of 
the incumbent regime ceases to be protected by the effective- 
ness of its security forces. (22. ) 
d) The Legitimacy Crisis and Military Intervention 
The search for legitimacy in developing countries by the 
governments can be measured roughly by the proneness of 
countries to military intervention. (1$) A country that has 
not had a coup, or attempted coup, would be at one end of a 
scale of stability and a country that has had several (Syria 
has had 21 coups and attempted coups since 1945) would be at 
the other. Military intervention is a sign of elite incohesion. 
The ruling elite, which rests its powers on the support of the 
governing political party; the instruments of the executive 
such as the police, and (in the last resort) the armed forces; 
the state bureaucracy, the articulated interest groups in the 
community, and its popular base in the population at large, is 
vulnerable to military intervention when it is believed to have 
failed one, several, or all, of these forces. A disaffection 
felt by the popular masses may provoke rioting and disorder 
and give encouragement to opposition political factions both 
within and outside the elite. One or more interest groups 
could be aggrieved at a particular policy (such as farmers or 
the middle-class urban groups and educated unemployed). 
The bureaucracy may become inefficient or corrupt and 
have an interest in the Government pursuing policies that 
leave them alone with their "clients". If the army and police 
are disgruntled either through the policies pursued by the 
Government (which might be trying to circumvent some of the 
political tensions by trying to create other bases of support 
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such as a one-party state ors at their peril, as will be seen, 
a quasi-militia force) or from a lack of faith in the 
Government's ability to counter the growing disorders, they 
are the one force in the community uniquely placed to carry out 
an illegal operation against the Government. 
The army has a near monopoly of violence in the state and 
is trained in how to use violence. This violence may not be a 
match for a well trained and armed force from an industrialised 
country but it is more than enough for dealing with unarmed 
cabinet ministers and disorderly mobs in the streets. The 
number of men required to carry-out a coup is surprisingly 
small - it certainly does not need the unanimity of the armed 
forces; a company or a battalion may be sufficient. (2. Y ) 
The armed forces are well placed then to take advantage of 
the dificulties of their Governments and, because it does not 
require complete agreement within the army to take this action, 
coups can take place when only a section of the forces utilises 
the army's advantages. (11) 
Party political systems have by general agreement a greater 
claim to legitimacy than military governments, and in the context 
of democratic and modern value judgements they also have a 
greater claim than monarchies. The value ordering implied 
above would probably ascribe greater legitimacy to a monarchy 
than a military government (excluding the viewsof republicans). 
Legitimacy rests on the capacity of the political system to 
persuade the citizens that it is the most appropriate system 
for the country (Lipset) and hereditary monarchy in this 
respect is likely to be more credible than that of self- 
appointed army leaders. 
As mentioned earlier over 200 military coups took place 
in the Third World between 1960 and 1972. This suggests the 
fragility of the legitimacy of Third World governments. Since 
1945 the number of coups amounted to over 280; there were at 
least -i-2 coups in Asia, 86 in Latin America, 62 in the Middle- 
East and 76 in sub-Saharan Africa. (UP) The full list is in 
the appendix. What we want to do is to see if the proneness 
to military coup is related to the political system of the 
country. The more prone a system is to coups and attempted 
coups the more fragile its legitimacy. 
(Z? ) 
First of all the Latin American record of coups was 
removed from the totals because as military governments pre- 
dominate in the political systems of this region it was felt 
that they would bias the results. This left the three other 
regions, the Middle-East, Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. The 
countries were arranged into the political systems operating 
at the time of the coups and attempted coups (i. e. into Party 
States, Monarchies and Military Governments). Thus, Egypt 
which was a monarchy at the time of the Free Officers Coup 
in 1952 is counted for that coup in the monarchy class but 
for subsequent coups and attempted coups it appears in the 
military government class. Togo which was a party state at 
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the time of the first coup is classed in the party states 
for that coup, but for subsequent coups it is classed as a 
military states Guinea which has remained a party state is 
classed for all its coup attempts as a party state, and so 
on(2 umming the coup and coup attempts according to the 
above system produces the results in Table One. 
Table One 
Distribution of Coups and Attempted Coups in Asia, Africa 
and Middle-East-by Political System 1945-Z2 
(1) (2) 
Political System.. No. of Countries Couts (2) _ (1) 
Party State 36 63 1.75 
Monarchies 12 2+ 2.0 
Military States 27 109 4.04 
The party states have an average of 1.75 coups per 
country and the monarchies slightly higher at two coups per 
country. The miliary states have an average of four coups 
and attempted coups per country and are more than twice as 
prone to further coups as the party states and monarchies. 
The legitimacy crisis is not resolved by military intervention; 
it only exacerbates it. Once one section of the military shows 
the way, or there is a successful example in another country, 
coup making can become contagious. Even if the 21 coups that 
took place in Syria are removed from the military states total 
the proneness to military intervention of military states is 
just under double that for party states. 
All military governments come to power by illegal and 
unconstitutional means, namely the coup dtetat 
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there a 
relationship between per capita income and proneness to coups 
and attempted coups? Given that coups and attempted coups 
can take place in both non-military and military governed 
countries and that statistically they occur more often in the 
latter this suggests that if there is a relationship between 
low per capita income and military coups, then military govern- 
ments are more likely in countries with lower per capita income 
than in countries with higher per capita income. 
Hopkins 4966) showed that there was a relationship between 
the level of economic development (measured by per capital income) 
and the proneness to coups and attempted coups. (This supports 
work by Lipset on the economic foundations of democracy). 
Hopkin's results, reproduced (in part) below cover the years 
1957-61ý 
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Table Two 
Distribution of Coups and Attempted Coups by 
Stages of Economic Development, 1957-64 
U. S. 0 
Stage of Development G. N. P. per 
No. of 
Countries COU]2s 
Per Cent 
with Coups Capita, 1957 
I 45 - 64 12 9 75 
II 70 - 105 18 10 55 
III 108 - 239 31 13 42 
IV 262 - 794 36 5 13 
V 836 - 2577 14 1 6 
Source: K. Hopkins, Civil Military Relations in the 
Developing Countries, British Journal of Sociology, 
XVII; 2; June 1966, p. 175. 
The countries in the table have been grouped according 
to per capita product for 1957. Then using Finer's criteria 
of civil military relations and van der Meheden's tabulation of 
military coups the number of countries experiencing coups in 
1957-64 are taken as a percentage of the number of countries 
in the group. (3ý) The final column shows a declining incidence 
in the percentage of coups in each income group as per capita 
product increases. Countries at the lowest stage of develop- 
ment, under X64+ per capita product, had military interventions 
in 75 per cent of the cases and countries at the higher stage 
of development, (over 0836 per capita product) had military 
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interventions in only six per cent of the cases. Of the 38 
military coups in Hopkin's table, 32 occured in countries 
with under , 239 per capita product. His calculations involved 
111 countries which must have included countries in southern 
Africa, the Caribbean and Oceania. In this thesis most of 
these minor countries have been excluded for reasons given in 
the Introduction. 
Hopkin's findings have been re-calculated for the period 
1960-72 for 77 countries, according to their 1967 per capita 
income. These results are set out in Table Three . Because 
the original Hopkin's intervals at the low income end are no 
longer realistic (only three countries had per capita incomes 
below 064 for example in 1967) the first two classes have been 
combined. The tendency noted by Hopkins is confirmed. The low 
income countries have shown a marked proneness to military 
intervention. Whereas 75 per cent of the lowest income 
countries experienced military intervention in the years 1957- 
64 this has risen to 90 per cent for 1960-72. There has also 
been an increase in the second stage (under $105) of from 
55 per cent intervention to 87 per cent intervention. In the 
two higher income groups the intervention rate runs at over 
50 per cent in each case whereas in Hopkin's table it was 
under 14 per cent. Military intervention has increased since 
1960; of the 286 military interventions2 over 200 occured 
since 1960. Excluding the smaller island countries and those 
landlocked in southern Africa, which all have special charac- 
teristics (though it did not prevent in Lesotho an 
unconstitutional seizure of power in 1970), military inter- 
vention is increasingly likely in a developing country, but 
more likely still, in the lower income developing countries. 
Of the 59 countries that had military coups 43 of them were 
countries with under 0239 per capita income. However the 
proneness to military intervention is highest among the per 
capita income group 0105 to 0239 if the actual number of 
coup attempts is divided by the countries in each group. For 
this group the figure is roughly four coup attempts per 
country while for the lower income group it is roughly three 
coup attempts per country (it is nearly 32 and 2 coup attempts 
for the two groups above 0239 per capita income respectively). 
Table Three 
Distribution of Military Intervention by Stages of 
Economic Development, 1960-Z2 
G. N. P. Per No. of Per Cent 
Capita Countries Interventions Interventions 
Under 0105 21 19 90 
0106-239 29 25 87 
15252-239 23 14 77 
Over 0812 42 50 
Source: Calculated from per capita income data in ACDA, 
World Military Expenditure 1968-69. Washington, 
1969; Record of Military Interventions from 
Appendix A. 
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A different method of testing for a relationship between 
military intervention and non-military intervention is to 
simply take the arithmetic mean income of countries that have 
experienced military intervention and compare it with 
countries that have not. Because of the varying incomes 
between the regional grouping (e. g. Latin America has higher 
per capita incomes on average) which might draw the levels 
upwards each calculation is kept within each regional group- 
ing. In each case the tendency for interventions at lower 
average per capita product is pronounced. 
Table Four 
Military Intervention and Average Per Capita Product 
(U. S. ,9 per capita, 1967; 72 countries, 1960-1972) 
Africa Asia Middle-East 
Oil 
No Intervention 147 200 1387 
Latin America 
$ 
470 
Intervention 135 120 308 370 
Military intervention increased considerably in the mid- 
sixties in Africa (there was in fact a whole spate of military 
intervention in 1966 the year that Hopkints article was 
published) but hardly any change occured in the minor countries 
that have been included in Hopkin's calculations. The Latin 
American countries have relatively higher per capita incomes 
than other Third World regions and their proneness to military 
interventions pulls up the tendency to coup in the middle- 
income range. Four countries, Bolivia, Paraguary, Honduras 
and Ecuador, contributed almost half of the military inter- 
ventions in this continent in the 19601s. They were also 
the four countries on the continent with the lowest per capita 
income. 
The tendency then is for lower income countries to 
experience military intervention. The probability of a 
successful intervention leading to a military government depends 
on a number of factors. If the intervention is successful the 
military government is likely to allocate more to defence 
spending. Thus any statistical relationship that might emerge 
between higher military spending and low-per capita product 
would be a consequence of the low per capita product leading 
to military intervention and then to higher defence spending2 
rather than the other route of higher defence spending leading 
to low per capita product. 
CHAPTER THREE 
VIOLENCE AND GOVERNMENTS 
a) Introduction 
The development process in the Third World is uneven. 
Each country does not reach the same stage at the same time 
or nor do the various sectors of the economic and social 
structure develop in phase. Growth, development and modernis- 
ation proceeds in an unbalanced way and for different countries 
starting off from different previous levels and responding to 
different natural endownments and local pressures. The process 
produces strains and stresses that are articulated in different 
forms according to the socio-political forces and counter- 
forces operating in each country. The rate of change is faster 
than in the colonial period, for both colony and metropolitan 
centres, and is taking place on all fronts, economic, soci alp 
cultural, political and military. ( 1) 
The aspirations levels of the various social groups, 
peasantry, proletariat, middle-class, ruling elite and the 
dispossessed have risen faster than their competing claims can 
be satisfied. The minimum tolerable levels of per capita 
consumption (2. ) press on the actually achieved levels and 
the result is a continual frustration, a feeling of alienation 
from yesterday's liberators and widespread cynicism at the 
open corruption of the political elite. There is a continual 
struggle between competing ideologies to guide the country 
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out of its predicament. The millenium did not arrive with 
the achievement of independence from European rule - in some 
cases the post-independence years saw a drop in real income 
in the country. (, 3) The traditional competes with the modern 
with the result that the modern is often an uncomfortable blend 
between the old and the new. In the Islamic countries this 
can be seen clearly in the schizophrenic nationalism of the 
new elite, searching for both an Islamic ideal of total 
community and the modern relaity of the nation state. (q ) 
Kemal Attaturk successfully joined the forces of the past with 
the forces of the future but Egypt, Pakistan, Indonesia, 
Algeria, Libya, for example, have had some difficulties in 
achieving a similar marriage and in some cases have had to 
deal firmly with the extremist religious sects of the Moslem 
Brotherhood who fanatically resist religious compromise0 .( 
The colonial heritage left behind many unresolved national 
problems, of which the Palestinian is perhaps the most 
intractable, and these have called for the attention of the 
new elites and some of the problems have escalated into military 
confrontationsf6)The border delineations of the European powers, 
in Africa and Asia, have left sources of tension which xenophobic 
nationalism cannot contain. In India the communal tensions 
between Hindu and Moslem, which have been prominent in three 
wars, have been fed by the border troubles in Kashmir and joined 
by the border tensions between India and China. (7 ) The issues 
at stake - often barren and useless tracts of uninhabited 
land - 
have been outweighed by the emotionalism of the competing 
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leaderships. Even Islamic powers such as Algeria and Morocco 
rluý fought in 1963 over territorial claims and counter-claims. (ö ) 
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b) Violence in the Party States 
Perhaps the most serious problem in the developing 
countries for the political structures is that of the succes- 
sion. In Western societies based on parliamentary deomocracy 
defeated governments leave their desks gracefully and quietly 
and transform into an Opposition. Troops and police are not 
called upon to install the new government. Defeated govern- 
ments in countries that are newly independent sometimes refuse 
to leave office. In Sierra Leone in 1967 the defeated govern- 
ment supported a military coup that removed the new cabinet 
before it had occupied the Government buildings. (9) A 
similar incident occured in Lesotho. In other countries where 
the succession is in doubt, i. e. where the return to office of 
the incumbents may be in doubt or under the charasmatic leader 
is anxious about the succession, the ruling party has attempted 
to create a one-party state (Kenya, Tanzania) Ghana, Cameroons, 
Zambia, Malawai). (10) 
Party states are states where one or more political parties 
forms the foundation of government. The succession in a one- 
party state can be arranged by a change in the top leadership 
but sometimes there is a irregular succession in the form of 
a military coup. It will be useful to separate out the party 
states from the military states in order to illustrate the 
extent of political and military violence in the Third World. 
This violence is not confined to the states run by military 
governments. 
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In Table One some of the wars and major counter- 
insurgency operations of the countries that have party state 
systems are listed. Israel, although a multi-party state, 
has been ruled without interruption by the Mapam (Labour) 
coalition. It has been described as a "garrison state". (ý1) 
The necessities of defence against Arab neighbours and their 
allies who declare their aims to liquidate the Israeli State 
and replace it with an Arab Palestine, has meant a major role 
for the Israeli army. 
k' )It has fought three major wars, in 
19+8,56,67, and has been on an alert status for many years. 
The terrorism of various Arab organisations has produced a 
large internal security presence combined in a surprisingly 
effective way with the maintenance of democratic government 
and opposition. Israel is a prime example of the exception 
to the view that military preparedness and tense internal 
security necessities are compatible only with authoritarian 
forms of Government. 
Vietnam, since 1968 has been a party state, previously 
being an open military dictatorship, but the security situa- 
tion has not been accompanied by a democratic system of 
government. The Vietnamese Government is not democratic in 
an Israeli sense and it has a much lower level of legitimacy, 
both at home and abroad. War in Vietnam has been going on 
since the Japanese occupation though as has been argued 
previously it is not the same war. The war against the French, 
which ended in 1954-with the fall of Dien Bien Phu, ended the 
anti-colonial war, and the subsequent war, between the 
Table One 
Party States; Wars and Insurgency Operations 1948-72 
Country Insurgency 
Malaysia 1948-5+ 
Communist guerillas 
Singapore Communist guerillas 
India Naxalite and extremist 
violence 
Sri Lanka Left-wing rural 
uprising 1971 
Lebanon Civil war 1962 
Cameroon Insurgency 1961 
Israel Arab terrorism since 
1967 
Phillippines Insurgency, 'HUK' 
rebellions, 1950ts; 
Maoist rising 1972 
Vietnam 19+5-54; 1956-72 
Keiya Somali separatist 
insurgency, 1963-67 
Tanzania 
Guinea (attempted "invasion" 
1971) 
Chad Regional dissidents and 
insurgency 1965-6 and 
1968 
War 
"Confrontation" 
Indonesia 1962-65 
Indonesia 1962-65 
Sino-India 1962; 
Indo-Pak 1948) 65) 71 
Arab-Israel war 1967; 
Border wars 1967-72 
Arab-Israel wars 19482 
562 67; border incidents 
Troops sent to Vietnam 
Invasion of Cambodia 
1970; North Vietnam 
1970-72 
Ug ada border war 1972 
ýý 
Country Insurgency 
Guyana Separatist action 
south-west border area 
1970 
Tunisia 
Malawi Insurgency and 
"invasion" 1967 
Uruguay Urban guerillas 1970- 
72 
Colombia Guerillas 19601s 
Zambia Religious insurgency 
1964; base for insur- 
gency operations against 
Rhodesia and Mozambique. 
War 
Border area used by FLN 
in Algerian War 1958-62 
ý, ýýý 
Communists and the South, has been a civil war. The 
Vietnamese war is also complicated by the associated wars 
in Cambodia, Laos and, to an extent2in Thailand. Proponents 
of the "domino theory" (Vietnam is the first "domino" in a 
line of them which when it is toppled will automatically 
topple the others) have fitted the facts to their schema. 
The South Vietnamese army invaded Cambodia in 1970 in 
pursuit of the war aims of the South Vietnamese against the 
indigenous Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese a11ieýýý This 
aggressive behaviour is not confined to Vietnamese armies; 
both the party states of India and Israel, which are democratic 
in ways which South Vietnam has no pretentions to being, have 
invaded adjacent territory, and held on to it. The Israeli 
occupation of Sinai, the Golan heights and the westbank of 
the Jordan has much more fundamental territorial aims (14) 
than that of the South Vietnamese in Cambodia, or for that 
matter, the North Vietnamese in Laos and Cambodia. India's 
dispute with Pakistan in Kashmir led to her occupying whatever 
parts of Kashmir she was able to hold onto in the 1948 and 1965 
wars. (1S) In contrast the Indian occupation of East Pakistan, 
now Bangladesh, in 1971 was terminated by mutual agreement 
with the Bangladesh authorities within a few months. (16) 
The other major 'war' was the so-called "confrontation 
between Sukarno's Indonesia and the newly formed state of 
Malaysia during 1963-65. Sukarno was attempting to emulate 
his successful "confrontation" with the Dutch in West Irian 
in 1963, which gave Indonesia the whole of Dutch New Guinea for 
a small outlay in bluster and moderate troop deployment. (i7) 
Sukarno's campaign against Malaysia was not successful, it 
burdened the economy with a massive arms budget (little of 
which went to the army with consequent disaffection), drove 
Sukarno nearer to the Communists, and isolated Indonesia from 
other Asian countries. For Malaysia it had the opposite 
effect in integrating the disparate communities that made up 
the Malaysian Federation. 
The party states have been subjected to insurgency from 
various sources. In Malaysia it was communist-led but the 
military intervention of the British reduced it to meagre 
levels by 1954. (I%) Further activity is being reported around 
the northern border region and combined operations are being 
undertaken by the Thailand and Malaysian governments to prevent 
the insurgents using one or other country as a refuge. A 
similar arrangement between the Indonesian and Malaysian armies 
is operating in Sarawak against dissident communists operating 
in the remote jungle areas on the border between the two 
countries. (19) In the Philippines the postwar 'Huk' rebellions 
were likewise contained but they have recently been succeeded 
by new style communist groups. The reported extent of the 
rebellions in 1972, about 10,000 armed troops and ten times 
as many supporters according to official sources, were used 
by the Marcos Government to enforce a state of martial law, (ZO) 
and establish a dictatorship with all the hallmark*s, in 
retrospect, of a military coup. (21) 
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In India, communal violence has been a feature of the 
country's political life since it was founded in 1949. In 
the latter half of the 1960's extremist violence of an 
ideological type began to appear, the 'Naxalites' for example, 
and necessitated the use of troops and counter-insurgency 
policy actionsLW Sri Lanka underwent a rural uprising led by 
youthful left-wing cadres in 1971. It required the use of 
troops and the import of modern counter-insurgency equipment 
to put it down. 
(3) 
The party states, whether democratic or authoritarian) 
have been faced with insurgency violence, sometimes on an 
extensive scale but not always assisted from outside. The 
legitimacy crisis is not confined to regimes that have 
illegitimate roots. Those countries that have established 
forms of rule that carry the characteristics of legitimate 
government, that have widespread support for and belief in 
their legitimate functions, and have integrated relatively 
successfully the administrative and political elite, are not 
immune to challenge to this status both within and without 
the country. Of the 29 Party states considered here only 
two, Gambia and Mauritania, had not experienced military 
operations outside the country or counter-insurgency operations 
inside between the end of the second war and 1972`Z'(The 
complete list is shown in Table Two). This means that 93 
per cent of the party states had been affected by insurgencies 
or wars. 
Table Two 
Party States in the Third World, 1972 
Malaysia + Zambia + 
Singapore + Sierra Leone * 
India + Gabon * 
Ceylon + Gambia 
Lebanon +* Philippines(') + 
Mauritania Vietnam +* 
Cameroon + Tunisia +* 
Ivory Coast * Chad +* 
Niger * Mexico + 
Senegal * Guyana + 
Kenya * Chile 
Liberia * Costa Rica * 
Malawi + Israel + 
Tanzania +* Uruguay + 
Guinea +* Pakistan 
(2) 
+* 
Notes: (+) indicates military activity in counter-insurgency 
or intra-country hostilities 
(*) indicates at least one coup or attempted coup, 
post-war 
(1) The Marcos "Coup" in late 1972 may have permanently 
transformed Philippines from a party state into a 
dictatorship. 
(2) Pakistan was under military rule from 1958 to the 
end of the Bangladesh War. It can be included in 
this table and the one for military states. How 
long President Bhuto's civilian regime will survive 
is a matter not yet determined and its inclusion as 
a party state is provisioned. 
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c) Violence in Monarchical States 
There is another group of states that are neither party 
states nor governed by military regimes. These are the 
monarchies and include Morocco, Iran, Jordan, Saudia Arabia, 
Gulk Oil States, Afghanistan and Ethiopia. The political 
composition of these states is mixed; Jordan, for example, is 
practically indistinguishable from a military governed country, 
the King is totally identified with his army and personally 
supervises it. (ZS) In comparison to Egypt under Nasser, who 
left the army as a serving officer when he assumed supreme 
power, (IL) King Hussein's involvement with his army is much 
more intimate. Yet Egypt would be described as a military 
state, at least under Nasser. 
Morocco is somewhat different from the Jordan model. Its 
monarch has been introducing some form of party government into 
the country but the King's relations with the army are question- 
able in view of the two attempted coups against his rule from 
within his immediate entourage (L7) in a period of one year. 
With this in mind, and because it might have confused the issue 
to have 
_included 
them in category of Party State, a separate. 
table has been compiled (Table Three) showing the military 
engagements of these countries. 
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Table Three 
Military Involvements of Monarchical States 
Country InsurRency War 
Jordan 
Morocco 
Gulf Oil States 
Ethiopia 
Suadia Arabia 
Iran(' 
Palestine guerillas 
1967-72 
Arab-Israel 1948 
and 1967 
Algeria, 1963 over 
disputed territory 
Numerous rebellions 
since 1960ts 
Eritrean separatist 
1960-72 
Somalia over disputed 
territory 1964 
Support and refuge for 
Yemini royalists 
Baluchistion Tribes- Seizure of disputed 
men across Paleistian islands in the Gulf 
border. 
("In 1973, Iran and Pakistan co-operated in actions directed 
against dissident Balunchi tribesmen living on both sides 
of the border. 
The most serious involvement in the table is the Jordan 
and Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967. In the 1956 Arab-Israel 
war Jordan was not directly involved though it felt threatened 
enough to ask for Iraqi military assistance. The Palestinian 
guerilla organisations that were operating in Jordanian 
territory were a particular difficulty. The west bank of the 
Jordan river, is Jordanian territory, is regarded by the 
') Q 
displaced Arabs as part of 
competing with each other 
Israel struggle, were less 
and, frustrated with their 
occupation, they turned on 
"soft" on Israel. 
(Z$) 
Palestine. The guerilla groups, 
for the leadership of the anti- 
than responsible in their actions, 
efforts against the Israeli 
those Arabs whom they regard as 
The Hussein monarchy, which has been a moderating force 
in the Arab-Israel conflict and has never felt at one with 
the extremist republican allies of Syria, Iraq and Egypt (and 
even less so with the militant Libyan and Algerian republics), 
has sought a middle-road for settlement. The guerilla groups 
have also been idologically orientated towards the ideological 
left and this has worked to divide them from the Jordanian 
Government. The outbreaks of open warfare between the Jordanian 
army and the guerilla groups since 1967 have been full-scale 
military confrontations but the Jordanian armour on all 
occasions has proved superior to the guerilla irregulars. The 
guerillas tried to force the issue between them and the 
Government by occupying the capital Amman but after several 
days fighting they were defeated. The guerilla camps were 
vulnerable to direct attack by the Jordanians and this forced 
them to stand and fight against a heavier fire power and gave 
the Jordanian a clear advantage. 
(Z°Iý 
Ethiopia has also faced a substantial internal rebellion. (30 
The Eritrean Separatists have been fighting since 1960, though 
with varying levels of intensity. They have received support 
ý1 
from the Arab countries, particularly Libya, and also from 
Soviet sources. The United States has a communications 
centre in Eritrea but this has not been a target for the 
separatists nor apparently an issue in the conflict. The 
border between Somalia and Ethiopia has also been a source 
of conflict. Somalia claims about a third of Ethiopia's 
territory, and also half of the French enclave of Afar and 
Issa on the Red Sea, and on the grounds of the presence of 
substantial numbers of Somali tribesmen in these areas, 
()The 
pressure on Ethiopia broke out into a two-day border war in 
1961+ but the contest was indecisive (there were reports that 
both sides ran out of fuel). What it did do, however, was to 
spark-off a military build-up in both countries with the 
Americans supplying Ethiopia and the Russians supply Somalia. 
The problem for Ethiopia is that if it conceded the Eritrean 
territory, and the area claimed by Somalia, and the areas 
claimed by the Sudan, it would shrink to about a third of its 
present size. This problem has a long history; it was the 
"Walwal" incident in Ethiopia near Somalia's border that led 
to Mussolinni's invasion of Ethiopia in 193443ý 
Border problems affected Morocco, Ethiopia, Iran, Jordan, 
the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia in the period 1960-72. It is 
the common problem of the monarchies. Morocco after independ- 
ence claimed large tracts of Algeria, the whole of Mauritania 
and part of Mali (Morocco if successful would treble in size 
and double its population). (3! ) In five of the six cases 
these border disputes have led to military conflict and none 
r 
of the actual disputes have been settled permanently. The 
Moroccan's have shelved their claims for the time being, 
and so have the Somali's. Iran has just began her campaign 
for the Gulf islands which is seen by her neighbours as the 
opening moves to absorb the Gulf States themselves. The 
Arab Israeli conflict is nowhere near a solution. The Yemeni 
disturbances, which resulted in 1972 in a unification of the 
two Yemeni states (Yemen Republic and South Yemen), have 
spilled over into border troubles with Saudi Arabia and are 
likely in the future to continue to be source of difficulty 
for the Royalist Saudi Arabia. The Republican Yemen also 
has now to contain a Marxian influence following the 1972 
unification (3f) with South Yemen. 
d) Violence in the Military States 
Thirty-five military governed countries out of forty-two 
listed in Table Four have been engaged in military activity 
either against internal insurgency or against external armies. 
(see Table Five). The decision to classify a country as a 
military governed country is in some cases quite arbitrary. 
In the Table we have included Pakistan as it was under military 
rule between 1958 and 1971 and during the time it fought two 
wars against India. Since 1971 ý following the defeat of the 
Pakistan army in the Eastern wing of the country, subsequently 
re-named Bangladesh, the country has had a civilian government 
headed by Mr. Bhuto. In other cases, such as Egypt and Korea, 
the regime was ruled by a 'retired' leading figure from the 
military whose power base remained the military. Colonel 
Nasser's strength lay in his balancing role between the elite 
groups in post-Farouk Egypt but his main-stay was always the 
loyalty of the military forces. General Park of Korea, retired 
from the army command after he sought legitimisation of his 
military coup in Presidential elections' , 
In many Latin American countries the same type of formula 
is followed whereby the (not always) leading member of the 
military junta is endorsed as a 'presidential' candidate by 
the other members to seek democratic endorsement of the take- 
over in an army organised election. But as the military in 
these countries remains in a leading position within the 
governing elite, often providing Cabinet Ministers for key 
L 
Table Four 
Countries with military Governments} 1970 
Burma 
Thailand 
Cambodia 
Taiwan 
Yemen Republic 
South Yemen 
Algeria 
Iraq 
Syria 
Libya 
Sudan 
Central African Republic 
Zaire 
Congo (Brazzaville) 
Burundi 
Dahomey 
Ghana 
Malagasey Republic 
Nigeria 
Indonesia 
Pakinstan (until 1971) 
Ruandi 
Somali a 
Uganda 
Togo 
Upper Volta 
Mali 
Bolivia 
Peru 
Paraguay 
Panama 
Nicaragua 
Honduras 
Guatemala 
El Salvador 
Ecuador 
Argentina 
Venezuela 
Brazil 
Korea 
Vietnam 
Egypt 
Chad 
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posts, and acts as a ghost 'second chamber' for the regime, 
it is more accurate to class these regimes as military in 
composition. The removal of the military as a force, such 
as in Turkey under Kemal Attaturk, or Mexico under Cardenas, 
is a qualitively different process to the "removal" of the 
military in Korea and Egypt, and in the 1972 political 
experiments in Indonesia. (IL) This is not to say that leaders 
of Nasser's, Park's or Suharto's ability are mere puppets, 
far from it - it is their very charisma that holds the loyalty 
of the military. It is their personal successes in ruling in 
this way that creates problems for their less charasmatic 
successors. 
(3i) 
The main wars fought by military governments include the 
Vietnam war and the Arab-Israeli wars. These are the two 
major wars of the Third World. The Vietnam war has already 
been discussed briefly but it should be noted here that the 
combatants included representative forces from Korea, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. Three of 
the Asian powers had military governments at the time but 
Philippines was a party state. Their involvement was relatively 
minor and served political purposes. The economic consequences 
of the. Vietnam war on these countries is discussed later. The 
Arab-Israeli wars have been of relatively short duration. The 
actual fighting has lasted days rather than years and the 
political issues between the combatants have not been resolved 
in any of the military encounters. As the military preparedness 
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Table Five 
Military States - Wars and Counter-Insurgency, 191+5-72 
Country Insurgency War 
Pakistan Communal violence 
Pathons, Baluchi 
dissidents 
Korea 
Indonesia Separatist rebellions 
Burma 
Thailand 
Cambodia 
Insurgency, Kazens, 
Mons communists, KMT, 
Arakanese 
Communists north-west 
region and Malaysian 
border 
Civl war since 1970 
Taiwan 
Yemeni Republic 
South Yemen 
Iraq 
Civil war 1960-67 
Anti-British terrorism 
Kurdish revolt 1950-70 
Indo-Pak 1965 and 
1971 - Bangladesh 
Korean War 1950-5+ 
Vietnam 19601s 
"Confrontation" with 
Dutch, 1963; Malaysia 
1963-65 
Vietnam War 1965-72 
Vietnam War; south 
vietnamese invasion, 
north vietnamese 
invations. 
Mainland China since 
1949; Vietnam 1960, s 
South Yemen 1972 
Yemeni Republic 1972 
Arab-Israeli Wars 
1948 and 1967; Iran 
border incidents 1972 
Egypt Arab-Israeli Wars 
1948,56,67 
Country Insurgency War 
Syria Arab-Israeli War 1967 
Algeria Anti-Government Morocco 1963 
dissidents, 1967 
Turkey Urban guerillas 1971-72 
Sudan Souther rebellion 
1960-70 
Libya Aid to guerilla movements 
in Africa and Middle- Aid to Uganda 1972 
East 
Zaire Secessionist rebellions 
1961-67 
Burundi Watatsi and Bahutu Ruwanda conflict 
tribal wars 1963 
Ruwanda Watatsi and Bahutu Ruwanda conflict 
tribal wars 1963 
Nigeria Biafra civil war Action in Zaire 
1967-70 1961 
Ghana Action in Congo 
1961 
Somali Ethiopia 1965 
Uganda "Invasion" civil Tanzania clashes 
war 1972 1972 
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has had to be maintained among all the countries concerned, 
and in economic terms this has given these countries the 
largest proportional military budgets of the Third World, 
it is possible to consider the entire period from the founding 
of the state of Israel in 19+8 to the present as a continuous 
period of war. The Middle-East is not a peaceful zone and the 
effects are felt in the economies of all the countries; trade 
and development has been distorted to take account of the 
hostilities between the countries. Chapter Thirteen will 
examine some of these economic effects in greater detail. 
Zaire, Nigeria, Cambodia, Indonesia, Yemen and Sudan have 
been involved in civil wars and practically all of the Latin 
American countries have conducted counter-insurgency operations 
for some period during the 1960's(3'V)Arising from this continen- 
tal problem the Argentinians have prospects of a major break- 
through for their ailing indigenous aircraft industry from a 
domestically designed and produced counter-insurgency fighters. 
In Yemen and Cambodia the civil wars began after the 
seizure of power by a military junta and were between those 
recently dispossessed of power, but with substnatial support 
in the country, and prospects of assistance from abroad, and 
those recently taking over the country, also with support at 
home and abroad. The Yemeni royalists were supported by the 
royalist Saudia Arabians and the Yemeni Republicans were 
supported by the Nasserist regime in Egypt. Nasser sent up 
to 60,000 troops to participate in the fighting as well as 
ý3 
part of the Egyptian airforce. 
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In Cambodia the overthrow of Prince Sinnaoek by the 
Lol Nol military junta had fortuitious consequences for 
the Americans fighting in neighbouring Vietnam. It closed 
the ports of Cambodia to communist war supplies and threw 
the whole logistical burden of the Viet Cong and North 
Vietnamese onto the "Ho Chi Minh" route to 
South Vietnam. The anti-Lol Nol forces consist of the 
communist armies (North Vietnamese and Viet Cong) and 
Cambodian troops loyal to Sinnaoek. There are South Viet- 
namese regulars and Cambodian American-trained veterans of 
the Vietnam war arrayed on the Government side with the main 
Cambodian army. (4o) 
The Indonesian civil war was resolved after about 300,000 
people were killed, most of them members of the PKI (Indonesian 
Communist Party). (41) The Communist coup of September 30th 
1965 was foiled by the surviving army leaders, who then turned 
on (and encouraged others to do likewise) the communists. 
Eventually the army leadership removed President Sukarno from 
office and installed a military government. (This will be 
dealt with in more detail in Chapter Six). 
In Nigeria the Biafran civil war had similar beginnings 
in an attempted coup that was foiled by surviving army leaders 
and loyal units. The January 1966 attempted coup was inter- 
rupted in the sense that the original leaders agreed to 
recognise the surviving Commander-in-Chief, General Ironsi, 
1. 
who assumed executive power. The rebels had liquidated the 
major political leaders of Nigeria in the early stages of their 
coup. Ironsi fell in July 1966 to another coup led by a tribal 
group, the northerners, who interpreted the January coup as a 
tribal attack on non-Ibos. The resultant anti-Ibo purges and 
murders drove the Ibos into a state of paranoia. In 1967 the 
Ibos declared their secession from Nigeria and the Biafran war 
began. (4L) It ended with a reported 2 million dead and a 
re-unified Nigeria. 
In Zaire (formerly the Belgian Congo) the country was torn 
by a civil war between the secessionist Katanga state and the 
central government headed by Lumumba. (93) The military 
governments of Mobutan came after periods of civil unrest and 
secessionist campaigns. The military came to power to enforce 
central authority in a country which in many areas did not feel 
subject to government from Kinshasha. 
In Sudan, the southern rebellion for independence continued 
through military and civilian governments and was finally 
settled by the granting of autonomy within the state of Sudan 
by the military government in 1970. In both the Congo and the 
Sudan the military regimes were not the cause of the rebellions, 
neither were they entirely a consequence of them. The central 
authority was challenged by secession and was not able to cope 
but this ineffectiveness was expressed in other fields beside 
secession; they were ineffective right across the administrative 
structure. The military intervention was aimed at re-organising 
fý 
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the whole of the government and dealing with a wide range of 
AmIA 
problems, as well as that of the rebellionsavr7 
This is in contrast to the civil war in Cambodia, and 
probably Nigeria as well, where the direct issue of the survival 
of the central government had to take precedence over other 
issues. The legitimacy of the central government is at stake 
in all cases but there is a difference between these civil wars. 
In Cambodia the civil war is about which political group shall 
run the central government (similarly in Laos and Vietnam) while 
in Sudan, Pakistan, Zaire, Nigeria, Ethiopia, the issue was, or 
is, about whether there shall be a central government at all. 
Secessionist civil wars aim to break up a country, civil wars 
aim to change the government. 
To-date the only successful secessionist example is 
Bangladesh. This was aided by the vast geographical distance 
between the two wings of Pakistan and the decisive support of 
the Indian army. (4S) Katanga (Zaire) and Biafra (Nigeria) are 
two examples of total failure of secession. The central govern- 
ment had substantial assistance from outside powers in the form 
of military aid (Nigeria) and military intervention (Zaire). 
The Bangladesh war was a local affair involving the Indian Army, 
the West Pakistan Army and the East Pakistan irregulars. 
Threatened intervention from China and America did not 
materialise. 
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The Katanga and Biafra separatists had a less obvious case 
than Bangladesh; they were geographically adjacent to central 
government territory, they contained vast sources of natural 
wealth (copper in Katanga and oil in Biafra) which were earmarked 
by the central government for the purchase of development resources 
and also as a source of revenue and, while the, economic viability 
of the proposed states was not in doubt, the political and 
economic effects of separation on the central government states 
was, with as little doubt, likely to be serious. (14) 
The separatist rebellions in Indonesia, a country which lends 
itself to disintegrative upheavals, were eventually put down by 
the central authorities. In spite of conditions conducive for 
weak central government, Indonesiaihas managed to produce a 
central government apparatus, both in the Sukarno phase and 
after, with sufficient cohesion to hold together the vast 
country, spread as it is among numerous islands. (47) 
In Burma, the military socialist government is in firm 
control, and the numerous isolated ethnic and political rebel- 
lions have become an established feature of the country. The 
communist guerillas in north-western Thailand are an inevitable 
counter-force to the pro-American military Governments and with 
their counter-parts along the Malaysian border will require 
increased attention after the end of open hostilities in 
Vietnam. «) 
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Iraq has had to face the Kurdish separatists since they 
returned from the Soviet Union in 1954. The Kurds have fought 
for a separate Kurdish Republic with varying degrees of 
intensity over the years. Their presence in Iraq and their 
compaign of violence against the central authority was not 
unhelpful to the Soviet Union's foreign policy of loosening 
up the Baghdad Pact countries who were in alliance with America 
during the Cold War. The Kurdish demands for autonomy were 
persistent enough to continue even throughout periods when 
Iraqi governments were friendly to the Soviet Union. Some of 
these governments made truces with the Kurds, granted them 
limited autonomy and, without exception, went on to try a 
military solution to the unresolved difficulties. The problem 
therefore remains. (tij) 
Military governments are not more successful in dealing 
with ethnic rebellions than party governments. If the ethnic 
minority are persistent enough and well-led the central 
authority must come to terms with them. A country that includes 
several nations cannot have a legitimatised government that 
ignores their felt interests. They can have a government 
ruling by force, and under seige, but this has economic costs 
that in the end produce war weariness. Genocide may suggest 
itself to some beleagured governments, and it has been tried 
on a_modest scale by some, but the persistence of minority 
separatism in many countries, some of whose governments have 
the technology available for genocidic policies, suggests that 
the problem does not always produce this solution. When the 
J 
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ethnic problem is also complicated by ideological allegiances, 
for example, the Eritrean separatists have a Marxist-Leninist 
wing, the central government's task is not made any easier, 
because this invites material or diplomatic assistance from 
the ideological powers. 
Conclusion 
Does then the political system have any relationship with 
the incidence of wars and insurgency? First we can take the 
number of wars and insurrections that each political system has 
experienced as a percentage of the number of countries that had 
that political system. By taking the type of political system - 
party state or military government - at the time that the event 
occured countries that experienced war or insurrection when 
they were a party state and then when they were a military state 
will of course appear in both divisions. 
Table Six 
Percentage of Countries in Each Political Group that have 
Experienced War or Insurrection Since 1945 According to 
Political Status at Time of Event 
Political System War Insurrection 
Party (40) 28ý 5 
Military (43) 3C 56% 
The percentages in each category are almost identical and 
it suggests that the percentage of countries in each political 
system that have not experienced either war or insurrection is 
about the same. Whether the incidence of war and insurrection 
is the same in each group would be of interest as well because 
this would indicate the proneness of the political system to 
these forms of violence. The difficulty here is that the 
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political system changed sometimes between violent incidents 
and also it is extremely difficult to judge when, say, an 
insurrection is a continuing event or a separate incident. 
About a third of all countries in the Third World (i. e. 
on the sample used here) have been involved in wars and about 
half of them in insurrections. This is a significant record 
of major incidents of violence. 
A round about way that we can answer the question about 
the incidence of violence in the political systems is to find 
the percentage of countries that have experienced major 
incidents of violence according to the political systems that 
existed in 1971. Thus a country that had experienced a war 
or insurrection as a party state and had subsequently changed 
its political system to a military state (e. g. Indonesia) would 
be included only in the military state division. 
Table Seven 
Percentage of Countries in Each Political Group by 1971 
Political Status that have Experienced War or Insurrection 
Since 1945 
Political System War Insurrection 
Party (29) 26% 4,: P% 
Monarchy (7) 71% 57% 
Military (42) 46 4% 
In Table Seven there is a much more pronounced tendency 
for the military states of 1971 to have experienced major 
violent incidents such as war or insurrection since 19+5 than 
for the countries whose political system of party rule had 
survived by then. A large number of countries have changed 
their political system from party states, or monarchies, to 
military states. As Table Six shows, the experience of major 
violence is evenly distributed between the political systems, 
and therefore if the states that have experienced major 
violence as party states have also gone over to military rule 
in any numbers this is bound to increase the apparent 
relationship between major violence in the military states. 
This cannot imply a causal relationship between violence 
and military government. For example, in a similar exercise 
we could relate natural disasters such as earthquakes and 
floods to the political systems. Assuming that natural disas- 
ters are equally distributed geographically, then as the number 
of military governments increased over time one could be drawn 
to the spurious conclusion that natural disasters are related 
to military governments. Thus the relationship between violence 
and military governments may be a qualified relationship such 
that the violence creates conditions in which a military solu- 
tion is a possibility. In that the violence is an element in 
the legitimacy crisis the prevalence of military rule after ten 
or twenty years of wrestling with this crisis can be seen to be 
a consequence of the violence rather than a cause of it. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ROLE OF THE MILITARY 
a) Introduction 
We have already expressed the view that the legitimacy 
thesis is the most appropriate explanation for the military 
in the Third World. This Chapter takes up some of the 
implications of this view. In later Chapters we will examine 
in greater detail military interventions in a number of 
countries. 
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b) The Role of the Military 
The legitimacy crisis in the developing world rests on the 
inability of any of the competing elites to sustain a political 
leadership for a long enough time for its concepts of public 
good to be supported by other elites and by the masses. (1) 
The conflict situation is a permanent feature of the political 
system; (Z. ) it is pluralistic, involving conflicts within the 
governing elite (which group or family or personality is to 
lead), and between the traditional and the modernising, between 
village and city, peasant and worker, landlords and tenants, 
collective and individual, ethnic groups, and religions, 
European and nationals, the unemployed and the employed, buyers 
and sellers, administrators and subjects, and the rising and 
falling groups. 
In a developed society the pluralistic conflicts are con- 
strained and within limits re-inforce the stability of the 
society; in the developing world, the pluralistic conflicts are 
fractionalising and keep the state off-balance. 
The competing elites are inward looking with short horizons - 
today's manoeuvre against opponents is more absorbing than 
tomorrowts - and this is prismatically reflected in the whole 
social structure by the acceptance of corruption. Corruption 
is a tax on getting things done, it raises the cost of 
activity. (S) It ensures that a minority re-distributes 
income 
towards themselves, by virtue of their position in the state 
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bureaucracy, and this transforms the state into a semi-private 
"taxation" system. The struggle for power in the state is also 
a struggle for access to this "taxation franchise". Illegal 
taxes have always been a source for sedition, and for cynicism. 
These are two sufficient conditions for a crisis in legitimacy, 
and a challenge to civil order. (i) 
Civil order is preserved by the legitimacy of the regime 
or by the force of arms. In a developing country the armed 
forces (sometimes) are the only uncontaminated force in the 
state. Their attitude on these occasions to corruption is 
disdainful, a mixture of self-congratulatory piety and an out- 
spoken bitterness regarding politicians who are thought to be 
practicing corruption. They regard the military virtues as 
being unquestionably superior to civilian virtues. (7) 
The military is often the most successfully Westernised 
of all the institutions in the developing countries. ((, ) Its 
hierarchical organisation is a carbon-copy of the Western army; 
its weapons are comparable, if slightly dated, and the 
organisational prerequisites of a western army which they 
invariably copy flow from the technology common to both. 
(7) 
Super-sonic aircraft, missiles, heavy armour, electronic 
communications, light naval vessels, infantry, artillery and 
logistical capacity, all require trained and skilled men, 
organised and disciplined, with some centralising ethos for 
cohesion. The Nation, the Flag, "Destiny" etc., become the 
centralising ethos, which raises the army above the secular 
., 
issues that divide civilian society. 
The army can become an inculcative force for nation- 
hood. ($) Where it succumbs to fractionalism the result is 
a threatened disintegration of the nation (e. g. Nigeria). 
It is not necessary that this role for the military is 
mirrored in every country at all times but it is a natural 
role for the army and, in the absence of other integrative 
forices, it will tend to develop to a greater or lesser extent. 
The foundations for such a role may be tenuous, its articula- 
tion may be mythical, but there is no doubt that the military 
interventions that have taken place in the Third World have 
been based on some local version of this concept of their 
role. (4) 
The army in many African countries is equipped, trained 
and motivated for intervention. (10) The civilian government 
deploys the military essentially for an internal security role 
but the military is able to transform its subordinate role into 
a dominant one. By kinship and peer-group affiliation it is 
aware of the prizes flowing from command of the state. By 
observation of the behaviour and living standards of the 
European it has acquired, like everybody else with ambition, 
any envy for living standards commensurate with its conceptions 
of its special role. It can only look on the struggle between 
political factions for power, which in no way resembles party 
politics in a traditional Western state in the intensity and 
ferocity of competition and the struggles between competing 
social groups for a share in the resources of the country, 
with paternalistic disapproval. For these reasons some of 
the early interventions over the pay and allowances of the 
army (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Sierra Leone etc. ) (11) or 
the share of the army in the state budgets (e. g. Central 
African Republic, Upper Volta), (I. ) were not articulating 
any particular political creed. They were merely asserting 
the army's place in the queue for the benefits of independence. 
The army which intervenes with relatively clean hands (1) ) 
may compaign against corruption, a few offenders may be jailed, 
and some may even be shot, but the command of resources in 
"soft" states soon leads inexorably to a diversion of resources. 
In an atmosphere where status and prestige is bound up with 
power and wealth, the scarcity of income among the pious is in 
conflict with the aspirations of the ambitious; either they 
succumb to the opportunities or they slide down the social 
scale. 
There is another route that does not involve corruption 
directly and that is to develop political ambitions exercisable 
on the basis of support from the corrupted within the military 
hierarchy. Thus rising political fortune may be a substitute 
for direct graft; the status of office, with the perks and 
privilige that this provides, may compensate for abstaining 
from the lower-rank's opportunities to graft. In these ways 
the army itself becomes as corrupted as the previous adminis- 
tration but the leaders may in good conscience be able from 
time to time to threaten action against the corrupt as a 
disciplinary tool over lower-ranks. The military leaders 
have authority over lower ranks and they can remove the 
'licences' to state position at will. The lower ranks return 
loyalty for the 'licence'. 
The military in Africa is relatively new as an independent 
force; its officers were almost entirely commissioned post- 
independence. (1`1) The European elites ruled through their 
own officer class in command of local troops. The crash pro- 
grammes of the independence preparations left relatively 
inexperienced officers in these armies. 
In the Middle-East the armies had been officered by their 
own nationals for decades and the military tradition is more 
indigenous than in Black Africa. (11) In Latin America the 
army has been a national force for all of this century and has 
a longer experience of intervention. Until the mid-1960's it 
was more or less a client social force for the ruling 
oligarchies. (it. ) In Asia two types are represented, the post- 
independence, and the traditional. (1111) 
To what extent are the military a modernising force? There 
is some controversy on this aspect of the military. One view, 
sees the military as an essential factor in the process of 
nation building: "the military coup is crucial for the continua- 
tion and acceleration of nation building in Asia and Africa". (19) 
The military removes obstacles to modernisation rather than 
creates them. 
"The good soldier is also to some degree a 
modernised man. Thus it is that the armies 
of newly emergent countries come to play key 
roles in the process by which traditional ways 
give way to more westernised ideas and practice... 
the acculturative process tends to be focused on 
acquiring technical skills that are of particular 
value for economic development... " (Iy) 
The army as an agency of modernisation is a view that is 
challenged by those who exclude the idea of independent social 
forces other than the bourgeoisie in the early period of 
industrial capitalism or the proletariat in the 20th century. 
What this view boils down to is this: that the only progressive 
social force is the political movement which represents' the 
historical interests of the latter-day proletariat, that iss 
the Marxist revolutionaries. There is inevitably bitter 
disagreement among Marxists as to which of the "Marxist" parties 
truly represent the-proletariat's interests. If this question 
is indeterminate it reduces the concept of an "historical force" 
in the form of a Marxist Party to the level of a myth agreed 
upon by its exponents. 
Another source of criticism of the military as a modernis- 
ing force is that of the empirical critics (mainly sociologists) 
who contrast what is claimed for the military as a modernising 
force with what the military has achieved in practice. In 
arguments between theory and practice the latter must start 
favourites, because if theory has to bend reality to make it 
fit there is something to be said for sticking with reality. 
"Modernising armies2 whether they intervene in 
politics or not, are often said to be modernising 
agents at large in their societies, because military 
investment in men and machines invariably produces 
positive non-military side effects. .... Such a 
claim may be good sales talk but it. isVpoor asocial 
science. It might have been ignored'but for 
endorsement by reputable social scientists... The 
double duty-enthusiasts trip over hard facts. They 
resort to deductive reasoning and tend to overlook 
the empirical evidence". (20) 
Another critical view tackles the argument from a different 
angle: 
"The political intervention of the military seems to 
me to proceed not so much from its prior attitudes 
to social change but from its strategic position within 
arena of social discensus, from its relatively large 
size, and hierarchic organisation that facilitates a 
cohesion which no other elite group can match... Nor 
does it seem very profitable to talk of a desire to 
modernise in the abstract. Such a desire may be wide- 
spread) like the desire to consume wester goods. That 
matters more is the order of priorities and of sacrifices. 
Who is going to be deprived of what in order 
that should consume what goods? " (tj) 
This approach is taken up by Dorothy Nelkin: 
"The military, then, acted upon a social base 
composed of a small but strategic part of the 
population. In no country can the shift be 
regarded as more than a transfer of power. 
There were no revolutionary changes within the 
social structure: the support of the coups came 
from groups, already relatively favoured vis a 
vis the rest of society". (tt) 
The one common theme in these divergent views on the significance 
of the military contribution to modernisation is that they all 
recognise the strategic position that the military has in the. 
political power balance of a developing country. 
The military is not an homogeneous force. (Z3) The 
possibility of upward mobility has made the military attractive 
to recruits from the lower classes, and minority tribes. Upward 
mobility is a function of time and therefore the military at any 
one time will have various layers of personnel from different 
classes, tribes and stratas spread across age and seniority of 
service cohorts. In Nigeria, for instance, the army had a 
different tribal composition at each major rank level and 
whether intended or not this contributed to the tribal 
characteristic of the 1966 coups. 
In the post-independence armies the rapid promotion of 
officers brought to the High Command soldiers who were trained, 
often hurriedly, by the previous European administration and in 
the case of Indonesia by the Japanese. (2`') Below them were 
officers recruited and trained post-independence. In some 
armies (Indonesia, Bangladesh, Sudan) (21) a propostion of these 
recruits were former irregular or guerilla troops and this 
presented problems of integration and professionalisation. 
In Egypt, the High Command was closely identified with the 
monarchy and there was a political, class, social and age gap 
between them and the officers who supported the Free Officers 
Movement. (2º') 
Colonels, majors and captains occupy strategic command 
positions within the strategic social position of the military. 
They are near enough to both the ranks and the top command, and 
learn to appreciate their potential role in the political 
structures. Some senior officers have managed to read the 
situation accurately and have placed themselves at the head of 
popular army revolts to contain them (Pakistan) or been placed 
there by the junior officers looking for acceptable figure-heads 
for their coup (Egypt). Where such figure-heads have not 
appeared the junior officers have had to act along (Libya) and 
take on both the ruling oligarchy and the High Command. Where 
senior military figures are not available it has sometimes led 
to a variation of this particular gambit namely, using senior 
civilian figures in the revolutionary cabinet. 
(L1) 
c) The Political Machines 
The format of the military intervention will depend on 
circumstances. Before examining these circumstances it is 
essential, first of all, to say something about party politics 
in the developing countries, particularly in Africa, which 
differs from party political behaviour as understood in the 
European industrialised countries. The party parliamentary 
form of government left behind by the European powers in 
African states rapidly ceased to resemble the model upon which 
it was based. The form was often there, but the original content, 
which was foreign, was rapidly replaced. 
Political parties evolved over many decades in the United 
Kingdom and are able to demonstrate fairly consistent mass 
support, and thereby they operate on the relatively safe 
assumption that they speak for some part of the electorate. 
An indication of the stable and genuine mass base of the major 
parties in the post-war years was the unlikelihood of a candi- 
date being elected without the sponsorship of the major party 
caucases (though this need not continue indefinitly). Between 
19+5 and 1972 only a handful of candidates have been successful 
against major party nominees in the seats held by a major 
party - successful challenges have normally been made only 
from the other major party. British political parties 
articulate the interests of their supporters, whatever the 
personal motives of the party activists, and the need to win 
support by persuasion is so much taken for granted that 
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election strategies have been exclusively based on this premise. 
The hiring of thugs to terrorise opposition candidates, the 
intimidation of electors, the partisan intervention of the state, 
the illegal disqualification of the candidates, and large scale 
personation of electors, are not common aspects of the electoral 
system. (Some of these features have of course appeared in the 
Northern Ireland province but that is atypical of the United 
Kingdom). The political leader's desire for office is not 
carried beyond the point of legality and their ability to 
compromise on essential principles (however vague these are 
defined) is constrained to some extent by the party activists, 
but above all, by the electorate. 
African post-colonial experience does not conform to the 
same behaviour patterns. The political leadership emerged 
rapidly out of relative obscurity. Their nationalist campaigns 
developed as rapidly. Some of the leaders were activity for 
many years in the independence struggle (e. g. Dr. Hastings 
Banda) but this was often from within the metroplitan country 
itself, where political conditions were more liberal than in 
the colonies, or they were active in clandestine groups isolated 
from the population. 
The ruling European powers prepared to hand over power to 
the local versions of political forces that were common in the 
metropolitan countries, namely political parties with mass 
following. Therefore competing nationalists had to produce 
'mass parties' to lay claim to the succession. On the eve of 
independence mass parties were created that were 
liberal values and were competitive and these virtues that 
impressed anti-colonial liberals who saw in these the proof 
that these countries were mature and ready for an indigenous 
version of London type parliamentary democracy. 
The parties took on the same form as political parties 
elsewhere. They had national leaders, local branches, 
conferences and rallies, symbols, platforms and, of course, 
promises. The content was, however, different. They were not 
political parties so much as political machines for getting, 
holding and extending political power. The distinction was 
not merely a difference in emphasis (western political parties 
have similar aims) but, because it operated in a different 
cultural climate, it took on an entirely different meaning. 
"The distinction is that a party aggregates demands 
and converts them into legislative policy, whereas 
a political machine exists almost exclusively to stay 
in power. To this end its main concern is to offer 
rewards and bribes to anyone who can contribute to 
keeping it in power. Office alone is its reason for 
existence and with office comes the opportunity for 
enrichment at public expense". (Ls) 
The road from political machines competing for the scarce 
fruits of office to the one-party state is a straight and 
well worn road in this context. (Di) Some liberal apoligists 
who see the one-party state as a form of government "most 
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suitable to Africa's conditions" ('there is so much to be done 
that all efforts must be directed towards that end and diver- 
sionary opposition must be dispensed with until the country 
is developed' etc. ) are only party correct. (3O) 
The one-party state is a development from the special 
character of African post-independence parties as machines 
for hanging onto power. 
"A one-party state has been created partly because 
those in power cannot afford to lose its fruits and 
the (many) 'carpet crossers' are unable to resist 
accepting a share; but also because, in the absence 
of an extensive and skilled bureaucracy, the 'parti 
unique' is seen as a means of using less technically 
trained men to further national union, partly by 
appeals to Camerouian solidarity and partly through 
the distribution of benefits". (SI) 
The reference is to the experience of the Cameroun but it could 
just as well be written about Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Malawi and Zambia. (s. ) 
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d) Political Independence 
Luckman sees the development of the African political 
elite into the form it has taken as part of the "contract" 
between the departing European power and the elite to whom 
the power was handed to: 
"... the colonial government handed over to the 
inheriting elite, the political class, the right 
to control the machinery of-Government in return 
for the protection of its economic interests. In 
practice, this meant the inheritors had the right 
to create and mobilise political resources without 
hinderance, to appropriate for themselves all 
patronage in government jobs and appointments, to 
create networks of political clientage and to use 
the bureaucracy and the means of coercion to maintain 
themselves in office, to make themselves secure in 
their employment and the lucrative rewards of politics. 
In return, the departing Nationals kept control of 
large-scale private economic enterprise and the 
profits extracted therefrom". (3L) 
Luckman's point can be taken without reading as much as he does 
into the "contract". 
Whatever "contract" was implicit in the transfer of power 
the mutual obligation, such as they were, quickly lost impulsion 
as local autonomy gained experience and metropolitan priorities 
Y 
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changed. For example, the demise of Empire and the Commonwealth 
reduced the importance of the 'colonial' lobby in the decision 
centres of British government. Other lobbies became more 
important (e. g. the "European") and took up more time and 
consequently, within a short space of time, British interests 
in independent states were much more vulnerable than before. 
Even if the British Government wanted to enforce the "contract" 
that Luckman suggests existed (even implicitly) a position was 
rapidly reached where it was unable to (e. g. Rhodesia, 1965 
and Uganda, 1972). 
Inside these countries the developing political situation 
also put pressure on the domestic parties to the "contract'. 
The political machine which succeeded the European power may 
have gained its status by convincing the European power that 
it was acceptable as the ruling elite by virtue of tradition 
(that it had for example previously been dominant in the 
country) or by demonstration of its popularity. This selection 
of a succession elite, which would inevitably exclude competing 
elites or emerging elites, would not necessarily lead to the 
acquiescence of everybody in the arrangement. Indeed some 
resented the arrangements and set out to stake a claim to 
office. 
Successive changes, inside the ruling elite, also contri- 
buted to the overturning of the "contract". The force of 
nationalism is pervasive; in some countries it has been called 
'Africanisation', but the effects are the same: the appropria- 
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tion of ex-patriate interests either outright or by stages. 
Foreign commercial interests have in the main to accept 
the indigenisation measures; the prospect of 'heavy' inter- 
vention by their governments to prevent take-overs is so 
remote as to be discounted. The main arguments are likely to 
be confined to the compensation terms. The political weakness 
of the foreign companies in this respect and the lack of ready 
funds in the countries that are encouraging indigenisation do 
not make the 'contract' relationship a sound one. For example, 
Nigeria's Indigenisation Act which comes into force in 1974, 
and excludes foreign commercial activity in a number of areas 
such as retail trade, light industry, transport and services 
and in activities requiring a fixed capital below £200,000, 
will cost up to £250 million in compensation. (33) Whether 
in the event the Nigerians can raise this sum, and, as 
important, permit the foreigners to repatriate its is a matter 
of some doubt. The Uganda solution of stripping the owners of 
assets and preventing them removing anything except the barest 
personal possessions is not necessarily the most tactful of 
policies but it is evidently one that can be carried through 
without intervention other than public appeals to morality. 
Analysing the new political leaderships of the developing 
world merely as some kind of client of western business 
interests is increasingly at variance with experience. While 
considerable evidence has been accumulated of the alleged 
relationship between Third World economies and the 
industrialised economies, and much of it is critical of the 
relationship, the growing independence of the economic 
managers of these countries, their aggressive assertion of 
their own national interests and their general non-compliance 
with behaviour that would be expected from dependent partners 
to a dual form of exploitation, which is what is implied by 
the theories of neo-colonialism, suggests that the relationships 
that were thought to be apparent in the 1960's are not as naked, 
nor as direct, and that new explanations are needed. (3Y-) 
The three major forces working in favour of military 
intervention as a solution to the legitimacy crisis are there- 
fore: the failings of the implanted political party system in 
the cultural milieu of the developing countries; the strategic 
position of the military -a small force with leverage; and 
the growing realisation of the potentialities of independence 
among the elites, or, to put it another way, the realisation 
that the European powers are less committed, and less able, to 
intervene against governments or policies they disapprove of. 
The post-independence order has in the main broken down. 
Where it survives it has been transformed to accommodate to 
the forces within the-country (the One-Party States) but few 
of the one-party states has so far faced the next test: how 
to survive the succession from the charasmatic leadership of 
the independence period. With these personal leaderships 
removed (a problem facing Kenya, Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania) 
the question is open whether the party system will continue or 
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whether the disintegrative forces will assert themselves as 
in other countries. The next chapters will go into greater 
detail regarding the military 'solution' and to what extent 
the intervention solution can be seen as a general solution 
or one confined to the circumstances in each country. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INTERVENTION IN AFRICA 
a) Introduction 
In this Chapter the military interventions in three African 
countries are examined. The first country is Sierra Leone which 
is one of the smaller countries in Africa. The intervention is 
of particular interest because it arose out of the refusal of 
one of the political parties to accept the role of opposition 
after a General Election. The tribal divisions in the country 
were present as a factor but do not explain the whole of the 
legitimacy crisis. 
The next country is Nigeria and in contrast to Sierra Leone 
where tribalism was one factor it is the conclusion of the study 
of Nigeria that tribal divisions were the major, if not sole, 
explanation for the collapse of the first Federation. In taking 
account of the realities of tribal divisions, the architects of 
the Federal State actually ensured that they would be dominant 
in subsequent years. The three major tribal areas the North, 
the East and the West were in political conflict from the 
beginning, and as nobody could gain an outright majority. 
The normal party political deficiences of the African 
political system meant a stagnation of political leadership and 
a fractionalising of effort. In these conditions the interven- 
tion of the Nigerian army was predictable but this intervention 
could not take on a unifying and nation-building form precisely 
because the army itself was tribalistically divided in the 
crucial aspect of officer ranks. Coups often involve the 
removal of some part of the elite; if the elite is stratified 
by tribe the removal of a rank inevitably means the destruction 
of a tribal group. Whatever the motivations of the coup makers 
this is bound to have tribalistic consequences. In Nigeria it 
led to civil/tribal war. 
The last part is a brief analysis of the 1966 Ghana coup 
against Nkrumaa. This is looked at from the mechanics of a 
coup against a personal dictator. Tribal divisions played an 
insignificant part in Ghana's political crises since 
independence. 
b) Sierra Leone 
In Sierra Leone there were two main political parties 
contesting for power. The social groups represented by the two 
parties roughly corresponded to the major tribal and regional 
divisions and also to class differences. 
t)The Sierra Leone 
Peoples Party (SLPP) represented the most Westernised of the 
elites, it was also allied with the traditional chiefs, and was 
predominantly imported by the Mende tribe. The All People's 
congress (APC) had a more plebian composition, with tribal 
support concentrated in the Tenne, Limba and other smaller 
tribes. Arriving on the nationalist scene later, and less close 
to the European orientated elite, it had a more open class 
appeal. The tribal divisions can be seen in the table, 
reproduced below: 
Table One 
Sierra Leone General Election Results, 1962 and 1967 b 
Percentage of Votes for Major Parties by Tribal Area 
1962 1967 
Region and Tribe SLPP A PC SLPP APC 
% (Seats) % (Seats) % (Seats) % (Seats) 
South (Mende) 38.8 (15) 4.8 (0) 1+7.5 (20) 9.9 (1) 
North (Tenne, 
Limba) 27.6 (2) ++. 8 (10) 19.0 (0) 79.0 (18) 
Other 34.2 (7) 10.7 (4) 36.7 (3) 60.5 (15) 
No. of Seats 24 14 23 34 
Source: J. Cartwright, Party Competition, Journal of Contemporary 
Political Science, 1972, p. 75. 
The figures in brackets are the number of seats gained in 
each area. These should be summed vertically to get total 
representation in the House for each party. Most of the 
independents (not shown in table) sided with the SLPP. The 
percentages should be summed horizontally (but note that the 
independent percentage votes are not included) as each percent- 
age is the vote received by the major parties out of the total 
votes cast in that region. 
In the 1962 election the SLPP had 31 seats (plus the 
independents who declared for the SLPP after the election) and 
the APC had 14. This 14 diminished through the defection of 4 
members to the ruling SLPP in the first three years of the 
parliament and then by a further 5 when they were imprisoned on 
various charges. (2. ) The SLPP, led by Sir Milton Margai, was 
firmly in command of the country and upon his death in April 
1967, his brother, Sir Albert Magai, took over. The 1967 
General Election took place under conditions of severe tension 
between the SLPP and the , 
APC, led by Dr. Siaka Stevens. The 
election results gave the APC 34 seats against the SLPP's total 
of 232 not counting the independents and paramount chiefs who 
may have delcared later for the SLPP. Instead of Dr. Stevens 
assuming power a military coup intervened and civilian govern- 
ment was suspended. 
The governing party in a maneouvre to outflank the opposi- 
tion APC only succeeded in thoroughly discrediting itself. In 
February 1967, the SLPP "discovered" a "plot" in the army to 
take-over the government and promptly arrested some officers, 
including the second-in-command, Colonel Bangura. The 
opposition APC was publically accused of planning a military 
intervention. The General Election took place in March 1967, 
under conditions where, as a subsequent official enquiry 
reported, "the whole of the Government's arrangements for the 
1967 election was rigged and corrupt... they were determined 
to use all means fair or foul to win and remain in office and 
if all failed to get Brigadier Lansana to take over". (3 ) 
These methods included: increasing the deposits from candidates 
from 200 Leones to 500 Leones (from $++0 or £200 to X1100 or 
£500), increasing the cost of election petitions, withdrawing 
the right of appeal in election disputes, raising the lost- 
deposit threshold from one tenth to one quarter of the poll, 
and the selection of returning officers on the basis of party 
affiliation. It is perhaps of no surprise then that the Prime 
Minister, with six colleagues, was returned "unopposed". In 
spite of the electoral disabilities the APC was declared the 
winner by the Governor, Sir Henry Lightfoot Boston. 
The military commander, Brigadier David Lansana, announced 
on the radio that day that he was taking over to "protect the 
constitution and maintain law and order". This was the one act 
most likely to provoke a disruption of law and order. The 
tribal divisions had been intensified in the election in 1967. 
The northern regions had been swept by the APC which won all 
the seats and 79 per cent of the vote. (See Table One). The 
situation was potentially threatening but the fact that apart 
from the SLPP leadership there was little support for Brigadier 
Lansana's action, particularly within the army itself, actually 
opened the door to a solution of the crisis that the SLPP 
leadership had placed Sierra Leone in by supporting the coup. 
On 23 March, two days after the first coup, another coup 
took place. Brigadier Lansana was removed and a National 
Reformation Council took over. Its leader, Lieutenant- Colonel 
Juxon-Smith, warned "trouble makers" in blunt terms: 
"whoever it is in Sierra Leone, wherever you may be, 
who is planning trouble, let me warn you, in your own 
interest, in the interests of your family, to go back 
home. Regardless of your rank or status, regardless 
of personality, you will be immediately apprehended, 
you will be tried by court martial, and you will be 
shot by firing squad. That is what martial law 
means", (4) 
Brigadier Juxon-Smith did not hand over power to the elected 
assembly but set up a Civilian Rule Committee, and used the 
cover of civilian participation to continue military rule. (5 ) 
Like the Lansana coup the Juxon-Smith coup made the 
elementary error of not ensuring its base. Illegitimacy was 
combined with carelessness. On 18 April, 1968, a group of 
NCO's and warrant officers, dissatisfied with a rejection of 
a pay claim, seized power by arresting the entire officer corps, 
except for those out of the country, including the National 
Reformation Council. The NBC-was accused of being "more 
corrupt and selfish than the ousted civilian regime" ((i) and, 
to emphasise this theme, an Anti-Corruption Revolutionary 
Movement was set up. The elected Assembly was recalled and 
Dr. Stevens was asked to set up a Government. Learning from 
the past, Dr. Stevens formed a coalition government from both 
parties. The country returned to civilian rule and has been 
led since by Dr. Stevens. 
The armed forces in Sierra Leone, before the coup numbered 
only 1: 3602 even the police force was larger with 2,000. The 
military share of the budget was only 1+. 9 per cent or 1.3 per 
cent of GNP. ('? ) The third coup was caused by dissatisfaction 
with pay among the lower ranks. The ruling military government 
had neglected its most important base. 
The political conflicts of the 19601s had neglected the 
armed forces and it was only in the context of a stubborn fight 
to hold on to power that the politicians incalcated the idea of 
military intervention, thus raising immediately the 'potential 
status of the armed forces as a balancing power in the political 
structure. Once the intervention was sanctioned events took 
their own course. The SLPP, presumably confident of controlling 
the army leaders, did not anticipate the possibility of the 
immediate removal of their officers and replacement by another 
set of leaders. But these other leaders did not apparently 
have much political experience or ambition and they soon 
exhausted their interest in power. The restored civilian 
government brought back to power experienced politicians 
(Dr. Stevens had been exiled to Guinea) and the political 
machines settled down to an uneasy acceptance of more democratic 
parliamentary rules. (I ) 
In November 1968 a State of Emergency was necessary and 
there were attempted coups in 1971. Dr. Stevens, in a move to 
prevent his deposition from power by military intervention, 
signed an agreement with Guinea that gave him power to call 
upon Guinea for military assistance in the event of army mutiny 
or threats to internal security. (q) This insurance policy 
between the two Governments is a response to the proneness of 
developing countries to military intervention and insurrection. 
A Government can strengthen its defences against insurrection 
by similar arrangements that Sierra Leone and Guinea have made, 
which echo the kind of arrangement that Francophone Africa had 
with Metropolitan France, and which were activated in French 
intervention against some military coups against pro-French 
Governments. (10 ) The British also intervened at the request 
of the Ugandan, Kenyan, and Tanzanian Governments in the 196+ 
army mutinies. 
The extent to which French support for African governments 
facing rebellions can be relied upon has diminished in the past 
few years. General Edouard Cortadellas, former French Military 
Delegate and Commander in Chief of the Chadian armed forces, 
stated in 1972 that the "French army, without any doubt, would 
not intervene in case of elections or place revolution". (II) 
A repetition of British intervention is also unlikely. The 
only prospects for intervention is of the kind provided by 
Libya to Uganda in the 1972 'invasion', where several hundred 
Libyan soldiers were flown to Kampala to act as a special guard 
for General Amin during the fighting. 
The use of foreign troops to fight for a government is not 
a population action among so-called independent states and in 
the competitive nationalism of the Third World it is not helpful 
towards the building of an image of the leadership as an anti- 
imperialist force. Where countries have close affinities of 
interest and ideology, as in Sierra Leone and Guinea, mutual 
security pacts are possible but they have yet to be tested. 
The return to civilian rule in Sierra Leone has not, 
unfortunately, led to a genuine multi-Party democracy. The 
bitterness over the SLPP role in promoting the period of military 
intervention continued long after Dr. Stevens resumed office. 
The State of Emergency imposed in 1971 continued throughout 1972 
in most areas. But more omninously the practice of "unopposed" 
candidates in elections reappeared. (12) This had two possible 
explanations; either the electorate were satisfied with the 
governing APC candidates and did not want to contest their 
election or there was an element of political intimidation 
preventing persons from publically challenging the regime. To 
argue that unopposed candidates were due to the technical 
incompetence of the opposition in carrying out nomination 
procedure-is not acceptable; if there was this kind of incom- 
petence present it would affect both parties, unless, of course, 
the hypothesis is that electoral incompetence is an attribute 
reserved exclusively for African political oppositions. 
The APC leaders were also flirting with the idea of declaring 
Sierra Leone a one-party state, or as the Government owned Daily 
Mail, put it, a 'no-party' state. (15) The arrest of opposition 
SLPP leaders in 1972 and 1973 on various charges of conspiracy 
and instigation of violence must reduce the effectiveness of the 
opposition even further. A breakaway party from the APC, the 
United Democratic Party, was also banned in 1972. (1') Thus the 
APC, itself the victim of unconstitutional action, has swung 
full circle and increasingly must take on all the too familiar 
features of a party on the road to dictatorship. With a tight 
rein on the military and a nobbled opposition, there is nothing 
but fortune between Dr. Stevens and absolute power. (I* 
c) Nigeria 
The intervention of the majors in Nigeria set off a train 
of events that was to encompass another coup in July 1966 and 
a bitter secessionist war from 1967 to 1970. The January 1966 
coup and the period to the end of the Biafran war was a 
connected and continuous period of struggle. The struggles 
within the military, and between the tribal groups that made 
up the military leadership, were not isolated but were sequential 
events - it was no military roulette. They were in fact struggles 
around the same central issues: if the civilian post-independence 
political system was to be replaced, and after the elimination of 
the political leaders by the January 1966 coup its replacement 
was unpostponable, what form would the military regime take and 
who would be represented in its upper leadership? The struggle 
over these issues in Nigeria was one of the bloodiest in 
Africa. 
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa with a 
population over 50 million of diverse ethnic composition. (Iý. ) 
Table Two 
Ethnic Composition of Nigeria 
Group Approximate Number in Millions 
Hausa-Fulani 16 
Ibo 10 
Yoruba 9 
Northern Yoruba 1.5 
Kanuri ) 
Nupe ) 13.8 
Other northern tribes ) 
Tiv ) 
Bamileke ) 
2" 
Efiks ) 
Ibibio ) 
Ijav 0.7 
Ika ) 
Edo ) 2.5 
Urobo ) 
Source: Approximate divisions of ethnic groups by 
comparing map of tribal areas in N. J. Miners, 
The Nigerian Army 1956-66, London, 1971 p. 16 
and Robin Luckman, op cit, Table 38, p. 208. 
The details in Table Two are only approximate and have been 
estimated by a crude comparison of ascribed tribal areas with 
estimates of the populations living in these areas. The last 
census was in 1963 but this was taken under circumstances that 
place grave doubts on its reliability and the Government, for 
political reasons2 has refrained from taking another census in 
case the fictions that were created in 1963 are challenged and 
lead to new inter-regional tensions. (i%) In all there are 235 
ethnic groups in Nigeria, the largest being the Hausa, Fulani, 
Yoruba and Ibo. The Hausa and Fulani predominate in the north, 
the Yorubas in the west and the Ibos in the east. (1a) Upon 
these tribal divisions, to which the first regions in the 
Federation corresponded, we can trace the political tensions 
of the post-independence period up to 1966. (ti) 
The Nigerian military in 1966 was differentiated from the 
type of army found ins say, the Middle-East. In the first place 
it was relatively new, particularly at higher command levels. 
Eighty per cent of the Nigerian army combat officers had only 
five years, or less, experience in command by 1966. Five of 
the seven most senior officers (including the top three most 
senior) were ex-NCO's from the British-led pre-independence 
army. Military training of Nigerian officers did not get under 
way until 1958. Of the 1+5 officers recruited prior to 1958,24 
were from the ranks and 21 had received some training at 
military establishments overseas (Sandhurst etc. ). In the-next 
two years (1959-60), of the 35 Nigerian entrants to the officer 
corps, only 13 were from the ranks and the rest were graduates, 
short-service intake, or Sandhurst-trained. The origin of the 
officer corps rapidly changed from 1960-61; the year of 
independence; only four entrants were ex-NCO's, the rest 
being recruited from other sources. (20) 
The pattern of recruitment was important. It telescoped 
into a period of a few years a similar process of change of 
origin in the officer corps that was going on in the other 
Third World armies over a much longer period. The Arab officer 
corps preceded political independence (Nasser and his contem- 
poraries had been officers for many years) but the Nigerianisa- 
tion of the officer corps was a development subsequent to 
political independence; the only candidates available to turn 
into officers before independence were experienced NCO1s, who 
were, in the nature of things, thoroughly imbibed in British 
methods and traditions. (3-1) The result, as Nigerianisation 
spread, was that the most senior officers were separated by 
background outlook and rank from their junior officers. The 
ranks below them were often better educated, better trained, 
and, most important, from the same peer groups that were 
susceptible to the awakening nationalism, and who were taking 
jobs in the expanding state bureaucracy, or becoming the new 
entrepreneurs, or staffing the academic centres and the 
political machines, and who were much less interested in a 
Nigeria that looked like a pale reflection of British 
traditions. (il) 
The rapid Nigerianisation of the officer corps, with its 
consequent rapid promotion of the senior NCOs to command 
rank, is in contrast to the situation in the Arab countries, 
such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq, where the Arab officers had been 
a common feature of the Ottoman and monarchial armies. Military 
training at schools and academics had been established for 
years. The presence of the foreigner held the system in check 
but his removal led to structural changes in which the already 
established army played an important part. In Nigeria the 
removal of the foreigner and the establishment of the army were 
coincidental events and the schism between the ranks of command 
was as sudden as it was inevitable. It embodied the central 
issues of professionalism and nationalism plus the potential 
issues of tribal advantage. In a short space of time events 
were to force a violent resolution of all three issues. 
The schism between junior and senior ranks in the Arab 
armies, where military tradition was established, became one 
of the identification of the upper ranks with the status quo 
and of their role as obstacles to national progress. This led 
to a more ideological development within the post-coup regimes 
than has so far been found in the military coups in sub-Saharan 
black Africa. In this region the main dividing line was the 
different experience and career origins of the officer ranks, 
expressed in disputes about how to administer the army/country, 
or how to ensure for honesty/efficiency and how to replace the 
colonial systems and traditions. 
The second major features of the Nigerian army, compared 
to the Arab armies, was its nascent tribalistic tensions. (L3) 
The Nigerian Federation was divided roughly into the major 
tribal areas, the North, the East and the West. The colonial 
army had been recruited tribalistically, with the northerners 
providing the infantry and general soldiers, and the other 
regions the skilled, technical and educated specalists. (?. )0) 
In the transformation of the army from pre- to post-independence 
the ethnic composition of the recruitment policies came to be 
reflected in the hierarchical composition of the different 
rank levels. Table Three has been compiled by bringing 
together two tables in Luckman's study. 
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The entry quotas of the tribes for the seniority cohorts 
is reflected closely in the progress of these cohorts through 
the officer ranks. The most senior officers in any army 
generally also have seniority of service and at any time an 
analysis of rank would show a rough correspondence to entry 
into the army. Between 1955 and 1958 the Ibos predominated as 
a result of the recruitment policy and this shows up in their 
predominance in the rank of Major immediately before 1966. In 
the January coup it was from within this rank that the 
murderous assault on the political and military leadership of 
the Federation took place. The elimination of those senior 
military commanders who were caught by the majors meant, after 
the settlement, promotion to senior rank of a cohort with heavy 
Ibo representation. 
The January coup was interpreted by the northern and 
minority tribes as an Eastern conspiracy for hogomony in the 
Federation. The details of the coup and how it apparently 
"failed" after the liquidation of the Prime Minister Abubaka 
Tafawa Balewa, and the regional premiers, and other ministers, 
fave credence to this view. (ZS) General Ironsi, an Ibo, took 
over command of the country by persuading the original coup 
leaders to surrender. Twelve of the fourteen coup leaders, 
according to Federal evidence published later during the Biafran 
war) were Ibos and two Yorubas; in an additional list published 
by the Biafran side, a further fifteen Ibos officers are named 
and three more Yorubas. There is prima facie evidence on 
this 
ground alone to justify the Northern officers to believe in an 
Ibo tribal attack on the North. 
The Northern political (and popular) line after the July 
coup was that Ironsi was implicated in the January coup, though 
the evidence is circumstantial. For example, he was an Ibo 
like the coup leaders and was not killed unlike similarly 
ranking officers of other tribes; he stepped into the leadership 
of the country adter the Ibo majors had liquidated the political 
leaders and he promoted the mainly Ibo majors to the depleted 
senior ranks. Whatever the truth, the tribal version was 
believed by enough of the non-Ibo officers in the army to 
create unrest. The May Decrees which proposed to abolish the 
Federation and set up a unitary state were seen as confirmation 
of the Ibo plot theory because it was believed that the Ibos 
had the most to gain from a unitary state under one civil 
service, one political system and one army command. (214) The 
military government faced open hostility from the North and 
in a series of bloody riots against Ibos in the Northern regions, 
in which hundreds were killed, the tribal tensions began to 
break through. Ironsi's solution to the regional system of 
government based on the tribal areas (in effect) was to try 
to impost a centralised state to remove the regional identities. 
The fact that the centralised state was being run by an Ibo-led 
military government, because of the over-representation in the 
upper ranks by Ibos, did not make this solution an attractive 
proposition to the other tribes. The January conspirators, 
who had been arrested after the Ironsi coup, were not brought 
to trial and this did nothing to assuage the feelings of 
insecurity among the other tribes. 
The Northern region was not governable under the Ironsi 
regime without a total subjugation, requiring a massive 
military presence, and, of course, the existence of a firmly 
united military force. The tribal divisions in Nigeria in the 
army, stirred up by the what was taken to be a tribal coup, 
precluded such a solution. To move troops into the Northern 
region would have been provocative under other conditions, and 
there was no hope of being able to do so with tribal tensions 
within the combat commands. Ibo Majors with Northern Captains 
in the same unit and a mixture of tribes in the ranks did not 
make for a formidable fighting force; there were therefore 
grave doubts as to their reliability. 
On July 29) 1966 the counter-coup took place. Ironsi was 
executed and so were any Ibo officers, that the coup makers 
could get their hands one except in the East region where 
Ojukwu managed to beat the potential rebels to the armoury and 
prevent them getting weapons to repeat the actions of other 
parts of the country. The counter-coup was entirely tribally 
motivated, it was a case of outright revenge for the January 
coup in which Northerners died and which the Northerners believed 
only the Ibos gained from. Lieutenant Colonel Gowan, the 
remaining senior officer, took over the country in much the 
same style as Ironsi had in the midst of the January coup. 
There was a leadership vacuum created by the elimination of the 
established government and therefore the senior commander took 
control because there was no obvious alternatives. He secured 
a larger measure of support among the non-Ibo tribes firstly 
simply because he was not an Ibo (this placated the North) and 
secondly he releasOd the jailed western politician Chief 
Awolowo, which placated the West. The massacres of Ibos on a 
large scale ensured that the Eastern region would be as 
unforgiving as they were hostile to what they regarded, with 
abundant justification, as an anti-Ibo program. 
Gowan's solution to the unsuitable tribal character of 
the Federation was entirely different to Ironsi's; he did not 
propose a unitary state but went in the other direction and 
put forward a new Federation based on a break-up of the three 
major regions into twelve smaller ones. This kept the federal 
structure, safeguarded some element of local interests whi3. e 
preventing them remaining the overwhelming problem that they 
were in the larger regions, and assuaged any fears that there 
was a tribal plan to dominate the whole of the country by one 
tribe. This was a brilliant constitutional scheme, at least 
in theory, but the Eastern leaders would not agree to it, and 
this disagreement and distrust was pushed by them to the point 
of secession. 
The Biafran civil war was over irreconciable issues: 
what kind of federal structure was suitable for Nigeria (the 
Gowan side) and the entirely separate issue of whether the 
Eastern region was to be a part of any form of Nigeria-- (the 
Ojukwu side). (11) Secession was not a new alternative to 
the Nigerian crisis; it had been mooted before - if the three 
regions cannot stay together in peace they might as well 
separate, but to separate without agreement meant they could 
only separate by force of arms. The civil war settled this 
issue. There was to be united and federal Nigeria, with a 
military leadership that was not dominated by any tribal group 
(Gowon is of the minority Anga tribe from the Northern region) 
and a period of transition to civilian political rule (1976) 
during which time political parties on a national rather than 
regional basis were to be created. (Zö) 
The problems of ruling Nigeria under the old system were 
insurmountable as the balance of forces made them disintegrative 
and in addition Nigeria had all the other problems of economic 
under-development. The political structure that emerged from 
the 1966-70 confrontations had two things in its favour: it had 
been created by a leadership that emerged partly by the fortune 
of survival and partly by rising to the events, the former 
creating the opportunity for the latter, and secondly, the 
alternatives of unitary and secessionist solutions had been 
violently liquidated as viable propositions thereby removing 
the disturbing presence of ready-made but untried plausible 
utopias. 
Nigeria's post-independence constitution was unworkable 
and was bound to lead to a crisis. This took the form of 
intervention by the majors in 1966. The country was shaping 
up for illegal interventions from both the military and the 
civilian politicians in the first six years of independence. (24) 
There were one or two quite serious attempts at conspiracy and 
subversion before the Major's coup. (30) The prospects for a 
return to civilian rule in the near future are not good (1973) 
and while the economic boom following the Biafran war continues, 
and the military leadership continues without crisis, the 
conditions for a change in political system are unlikely to 
emerge. 
d) Ghana 
In Ghana the constitution left behind by the departing 
British was, in contrast, quite workable and it required the 
single-minded effort of the Nkrumuah over several years to 
create the conditions for military intervention. 
Ghana was the constitutionalist hope in Africa. (3() 
It was the first British African territory to gain independence. 
Independence brought to power Kwame Nkrumah, a popular national- 
ist figure who transformed his political movement the Convention 
Peoples Party (CPP) from the leading political party into the 
only political party, with himself as absolute ruler. Nkrumah 
described himself as the Osagyefo (redeemer), The Aweful, the 
Achiever, the Ruthless, the Valorous, the Quencher of Fires, 
the Fount of Honour, the Father of Nation, the Brave Warrior, 
the Renewer of All Things, (3Z) and he was and remains, a 
controversial figure in post-independence African history. 
He certainly regarded himself as being at the same level of 
importance as Nasser, Sukarno or Nehru, and if personality was 
the only grounds for comparison there was some substance in 
his claim, if only in a negative way. He was also a more 
vulgar version of Stalin or Mao in the creation of his 
personality cult and his strident, as well as naive, ideological 
writings bear an obvious stylistic resemblance to Marxist 
literature. (33) 
The February 1966 army and police coup ended his 
'Presidency for Life' and the rule of his political machine. 
He had eliminated all organised opposition, all independent 
political life, and relied entirely on the forces of the state 
for survival. Once he threatened this base the outcome was 
inevitable. (lilt) 
Ruth First adopts an interesting view of Nkrumuah and 
the Ghana coup: 
"Nkrumuah's government might have been a case of 
socialism badly manque; but its successor regime, 
far from restoring the health of a dependent economy, 
has delivered it to the system responsible for the 
poverty and the exploitation of all the Third 
World". (Sd) 
This type of apologetic for one-party dictatorships which are 
ideologically approved of is a disturbing feature of much of 
the writings on the Third World. Because Ghana under Nkrumah 
was allegedly a socialist country, her argument goes, the 
dictatorship and its ugly features are not of decisive 
importance. But to go on and judge his successors for 
association with something called the "system" which is allegedly 
"responsible for the poverty and exploitation of all the Third 
World" is absurd hyperbole. The implication that Nkrumah's 
marque socialism was preferable to his successor's on the 
grounds that Nkrumah was only guilty of domestic legalistic 
sins while the successors were party to all the Third World's 
poverty and exploitation has only to be stated to be seen to 
be in desparate need of qualification. It would be more honest 
for the many scholars who think similarly, to simply state their 
preferences for certain dictators, no matter what they dog and 
leave it at that. 
The major problem of dictatorships (right or left) is in 
ensuring the security of their political structure against 
challenges from within. This is why there is a close associa- 
tion between personal paranoia and dictatorial behaviour (a 
condition that gets worse with time). ( +) The problem is 
exacerbated in a developing country by the scarcity of a 
bureaucratic elite. The support apparatus of the dictatorship 
in a developing country is already thin on the ground. Through 
the inevitable purges of "conspirators"; real and imaginging, 
the elite is replenished by inadequately trained persons because 
the virtues of loyalty over-ride their competence. The paranoic 
condition also worsens through time. The atmosphere of 
insecurity purveyed by the dictator and his immediate circle 
permeates to the personnel whose function it is to provide for 
his safety. (31 The dictator becomes vulnerable to the very 
thing he is most insecure about. 
Errors of judgement by the security forces in matters 
affecting the dictator's safety are highlighted in disciplinary 
measures and threats to all whom the dictator feels is guilty. 
If the security services are 'terrorised' into blocking loop- 
holes in the security net around the dictator, and feel 
disgruntled in the process, it is but a short step for them to 
consider the only means of redress open to them, the coup, the 
mechanics of which they have become specialists in. The dictator 
is least protected if the situation in the country is insecure 
and hostile to the regime. The security services function as 
intelligence fatherers would give them a relatively accurate 
picture of what was really happening in the country, and if, 
for many reasons, they do not pass this information on to the 
dictator (for fear of criticism and punishment), they increase 
things in their favour in planning a coup. 
They are experts in the security of the regime and there- 
fore know how to strike at its weakest points. They also know 
best when is the most opportune time from the point of view of 
the internal political situation. When the three factors of 
ability, conditions and motive are present the dictatorship is 
vulnerable. In Ghana, Nkrumah's excesses had created the 
conditions of popular dissatisfaction. The chief of police 
and the top army leaders were in favour of action and they had 
also the advantage of keeping out of the country in China. The 
Ghana coup of February 24 1966 is largely explained by these 
circumstances. (9) It may certainly have been weakened by 
Nkrumah's many international enemies but their support was not 
erratical to the seizure of power. 
e) Conclusions 
The basic cause of military intervention shown up in 
these cases is the failure of the political structure to 
produce stable political parties that accept the essential 
rules of a parliamentary democracy. Where political parties 
fail, either the military must intervene or personal dictator- 
ships must try to become established. Africa's experience to 
date has been in favour of the military solution. If the 
political leadership can be re-instated (such as in Sierra 
Leone's case where Dr. Stevens found refuge in Guinea) the 
military can be replaced. (3'1) Where the political leadership 
is physically destroyed (Nigeria) there is little prospect of 
an early return to civilian rule. In Ghana's case the political 
leadership was hopelessly compromised in the defects of the 
Nkrumah regime or represented minority interests (such as 
Dr. Busia) which when given an opportunity to re-instate 
civilian rule do not have wide enough support for a long enough 
time to establish stable civilian government. The result, in 
Ghana's case was the re-intervention of the military in 
January 1972. 
(eo) 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE MILITARY IN PAKISTAN AND INDONESIA 
a) Introduction 
The military in Pakistan and Indonesia intervened as a 
result of the unconstitutional actions of political leaders. 
This Chapter tries to analyse the process of political suicide 
that the civilian political leadership embarked upon in order 
to pursue their objective of absolute power. In the cases 
discussed here the civilian political forces attempted to ride 
the tiger and became its first victims. In Pakistan the 
military leaders took power in a constitutional vacuum created 
by the civilian leadership and with the additional intentions 
of forstalling military intervention led from the junior ranks. 
In Indonesia the murderous assault on the army leadership by 
Communist led troops backfired, largely through incompetence, 
and the surviving army leaders took power and exacted a terrible 
revenge. In both cases the military had been built into a 
powerful machine by foreign assistance and were prvoked into 
action by events rather than ambition. 
b) Pakistan 
t 
Pakistan was from its inception a state disunited in 
everything except the Muslim religion. It was divided geograph- 
ically by 1,000 miles of Indian territory, by ethnic and 
language differences, and by communal tensions (exascerbated 
in the East to the point of secession in 1971). One Government 
Minister, Abdul Mansur Ahmad, described Pakistan's problem as 
"creating one state out of two countries and one nation out of 
two peoples". (I ) He could have added to the number of peoples 
and countries to be united and still have been accurate. A 
unified Pakistan was essentially mythological and a parliamentary 
governed one almost impossible. The minorities in Pakistan are 
quite substantial e. g. Bengal Pakistan had over half the 
population within it. Passionate minority activity, often 
myopic and partisan in the perception of their own interests, 
will always weaken the political system and hold back nation- 
building. (Compare with Nigeria). Without nation-building 
a divided country will be ungovernable. If the state is to 
continue it must either transform the sectarian conflicts 
into a national interest or reconstitute itself around an 
authoritarian centralist structure, such as the army. 
(2) 
The pose the problems in this way is not to ascribe to 
the actual process by which it was worked out a consciousness 
that rose to the occasion and resolved the matter directly. 
Time is a ruthless eliminator of alternatives. In Pakistan 
it took nine years to draw up a Constitution and that was 
operated for only two years. (-. -0) In the period while the 
constitution was being argued over the executitive of the 
country was moulded on the former British Viceroy system. (9') 
The Governor-Generals of Pakistan were: Mohammed Ali Jinnah 
(1947-48); Liquat Ali Khan (1948-51); (though the title 
belonged to Khwaja Nazimuddin) ; Ghulan Mohammed (1951-55); and 
General Iskander Mirza (1955-56). 
Ghulan Mohammed was the first to act unconstitutionally 
when he sacked Nazimudden as Prime Minister. Ntazimudden had 
swapped the Governor-General's post for Prime Minister after 
the death of the powerful Liquat Ali Khan - politicians tend 
to gravitate towards the source of effective power. The 
sacking of Nazimudden by Mohammed was not challenged and it 
signified the movement of the centre of power to the Governor- 
General. He went on to dissolve the Constituent Assembly on 
24 October 19542 with army support, and bought into the 
Cabinet, the army leader, Ayub Khan. In March 1955 he assigned 
to himself the right to rule by decree thus consolidating 
executive power firmly into his hands. This was not a popular 
move and he was forced to resign; the country was given a last 
chance at parliamentary government. 
The Defence Secretary, General Iskander Mirza, took over 
as Governor-General and he became Pakistan's first president 
when the new constitution was implemented in March 1956. The 
new constitution did not resolve any of the difficulties in 
running the country, it only gave them a new form of expression. 
No party could get a majority and the system of blocking 
coalitions operated to frustrate the opportunities of party 
government given by the constitution. 
While many of the cleavages in the country were articulated 
in the political system some major ones were not, such as the 
problems of the landless peasant and other underpriviliged 
groups. Personal cliques, bribery and corruption, and the ever 
present system of party manoeuvering, drove Pakistan into 
political stagnation, the one condition that it was not suited 
for. 
The long awaited General Election to elect a National 
Assembly was postponed for one reason or another under the 
very constitution that had been designed to ensure free 
elections. While there were no national elections there could 
be no national political parties and therefore no national 
cohesion or national interest. The delay in setting up a 
national political structure permitted local political machines 
to flourish and entrench themselves. Local politics in this 
situation tend to be negative rather than broadly representa- 
tives of nationwide groupings. (They combine in a microcosm 
all the worst features of Third World political machines). 
There can be no overlap of discensus is such a system, it is 
zero-sum activity, aimed at preventing others getting anything 
if the locality, or sect, represented by the party is not 
getting what it thinks is due. All effort is directed at 
stopping any change until the full (extreme) demands are met, 
irrespective of the overall damage to the national interest. 
The national government faced external threats as well. 
In Kashmir it was in dispute with India and there were tensions 
with Afghanistan and India over water rights. The Muslim League 
and the Awami League were both in opposition to President Mirza, 
who was surviving in a Bismarkian style by dividing his 
opponents. (S) This further weakened the party system. He 
had formed a Republican Party to counter-act the other political 
parties but this identified his (small) political base more than 
it threatened the other parties. 
Mirza wanted to be re-elected President in the forthcoming 
General Election and he also favoured a larger role for the 
presidency than envisaged in most parliamentary systems. At 
this stage Mirza attempted the kind of activity that his 
predecessor, Ghulan Mohammed, had failed to carry through in 
1955. Both leaders were forced to feel their way to a solution 
of the political crisis along the lines of a centralist 
presidency. This had brought Ghulan Mohammed down. Mirza was 
therefore defying precedent, and he was attempting to change 
the constitution in a shorter time scale (two years) than the 
eight years it had taken to create the Governor-General system. 
For the plan to work, the army was required to go along with 
measures that dispersed the political parties and gave greatly 
enhanced powers to the presidency. The army was also a much 
more modern army than before, having been modernised by 
generous American aid, (negotiated by . Ayub 
Khan). The army 
was stronger in 1958 and the political system weaker. 
There was a virtual two stage military coup. A brawl 
in the National Assembly, which fatally injured the Speaker, 
dragged parliamentary prestige to near zero-point and gave 
Mirza the opportunity to step in. On 7 October 1958 the 
President assumed full powers; he ended the 1956 constitution, 
dismissed the cabinet, disolved the Assemblies, banned all 
political parties, made a few arrests and declared Martial Law. 
The army commander, Ayub Khan was given the task of enforcing 
these decrees. Without a constitution it is difficult to see 
on what basis Mirza considered his power rest. 
The army upper-echolons were subject to the changes taking 
place in the country and aware of the pressures building up 
within their own ranks. The officer corps was a more broadly 
recruited class in 1958 than it was in 19+8. The European and 
Pacific Wars had opened its ranks to lower middle-class and 
landowning families. Men of the commercial classes and academic 
backgrounds joined the army in the post-independence years in 
large numbers. In 1957 there were 3,000 applications for 80 
vacancies in the officer cadets. (Co) This kind of change had 
been taking place in other Third World armies and it had 
produced different solutions. In Egypt the younger officers 
were sufficiently different from the older officers to have 
completely different political and social outlooks and after 
the coup in 1952 they simply retired the whole lot (a similar 
pattern occured in Iraq after 1958). The younger officer 
solution in Egypt and Iraq did not pass unnoticed in Pakistan. 
The common conditions existing in each country immediately 
before the coups - dissatisfaction in the junior ranks with 
the kind of status quo that the senior officers were prone 
to prefer - presented the senior Pakistani officers with a 
dilemma: either step in against the President or have one of 
their junior commanders do it without them. The July 1958 
Iraq coup had increased this pressure by public example. 
Ayub Khan carried out President Mirza's orders of 7 October 
and a few weeks later he was appointed Prime Minister. On 
27 October, with his position secure, the opposition dispersed 
and the president totally dependent upon him, he dismissed the 
President. (1) Mirza had created the situation with a 
careless abandon that defies explanation. Mirza's position as 
President rested on the Constitution which he had overthrown 
or it depended on the willingness, or otherwise, of the 
instruments of his power (the army and the police). He 
abrogated the constitution on the grounds of political chaos 
and technically liquidated his own legality. It was a fragile 
base to build a personal dictatorship. Only the army could 
enforce the fiction of his legality and this made him vulnerable 
to what the army, in the person of its commander, Ayub Khan, 
had in mind for the effective running of the state. Ayub 
obviously decided that the fiction was a brittle defence 
against potential coup-makers in the junior ranks. 
If the fiction of the Presidency was left in Mirza's 
hands this tied the army leadership to Mirza's fortune. If 
Mirza was allowed to consolidate his power he might drag the 
army into any number of unpleasant adventures which if they 
aborted would tarnish them as targets for popular criticism 
(and retributions) as well. It was better by far to 
reorganise the political structure with the army at the 
head, and Ayub at the head of the army, and rely on one's 
own fortune. (9 ) 
Thus the Ayub coup arose out of a defencive strategy 
against the unknowns of personal dictatorship and the fact 
that the conditions for military intervention in the country 
were present, and which, on past and recent form, had 
produced actions directed not just against the established 
ruler but also against the established army command. Ayub's 
coup prevented that scenario and for the next ten years he 
was to rule the country without interruption. (Cl) 
c) Indonesia 
The civil-military situation in Indonesia does not lend 
itself to a simplistic sequence in which the military supplants 
the civilian power along the lines of the normal political 
models of the literature. (10) Indonesian politics were inter- 
woven in such a way as to produce a defensive counter-coup 
against a political insurrection led by the Communist Party of 
Indonesia, and later against the Executive (President Sukarno), 
in which the army as an independent social force was threatened 
with extinction. The military did not conspire to intervene 
and overthrow the established Government. It reacted to a 
situation that had been developing for a long time. 
It would also be simplistic to suggest that the army's 
intention as the only homogeneous force was related to 
Indonesia's geography. The country is dispersed over a thousand 
miles of ocean and as many islands, and has a multitude of 
dialects, customs and cultures, and also suffers all the normal 
disabilities of a pre-industrial economic system. An obvious 
criticism of the homogeneity thesis (in so far as this 
homogeneity is considered to be an inherent characteristic of 
the military) is that the army was as bitterly divided as any 
other structure in Indonesia. It was a constant source of 
instability throughout the 1960's. The civilian political 
instability -a host of parties and ideological schisms - had 
its reflection inside the armed forces and led to intercine 
conflicts and clashes over issues. (11) 
The factionalism in the army is, however, important to 
an understanding of what was happening to the military during 
the period and how this was preparing it for its role in 1965. 
The army factionalism can be compared with the equally 
factionalised political structure but there were crucial 
differences in the effect of factionalism in both structures. 
Within the hierarchical army structure factionalism purged the 
army of dissidents as each successive (and unsuccessful) 
challenge to central authority resulted in organisational 
retribution. When a political party splits over principle, 
or personality, the result is two parties in place of one. 
When a military structure splits there can be only one victor 
and one structure remaining; the losers are paid off, killed 
or exiled; they cannot set up another army and challenge the 
central army's monopoly of violence. Through this process 
the army was, by the 1960's, becoming more orderly, more 
professional and less ideological than it was in the early 
days of the republic. It was the factionalism which produced 
a relatively homogeneous force in the military, not its 
inherent nature. 
The uneasy fusion of the guerilla troops, with their 
ideological motivations, and the Dutch or Japanese trained 
soldiers who came over to the independence struggle and out 
of which the Indonesian army was formed, was the single most 
disintegrative feature of the army in the early years. 
Moreover, the major issues of communism, in all its variants, 
and Islam, were paralleled in the army 
in the confrontations 
and rebellions against central authority. These ideological 
struggles about what form of political system was to be 
adopted in Indonesia were compounded in many cases by outright 
separatist or half-way federalist tensions arising from the 
geographical spread of the country. 
The natural selection process that was inevitable in the 
army, because the central authority was not successfully 
challenged, resulted in the decline in the numbers of 
ideologically committed officers, at least of the extremist 
variety from left and right wing and the emergence of officers 
committed to centralist Indonesia. This trend coincided with, 
but was not necessarily in phase with, a decline in the 
confidence of the army officers with civilian political leaders 
and movements that appeared to be making a negative contribution 
to Indonesia and the kind of nationalism favoured by the army. 
The army was, then, not a ready made unifying force, but became 
one through a long process of seemingly endless factionalism. (12) 
At the same time the age composition of the army was 
changing. When General Sudirman became Army Commander in 19+5 
he was only 33 (about the same age as Libya's Colonel Gadafy 
when he came to power in 1971) and most of his officers were 
in their twenties. In 1965 a large proportion of the army 
officers were products of the Republic and not of the previous 
period of struggles against the Dutch. (13) 
For thirteen months, from March 1956 to April 1957, 
Indonesia had a directly elected Government. It was the first 
and only experiment in parliamentary democracy. (14) For the 
rest of the time it was ruled by nominated political leaders 
in legislative institutions, at the head of which was President 
Sukarno. From 1957 to 1965, President Sukarno ruled almost 
entirely by executive action. However, it was not the non- 
elected character of Indonesia's political system that provoked 
military intervention. In itself the system worked, in the 
strict sense that it limited the damage caused by party 
conflicts. The problem was that the army was not represented 
in the political system and this exclusion was bound to cause 
tensions whenever the administration neglected, threatened or 
interfered with army interests. And these interests were 
increasingly articulated by an increasingly more rationalistic 
army. 
The first major crisis occured in 1952 when military units 
of the Army Command took to the streets of Jakarta for a few 
hours on October 17. It was meant as a display of strength 
for the President. The Chiefs of Staff, Major-General T. B. 
Simatupang and Colonel A. H. Nasution, led a delegation to 
confer with Sukarno and requested the dismissal of the appointed 
parliament and the Cabinet. The Defence Minister had declared 
his intention to cut military expenditure through a forty per 
cent reduction in army strength by the end of 1953. The army 
leaders were not reconciled to the idea of such substantial 
cuts though they did have preferences as to which kind of 
troops would be sacrificed if some cuts were imposed. (if) 
The affair highlighted the basic weakness of the Indonesian 
political system: the Cabinet could not claim a mandate without 
an election, and this made the army leaders no more and no less 
representative of Indonesia's interests than the politicians. 
Moreover, the army also demonstrated its ability to exert 
pressure on the President. This incident marks the beginning 
of the army's entry into politics as a institution and it was 
followed up in 1955 by a declaration against civilian 
interference in the army's affairs. 
The incident also prompted the civilian leaders in the 
direction of democratisation through directly elected parliaments 
that would answer criticism as to their being non-representative. 
Elections would also re-inforce the claims of the politicians 
to legitimacy. At the same time it placed at risk the party 
state, for if a demcratically elected parliament failed, the 
political system would have to look elsewhere for stability. 
The Communists and the Islamic forces saw this as their 
opportunity to fashion Indonesia according to their image of a 
properly run society. The President, whose personality, 
ambitions and charasmatic role can never be left out in under- 
standing Indonesia at this time, may also have seen 
democratisation as a step towards absolute power through the 
party he helped found, the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI). 
While the immediate army challenge came to nothing - the 
President dispensed liberal dosages of sympathy towards the 
officers but nothing else - the turning point in the 
situation had been rendered. 
Forty parties contested the General Election in 1955. 
The results for the major parties are shown in Table One. 
The Islamic Parties, which had split out of the Masjumi in 
the early fifties, polled 43.5 per cent of the vote. The 
communists polled 16.4 per cent and two years later they were 
to continue their progress with large gains at the expense of 
the nationalists in local elections. (14) The position of the 
Communists was strengthened as Sukarno came to rely upon them 
for support in the early sixties and they emerged as the major 
contender for power. 
"Given protection from army repression ... by 
Sukarno, and aided by his "revolutionary" stress, 
the Party grew to claim a membership of about 
three million by mid 196+, and another fifteen 
million among its affiliated mass organisations 
of youth, labour, women, farmers and so forth. " ( i? ) 
The large number of parties that gained seats in the 
election made coalition government inevitable. There were 
three major political parties in parliament: the Nationalists, 
the Islamic parties and the Communists. The Islamic and 
Communist parties were bitter enemies and missed no opportunities 
for factional attacks on each other. The ensuing inter-coalition 
battles led to blocking coalitions such that no matter what 
Table One 
Indonesia: Percentage of the Vote and Number of Seats 
1955 General Election 
Party Percentage Number of 
of the Vote Seats 
Indonesia National Party 22.3 57 
Masjumi 20.9 57 
Religious Scholars League 18.4 45 
Communist Party (PKI) 16.1+ 39 
Islamic Party Association 2.9 8 
Christian Party 2.6 8 
Catholic Party 2.0 6 
Socialist Party 2.0 5 
Ikati Pendukung Kemererdekan 1.4 4 
Islamic Education Movement 1.3 4 
National Rakyat Party 0.6 2 
Others 9.2 22 
100 257 
Source: A. Van Merle, The First Indonesian Parliamentary 
Election, Indonesia, IX; 1956; Table Adjusted. 
mixture of parties was enticed into a coalition there were 
sufficient votes left in opposition to make such a coalition 
impracticable and unstable. In 1957 the attempts to form a 
new cabinet failed and Sukarno, wearied by the whole business 
of representative democracy, intervened and declared Martial 
Law. 
Local rebellions and dissidence in the country combined 
with party political in-fighting made the situation unstable. (Is) 
The putting down of the rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi 
brought the army into closer affinity with the President who 
at the time embodied the ethos of One Indonesia. The President, 
the Communists, the Islamic Masjumi and the Army entered into a 
period of struggle for supremacy. 
In 1958 Sukarno, with the support of the Communists, and 
rival Islamic factions, banned the Masjumi, the largest of the 
Islamic parties, along with the smaller Socialist Party. This 
eliminated one of the contenders within the upper elite. The 
communists grew in strength and the balance of power in the 
country made the President a political prisoner alternating 
between appeasing the army or the Communists. The Communists 
were aided in their efforts by the diplomatic assistance of the 
Chinese Peoples Republic and Sukarno's foreign policy 
adventures. Sukarno's alternative to representative democracy 
was "Guided Democracy"; a thinly disguised form of personal 
rule. Some of the foreign policy adventures were a success, 
such as the campaign against Dutch New Guinea (1963) but others 
were poor failures, the most notable being the "confrontation" 
with Malaysia which mobilised vase resources and undermined 
the economy. 
The defence budget increased enormously but was largely 
spent on forming a modern airforce and navy. The American 
trained army became suspicious that their neglect was deliberate 
and that alternative forces were being consciously built-up 
which could be used to neutralise the army in a showdown. 
While Peking courted Indonesia as a brother Asian power, the 
Russians courted him to offset the Chinese diplomatic successes 
and supplied much of the military equipment that Sukarno 
wanted. A list of major weapon exports from Russia and Eastern 
Europe shows the extent of the non-army military build-up. 
Table Two 
Russian Military Aid to Indonesia 1958-65 
Fighters 108 
Bombers 68 
Transports/Helicopters 38 
Missiles 396 
Attack Ships 21 
Submarines 4 
Gunboats 73 
Support Ships 3 
Source: S. I. P. R. I., The Arms Trade with the Third World, 
op cit, p. 824-826; Thayer, The War Business, New 
York, 1971, gives slightly different figures for 
some of the items, e. g. 12 submarines and 8 not 
6 destroyers, as well as "helicopters, tanks, 
anti-aircraft guns, field artiller ... and small 
arms". p. 328. 
The army was in desperate straights to even pay its troops 
and in some areas illegally "taxed" local businesses. (11) The 
"confrontation" project with Malaysia was carried out by them 
diminishing enthusiasm. General Nasution was critical of the 
President's policies and was promoted "upstairs". (2-0) The 
drain went on and reached, according to one estimate, a 
military appropriation of as much as 75 per cent of the 
Government's budget. (2. t) 
Nasution tried, before his "promotion", to turn the army 
to a "middle-way" project of combining defence with development 
and it was the effect of the President's militant foreign policy 
which frustrated such a role for the army that eventually turned 
him away from unconditional support for Sukarno. (L2) The 
evidence suggests that the army was not directing nor gaining 
from the military build-up of 1963-65 and that it came in 
consequence to oppose the defence spending levels. This is in 
contrast to accepted views of the military as an unqualified 
force for militarism constantly seeking, irresponsibly, to 
increase its budget and embroil the government in foreign 
adventures. Governments, apparently, can sometimes drag alone 
an unwilling military-industrial complex. 
The increased military spending was accompanied by a 
billion dollars of Soviet equipment "sold" to the Government. (t) 
The Americans provided only 95 million worth up to 1952 for 
internal security. (Z`f) Although the bulk of the equipment 
did not go to the army it was dependent after 1959 for Soviet 
supplies of small arms and these replaced its American and 
war-surplus weapons. (14) (There was also some local 
production under licence of the Italian Beretta qmm sub- 
machine guns and the M-1 rifle). 
The Russians were no doubt wary of arming such an out- 
spoken critic of communism as the army. (2`) The military 
take-over was not a consequence of the arms build-up) because 
this arms build-up did not place the army in a commanding 
position as was the case following American military exports 
to Turkey. Quite a different relationship exists in Indonesia 
between the rise of the military budgets and the army take-over. 
The sharp rise in defence budgets, the unpopular confrontation 
with Malaysia, the growth of Russian influence within the armed 
services (an inevitable consequence of using Russian weaponry 
and the associated training programme) and the allignment with 
Chinese foreign policy interestý)contributed to a sense of 
paranoia in the army. They reacted ruthlessly and violently 
when their survival as an institution was finally made real 
in 1965. It was, in fact, the high defence spending and its 
associated policies, that forced the army to fight for survival 
and not the growth of the parasitic army that forced the state 
to collapse. 
The mechanics of the coups of October 1965 can only be 
understood in this context. (7.1) The first coup of September 
30 to October 12 was directed against the army High Command, 
in the name of the President. Six of the top ranking 
Generals were kidnapped and executed. Generals Nasution and 
Suharto escaped and organised the counter-coup (which also 
issued orders in the name of the President). The coup was 
defeated and the ensuing revenge campaigns saw the physical 
decimation of the Indonesian Communist Party (Zg) and the 
reduction of the contenders for power from these two: the 
President and the Army. The ailing President had mass support 
and it was substantial enough for him to be extended the 
courtesies of office by the army leaders, although there was 
some circumstantial evidence of his complicity in the 
Communist coup. But within six months the decision to remove 
him was taken and, under army pressure, he signed away his 
"powers" to General Suharto. (24) On 11 March 1966 the army 
took over the Government of the country without opposition. 
They have ruled since then with undisputed title to government 
and are now experimenting in a new version of "Guided 
Democracy". (SO) 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
ARAB MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 
a) Introduction 
Military interventions in the Arab Middle East have been 
dominated in the past twenty years by the personality and 
leadership of Gamal Abdul Nasser. His influence extended 
beyond the borders of Egypt throughout his leadership up to 
his death in office in 1971. There were of course numerous 
Arab military interventions before the Free Officers seized 
power from King Farouk in 1952, and there have been numerous 
since. But Nasser's pre-eminence in the Arab world was a 
product of the circumstances of the transformation of the Arab 
countries from semi-dependent to independent states (symbolised 
by the great struggles against the British over the Suez Canal) 
and of his own concept of his special mission to be undisputed 
leader of the Arab nations. 
This Chapter discusses the rise to power of Nasser in the 
Egyptian coup of 1952 and his ruthless elimination of his 
co-conspirators in the Free Officers leadership. This period 
tells us a lot about Nasser's political skills. We then look 
at his role in the interventions and instability of two Arab 
countries, Syria and Iraq. The interventions in Syria and 
Iraq after 1958 were inter-linked at several points in the 
international struggles between the three main forces in the 
Arab nationalist movement, the Ba'athists, the Communists 
and the Nasserists. These intercine struggles throughout the 
1960's have produced a more independent type of nationalism 
in Syria and Iraq than existed in the 1950's. Since the death 
of Nasser there have been new elements in the Arab nationalist 
movement - the rise of Ghadaffy of Libya, the resurgence of 
the Palestinian guerilla movements, and the rivalry that is 
developing between Iraq and Iran. 
b) ERvpt1s Revolutions 
Nasserism is now a spent force, not just because of 
Nasser's death but probably in spite of it. Egypt's strategic 
position and its special relationship with the Russians gave 
it prestige and influence up to the Six Day War. After the 
war Nasserism was finished as the driving force for the Arab 
cause; Nasser was transformed from the major leader of the 
cause into its ''grand old man'. The new spirits of self- 
reliance; and an Islamic nationalism looking in new directions 
(south of the Sahara and east of the Gulf), less dependent on 
Russian goodwill, in search of an Arab solution to the problems 
of the region, largely replaced the Nasserist idea as the 
inspiration for the young Arab officers in the armies of the 
region. The commercial successes of the oil producing countries 
in gaining larger shares of the oil revenues from the Western 
oil companies probably had, and will continue to have, a 
larger impact on the Arab cause than the Nasserist "gains" 
against the British over Suez. Firstly, the British have gone 
and their presence is just a memory and secondly, the Six Day 
War reduced the strategic importance of Suez from international 
proportions to that of an anti-tank ditch across Sinai. 
President Sadat is no Nasser in the Arab World. He was 
left with the remnants of a strategy that had reduced Egypt's 
ability to provide leadership against Israel to that of a 
purveyor of slogans and empty promises. Libya's leaders start 
with the singular advantage of youth. Because they have not 
done very much, they have not made any fundamental mistakes - 
their reputation is intact, and more important, it is backed 
up by oil revenues. They do not suffer from the disadvantages 
of Algeria, Boumedienne who seized power in 1964. ALgeria is 
distant from the confrontation with Israel, and is inevitably 
still influenced by its former French connections. 
U3Libya 
can 
appear more Arab, more Islamic, and more often, before the 
Arab youth than the Algerians, and now the Egyptians, as the 
proto-type of the Arab militant for the 1970's. But their 
ability to do this is a product of the previous period of 
Nasser's dominance in Egypt and his influence on other Arab 
powers. 
c) The Rise of Nasserism 
If Indonesia's army was dragged into politics by events, 
Egypt's stepped in with alacrity. (Z) The Free Officers in 
1952 were junior in rank (Lieutenant Colonels and Majors) and 
in their early or middle-thirties. Many of them had been 
engaged in politics since their twenties (Nasser was only 21 
when he became politically active). ('3) Egypt, being an 
occupied country, was bound to have an ideological nationalism 
expressed from within its officer corps in common with other 
elites in the country. The targets against which the army 
officers aimed their (largely hidden) disgust were the general 
enemies of Egyptian nationhood but not the monarchy as an 
institution. Their goal was an unspecified national resurgence 
and rejuvenation. The World War interrupted the development of 
the "conspiracy", though some, such as Sadat who succeeded 
Nasser as President in 1971 were active throughout the war. 
N) 
There was plenty of fuel for nationalist dissension in 
Egypt after the war. The military occupation by the British, 
the creation of the state of Israel and the apparent inability 
of the monarchical regime to meet Arab and Egyptian aspirations 
in these matters, kindled the fires of subversion and created 
groups, like the group to which Nasser belonged, to move from 
vague idealistic notions of a Greater Egypt to determined 
opposition to the established regime. An attempt was made to 
prepare a military coup in 19+8 but police surveillance was 
enough to confine the movement to a discussion. 
(5) The 
officers who returned from the debacle of the 19+8 War against 
Israel were even more convinced of the necessity of action. 
In 1949 there were three military coups in Syria. The 
Palestinian War was the catalyst that brought the Syrian military 
into politics - the army was used to preserve public order 
provoked by a popular need to expatiate feelings of utter 
dismay at the Arab's performance against Israel. (6) Egyptian 
officers were conscious of the Syrian example and it is probably 
connected with the Syrian events that the Free Officers Movement 
went "operational" from 19+9. 
The conspirators had potential allies with political 
connections to wider layers of the population than were open to 
the army. There was, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood who 
opposed the existing order (it had let down Islam). The 
differences between the extremist Muslim sect and the Free 
Officers were implicit in the Free Officer's secularism and the 
Muslim's universalism. The Officers were Egyptian nationalists 
first and Muslims second; the Muslim's reversed that order and 
espoused a trans-nationalism, with the vision of Muslim nation- 
hood rather than the narrower Egyptian nationalism. The army 
conspirators had to tread carefully in their dealings with the 
Muslim Brotherhood, organisationally separating themselves from 
them and, at the same time, keeping in touch with the forces 
that the Brotherhood had influence over, to pull them behind 
their own nascent revolution 
Cl) when the time came. 
Another opposition group was led by the communists. ($ ) 
They presented a similar problem. The communists supported 
the nationalist movement as a first stage in the proletarian 
struggle and a prelude to social change. It was a Stalinist 
version of the 'permanent revolution'. The Egyption Communist 
Party cadres were to be sacrificed by the Russians later when 
Soviet foreign policy interests in the Nasserite break with 
the West required it. The officers maintained contact with 
the communists and with other groups such as the Wafdists. (q ) 
The opposition groups were engaged in mass agitation, 
officially encouraged by the Government, but the campaign got 
out of hand and led to serious disorders and clashes with 
British troops. The Farouk regime was using the disturbances 
to bring pressure on Britain but had no intention of allowing 
order to break down. The Free Officers remained aloof from 
these actions and watched the rapid fall of Cabinets in 1952 
as Farouk tried to manoeuvre out of crisis. 
Farouk's administration then made a fundamental error; 
it added to its cabinet crisis the burden of provacative actions 
against those officers it suspected of plotting treason. It 
sentenced one of them to death for possessing incriminating 
pamphlets; it ordered others to be posted and appointed a 
Minister of Defence, related by marriage to the King but by no 
means of any proven capacity for the job. These measures over- 
stretched the regime. 
The army was pushed to the point where it accepted the 
challenge or it permitted itself to be dispersed, with a 
future confined to cerimonial duties and with prospects of 
being called upon to back-up police action against agitation 
campaigns that many of the officers were basically in sympathy 
with. Once the Free Officers refused to disperse the monarchy 
was at risk but, obvious to the dangers, Farouk's court 
proceeded as if its writ ran on without question. The writ, 
however, stopped when the Free Officers in Cairo occupied the 
city and declared themselves in rebellion. Farouk was forced 
to give way as he did not have the forces to do anything else. 
Power, when it passed on, passed on without much resistance. (10) 
The coup leaders were headed by Neguib, the most senior 
officer. _ who supported 
the Free Officers. The King left Egypt 
and the new regime set to work to bring to fruition their plans 
for Egypt. The structure of government was quite simple. An 
all-civilian administration was set up, headed by appointed 
ministers was not abolished immediately; the Free Officers 
ruled as regents for the Crown Prince. All senior officers 
were cashered and junior officers promoted to replace them, 
ensuring an infusion of new blood and, as important, gratitude 
and loyalty from the promoted officers to the coup leaders. A 
large strike was brutally suppressed in August 1952, though 
the strikers were acting in support of what they thought were their 
rights under the Revolution. Several workers were killed in 
clashes outside the plant and subsequently others were court- 
martialled and sentenced either to death of imprisonment. The 
regime was against disorder and strike movements were regarded 
as a threat that could take on a political character if not 
checked at the start. 
Political parties were summarily stripped of their functions 
so that the promotors of the campaigns of unrest that helped 
topple the monarchy in 1952 did not remain in a position to 
continue their activity. By January 1953 political parties 
were outlawed. Popular support for the revolution was sought 
by the regime but this support was to be strictly controlled 
by the new state and was not to be permitted any independence. 
Mass adulation for the Revolution and its leaders was the only 
form of mass activity to be tolerated. (11) 
The settlement of the external challenges to the regime's 
power left the question of who within the leadership was to 
prevail. The broad way in which this struggle unfolded is as 
follows. (1Z) 
The coup leaders selected Neguib as their main spokesman. 
He was, however, no mere figurehead and set out to ensure his 
primacy among the Free Officers, to whom he was senior in rank. 
In the June 1953 Government, Neguib was President and Prime 
Minister and Nasser Deputy Prime Minister. A year later Nasser 
moved up to Prime Minister. Some of the leading figures were 
eliminated from office during this period by expedients ranging 
from arrests to appointment as ambassadors abroad. 
(11) 
The forces in the state were the Revolutionary Council, 
dominated by Nasser, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Broad Left 
and Neguib, who was occupied by the centre balancing position. 
The major political force with mass support was the Muslim 
Brotherhood which also had allies within the army command. 
It was the one pre-Revolution force not banned by the regime 
and co-existed with the Liberation Rally, set up by the 
officers to channel popular support for the regime into safe 
activity. The implicit differences between the purist 
Brotherhood and the secularist officers were held in check in 
the aftermath of the coup as each side calculated it could use 
the other for its own ends. The cracks, when they came, 
appeared first in the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood 
was united only in so far as interpretation of Muslim interests 
was monolithic. The strains broke into open conflict in 195+ 
and were reflected in tensions within the army among officers, 
as "represented" by Nasser (the revolution's pragmatists), and 
among more idealistic (and in the context of Islamic culture) 
more traditionalist officers "represented" by Neguib. 
Nasser became a target for the Muslim agitation which 
described him as an imperialist lackey and dictator, and 
accused him of diverting Muslim ideals into narrower egoism. 
(14) 
Nasser took action against the Brotherhood and this prompted 
Neguib into resignation as President. Nasser was thereby 
challenged from within by those officers who supported Neguib 
and from without by the mass political base of the Brotherhood. 
Nasser intensified the arrests of Brotherhood members and 
invoked a hard line against their activities. Neguib was 
placed under house arrest. The situation turned when some 
army units declared for Neguib and the Sudanese put diplomatic 
pressure on the Government. Neguib was restored to the 
Presidency and Nasser was forced to take a back seat for a 
while. 
The crisis had brought to the surface the opposition to 
Nasser. But the tenuous nature of the forces that supported 
Neguib were exposed. Firstly, there was the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and secondly, there was the broad Left, which was suspicious of 
Nasser's anti-party activities. This was not just a tenuous 
alliance upon which to build a political base, it was also 
divisive, as the Muslim and Communist movements had less in 
common with each other than they had with Nasser. 
Nasser struck back in March with mass arrests of political 
figures in the Communist, Wafdist and Muslim movements. He 
removed in a few swoops the key cadres in the political base 
which rested uneasily beneath Neguib. Leaderless these move- 
ments were much less a threat and were reduced to potential 
mobs rather than being disciplined political forces with 
distinct command structures and organisational competence. 
The disparate political interests of the groups would inevitably 
flare up without local leadership. 
Nasser meanwhile turned towards a populist stance in a 
demogogic plea for defence of the Revolution from vague 
threats from within. The army officers responded to Nasser's 
appeals and so did, significantly, the Cairo Transport Workers 
Union. The official Liberation Rally was behind Nasser (it 
was a competitor with the opposition movements). As the 
pendelum swung in favour. of Nasser he stepped up the arrests, 
forced the resignation of the remaining leftist in the 
Revolutionary Council, Khalid Muhialdin, and broke the back 
of organised opposition. 
He completed his coup with a well publicised agreement 
over the Suez Canal reached with the British Government in 
October 195+. This agreement was described as a betrayal by 
the leaderless opposition because of the clause which gave 
Britain re-entry powers to the canal under certain circum- 
stances. An incompetent assassination attempt by a member of 
the Brotherhood gave Nasser his opportunity to settle scores 
with the organisation once and for all. The movement was 
banned, its leadership arrested (seven were hanged) and because 
Neguib was allegedly implicated he was placed under arrest. (IS) 
Nasser's victory in the factional struggle was possible 
because the opposition divided into sectarian factions so that, 
even if they did unite they were drive inexorably into an 
unstable and divisive alliance. The Egyptian political move- 
ments were much less experienced than those in Indonesia. 
Neither of the major forces, the Muslims nor the Communists, 
presented the same kind of threat to Nasser as their Indonesian 
counterparts did to Sukarno. Nasser's base in the army was 
correspondingly secure. The extremism of the Muslims isolated 
them from becoming an effective opposition and the Left was not 
a popular force (in an Indonesian sense) but was more a manipu- 
lative elite that worked within the state power structure and 
identified itself more with personalities than mass movements. 
It relied more on personal contacts than mass social pressure. 
For this reason alone it was vulnerable to decimation by the 
suppression of its leading cadres. Neguib's forces were too 
disparate to be concentrated, and not clear enough on what they 
wanted to stand up to Nasser's faction. 
d) Syria and Iraq: Inir-active Interventions 
The Nasserite victory in Egypt began a period of pre- 
eminence for Egypt and President Nasser in the Arab world. 
Nasser was to export his own version of pan-Arabism in various 
scenarios which had in common the premier position reserved 
for himself. His single mindedness in pursuit of the goal of 
Egyptian (i. e. Nasserite) hegemony involved ruthless inter- 
ference in the internal affairs of neighbours whenever the 
political position of neighbouring governments was at odds 
with his own. 
Nasserism was more than Nasser, large as his contribution 
to events remained. It became symbolic of Arabism, modernity, 
anti-imperialism, nationalism and rejuvenation among wide 
layers of the Arab community in the Middle-East and in partic- 
ular among the army officers of Arab countries. Nasser was 
both myth and idol, in whose name actions were initiated, such 
as coups and purges, without, necessarily, a direct connection 
between these events and the man whose name was so liberally 
invoked. 
Contrawise, anti-Nasserists emerged from time to time, 
angered at Nasser's failings, jealous of his popularity, or 
grieved at his over-assertion of Egyptian eminence in the Arab 
struggle. In two countries, Iraq and Syria, the Nasserist 
influence in the ten years from 1958 was a source of 
instability 
"Nasserist intervention in Syria, perhaps more 
than any other factor, contributed to the tensions, 
divisions, and hatreds that produced the coup 
d' etats after the break-up of unity in 1961". (I() 
The struggle between the nationalists, the Ba'athists and the 
Nasserists (sometimes self-appointed, other times not) in Syria 
and Iraq led to the chronic inability to maintain stable 
government in these countries, and due to their proximity, 
the interaction of the coups and attempted coups in each 
country only added to the problems. These interactions can 
be linked with each other throughout the ten years 1958-68). 
The pro-Egyptian coup of January 1958 in Syria was followed 
by continual pressure on Iraq, at that time ruled by a monarchy, 
and allied with the American Baghdad Pact. In July 1958 a 
military coup succeeded in Iraq and expressed a pro-Nasserist 
sympathy. The two movements were independent but were subject 
to the same kind of idealism expressed in their adulation of 
Nasser. In so far as Nasser represented the Arab revolution 
they were Nasserist but this naive identity was not to last. 
The next few years were to produce a series of military coups 
for and against Nasser. 
The Iraqi revolution remained "Nasserist" for only a few 
weeks but Syria went through its union with Egypt before it 
lost enthusiasm for Nasser. 
The 1961 military coup in Syria against the Nasserists 
brought Syria back into agreement with the, by then, anti- 
Nasserist Government in Iraq. A step towards rapprochement 
with Egypt followed the successful March 1962 Syrian coup 
but a follow through coup for reunions with Egypt a few days 
later was defeated. 
The Syrian and Iraqi leaders were continuing their 
revolutions but were determined to keep the Nasserists, and 
Egypt, at a distance. The pattern became familiar. Military 
coups attempted by Nasserists were resisted and the military 
coups that were successful moved the political systems towards 
more nationalist regimes. 
In January 1963 another group of Nasserists tried and 
again failed in Syria to move the regime further towards 
Egypt. On 8 February 1963 Ba'athist officers in Iraq success- 
fully seized power and made friendly overtures to Egypt and 
they were followed on 8 March in Syria by a successful coup 
identically motivated and similar in composition. Again in 
July 1963 Pro-Nasser officers attempted to force Syria firmly 
into Nasser's camp and again they failed. 
In November 1963, extremist Batathists in Iraq tried 
unsuccessfully to force the socialist pace of the Ba'athist 
Party but this only provoked an anti Ba'athist counter coup 
five days later which formed a regime that survived a series 
of Ba'athist and Nasserist coups over the next five years. 
The Ba'athist regime in Syria remained the dominant political 
force in the country though a series of factional coups took 
place. 
In February 1966 a successful radical Ba'athist coup in 
Syria was followed in March by an unsuccessful Ba'athist coup 
attempt in Iraq and two years later in 1968 a similar sequence 
of factional coups among the Ba'athists in Syria was followed 
this time by a successful Ba'athist coup in Iraq. (See the 
Appendix). 
We need now to look at the military interventions in Syria 
and Iraq in more detail. The Ba'athist experience of these 
countries was not repeated in other Arab countries. It both 
identifies their socialist nationalism and separates them 
from Nasserism. The perennial struggle inside the regimes 
between the political forces - Ba'athists, Nasserists and 
Communists - gave these countries an instability unequalied 
in the Middle-East. With the anti-Nasserist monarchies, and 
the periodically anti-Nasserist Syrian and Iraqi governments, 
Nasser was restricted in the region politically and frustrated 
in his drive for Egyptian hegemony of the Arab Revolution. 
At his death Egypt was recovering from its third military 
defeat in twenty-four years and was in retreat in its influence 
among Arabs and the Russians. The frenzied interventions had 
been a failure. 
o) Syria: Cyclic Interventions 
Syria had its borders fixed abritrarily by the major 
powers in 1946 and lost about half its traditional land 
space. As if to compensate for this domestic contraction 
it has exhibited through its leaders an obsessive interest 
in external affairs, particularly among its neighbours and 
allies. It has participated in wider union with Egypt in 
the ill-fated United Arab Republic, and has flirted from 
time to time with the idea of union with Iraq. Syrian oppo- 
sition to Israel has been consistently militant and unrelent- 
ing. But external relations are a two-way process and Syria 
has been subjected to constant penetration, by not entirely 
disinterested foreign powers, notably, the Egyptians and the 
Russians. 
The Syrian regime before the military coups was different 
to that of Egypt and Iraq, which had monarchies identified in 
the minds of the officers as corrupt, alien and incompetent. 
But Syria's independence from the French left it with a fully 
operational constitutional republic. The officers did not 
head a popular revolt against the representatives of the 
discredited past, they simply organised a change of government. 
(17) They did not announce a programme of action, only a 
number of slogans. 
The Syrian army in the Palestine War of 1948 performed 
comparatively well and actually made territorial gains. 
These were not enough to overcome the general dismay at the 
debacle. Whatever the conduct of the army in specific places, 
overall the Arabs lost and lost badly, and the defeatism was 
universal in all Arab countries. Defeats produce scapegoats 
and in most cases the ruling regime, justly and unjustly, is 
cast for this role. The army was as demoralised as the 
population but the situation changed when the government called 
upon the army to restore order in a series of violent demon- 
strations; the army found itself in a positive role again 
which with little imagination provided them with a means for 
expatiating their sense of guilt and at the same time gave 
them the opportunity for enhancing their role. The defeat 
of 191+8 did not cause the army to assert itself. It was the 
inability of the civilian government to cope that provided 
the army with its "mission" of national salvation. (it) 
The Government made the incredible blunder of using the 
army to disperse anti-Government demonstrations (November- 
December 19+8) and followed this with an announcement of 
intended budgetary cuts in the military appropriations 
(March 19+9). The necessity for the former made impractical the 
introduction of the latter. 
The army's reaction by coup on March 30 1949 ended the 
constitutional republic and began the military republic. 
"In two turbulent decades, the Syrian army had 
emerged from the role of a military force, to 
become the political guardian of the country. 
The continuous civilian interference in army 
politics, and the politicalisation and radical- 
isation of the army, increased the influence of 
military politicians. The army no longer acts 
as an arbitrator of nationalist and progressive 
forces. It has been persuaded of its unique and 
historical destiny and special political role as 
the "saviour" of society from the "corrupt" 
politicians. It has assumed the "role of hero", 
and considers itself the key and the only hope 
for honest politics, stability, order and progress. 
'These expectations and aspirations, now claimed 
exclusively by the army, have been supported in 
the last two decades by the civilian politicians, 
by the progressive forces, by the intellectuals 
and the academics. Because most of these groups 
have discredited themselves by ones means or another, 
the Syrian army has reamined the only political 
organisation above the battle". (J4) 
In 21 military coups since 19+9 the Syrian army has become the 
political system within which the political groups in the 
country have fought out their differences. 
(10) 
Syria's exposed position brought international alignments 
which added new conflicts to the already overburdened political 
system. Turkey and Iraq Joined the Baghdad Pact; Israel was 
supported by America and Lebanon adopted a generally pro- 
western stance. Syria's weapons supplies had come mainly from 
the British and the Americans before 1955 and this was a narrow 
and precarious base for security. The American drive to "sign- 
up" allies against Russia pushed Syria into a position where 
its moderate opinion had no resistance to demands for a closer 
alignment with Egypt, and through Egypt, with the Soviet Union. 
The political system within Syria rewarded with office those 
who advocated the preservation of Syrian security by friendship 
with the enemies of Syria's hostile neighbours. 
The Table shows the extent to which the Russians responded 
to Syria's defence requests. 
Table One 
Soviet Major Arms Exports to Svria3 1955-58 
Item Quantity 
Fighters 93 
Trainers 10 
Transports 8 
Helicopters 7 
Tanks 4oo 
Armoured Cars 100 
Source: S. I. P. R. I., op cit, p. 850. 
Political opposition to pro-Russian "neutrality" was 
eliminated between 1955 and 1957. A series of 
trials were undertaken of opposition political 
accused variously of pro-American or pro-Iraqi 
The interests of the Syrian Ba'athists and the 
coincided up to a point; both movements gained 
drift leftwards. 
political 
figures, 
activities. 
Communists 
by the country's 
The union with Egypt added another political force, that 
of the Nasserists, who went for total integration of Syria 
into Egypt and the subordination of Syrian nationalism to 
Egyptian interests. This struck at the Ba'athist party, for 
Nasser did not tolerate political parties in the United Arab 
Republic, but it also created a nationalist trend in the 
country that was directed against Nasser. Poor harvests and 
Nasserite Egyptian socialism combined with Ba'athist socialist 
nationalism undermined the union. The military were humiliated 
by partisan retirements, transfers and postings of Syrian 
officers to make room for Egyptian officers; the middle-class 
were expropriated and politicised; the masses were suffering 
deprivations. 
The 28 September 1961 coup ended the union and returned 
Syrian politics to its domestic tensions. It did not end 
Russian influence but gave Syria a new form of nationalism. 
The idealism of experimenting with pan-Arabism was replaced 
with a maturer determination to maintain an independent 
Syria. (Z1) 
f) Irans Bloody Cyclic Interventions 
Hurewitz describes Iraq's and Syria's condition as 
"military roulette". (it) Before 1958, Iraq could with 
justice be described as "cabinet roulette". From 1921 to 
1958 (the year of the coup) Iraq had 59 cabinets, 45 of them 
since 1932, and had only two Chambers which completed the 
election term of four years. (ZS) There were seven military 
coups between 1936 and 1941, but they mainly re-shuffled the 
ruling coalition. No single faction had power enough to 
enforce itself over the others for anything but a short period. 
They differed on domestic policy and on foreign policy, where 
Iraq was embroiled in the growing tensions between Britain and 
Germany. The 19+1 coup in fact declared for the Axis interests 
and provoked a British intervention, and this had the side- 
effect of removing the military from politics until 1958. (ty) 
The Iraqi military returned to political intervention in 
the anti-Western struggles of the 1950's. In 1948 and 1952 
the military were called-out to prop-up the civilian Government. 
There were serious disturbances during anti-British political 
campaigns arising from agitation against the British-Iraqi 
Treaty and the encirclement policy being pursued by America 
against Russia. The 1948 demonstrations prompted a change in 
Cabinet policies (as well as personnel) and the 1952 disorders 
required martial law to quell them. The army loyally handed 
over power to the newly elected Iraqi government in January 
1953; it did not follow the Egyptian example and take-over 
completely. (2S ) 
The Monarchical-civilian governments of 1952 to 1958 
attempted modernisation and reforms in the context of the 
necessity for political balance between conflicting ideologies 
whose disputes were fed by the example and counter-example of 
the Nasserist revolution under way in Egypt. (t() Iraq was 
competitive with Egypt in many fields but especially in the 
field of leadership of the Arab world. The Egyptians regarded 
the Iraqi monarchy as a symbol of reaction in the Arab world, 
proven beyond doubt by its close western ties which gave 
"imperialism" a foothold in the Middle-East for anti-Arab 
policies. If Iraq succeeded in'economic and social reform 
it would become a counter-weight to Egyptian claims to Arab 
leadership. The courting of Syria by both Iraq and Egypt 
was connected with this competitive relationship between the 
two powers. 
The relative military balance between the three countries 
is shown in Table Two. In population Egypt was unchallenged 
even by a combination of Syria and Iraq. The military forces 
that were available to the countries showed that an alliance 
between Iraq and Syria in 1959 could have matched Egypt in 
military strength. 
Table Two 
Military Balance, Syria, Iraq and Egvbt, 1949-59 
Cou= 1949 1954-5 1212 
Military Forces ('000) 
Syria 25 25 60 
Iraq 45 1+0 50 
Egypt 70 80 80 
Population (millions) 
Syria 3.8 4.2 
Iraq 5.8 6.0 
Egypt 22.7 25.0 
Defence (% of G. N. P. ) 
Syria 4.0 10.8 
Iraq 6.9 8.8 
Egypt 1+. 0 7.0 
Sources: Halpern, Middle-Eastern Armies and the New Middle 
Class, in J. J. Johnson (ed) The Role of the Military 
in Under Developed Countries, N. J., 1962, p. 292; 
Hurewitz, Middle-Eastern Politics: the Military 
Dimension, 1969, p. 137,159,160. 
Iraq hosted the initial meeting of the Baghdad Pact in 
1955 and signed alongside Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Britain. 
The political alignment was complimented by a dependence upon 
Western suppliers for military equipment. Iraq's dependence 
on the West for arms supplies (see Table Three), its isolation 
from the Arab world (it was looking northwards rather than 
southwards), its monarchist government and above all its 
opposition to Nasser exposed it to internal and external 
political pressures which increased in the wave of sympathy for 
Egypt following the 1956 invasion of the Suez. The Iraqi 
government sent troops to Jordan to aid it in case of an 
attack by Israel but this did not make up for the solidarity 
felt towards Egypt nor counter the prestige credited to Nasser 
after the invasion was called off. Egypt's subsequent alliance 
with Syria brought Nasserist pressure to the Iraqi border. 
Table Three 
Major Weapon Supplies to Iraq 1950-58 
Weanon 
D. H. Vampire 
Beaufighter 
F-86 Sabre 
Hunting Provost 
Hawker Hunter 
Churchill Tank 
Centurion Tank 
M-24 Tank 
Quantity 
18 
10 
5 
6 
Supplier 
U. K. 
U. K. 
U. S. A. 
U. K. 
U. K. 
U. K. 
U. K. 
U. S. A. 
U. K. 
15 
25 
90 
40 
Ferret APC - 20 
Source: S. I. P. R. I., op cit, p. 824-843 
/; 
The Iraqi army was undergoing a subtle transformation in 
the post-war years. Men of lower middle-class origin, and 
often sympathetic to Nasserism and nationalism, were gradually 
working their way up the promotion ladders. Their predecessors 
were graduating into the higher ranks and a two-tier army was 
forming; traditionalist, conservative and identified with the 
ruling oligarchy at the top and radical, young and critical 
below. The lower officer ranks also had the advantage of 
contact with the troops. 
Nasserist propaganda was directed at the younger elements 
and urged them to emulate the Egyptians by overthrowing the 
monarchy and ending Iraq's dependence on the West and the 
imperialist powers that had invaded Suez. The Iraqi monarchy, 
allied with Israel's friends, conservative and anti-Nasserist, 
became identified in army circles as a major obstacle to Arab 
resurgence. The tradition of military intervention had been 
dormant for seventeen years and was therefore already established. 
Moreover the army had some experience of mobilisation in the 
1948 and 1956 Israeli wars and therefore was able to consider 
the mechanics of taking over political power. 
It was the Lebanon crisis in 1958 which created the 
mechanical conditions for the Iraq coup. Large numbers of troops 
were mobilised by the Government and given orders to move across 
Iraq. This gave a useful cover for the Free Officers' coup. 
Led by Brigadier General Abdul Karim Kassem, Colonel Abdul 
Salaem Aref and Colonel Wasfi Torher, they executed a neat 
manoeuvre while passing Baghdad, entered the city and took 
it over. 
The level of violence and the ferocity reached in the 
aftermath set a standard for Iraqi military coups and 
reprisals that was followed in later years. The entire Royal 
family, and their Prime Minister, General Nuri, were executed, 
eliminating at a stroke potential sources of loyalty for 
dissident forces. (Ii) 
In further moves, following the Egyptian experience, 
senior officers above the rank of colonel and senior civil 
servants of the monarchical regime were retired. 
The coup leaders were mainly in their thirties, (except 
for Kassem who was over forty), and in the main were not 
ideologically motivated. The forces that supported the coup 
were disparate and susceptible to manipulation, which Kassem 
was to take advantage of in his moves to supreme powere. (Lý 
The ambitious were played off against each other and the 
dangerous political pressures were diverted into a generality 
about Iraq's place in an undefined and non-existent Arab 
nation. In this "new Iraq" there was a place for the 
rebellious Kurds. 
Opposition to Kassem was kept off balance, but enemies 
cumznulate through time and disappointment. Kassem was pushed 
into action against the pro-Egyptian Ba'athist Party (riding 
high in neighbouring Syria), the various nationalist groups, 
and the pro-Soviet Communist Party. These groups epitomised 
the problem for Kassem who had ambitions of rivaling Nasser. 
Traditional Iraqi - Egyptian rivalry which had formally 
been presented as the struggle between republicanism and 
monarchy, or Arab nationalism and sub-services to imperialist 
domination, but was in fact a national struggle between the 
two competing powers. The ascendancy of Kassem allowed for 
a new form of this traditional competition within a broad area 
of radical Arab politics. For Kassem, Nasser, or his local 
representatives, posed a threat to his buil-up as an Arab 
leader. At the same time, Kassem's moves against Nasserism 
presented the sharp edge of the sword at the new regime's 
throat: the single most unifying feature of the anti-monarchist 
forces in Iraq was the pro-Nasser sympathies of the army - to 
offend this base was risky. 
Kassem believed that the only way to compete with Egyptian 
nationalism, and Nasser, was to indulge in an even more extreme 
form of Iraqi nationalism. The early honeymoon with Nasser 
after the coup quickly passed away to outright hostility. But 
Iraqi nationalism was a much too narrow power base upon which 
to build a revolutionary structure, especially in view of the 
Kurdish problem which would be reactivated by the normal 
., ýý 
expressions of Iraqi nationalism () and because of the likely 
reaction of the Egyptians whose influence went far beyond their 
own borders. Just as nationalism was not strong enough to 
insulate Kassem from Kurdish and Nasserite hostility it was 
also not likely to protect him from the ideological parties, 
such as the Ba'athists and the Communists. 
Iraqi nationalism led to a switch from Western to Soviet 
allies; to abandon Iraqi reliance on the friends of Israel meant 
reliance on Russia. This r.. liance is manifest in Table Four 
which dtails the Soviet arms shipments to Iraq between 1958- 
1962. The route to the Soviet alignment came through the early 
declaration for Nasser; the first 19 MIG-15 fighters were flown 
in from Egypt in the early months of the coup. 
The Russians were eager to take on the role of military 
supplier to Iraq. For them it was a great victory against the 
American encirclement. When Nasser fell out with Kassem the 
Russians remained aloof from the dispute, even though it was 
Nasser who introduced the Russians to the Iraqi leaders. At 
the time of the coup Nasser was in Yugoslavia and when the 
news broke he flew direct to Moscow to make as much milage 
as he could out of the fall of the pro-Western Government. (30) 
It raised Nasser's prestige with the Russians, and they could 
see that their policy of backing him was justified as, no 
doubt, Nasser was at great pains to tell them. 
Kassem had his own ideas about breaking the Nasser's 
monopoly of attention from the Russians and he accordingly 
brought Iraq out of the Baghdad Pact in March 1959. To 
emphasise their regard for their break with the West, the 
Russians made a $500 million Development Loan in the same 
month. They appreciated Iraq's strategic importance to 
their strategy against American encirclement. ()() 
Table Four 
Soviet Major Weapons Exports to Iraa3 1958-62 
w 
Mig 15/17 
Ily-1 x+/28 
Yak-11 
Tu-16 
P-6 Patrol Boats 
T-54 Tanks 
T-34 Tanks 
JS-111 Tanks 
BTR-152 APC's 
Source: S. I. P. R. I., op cit, p. 842-8+3. 
Quantity 
71 
21 
15 
7 
12 
100 
45 
25 
200 (1960-61+) 
Kassem also moved against Colonel Aref, his colleague in 
the leadership of the coup. In a series of manoeuvres he 
finally got Aref on trial for treason and sentenced to death 
for implication in Batathist and Nasserist intrigues. The 
dispute with Aref was more than just a personality conflict, 
it entailed an interpretation of Iraq's relations with Egypt 
and Egypt's interest in Iraq. The various interpretations 
of Egyptian interests included the future of Iraqi oil and, 
however attractive Nasser's early role as a symbol of Arabic 
modernism and ressurgence, the prospect of closer ties with 
Egypt looked a lot less attractive to the newly arrived 
officers when it implied a diminuition of their newly 
acquired roles through submission to Nasser. 
In turning against the Nasserists Kassem was forced into 
a reliance on the popular forces, largely under Communist 
influence. These forces had an armed hard-core which had 
acquired weapons in the confusion of the 1958 coup. However, 
the factional war conducted by Kassem cut his support. An 
attempted coup in March 1959 against Kassem was put down 
brutally and this done Kassem further into the Russian 
camp. (3tJ He relied upon the Russians for weapons and upon 
the Iraqi communists for support. 
The executions that followed the 1959 coup were supple- 
mented by unofficial executions carried out by local communists. 
These excesses drove the middle-class into support of the 
socialist Ba'athist party. This alliance was tenuous but 
the communist excesses were extreme enough for the middle- 
class to overcome their ideological hostility to the Ba'athist 
version of socialism. The Ba'athists were recognised as an 
indigenous force in contrast to the "foreign" communists. To 
counter this situation Kassem reduced his association with 
the communists and even re-opened relations with the West 
(Britain supplied two vampire jets) only to have these 
interrupted by his military threat to Kuwait in 1961. 
The economic situation deteriorateg and the country was 
polarised. Kassem's rule was eventually toppled in a coup 
on 8 February 1963. His dream of emulating and surpassing 
Nasser collapsed. He was never able to get a dependent 
political force behind his rule and had to rely on others. 
Where Nasser smashed all political parties which he did not 
control, Kassem had to leave the most seditious, the communists, 
operating and thereby he became associated with their actions. 
Where Nasser had solid support in the army, Kassem weakened 
his base by continuous purges, trials, and witch-hunts. Neither 
did Nasser have to deal with the problem of a non-Egyptian Hero 
in his Revolution but Kassem faced Nasser abroad and Nasserists 
at home. Finally his violence against his enemires drove his 
enemies to unite against him. 
The inability for the various political factions in Iraq 
to gain permanent ascendancy or for the political structure 
to accommodate orderly transfers of power between them meant 
that each change of power was accompanied by physical 
extermination of the losers. (S') The cost to Iraq in the 
destruction of the ruling elite every few years must have been 
enormous, especially in a country not abundant in administrative 
and executive talent. 
It was not so much a game of roulette, which is a game 
of chance, as an endemic conflict arising from the weaknesses 
of the ruling elites, worsened each time by each coup, and 
the ever changing balance of forces within Iraq and within 
its neighbour, Syria, both subject to the pervasive influence 
of Nasser's Egypt. 
Nasser's role in the military interventions diminished as 
the Arab countries developed their own political styles. With 
the ascendancy of Ghadderfy in Libya the same pattern of 
interventions in other countries as part of the lid for Arab 
leadership has already been established. Libyan resources and 
political assistance have been deployed both for allies and against 
enemies. The Libyan support for the anti-monarchist coups 
attempted in Jordan and Morocco is not unexpected from a 
republican regime but its assistance to conspiracies in 
republican Sudan against the "moderate" Sudanese leaderships 
is in the classic Nasserist mould. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE POLITICS OF NON-INTERVENTION 
a) Introduction 
We now need to take up cases where the military has been 
de-politicalised and made either to return to the barracks 
(Mexico) or to stay there (Israel). Military intervention is 
neither inevitable in every country nor in particular 
countries at all times. 
In Israel the military has not intervened since the state 
was founded. In Mexico the state began in a perennial gale of 
interventions but since 1940 the military have kept out of 
contact with the political system in other than a subordinate 
role. In Turkey, our third cases the military was systemati- 
cally reduced in influence up to 1946 but political conditions 
were created by the Cold War and domestic politics which 
brought the tanks into the streets again. These cases will 
provide some pointers to the conditions that insulate a 
developing country from military intervention. 
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b) Mexico: Cardenas versus the Revolutionary Generals 
The Mexican Revolutionary Generals were a dominant force 
in the country's political system after the revolutionary years 
(1910-1920) up to 1940 and were then virtually eliminated from 
Mexican politics. 
Mexico from 1910 to the end of the Revolution in 1922 was 
a bloody and violent country. (I ) Power rested on armed might 
and demonstrable cruelty. The Presidents of Mexico were ex- 
Revolutionary Generals turned politicians. The last of the 
traditionalist Revolutionary Generals was Calles whose term of 
office ended in 1936. He chose as his successor, and supported 
his drive for the nomination, his protege since the early days 
of the revolution, General Cardenas, who had joined the Calles 
army in 1913 and had risen with Calles to become his War 
Minister in 1933. However, he was to prove more independent 
than a protege as he broke the power, influence and proclivity 
for interference by the Revolutionary Generals and their 
successors. (Z, ) 
Within twelve months he had virtually eliminated Calles 
and his supporters from the political structure through 
premptive purges of the state apparatus. Calles made some 
attempts at a come-back to reverse what Cardenas was doing 
but 
he did not have enough support or organisation. The President 
had control of the patronage resources of the state, which 
Calles had relinquished when he ceased to be President, and 
potential supporters of Calles had to consider what risks they 
took in supporting him and alienating the new President. The 
old Revolutionary Generals were comfortable with their personal 
positions and the consequences of a lost rebellion set against 
the kind of issues that were in dispute did not make for an 
attractive gamble. Calles having failed to get support then 
retired from politics. 
Cardenas established his ascendancy and independence and 
introduced a programme of reforms which reduced the potential 
opposition's leverage against him. These eroded the army's 
base of power. Promotion in the army was largely a matter of 
a man's record in the Revolutionary Wars and his loyalty to his 
commanding officer. This served to perpetuate the unifying 
mythology of the Revolution to the detriment of professional- 
ism. (3) The army officers formed a priviliged political elite 
in the country with power bases in the local areas over which 
they held undisputed sway. Cardenas took the first step to 
alter this situation by introducing proficiency tests for 
officers below the rank of major. Most of the men in this 
group in 1936 wer men from the junior ranks doing the 
Revolution or were post-Revolution recruits. The proficiency 
tests were not required for senior ranks in the army (thus 
allaying their fears) and therefore two promotion standards 
were introduced that corresponded to the division in background 
in the officer corps that Cardenas wanted to exploit. The 
senior officers had little cause to oppose merit tests for 
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their juniors and junior officers hardly had grounds to oppose 
them either: it is not easy to articulate a case for a 
promotion system based on priviliges and informal relation- 
ships. 
Recruitment of suitable officers from the ranks was also 
introduced, to reward ability and change the class character 
of the junior officer corps as well, and some modest efforts 
were made towards providing schools for the children of enlisted 
men. The President was shifting the base of support for his 
office within the military from the priviliged clique group 
of the Senior leadership to the more junior, and professionally 
abitious ranks, and the enlisted men. 
Promotion by merit became explicit in 1936 as the sole 
criterion for promotion. The implications held more signifi- 
cance for the future than for the present. Men who rose through 
the ranks on one system (merit) were not likely to be happy with 
a change of rules to informal and unspecified criteria when they 
approached their Senior ranks. It was unlikely that any system 
other than merit could be made to apply when sufficient numbers 
of them had reached the senior ranks. The sitting colonels and 
generals were secure for their service life and time would 
reduce their number. To speed-up the process of reducing their 
number Cardenas passed laws reducing the officer career span 
from 35 to 25 years. This would have retired all officers 
serving before 1911 and by 1940, the end of his term of office, 
it would retire all officers serving before 1915. In the event 
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the law was not applied until 1945 when it had an even greater 
impact, retiring officers serving since before 1920. This 
eliminated from service the majority of the officers of the 
Revolutionary years. 
Further efforts were made to allign his Presidency with 
the junior ranks by setting up military hospitals. By courting 
these ranks and retiring the Senior ranks Cardenas aimed to 
break the army as a force under the undisputed control of the 
local army generals who had much in commin in their relative 
power positions with the Barons in a fuedal system. 
Professional armies have both active and administrative 
functions. Cardenas next sought to get as many of the older 
officers out of active command into administrative tasks as 
quickly as possible. This had two objectives. Firstly, it 
would create promotion opportunities for junior ranks, firming 
up their association with the Presidency, and secondly, it 
would separate local figures from their local power base and 
turn them into uniformed civil servants. 
Active service limits were set at the age of 48 for junior 
officers, 58 for majors and 65 for divisional commanders. Men 
who had failed to reach higher rank by these ages, and under a 
merit system of promotion this would imply their unsuitability 
for active command, would be transferred to administrative 
functions or retired, making way for more suitable candidates 
from the lower rank. The most proficient professional soldiers 
would rise through the rants and remain in active command (in 
theory). 
ý 
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In 1937 Cardenas made the final preparations to reduce 
the army's political position. He declared part-time non- 
military interests as incompatible with army service. This 
made local army officers choose between their (sometimes 
considerable) business interests and continued active service. 
These officers had made good their command positions in local 
areas by manipulation of their position among local business 
interests. This new rule mainly affected the senior ranks. 
Cardenas in addition raised the pay of enlisted men and officers 
and also introduced an insurance scheme for the lower ranks. 
A troop ceiling of 50,000 was set. (j) Responsibility for 
local law and order (a potentially profitable aspect of power 
that some area commanders had manipulated to their advantage) 
was handed over to a part-time militia, consisting, in the main, 
of men from the peasant and worker classes. 
The setting up of another centre of violence is a most 
difficult and dangerous set for a government in the Third 
World to take. It has brought down a few governments in the 
post-war years, for example in Algeria a similar move initiated 
by Ben Bella was one of the causes of the army take-over. (: 
r) 
Similarly, in Ghana, Nkrumah's prestigious Presidential Guards 
and his Worker Brigades did a great deal to drive the army 
into the 1966 coup. (G ) 
Cardenas had already made several moves against the 
interests of the army commanders and this last one was a 
crucial test for his programme. The fact that these militias 
were poorly armed, badly trained, and relatively useless for 
a co-ordinated action, did not alter the fact that another 
centre of violence was being set up. In the hands of a 
determined political leadership such as the communists, who 
were very strongly represented in the urban centres, they 
posed a threat to the army should they need to intervene in 
the affairs of state. Carrying out a military coup against a 
few unguarded public buildings is an entirely different type 
of operation to one that risks a civil war where an armed 
militia exists. The army had to strike immediately if it was 
to strike at all. They did not and Cordenas passed onto the 
next stage of his confrontation with the military. 
The Cardenas Presidency was radical in a number of other 
ways and in broad terms he had attempted to take the Revolution 
to the lower classes, who up to then had been neglected. The 
gains from the Revolution were mainly the middle-classes and 
state bureaucrats. Land reform and higher wages through trade 
union militancy were directly encouraged. The land reform 
provoked bitter opposition and local disputes were inevitable 
between the vested interests and the peasants. Local law and 
order was now the prerogative of the part-time militia and not 
the army and this should have helped the peasants (who were 
also in the militia). 
The reforms were modest but it was more significant that 
they took place at all; even on a small scale. The enlisted 
men in the army, being peasant in origin, and benefiting from 
the Cardenas army reforms, were an unreliable force for putting 
down peasant agitation. To reverse the land reform meant using 
unreliable troops against armed peasants. In the urban centres 
the same situation prevailed. The trade unions were agitating 
and striking for higher wages and through the militia the armed 
workers were responsible for order. Thus employers could not 
rely on terror or the use of troops to disperse their 
dissaffected workers - they had to parley and get a compromise. 
The result was rising wages. 
The Mexican political structure was based on the National 
Revolutionary Party (PNR) founded by Calles in 1 928. (% ) 
This was meant as a popular political organisation for the non- 
military masses to participate ins something like the Liberation 
Front in Nasser's Egypt. The local army commanders dominated 
the local machines of the PNR and, therefore, Cardenas in 
reducing the power of the local army command, simultaneously 
created the possibility of transforming the PNR into a genuine 
mass political force to become a counter-weight to the army, 
This meant re-organising the PNR. 
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In 1938 the PNR was re-organised into four separate 
sectors to represent the major interests in the country: 
Labour, Peasant, Popular and Army. Under this structure the 
army was forced to organise as a separate section in the PNR 
rather than dominate it entirely, or had to joint one of the 
sections but relinguish the military base. Each sector was 
awarded 40 seats at the party congress, which chose the 
Presidential nominee for the election. The nominee was 
certain to become the next President given the overwhelming 
electoral support for the PNR. Moreover, as the incumbent 
President was able to choose the 40 army delegates to the 
conference, he was also able to ensure that they were 
sympathetic to his views on the role of the army in the state. 
This system was undoubtedly loaded against the traditional 
conception of what constituted army civilian relations. 
The problem for the army was that being unable to bring 
Cardenas down on any of the single issues that had been 
introduced since 1934 they were now even less able to act 
cohesively against him even though the sum of these issues 
were clearly detrimental to their established interests. 
There was a brief attempt at revolt by one army commander but 
this was crushed. (V) 
The balance of forces in the new party were against the 
army from the beginning. They had only 55,000 votes against 
1.25 million for Labour, 2.5 million for the peasants and 
55,000 for the popular sector (this section was for those not 
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coming under any of the other categories). (q ) Political 
power in the new party passed to the civilian groups. More- 
over2 whereas the peasant and labour sectors were organised 
on a local basis, the army was organised on a national basis 
thus removing them from interference in local politics. 
The Caudillo figure in Latin America has always been 
based traditionally on a locality and his roots are with the 
local people who give him their loyalty. (10) Without this 
support (however it is gained - genuine affection or terror) 
the Caudillo is isolated and ineffective. The national basis 
for Army political action undermined potential Caudillo 
figures and removed local civilian political activity from 
overt intimidation by army commanders. 
The army did not intervene as a military force but as a 
political force. It met Cardenas on his own ground, in a 
Presidential election, not so much by choice but by circumstance, 
and this expressed the weaknesses of the military more than its 
strength. The problem for the Generals was that they could not 
agree on a single candidate and therefore individual Generals 
set up their own movements, or joined established ones, to 
sponsor their own candidacy. This further exposed their weak- 
nesses. A credible military intervention requires a firmly 
controlled and disciplined force and is not proceded by a sort 
of coup-makers primary election. The divisive nature of the 
military opposition allowed the alternative civilian contest- 
ants to gain in confidence. 
The army's political parties had colourful names which 
in a way tell their own story: The Association of Revolutionary 
Patriots, The Constitutional Democratic Front, The Anti- 
Communist Revolutionary Party, The National Union of Veterans 
of the Mexican Revolution, the National Vanguard and The 
Revolutionary Committee for National Reconstruction. 
The 19+0 General Election ended the army's political 
challenge within the constitution, and it either had to submit 
from then on or stage a coup. Its candidate, General Juan 
Almazon, who had emerged in the pre-election period as the 
most popular of the army candidates, was the most senior army 
commander, and he went to the polls for the Revolutionary Party 
of National Unification. He had the open support of 34 senior 
officers who took leave to compaign for him. 
The PNR was renamed the Party of the Mexican Revolution 
(PMR) and adopted General Camacho as its candidate. He was 
assured of the support of the President, the labour, peasant 
and popular sectors of the old PNR, as well as considerable 
support from within the army. Cardenas enfranchised serving 
soldiers in a move to split the lower ranks from the upper 
ranks. The choice of General Camacho was significant. He was 
the former Defence Minister in the Cardenas cabinet and agreed 
with him on the issues of civilian-army relations. He was not 
a Revolutionary General but had served during the Revolution 
as a junior officer and gained his promotion later. The fact 
that two Generals were candidates in an election that was to 
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decide whether the military were to have a role in politics 
is one of the ironies of the contest. 
The election which was accompanied by several murders 
and other bloody incidents, gave Camacho an overwhelming 
victory: 
General Camacho (pro-Cardenas) 2.2 million 
General Almazon (the army) 128,000 ((1). 
The army was now faced with a desperate decision: it was the 
last moment for a military coup, but it was also an unfavour- 
able moment as the army clearly lacked a popular mandate. 
Almazon and his friends accused the President of electoral 
fraud and claimed they had been robbed of victory. This 
position can only be backed by a military intervention or it 
simply collapses. The army waited for the signal from Almazon 
but it never came. He retired quietly and Cardenas 
magnanimously called upon the army officers to return to their 
normal duties at the end of their leave. General Camacho was 
inauggerated on 1 December 19+0 and the country turned to 
other problems. The army ceased to be a sector in the ruling 
party (re-named again in 19+5 as the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party - PRI). The 1936 law on retirement was implemented in 
1945 and 550 officers were retired in the first instance. 
Table One brings out the extent of the decline of the army 
in Mexico's political system. It has been receiving a declining 
share of the state budget since the high point of the 
i 
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Table One 
Proportion of the State Budgets Allocated to Military 
Expenditure, Mexico, 1914-70 
Year % Total Budget Year % Total Budget 
1914 31 1944 14 
1915 31 19+5 15 
1917 72 1946 15 
1918 64 1947 13 
1919 66 1948 10 
1920 65 1949 10 
1921 61 1950 10 
1922 41 1951 10 
1923 36 1952 8 
1924 36 1953 
'9 
1925 31 1954 8 
1926 31 1955 8 
1927 25 1956 7 
1928 33 1957 7 
1929 34 1958 7 
1930 32 1959 7 
1931 27 1960 7 
1932 27 1961 7 
1933 25 1962 7 
1935 23 1963 7 
1936 24 1964 7 
1937 24 1965 7 
1938 19 1966 7 
1939 21 1967 10 
1940 21 1968 9 
1941 22 1969 10 
19+2 22 1970 10 
1943 21 
Sources: Official Sources quoted in Lieuwen, op cit, 1914-40, 
p. 153) 1940-66 p. 142ý 1967-70 from United Nations 
Year Book, 1970. 
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Revolutionary Wars. The levels of over 60 per cent exceed 
even the Arab-Israeli budgets. There was a continuing decline 
through the 20's and 30's but under Cardenas there was only a 
slight drop of from 24 per cent to 21 per cent, brought about 
by his cuts in the budget and his increases in the pay and 
allowances for the lower ranks and enlisted men. From 19+5 
the decline was dramatic, to 7 per cent by 1956. In 1970 the 
military budget was hovering around 10 per cent. 
Mexican policy on defence has been not to try to meet the 
improbable: "Military hardware is purchased neither for display 
nor for defence against a quite improbable external threat, but 
only for the purpose of preserving internal order". (12) This 
view is confirmed by examining the purchases of military 
equipment of the Mexicans since 1945. There are no advanced 
jet fighters and bombers and the purchases tend to be confined 
to transport, trainers, light patrol and helicopters. All of 
these type of aircraft have a counter-insurgency role. (I3) 
Naval purchases are of light types of craft suitable for 
inshore operations, though 4 frigates were purchased from the 
United States in 1961+. Most of Mexico's armour consists of 
World War II models. (Jf 
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c) Turkey: Victim of Modernisation 
Turkish politics were influenced by the military 
establishment in the Ottoman Empire and this tradition was 
followed in the early years of the Republic. (15) But for 
almost 40 years after the foundation of the Republic the 
role and influence of the military was reduced, and consciously 
undermined, in favour of civilian dominated political processes. 
As in the case of Mexico, this state of affairs was brought 
about by a military leader, the most illustrious of the Turkish 
Generals, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. (16) His views on civil- 
military relations were expressed many years before he was 
ever in a position to be tested by them. In 1909 he insisted 
that the relationship between the army and political activity 
be democrated by a total separation of the two functions: 
"As long as officers remain in the Party we shall 
never build a strong Party nor a strong army. In 
the 3rd Army most of the officers were also members 
of the Party and the 3rd Army cannot be called first 
class. Furthermore, the Party receiving its strength 
from the Army will never appeal to the nation. Let 
us resolve here and now that all officers wishing 
to remain in the Party must resign from the Army. 
We must adopt a law forbidding all future officers 
having political affiliations". (17) 
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The separation of army and political life in the midst of 
revolutionary changes has a long tradition going back to the 
17th century Revolutionary General, Oliver Cromwell. In 1644, 
when Cromwell was wrestling with the army command and their 
parliamentry supporters over the conduct of the civil war he 
concentrated his attack on the dual status of army commanders 
and Members of Parliament: 
'For what do the enemy say? Nay, what do many say 
that were friends at the beginning of the Parliament? 
Even this, that the Members of both Houses have got 
great places and commands, and the sword into their 
hands; and, what by interests in Parliament, what by 
power in the Army, will perpetually continue them- 
selves in grandeur, and not permit the War speedily 
to end, lest their own power should determine with 
it... I know not the worth of these commanders, 
members of both Houses, who are yet in power; but if 
I may speak my conscience without reflection upon 
any, I do conceive if the army be not put into 
another method, and the War more vigorously prosecuted, 
the People can bear the War no longer, and will enforce 
you to a dishonourable Peace". (1s) 
Parliament went on to pass the Self Denying Ordnance whereby 
members of Parliament were precluded from being commissioned 
in the army. The intent was not entirely the same as. 'Ataturkts 
(apart from the circumstances, being different); Cromwell wanted 
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an effective army to win a peace honourable to Parliament, 
Ataturk wanted both an effective army and an effective Party. 
Ataturk came to power with the support of the Army and 
the Party. Twelve of the 17 Ottoman Turkish Commanders joined 
the Nationalists. (Iq) But, once assured of power, Ataturk 
carried out his principles of separation of the military from 
civilian political life. He insisted on political leaders 
resigning from the armed forces, and he refrained from wearing 
his uniform on official occasions. His modernisation programmes 
did not give the army any inclination or need to intervene and 
his charisma ensured their loyalty. There were two plots 
against him but they were isolated incidents. He alleged in 
1924 that there was a number of senior officers in conspiracy 
against him and he secured their resignations. In 1926 a 
colonel went to the gallows for his part in another plot. (t0) 
The influence of the military in terms of numbers in the 
Assembly decline from 1 /6th in 1920 to 1 /25th in 1958. 
Table Two 
Proportion of Military Members in the Turkish Assembly, 
1920-1958 
Year Proportion 
1920 1 /6th 
1943 1/8th 
1946 1/9th 
1950 1 /20th 
1958 1 /25th 
Source: D. Rustow, The Army in the Founding of the Turkish 
Republic, World Politics, XI, July 1959, p. 550. 
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Electoral laws adopted after the Second European War dis- 
enfranchised the military and the police; they could neither 
vote nor stand for office nor engage in political activity. (L1) 
This went much further than the Cardenas reforms: Cardenas 
shrewdly enfranchised the soldiers but depoliticalised the 
Generals. But in Turkey, by taking away the soldiers vote, 
the Government removed any feeling of responsibility by the 
military for anything that the elected civilian Government 
did. Taking away their rights to stand for office and to 
engage in political activity was probably a sensible step but 
to extend this to voting was a blunder of the highest magnitude. 
Electors are implicated in the follies of the Governments they 
elect; those who voted for another party have a chance at 
another election. But, if a powerful section of the community, 
such as the army, has neither the satisfaction of voting for a 
successful government nor the satisfaction of a protest vote 
for an alternative government, it is only left with the choice 
of unconstitutional action if they are politically frustrated. 
It is totally unrealistic to assume that because they are not 
permitted political rights that they will automatically lose 
political interests. If the Turkish version of a Self 
Denying Ordnance had left the army the right to vote it may 
have averted the scenario of the army looking up itself as 
an untained alternative to the sins of the politicians. 
Turkey's political evolution up to 1946 had taken the 
form of a unique alliance between two opposed social forces. 
The ruling elite of the urban centres (leaning towards 
modernisation) were allied with the ruling elite of the rural 
areas (leaning towards the past). The urban Kemalists were 
secularist, modernist and nationalist; the village "Kemalists" 
were Islamic, reactionary and universalist. Yet Kemal Ataturk 
held these divisive forces together on the understanding that 
the modernisation proceeded without interfering with the 
traditional power base of the village elites. The poorer masses 
and the lower middle-classes were more or less left out of the 
alliance and excluded from power. 
Modernisation, economic development and structural changes 
operated on the Turkish social structure and undermined this 
alliance. (L1) New social classes were appearing and growing 
in strength and their exclusion from the political system was 
less realistic as time went by. The social bonds of Islam were 
loosening and this also loosened the village social structure 
and the extended family system. The small businessman, the 
lowly state bureaucrat, the technician, the intellectual and 
the clerk were seeking political expression but in the circum- 
stances of the dominance of a single political party, the 
Republicans; they had not outlet. In 1946, President Inonu 
(Ataturk's successor and former colleague) in recognition of 
this changing situation permitted modest reforms that included 
the formation of new political parties (it was these reforms 
that also took away the soldier's vote). 
This set off forces outside the established power system 
and rapidly transformed the balance of power. Political 
competition opened up new possibilities in the village whereby 
the reactionary elite could be challenged. The Republican 
Party had been a mere symbol of modernisation around which 
the social remnants of the Ottoman Empire preserved their 
established priviliges and authoritarian rule. They did not 
organise resistance to change because they controlled it 
locally and this made modernisation an uneven process in the 
country. 
The 191+6 constitution changed the "understanding" and 
modernisation became a struggle in the country between the 
new forces and its previous champions whose powere base rested 
in effect on the past. The old alliance made its contribution 
to Turkey's development but some accommodation with the new 
social forces was necessary. Voters were courted and encour- 
aged to express themselves; to campaign for votes is to 
mobilise groups for action and this reached into parts of 
Turkey's power structure up to then unaffected by the 
Republican revolution. 
The growth of the Democratic Party, led by Meneres, 
announced the entry of the new Turkish middle-class and 
workers into politics. The Democrats came to power in 1952 
and this rapid transformation of the political structure 
brought with it new tensions. The associated policies of 
the land reform and trade unionism, and the inflation which 
they were blamed for and the participatory political activities 
of previously ignored groups, all contributed to insecurity in 
the established elites. This development coincided with a 
transformation of the recently disenfranchised armed forces. 
The scenario that had extinguished the military as a 
political force in Mexico was repeated in Turkey but with some 
significant differences that were to produce an entirely 
different result. 
"In 1948, the army was still horse-drawn, equipped 
with World War I weapons, ill-trained, poorly fed 
and inadequately clothed. It was no longer the 
avant guard of modernisation it had been in Ottoman 
times. Nor was it now a channel of upward mobility 
around a frozen elite. Civilians were clearly in 
a position of unchallenged supremacy, politically 
and technologically, and it was in the civilian 
hierarchy that ability was most clearly recognised 
as a basis for promotion and power". (t)) 
The Cold War created the opportunities that changed the 
condition of the army. 
The emergence of Russian, on Turkey's borders, as a major 
world power changed Turkey's peripheral pre-war position. It 
became, what the American's designated asp a "forward area". 
Turkey's ramshackle army was unsuited for the new role that was 
written for a country in the front line against Russian 
expansionism. Turkey lays across the exit for Russia's Black 
Sea fleet (and the entrance for America's Mediterranean fleet). 
It also lies across the land-strike routes for Russia to the 
Middle-East. A weak Turkey was incompatible with any strategic 
defence of the area and credible policy of containment of 
Russia. 
Table Three 
Allocation of the State Budget to Military Expenditure 
Turkey, 1926-69 
Year Percentage 
1926 40 
1930's 28 
1940 56 
1946 33 
1959 25 
1961 24 
1962 26 
1963 22 
1964 23 
1965 22 
1966 21 
1967 21 
1968 18 
1969 17 
Source: Lerner and Robinson, op cit, p. 27,1926-46; 
United Nations Year Book, op cit, 1959-69. 
The proportion of the state budget allocated to defence 
has declined (Table Three). throughout the Republic and this is 
similar to Mexican experience. The massive inflow of military 
aid from America raised the proportion of total resources spent 
on defence, comensurate with its "forward defence area" status. 
Table Four brings together the state military budgets and 
American military aid for the years of the Cold War and the 
post-coup regime to put the defence spending in perspective. 
A NATO definition of military expenditure is used in the defence 
expenditure out of the budget plus strategic investments on 
military highways and communications. The percentage of 
military aid to total military expenditure has been calculated 
in the final column. Using the NATO definition of military 
expenditure this reduces the aid proportion a little. 
expansionism. Turkey lays across the exit for Russia's Black 
Sea fleet (and the entrance for America's Mediterranean fleet). 
It also lies across the land-strike routes for Russia to the 
Middle-East. A weak Turkey was incompatible with any strategic 
defence of the area and credible policy of containment of 
Russia. 
Table Three 
Allocation of the State Budget to Military Expenditure 
Turkey a 1926-69 
Year Percentage 
1926 40 
1930's 28 
19+0 56 
191+6 33 
" 1959 25 
1961 22+ 
1962 26 
1963 22 
196+ 23 
1965 22 
1966 21 
1967 21 
1968 18 
1969 17 
Source: Lerner and Robinson, op cit, p. 27,1926-46; 
United Nations Year Book, op cit, 1959-69. 
Table Four 
Milit ary Expenditures an d Military Aida Turkey 1 948-62 
(in millions of Turkish Lir a) 
Year Military Budget Military Aid Total Aid Per Cent 
1948 530 203 733 27 
1949 556 156 712 21 
1950 599 131 730 18 
1951 652 165 817 20 
1952 725 409 1134 36 
1953 827 491 1318 37 
1951+ 936 620 1556 40 
1955 1077 465 15+2 30 
1956 1159 482 1641 29 
1957 1266 824 2090 39 
1958 1470 2264 3734 61 
1959 2153 1128 3281 34 
1960 2410 786 3196 25 
1961 2718 750 3468 22 
1962 2970 1419 4389 32 
Source: Military Budget: NATO, Facts about Nato, Paris, 1962, 
p. 105, Military Assistance Facts, Washington, 1963, 
p. 30; International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments 
Year Book, 19541 United States, Foreign Assistance 
191+5_62, Washington, 1963, p. 23. Quoted in 
F. C. Shorter, Military Expenditure and the Allocation 
of Resources, in Shorter, (ed). Four Studies in the 
Economic Development of Turkey, London, 1967. 
Military aid from the United States has been substantial; 
at its lowest it was 18 per cent of the total military budget 
in 1950, rising to 61 per cent in 1958 and normally hovered 
around 1/5th to 1/3rd. By 1959 $2 billion had been spent on 
military aid for the Turkish Army and such an injection could 
not help but have an important affect on the army. (2`F) 
The army was rehabilitated from top to bottom. At first 
the aid was merely confined to the delivery of surplus equipment 
but early American missions to Turkey, to oversee the results of 
the deliveries, reported that the equipment was being so abused 
by the ill-trained army that it was rapidly disintegrating. 
Within a couple of years nearly half the trucks given to the 
army were non-operational through lack of proper. maintenance. (2S) 
The American response was to put into an effect an intense 
training programme which by 1951 had passed out 1,000 officers 
and NCO's. A further 300 pilots were trained on jets by 1958. 
All the equipment, vehicles, artillery, communications systems, 
machine guns and small arms for the military were provided by 
the United States. The airforce received Sabre jets, F-51s 
and F-104 super sonic aircraft, plus trainers, transport and 
helicopters. (2G) The navy received a loan of ten submarines 
and destroyers. (VV In Table Five the share of Turkey in 
American aid to "forward areas" and to the Third World have 
been calculated from details in S. I. P. R. I. tables. 
r 
Table Five 
Share of A merican Military Aid to Turkey as a Percentage 
of America n Military Aid to "Forward Areas" and to the 
Third World , 1949-1 969 
Aid to Turkey as Aid to Turkey as 
Years Percentage to Percentage to 
"Forward Area s" Third World 
191+9-52 32 32 
1953-57 23 22 
1958 22 19 
1959 20 17 
1960 12 11 
1961 13 10 
1962 22 17 
1963 17 14 
1964 13 11 
1965 12 11 
1966 13 11 
1967 13 11 
1968 10 9 
1969 9 8 
1949-59 23 21 
1960-69 13 11 
Source: Calculated from Tables in S. I. P. R. I., The Arms 
Trade with the Third World, op cit, pp. 146-147. 
Before the 1960 military coup the share of Turkey in 
American aid to the "forward areas" was averaging 23 per cent 
and its share of Third World aid was averaging 21 per cent. 
After the coup the share dropped to 13 per cent (11 per cent 
of Third World). The major build-up of the armed forces had 
already taken place by 1960. The army was transformed from a 
stagnant force in Turkey into one of Turkey's most modernised 
and technologically advanced elements. It regained its lost 
eminence of the Ottoman period. 
The rapid political change expressed in the victory of 
the Democratic Party (which was also vigorously pro-American) 
and the transformation of the military into a dynamic force 
altered the outcome of Turkey=s political crisis from a 
civilian-political solution to Turkey's post-war problems to 
a military-civilian solution. The Cold War military build-up 
gave the Turkish Army a new role in the country's defences. 
Its status was enhanced at the time when the factional 
political struggle between the Republicans and the Democrats 
was shaking the structural foundations of the old alliance of 
the elite power groups. The army, excluded from political 
activity, and seeing itself as the guardian of the country 
from Russian expansionism, to which was linked subversion and 
disorder inside Turkey was able to re-enter the political 
arena as the country's "saviour". (Zg) 
The Mexican experience diverges from the Turkish from 
this point. The military was removed in both cases, in Mexico 
after a brilliantly fought tactical struggle and in Turkey by 
the sheer dominance of Ataturk's charisma. Turkey's military 
withered away into stagnation; Mexico's was professionalised. 
Turkey's political system introduced the masses to political 
activity after the de-militarisation that had been operating 
for many years while in Mexico the two events were party of 
the same process. By the accident of geography Turkey became 
eligible for massive military aid and this revolutionised the 
army at a time of severe tensions in the civilian political 
structure. Mexico remained unthreatened and with only a 
nominal role for its military. In Turkey this was enough to 
provide the opportunity for military intervention, in Mexico, 
so far, there have been no new circumstances to alter its 
army's role. A deterioration in internal security and the 
consequent build-UP) could bring Mexico's army into politics, 
if the civilian government cracked. 
d) Israel: Domocratic Military 
Israel is a unique case to compare with the countries so 
far discussed in this thesis. Like Mexico, the Israeli 
military has been contained within the civilian political 
system. Unlike Turkey a massive military build-up has not 
brought the military into politics. Israel has fought three 
wars, and myriads of smaller engagements, but these have not 
created tendencies towards military interference in government, 
nor has this military posture created authoritarian conditions 
within the system of government and administration. 
Israel did not have a prominent Revolutionary officer 
caste to lead it to independence. It had instead a revolution- 
ary creed; Zionism, which united the majority of Jewish 
population. The conflicting interpretations of this creed 
contributed to a certain amount of fragmentation in the early 
days, expressed to some extent in the emergence of three 
separate fighting forces before the formation of a single 
state structure in 19i8.0)) 
The State of Israel began as an Idea and became a reality. 
The Idea unified the historical religious tradition with the 
secularist political movement; there was no toruous conflict 
between God and Mammon that need to be resolved before or 
during the struggle for the Idea. 
This is in contrast to Islam where the struggle between 
God and Mammon has created problems for the Islamic regimes 
because the one is not a natural ally of the other. The 
nationalists and the Islamic sects have clashed in several 
countries (Egypt, Sudan, Indonesia, Algeria). Islam is at 
root a universalist idea that does not co-exist happily with 
assertative nation-states? less so in the period of their 
vigorous formation. Compromise is possible between the Islamic 
idea and the nation-state for a short period, identified with 
the removal of a foreign power (imperialism), and for this 
purpose the nation-state can be seen by the faithfull as a 
prelude to the wider universalistic Islamic brotherhood. 
The problems emerge forefully when the nation-state takes 
on essential modern forms and is forced to compromise with the 
Idea. Both Gadafy (Libya) and Boumedienne (Algeria) are 
prisoners of this contradiction. Libyan efforts at the 
formation of an Islamic nation of Arab states are unlikely to 
develop any further than Nasseres previous efforts and no 
matter what the temporary gains they will eventually have to 
face up to separarist nationalism from within the federations 
that are set up. Boumedienne came to power partly to "purify" 
Algeria of athiestic Marxism but the domestic programme his 
Government follows is little different from that of any other 
militant Third World power. What distinguishes the Islamic 
revolutionaries from other Third World countries is their 
hostility to Israel, whose existence is to date a more unifying 
force for Islam than the universalism of their religious creed. 
ý, - c 
Zionism, in contrast, brought nation and religion together; 
it fused rather than divided. Moreover, because of the 
territorial complications of Israel's foundation, the new 
Jewish state, in struggling to express its Idea, had also to 
fight for its physical survival. These forces reciprocally 
re-enforced each other and gave the Zionist state a cohesion 
unmatched in the Third World. Oter states have shown similar 
s olidarity2 e. g. Communist Vietnam, but these have also required 
authoritarian and terroristic instruments to maintain their 
cohesion. 
Given this history of violence why has the Israeli state 
not succumbed to the military. (30) Other countries with only 
some of the problems that Israel has faced have fallen to 
military intervention. One factor in the Government's favour 
has been its consistent record of victories (this also makes 
it difficult to compromise in a peace settlement). Israel is 
also governed effective by a single party that has ruled since 
1948. The opposition parties are schismatically divided and 
spread across the entire political spectrum. Without an 
effective opposition there is no inhibition on their activity 
the ruling party is secure in its coalitions. After Mapai 
there are only two alternatives: the military or the Arabs. 
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The struggle for Israel was conducted on both the military 
and the political front. It was assisted by overseas resources 
and the political pressure of the Jewish communities in the rest 
of the world. The military struggle was divided into three major 
groups. (3I) The largest was the Irgum Ha-Hagana (Defence) that 
had around 1+3,400 fighters (both sexes); the next largest was 
the Irgum Tz'vai Leumi (National Military Organisation) with 
about 3,000 fighters and the smallest was the Lohomai Herut 
Israel (Freedom fighters for Israel), known popularily as the 
Stern Gang, with about 300 fighters. (3#) Another dimensional 
division was between the Kibbutzim-based Palmach and the 
official Hagana. The Palmach were ideologically leftist 
(Kibbutzin socialists) and prefered an Israeli army that was 
Kibbutzim based, volunteer and non-professional. (33) But 
the Provisional Government set up the Israeli Army on different 
principles. It ordered the fusion, or disbandment, of all 
unofficial groups and placed the army 
(Zahal) under a single 
civilian command, that of the Defence Minister, David Ben 
Gurin. 
The issue between the unofficial fighters and the central- 
ised Zahal was brought to a head in 1948 when an unofficial arms 
delivery (the "Altalena" incident) was intercepted and the army 
opened fire when attempts were made to take delivery of 
the 
weapons by one of the unofficial groups. The army won 
the 
engagement and this settled the issue. After 
the assasination 
of Count Bernadotte, the United Nations Representative, 
the 
other fragmentary groups were rounded up and disbanded. 
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Civilian leadership of the armed services with the monopoly 
of violence being held by the Government was established. 
Perlmutter, gives the credit for this development to Ben Gurion1s 
leadership: 
"The transformation of Israelis voluntary, semi- 
professional2 and highly politicalised security 
organisations into a unified, compulsory, 
professional and de-politicalised army was 
accomplished by the determination and skill of 
David Ben Gurion". (jY) 
The civilian government established its legitimacy, and 
with the "second chamber" represented by the Histradut (3s)ß 
the population are able to exercise influence on, and 
opposition toi the political leadership. The army is central- 
ised and monolithic; the political system are stable at the 
centre and the factional in opposition. The state is able 
this way to exercise a maximum of political democracy with a 
maximum of military response to external threats, using a 
skillfully combined professional and conscripted force. 
The new Israeli Government prefered a professional 
nucleus supported by a conscripted army - the professional 
elite would guarantee continuity and standards and the 
conscipts would provide the manpower. The Palmach version of 
an Israeli army was that of volunteer autonomous mobile 
fighting units localised on the Kibbutzim. This would have 
led to unco-ordinated responses to external threats and would 
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have brought to the surface ideological divisions. While 
Zionism was a unifying Idea it was also susceptibel to various 
interpretations. The egaliterian agrarianism of the Kibbutzim, 
the Western elitism of the cities, or a totally religious 
rather than a secular state, are but a few of the possibilities. 
To have a military expression for each and every interpretation 
would have meant a fractional front against the Arabs. ('4) 
The Government's early test on this issue led to the disbandon- 
ment of the Palmach General Staff in November 1948. The 
combination of professionalism and conscription had not affected 
the competence of the Israeli army as a fighting force and it 
has probably ensured a non-military system of government. In 
Turkey this combination has not had this effect. The 
conscripted army (largely rural in composition) has been a 
willing tool of the professional army command in the military 
interventions. 
The officer corps is exclusively merit-selected and also 
constantly rotated. They defend all of Israel not just their 
local version of it, It does not have long periods of 
separation from the civilian way of life because it is inte- 
grated into civilian society in many ways. Training is 
directed at skills useful in both military and civilian occu- 
pations. In some aspects of the work of the army the two are 
combined into the same activity - building insolated settle- 
ments, or roads, opens up isolated regimes for settlements and 
this assists the defence of the territory. 
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Israel faces a 'tribal' problem in trying to fuse diverse 
minorities and refugees from different social systems into a 
single nation, with a common language and common institutions. 
This problem is partly tackled by compulsory military training 
for the youth. The army is a melting pot for the diversity of 
the citizens. (17 ) 
The professional officer corps is normally a possible 
source for ambitious towards military intervention, but the 
Israeli army system prevents this outcome. The demand for 
army officers to take up civilian employment is sufficient 
to drain off any frustrated, or politically motivated, officers. 
Table Six shows the civilian occupations of retired officers 
of the Zahal in 1966 by percentage distribution among 
categories of employment. 
Table Six 
Occupations of Retired Zahal Officers, 1966 
Category Percentage 
Private Corporations 22.1+ 
Government Departments 
(not listed below) 21.7 
Government Corporations 12.2 
Independent 12.2 
Foreign Affairs Ministry 6.9 
Defence Ministry 5.2 
Higher Education 5.2 
Kibbutzim 5.2 
Politics 4.4 
Local Government 2.6 
Other 2.0 
100 
Source: Amos Perlmutter, op cit, p. 76; Table re-arranged. 
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Only 4.4 per cent have gone into politics and the largest 
group have become civil servants 36.4 per cent) though this 
rises to 53.8 per cent if those who work for government corpora- 
tions and higher education are included. Non-government and 
private employment. -accounts 
for 39.8 per cent of the retired 
officers. These extensive employment opportunities in Israeli 
society for trained officers with educational and administrative 
abilities, plus the possibility of technical skills acquited 
from operating advanced military weapons systems, prevent the 
building-up of fears and insecurity among the professional 
officers of post-service deprivation through loss of income and 
status. They also ensure that the Israeli states have a high 
proportion of ex-military personnel at all levels. 
Promotion for the junior ranks is assured through rotation 
and retirals of senior ranks. The turn-over of the officer 
corps also ensures a closer integration of the civilian society 
with the military because many of the key civilian personnel 
will be ex-military personnel. 
There does not seem to be any grounds in which the Israeli 
army is likely to intervene unless it is evident that a military 
government would carry out a foreign, or domestic policy, 
that 
is significantly different from that being carried out by the 
civilian political leadership. In this context, the civilian 
Government's eventual peace deal with the Arabs will have to 
take 'military' i. e. militant Jewish nationalism views about 
possible concessions into account. For example, the surrender 
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of Jurusalem to the Arabs, is probably one issue that could 
provoke some kind of military intervention but it is unlikely 
that any civilian government would be found that would contem- 
plate such an act, unless the balance of forces in the Middle- 
East were to alter dramatically. In 1973 the ruling Mapan 
Party Government faced defections within its conditions from 
a minority party over the prospect of the recognition of 
Jordanian sovereignty on the West Bank of the Jordan. This 
defection would have reduced the Government's majority to 
Four. If the party can split over this "concession" before 
direct negotiation with the Arabs the fragility of the civilian 
leadership is much more serious than it looks. The eventual 
"peace plan" will probably need to be tested in a General 
Election. Peace may bring more problems to Israel than the 
status quo. 
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Conclusion 
The military can be contained in a developing country. 
But this is already implicit in the analysis of military 
interventions. The military can become a political force in 
the state in the absence of viable alternatives. In Mexico, 
Turkey and Israel, the factor that they have in common is the 
existence in each country of a powerful political figure at 
the head of an undivided party. Ataturk, Cardenas and Gurion 
were charasmatic leaders who were able to hold together their 
political movements and ensure loyalty from activists in an 
atmosphere of revolutionary change and, in Turkey's and Mexicots 
cases, a class divided nation. In Israel society was more 
pluralistic but its external security situation was severely 
threatened. If these leaderships had been weaker, or had 
diverted their ambitions to personal dictatorship of the kind 
attempted by Mirza in Pakistan, or Sukarno in Indonesia or 
iikrumah in Ghana, then the outcome may have been different. 
The three leaders were legalistic to a fault and no 
substantial charges of extra-constitutional action can be 
brought against them. Because they were legalistic in respect 
of the constitution they did not threaten constitutional 
opposition nor invite extra-constitutional activity. It is 
this aspect of their political behaviour that separates them 
from the activities of the politicians refered to above, and 
also, from the current behaviour of the leaders of some of 
Africa: s one-party states, who combine their personal rule 
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with an inability to refrain from suppersing opposition 
movements. (p ') 
When a political leadership over-reaches itself, such as 
when it creates through time more enemies than it has friends, 
it is vulnerable to military intervention from a comparatively 
small number of armed and disciplined men. Thus the leadership 
may feel secure in the loyalty of its Chiefs-of-Staff (Nkrumah 
was even wrong in this respect) but the required force for a 
coup d'etat does not need the Chiefs-of-Staff to carry out the 
take-over, nor does it need the support in the initial attack, 
of the rest of the armed services. 
The civilian leadership can fall to intervention from 
another source; it can be fractionalised into a stalemate 
(blocking coalitions). If viable government is not possible 
neither is viable resistance to disorder. The army is then 
able to intervene to ! preserve law and ordert. 
In Turkey, Mexico and Israel the political leadership did 
not fall into any of these errors. Ataturk carried out his 
modernising revolution in alliance with the natural enemies 
of change (this was a sensible policy for Ataturk but it left 
problems for Ionu). He stuck to the constitution and eschewed 
military dictatorship. Cardenas removed the military from 
politics and administration by asserting the supremacy of 
civilian government and not the supremacy of Cardenas. When 
his term of office expired he retired; he did not attempt to 
become "President for Life". - 
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Civilian government is as much a means for choosing a 
succession as for determining its composition. Gurion created 
an armed state with a single government and a population free 
to act as civilian electors (to participate in the politics of 
opposition) and obliged to form the bulk of the armed services. 
The independent armed forces were either integrated or disbanded 
and the closest possible relations between the professional 
military forces and the community were established. Practically 
all levels of Israeli society have personnel who have served 
in the armed forces or are in active reserve units. The 
military is constitutionally under the direct command of the 
civilian cabinet and, because of the composition of the armed 
forces, the possibility for an independent role against the 
civilian cabinet is extremely limited. There are conceivable 
circumstances in which a civilian cabinet could hand over 
executive powers to an army cabinet 
(some serious Israeli 
reverses in the field against the Arabs or a successful 
assassination action against the majority of the Government) 
but this would not be strictly comparable a situation in which 
a professional armed force took-over and directed civilian 
activities as in other military interventions. It would 
bei 
in fact, the civilian population of israel in uniform. 
These three cases confirm the legitimacy thesis. Where 
viable civilian government is present, its military form 
is not, 
and where military intervention is attempted and fails; 
this 
only serves to confirm the viability of civilian government. 
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Where civilian governments fall and the military succeeds this 
expresses the crisis of civilian government and not the inherent 
pathology of the soldier. 
CHAPTER NINE 
POLITICS AND DEFENCE BUDGETS 
a) Introduction 
In this Chapter we want to look at the allocative decisions 
of Third World Governments. The government budget is an 
indicator of the allocative values of a government. We want to 
relate allocative decisions to the political systems in these 
countries and see whether any relationship exists between the 
type of political system and the expenditure decisions under 
various headings, such as defence, welfare and education. For 
example, do military governments spend more on defence than on 
welfare or is the security situation, as perceived by the 
government in either political system a more important influence 
on defence spending than any innate preferences for an against 
military spending? 
Outside of the textbooks it is very doubtful if the 
following allocative rule laid down by Professor Pigou is of 
much use to any of the governments in the Third World: 
"Expenditure should be distributed between battleships 
and Poor Relief is such wise that the last shilling 
devoted to each of them yields the same return of 
satisfaction". (I ) 
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The information necessary for such a rule to be applied is just 
not available in anything remotely accurate enough for a 
meaningful calculus of transformation of utilities to be 
considered. The division of resources into the budget headings 
is subject to the political bargaining process of each country, 
at each time and place. It is not reducable to a single rule 
or law applicable in all countries and political systems and a 
great deal of time and talent is wasted in behaving as if it 
is. (C ) 
The Governments budget is sensitive to the political 
tensions within which the government has to function. It is 
an expenditure that the government has direct influence over. 
The budget outlays also have some element of continuity in 
them, being affected by the decisions of previous administra- 
tions. This is of some importance to all governments. In 
developing countries the decisions of previous administrations, 
on such matters as foreign aid and loans, will continue to be 
budgetary burdens, long after the administration is changed, 
through the necessity to pay interest on the loan, and, 
eventually, through having to repay the principle. 
In education, decisions to introduct primary and secondary 
education, have consequences through time due to the new age 
cohorts that require recurrent expenditure, and, as the 
population grows, due to additional expenditure to meet the 
demands of larger age cohorts. As the population grows so must 
the budgetary expenditure on education, if the original decision 
remains unchanged. A similar situation applies to health and 
social welfare expenditure. 
To this type of expansion in budgetary outlays must be 
added the inflationary pressures, particularly those due to 
rising costs of capital from abroad over which the government 
has little control. If the physical equipment is imported 
from a developed country, it is subject to inflation and the 
developing country must increase its budgetary outlays just to 
maintain the quality of the educational and health provisions; 
and because the population pressure is also increasing the 
total outlays themselves, the combined effect is to raise 
expenditure. This reduces the areas of discretionary decision 
for the government. 
In the case of armaments imports this problem is acutely 
felt by governments. Defence is undertaken by all countries. 
In developing countries, which import the great bulk of their 
military equipment, the pressure of foreign prices is eventually 
felt, even if slowed down by subsidised political sales and by 
purchases of relatively obsolescent or surplus equipment. 
Violence has, not diminished in developing countries, as has 
been shown, and consequently there is great pressure to maintain 
and expand military outlays. As security is an inter-active 
relationship between a country and those other countries it 
feels threatened by or is hostile towards, the acquisition of 
weapons by one country will provoke others to follow suit and 
invest in similar or more advanced weapons. The performance 
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standards of weapons acquired in the Third World thereby 
improves through time but so does their cost. 
The elements of an arms race are not difficult to discern 
in several parts of the Third World (e. g. Arab states and 
Israel; Ethiopia and Somalia; North and South Korea; North and 
South Vietnam and their neighbours; Latin American Republics 
and for the future, Uganda and Tanzania? ). 
Table One 
Number of Third World Countries with Super-Sonic and 
Trans-Sonic. Military Aircraft by Date of Acquisition 
Year 
19516 1958 1962 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
No. of 
Countries 148 14 21 25 29 30 
Source: S. I. P. R. I., The Arms Trade with the Third World, 
Stockholm, 1971, p. 8, Table 1.2 (3 ) 
The acquisitions of super-sonic and trans-sonic military 
aircraft, shown by date in Table One, illustrates the tendency 
for countries to increase the military sophistication of their 
weapon systems, as these weapons become available on the 
international market, ors as frequently, as their rivals acquire 
them. The escalation in costs matches the escalation in 
performance. In 1966 a sub-sonic F-86 Sabre jet fighter was 
priced at around 0200,000 for a surplus plane but the super- 
sonic F-1+ Phantom was priced at 92.5 million. (If) 
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The same pressures are felt where the violence is not 
threatened externally but from within the country from 
guerilla and insurrectionary forces. The type of security 
threat ought in the long run to determine the type of-response, 
though we can note here that governments do not always respond 
to this rule. For example, both Brazil and Argentina acquired 
aircraft carriers and air-strike capacity in the early 1960's 
which are only useable in conventional warfare. The security 
threat in these countries throughout the 1960's was of an 
entirely different nature, and the international threat was 
non-existent. The value of a deep sea aircraft carrier for 
use against urban guerillas is minimal. The growing interest 
of these countries in Counter-Insurgency (COIN) weapons 
suggests that this point is beginning to be understood. 
The data that is available on the budgetary allocations 
in developing countries shows, in effect, the vectors of a 
complex political process that was going on both in the years 
covered by the data and in previous years. Sudden shifts in 
allocation are rare and normally the shifts are gradual over 
a period of time. These shifts occur when some immediate 
adjustment is necessary to deal with an emergency or where the 
implications of previous decisions begin to take full effect. 
Governments in developing countries have less continuity in 
policies than their counterparts in the developed world and 
therefore the budgetary shifts in allocations usually coincide 
with a change in government. In Togo, for example, following 
the 1963 military coup the share of military expenditure out 
I 
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of the state budget rose from 5.4 per cent to 13.5 per cent 
in twelve months. 
The a priori view that the level of insecurity felt by a 
government would be an important influence on that government's 
budgetary allocations to defence and security spending is one 
that appeals to commonsense. In Table Two this conclusion is 
confirmed. The annual average defence allocation out of state 
budgets for periods in the 1960's shows a strong relationship 
between military hostilities and the size of the allocation. 
The effect of the Arab-Israeli wars on the countries concerned 
has been to raise their defence allocation to extremely high 
levels. Syria with 48 per cent of its budget allocated to 
defence is carrying the heaviest burden, followed by Jordan 
(1+6 per cent), Egypt (33 per cent), Iraq (30 per cent), Israel 
(25.8 per cent) and Lebanon (21.2 per cent). The Nigerian- 
Biafra war raised the budgetary allocation from 5.2 per cent 
in 1961-66 to an average of 35 per cent during the war. The 
post-war projections for defence and security show a drop 
from this emergency level to 9.4 per cent. (. 
5) 
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Table Two 
Average Annual Percentage Allocation on Defence Out 
of State Budgets, (41 countries) 
Country Date Percentage Remarks 
Syria 48 Arab-Israeli Wars 
Jordan 4+6 Arab-Israeli Wars 
Nigeria 35 Biafra War 1967-70 
Egypt 33 Arab-Israeli Wars 
Burma 33 Insurgency 
Indonesia 31.3 Confrontation 1962-65 
Iraq 30 Arab-Israli Wars 
Korea 25.7 Korean War and High Post- 
War Tension 
Pakistan(') 24.9 Indo-Pak Wars, 1965,1971 
Iran 23.1 Persian Gulf Ambitions 
Turkey 21.8 "Forward Defence Area" 
Colombia 21.3 Insurgency 
Lebanon 21.2 Arab-Israeli Wars 
Ethiopia 20.9 Ethiopia-Somalia War and 
Separatist Insurrections 
India 20.7 Indo-Pak and Sino-India Wars 
Brazil 17.0 Insurgency 
Thailand 17 Vietnam War and Insurgency 
Peru 16.9 Insurgency 
Malaysia 16 Confrontation and Insurgency 
("Reported to be 60% in 1973. 
R ý, rr i 
Country Date Percentage Remarks 
Argentina 15.6 Insurgency 
Ecuador 15.3 
Cameroon 15.2 Insurgency 
Bolivia 14.8 Insurgency 
Singapore 11+ 
Tanzania 13.4 To Rise Post-Uganda War? 
Sudan 13.3 Separatist War 
Philippines 11.5 Insurgency 
Togo 10.7 
Guatemala 10.4 Insurgency 
El Salvador 10.3 
Venezuela 10 Insurgency 
Chile 9.6 
Honduras 9.1 
Ghana 9 
Ivory Coast 9 
Uganda 8.8 To rise Post-Tanzania War? 
Costa Rica 7 Army 'abolished' 1948 
Liberia 5.1+ 
Kenya 5.1 
Sri Lanka 3 Uprising 1971 
Malawi -2.2 
Source: United Nations, Year Book of Statistics, 1970; 
various time periods in the 1960's; some 
countries for one year only. 
Indonesia was allocating 31 per cent of the budget to 
defence during the confrontations with Dutch New Guinea and 
Malaysia and some reports put the proportion even higher. ((j) 
Korea and Turkey are major recipients of American aid and 
have bee scheduled "forward defence areas" in American global 
strategy. (7 ) 
South Korea allocates an average of 25 per cent of the 
state budget to defence a decade or more after the end of 
hostilities with North Korea. The military posture of the 
Koreans has been maintained at such a high level because the 
governments throughout the period since the war felt insecure 
with their northern neighbour. The Blitzkeig capability of the 
north Koreans, evidenced in their original offensive in the 
Korean War where they almost pushed the Americans out of the 
peninsular, has been the main strategic threat to South Korea 
and they have kept themselves in a quasi-alert status since. 
(a ) 
it also accounts for the 40,000 U. S. soldiers permanently 
stationed in South Korea. 
Turkey has also maintained a high proportion of the budget 
on defence (2108 per cent) and in 1973 this is to be increased 
still further to meet the Government's security preparations. 
These preparations are to cover ýýcidýnýs with the Soviet 
Union, with Syria, which is well armed with Soviet advanced 
weapons, and for evt4utALVºtS if there is a decline in Greek- 
(9 ) Turkey relations over Cyprus. 
Pakistan is another power with a high defence allocation 
(24.9 per cent), and substantial American military aid. The 
military conflicts with India have contributed to a receptive 
atmosphere in the executive for military allocations. There 
has been an active "Defence-Business" lobby close to the 
Government. (10) There are a number of unresolved border 
problems with India and the effect of the successful Bangladesh 
separation on the communal tension within the remaining Western 
wing may require increased allocations to produce a well 
equipped and loyal force at the disposal of the central 
government. (11 ) 
India has also increased its budgetary outlays on defence. 
It averaged 20,7 per cent of the budget in the 1960's and this 
increased to 28 per cent for 1969. India has fought wars with 
both Pakistan and China and has also been active in a number 
of smaller engagements with insurgents such as the Nagas in 
northern India. 
Malaysia and Singapore have defence allocations of 16 and 
14 per cent respectively. Singapore is planning to increase 
its allocation to 38 per cent in the 1970's to compensate for 
the rundown in external military assistance from the U. K., 
Australia and New Zealand. (l2) 
It is interesting to note that the Latin American republics, 
which have high absolute amounts allocated to defence, are 
mainly located in the bottom half of the Table. They have not 
experienced external hostilities in the post-war years (with 
the exception of the so-called football "war" between Honduras 
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and El Salvador in 1971). The main security threats have been 
insurgency and the present para-military role of the security 
forces has been sufficient to contain these typed rebellions. 1t- 
Of the fifteen countries have devoted an average through- 
out the 1960's over a fifth of their state budgets to defence 
ten of them had military regimes for all or part of the years 
in question (Syria, Nigeria, Egypt, Burma, Indonesia, Iraq, 
Korea, Pakistan, Turkey, Colombia) and a further three, Jordan, 
Iran and Ethiopia, were militant monarchies. Only three, 
India, Lebanon and Israel, were party states. At the other 
end of the scale, the ten countries that allocated an average 
of under ten per cent of their budgets to defence, eight of 
them were Party states (Chile) Ivory Coast, Uganda, Costa Rica, 
Liberia, Kenya, Sri Lanka and Malawi). The two exceptions, 
Ghana and Honduras were at the upper end of this bottom 
ranking (9 and 9.1 per cent respectively). 
To see if there is any significance between the political 
system and the defence allocation for countries in the sample 
the average annual expenditure on defence as a percentage of 
the state budget was calculated according to whether they were 
military regimes or non-military regimes (monarchical states 
were taken as non-military for the purposes of this exercise). 
The results are shown in Table Three for each regional grouping, 
and in the final column, the average for the whole sample in 
each classification is shown. 
In the Middle-East region the military regimes have an 
average allocation of 27.9 per cent against the non-military 
regime's 29.8 per cent. The non-military figure is in excess 
of the military outlay and contrary to other regions in the 
Table. All other regions show a pronounced bias in favour of 
higher defence allocations by military regimes than by non- 
military regimes. The high allocations of all countries in 
the Middle-East contributes to the higher figures in this 
column and there are a variety of high allocating non-military 
regimes such as Jordan. If the Party States alone are taken 
for comparison, i. e. Israel and Lebanon, the non-military 
average annual allocation falls to 21.9 per cent, thus 
Monarchist Jordan is helping to raise this group's average. 
Table Three 
Average Annual Percentage Expenditure on Defence Out of 
State Budgets According to Political Status and Hostilities 
Category Average Percentage of Budget 
Regions 
Middle 
East Asia Africa 
Latin 
erica 
ALL 
Military Governments 27.9 25.5 11.3 13.9 20.5 
Icon-Military 
Governments 29.8 11.4 6.9 7.5 14.3 
Belligerents 
(all states) 33.1 23.1 22.9 .. 30.8 
lion-Belligerents 
(all states) 18.4 17.5 7.9 00 13.3 
Military Governments in Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin 
America allocated about double the percentage allocated by non- 
military governments on defence out of the state budgets. The 
relative allocation in the Middle-East group, after the 
adjustment of the non-military regimes (21.9 per cent), is still 
much closer to the military regimes than for those in other 
regions. This is explained by the intense pressure of Middle- 
East in security, which is partly related to the Arab-Israeli 
war and partly also to the ever present threats felt by the 
monarchical regimes who are under pressure from their republican 
neighbours. The former monarchical regimes of Egypt, Iraq, 
Yemen and Libya are an active (even evangelical) force for 
republicanism and consequently the monarchies invest additional 
(p 
resources in state security. (15) The monarchies of Iran, 
Morocco, Saudia Arabia and the gulf states are all heavy 
defence spenders. 
The impact of hostilities on the defence budget can be 
seen in the last two rows in Table Three. The allocations in 
the belligerent category (taken as being a country that has 
been engaged in hostilities with a neighbour during the 1960's) 
are in every case much larger on average than those for 
countries that are in the non-belligerent category. 
In the Asian group, both Malaysia (including Singapore) 
and Indonesia were not included in the belligerancy category 
because the 'confrontation' had an unequal effect on the 
countries concerned. Malaysia and Singapore received consider- 
able lo logistical and material assistance from Britain, 
Australia and New Zealand and the effects of the war on their 
budgets is not entirely clear. 
In the Middle-East and Africa the difference between the 
belligerents and the non-belligerents is clearly marked. War 
compels the government to allocate resources to ensure the 
survival of the territorial integrity of the country. 
The impact of the political system, and the foreign 
relations of a country, on the proportion of the budget 
allocated to security has been shown to be positively related 
to conditions of hostility with neighbours and also related 
to whether a military government is in power. We now want to 
pr 
see if the allocations to defence expenditure are competitive 
with some other items in the budget, i. e. whether the spending 
on defence reduces the amount available to be spent on 
education and health. 
k 
b) Welfare and Defence 
Welfare expenditure is only one item in the state budget 
but this heading is chosen because it is the heading most 
commonly considered by critics of defence spending as the 
politically sensitive sufferer from military preparations. 
The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) 
in its reports contrast the amounts spent on military prepara- 
tions with the amounts spent on education and health on a 
world wide basis on the (warranted) assumption that most 
readers will be applying value judgements which favour welfare 
expenditure in any competition between the two headings. (l6) 
Taking world defence expenditures as a whole, for developed 
and developing countries, in 1967 the education budget was only 
2/3rds of the world military budget and public health expenditures 
was even lower at 1/3rd of world defence spending. This, of 
course, must be put in the context of the fact that the 85 per 
cent of all world military spending is carried out in only 
seven countries, America, Russia, China, Germany, France, 
Canada and the United Kingdom. Half the countries in the world 
spend more on defence than on education and only 36 countries 
spend as much on public health as they do on defence. (1%) 
Of the developing countries, 49 spend more on education than 
defence and 23 spend less; 22 spend more on health than defence 
and 47 spend less. (1g) 
In Table Four percentage expenditures on defence are tested 
for a relationship with percentage expenditures on welfare. The 
correlation coefficients for 30 countries have been calculated 
for the years shown in the table. The existence of a high 
statistical correlationship does not of course imply a causal 
relationship, nor does the reverse indicate a lack of such a 
relationship. 
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Four countries, Egypt, Honduras, Sudan and Turkey, (all 
with military governments) have strong positive correlations 
between percentage defence expenditures and percentage welfare 
expenditure (above r =. 8)o This indicates a statistical 
relationship between percentage movements in the defence budget 
and percentage movements in the welfare budget - as defence 
spending increases so does welfare spending. Only four 
countries, Kenya, Argentina, Korea and India, had negative 
coefficients, which suggest a statistical relationship such that 
when percentage defence spending rises percentage welfare 
spending falls (and vice versa). The coefficients for Korea 
and India were very weak correlations, India coefficient is 
close enough to zero to be indicative of no correlation at all. 
Twenty-six of the countries have positive correlations of 
which 12 are fairly strong (above r= . 5) and 14 are weak. Of 
the eleven non-military governments included in the table, 
four are among the group with fairly strong correlations and 
seven with weak correlations. Of the countries with nine 
lowest coefficients, six were non-military governedLcountries. 
Within the limitations of the data the broad suggestions is 
that defence spending is not obviously competitive with welfare 
spending, that for military governed countries it is less 
competitive than for non-military governed countries and that 
for only two countries in the sample, Kenya and Argentina is 
there any strong evidence of direct competition between the two 
headings. In Kenya's case welfare spending as a proportion of 
the budget remained static between 1961 and 1970 while defence 
spending as a proportion of the budget trebled. In absolute 
terms the amount spent on defence quadrapuled and that on 
welfare almost doubled. Even so, Kenya was still one of the 
lowest defence spenders in the sample. (14) 
For all countries in the sample the state budget increased 
throughout the 1960's and this enabled governments to increase 
expenditure on a number of headings and thereby avoid in 
political terms painful decisions between conflicting interests. 
It can still be argued (and this is implicit in much of the 
ACDA work) that welfare headings could be increased faster if 
defence spending was cut; this is true of all headings in the 
budget, including foreign aid repayments. The essential point 
to be established by its critics is that defence spending is 
demonstrably unnecessary and thereby wasteful. Given the 
pattern of violence in the Third World this hardly seems a 
tenable proposition, (20) 
Table Four 
Correlation between Percentage of the State Budget 
Allocated to Defence and Welfare, 10 countries 
Country Years r 
Egypt 1963-71 . 85 
Honduras 1964-70* . 89 
Sudan 1962-69 . 85 
Turkey 1961-69 . 81 
Thailand 1961-71* . 79 
Kenya 1961-70 -. 78 
Burma 1963-70 . 74 
Nigeria 1961-66-- . 69 
Argentina 1963-69 -. 62 
Ecuador 1963-69* . 67 
Lebanon 1961-69 "59 
Philippines 1961-70 . 55 
El Salvador 1964-70 . 
52 
Ethiopia 1964-69 . 51 
Venezuela 1965-71* . 48 
Pakistan 1960-69 . 38 
Mexico 1964-70* . 38 
Syria 1962-69 035 
Iraq 1960-70 "33 
Guatemala 1963-69 . 29 
Ghana 1959-70 . 27 
Liberia 1964-69 . 25 
Korea 1966-70 -. 20 
Country Years r 
Jordan 1961-70 . 18 
Uganda 1960-70 . 16 
Colombia 1965-71 . 15 
Malawi 196+-69 . 09 
Brazil 1961+-70 007 
Malaysia 1960-69 o6 
India 1962-71 -. 02 
Source: Data calculated from United Nations, Ye ar Book of 
Statistics, 1970, 
(*) education and defence only 
(--) defence includes internal security funds. 
Governments control their own budgets. If military 
governments are more prone to high proportional defence budgets 
and governments of all types are even more prone to high defence 
budgets if they face, or believe they face, external threats, 
the next point to examine is whether these defence allocations 
are competitive with education and welfare in particular cases. 
It is possible for a high proportional defence budget to coexist 
with high and low welfare proportional shares. If defence is 
competitive with welfare then high defence allocations will 
be accompanied with low welfare allocations and conversely low 
defence allocations will be accompanied by high welfare 
allocations. 
Table Five shows the annual average percentages spent on 
defence and welfare for ten African countries. The years for 
which the data applies vary due to the availability of the 
data. They are ranked in order of size of defence spending. 
The individual annual averages for each country under each 
heading has been averaged to give a group average. The annual 
average for all the countries of the budget spend on defence 
was 8.7 per cent and that for welfare was 21 per cent. 
Table Five 
Annual Average Ex penditures on Defence and Welfare State 
Budgets, 12 African Countries, 19601s 
Country Years Defence Welfare 
Malawi 1964-69 2.2 20.3 
Zambia 1964-67 5.0 20.5 
Kenya 1964-70 5.1 15.6 
Nigeria 1961-66 5.2 25.6 
Liberia 1964-69 5. L 18.3 
Uganda 1964-70 8.8 25.2 
Ghana 1964-70 9.6 24.7 
Ivory Coast 1961* 19.0 26.2 
Tanzania 1964-70 13.4 21.5 
Togo 1964-70 11.1 24.4 
Cameroon 1964-65+ 15.2 23.2 
Ethiopia 1964-69 20.9 17.3 
Group average ..... .. ............ o........ 
8.7 21.0 
Source: Calculated from United Nations, Year Book of Statistics, 
1970" 
(*) date for one year only in Bulletin Menseul de 
Statistique, June 1967 
(+) data for one year only in Cameroon Federale, 
Oriental Occidental, 1964-65. 
Malawi allocated the smallest amount to defence but did 
not allocate a proportion as great as the regional average to 
welfare. Indeed of the seven countries that allocated an above 
regional average for defence, six of them also exceeded the 
regional average for welfare. The below average allocators on 
welfare were also below average allocators on defence. For 
the twelve African countries in the sample the results do not 
support the a priori view that high defence spending is 
competitive with welfare spending. 
The six countries in the Middle-East group for which data 
was available are shown in Table Six. 
Table Six 
Average Annual Expenditures on Defence and Welfare State 
Budgets, 6 Middle-East Countries, 1960's 
Country Years Defence Welfare 
Lebanon 1962-70 21.2 17.9 
Israel 196+-70 25.8 15.3 
Iraq 1960-70 30 18.7 
Egypt 1958-70 33 20.7 
Syria 1951+-70 45 19.8 
Jordan 1964-70 1+6 10.7* 
Group average .................... 33.7 16.8 
Source: Calculated from United Nations, Year Book of 
Statistics, 1970. 
(*) estimated. 
ý ', 
The results are conflicting. Of the three countries with 
below average defence spending, Lebanon, Israel and Iraq, two 
had above average welfare spending, which supports the 
competitive relationship. But of the three countries with 
average or above average defence spending two also had above 
average spending on welfare. Jordan and Israel have below 
average welfare spending but have defence proportions above and 
below the average respectively. This ambiguity in the evidence 
could arise from this area's special position as an arms race 
region. 
Israel's rate of growth in defence spending for 19+9-69 
was 17.7 per cent per year (in 1969 it reached an annual rate 
of 27.7 per cent). For the region as a whole in the same period 
the rate of growth in defence spending was 13.2 per cent 
(18.9 per cent for 1969). (2I) It is not feasible for countries 
to sustain such a rapid growth in the defence budget without 
distortions appearing in the economy. 
Recent suggestions from the Arab Chiefs of Staff that each 
Arab country should contribute 15 per cent of the national income 
to defence (i. e. for the war against Israel) indicate that the 
arms race could reach yet higher levels, though some element 
of this will actually be price increase. The reluctance of 
the 
Soviet Union to accede to Egyptian arms requests is forcing 
the Arab states to consider how to finance substitute 
) purchases. 
XL) 
I) 
Turning to the Latin American countries the data is set 
out in Table Seven. 
Table Seven 
Average Annu al Expenditure on Defence and Welfare State 
Budgets, 11 Latin American Countries, 1960's 
Country Years Defence Welfare 
Costa Rica 1965-69 7.0* 28.6 
Mexico 1964-70** 8.4 21.4 
Honduras 1965-70 9.1 22.4 
Chile 1964-68 9.6 16.0 
Venezuela 1965-71 10.0 14.8 
El Salvador 1964-70+ 10.3 24.0 
Ecuador 1963-69 15.3 18.3 
Argentina 1963-69++ 15.6 14 
Peru 1964-69 16.9 16.4 
Brazil 1964-70 17.0 7.1 
Colombia 1965-71 21.3 14.8 
Group average .................... 13.3 19.7 
Source: Calculated from United Nations, Year Book of 
Statistics, 1970. 
(*) includes internal security 
(**) 1967-70 estimated 
(+) 1970 estimated 
(++) 1967-69 not strictly comparable. 
Health expenditure totals were not available for all 
the countries and therefore only education outlays 
are included in welfare. 
The evidence for Latin America does show a marked leaning 
towards a competitive relationship between defence and welfare 
expenditure. Of the six countries with below average defence 
allocations) four have above average welfare allocations. 
Details for health expenditures were only available for a 
minority of the sample and, therefore 2 as the welfare figures 
relates to education only, this must be borne in mind when 
evaluating the table. Nevertheless, the five above average 
defence spenders all have below average expenditures on education, 
and this is in line with the trend among the lower defence 
allocators. The Latin American group are completely different 
in this respect from the African group. 
There are a number of points to make in passing about the 
Latin American experiences. Costa Rica, for example, allocated 
28 per cent of the state budget on education on average for the 
years 1965 to 1968 (the trend was decidedly upwars and reached 
a third of the budget in 1969). (23) The effect of this large 
proportion on the country was noted by one observer: 
"Nowhere in Central America or the Caribbean are 
there to be seen so many students wearing college 
badges or school uniforms, so many sock and stripped 
shirts..... The thirst for learning seems all 
consuming in Costa Rica". (2t. ) 
The illiteracy rate is amongst the lowest in Latin America. In 
1963 the illiteracy rate was 15.7 per cent compared 2 say 2 to 
2ticaragua's rate of 50.2 per cent. (1$) One reason for the low 
defence allocation in Costa Rica was the unusual "revolution" 
of 19+8 which disbanded the armed forces, formed a national 
guard, and turned the main barracks into an arts museum. (2b) 
Mexico, like Costa Rica, makes a relatively large allocation 
to education (for the years 1967 to 1970 it exceeded a quarter of 
the state budget). (17) Defence spending has also been 
increasing after a long period when it was falling. The annual 
increase for 19+9-69 was 5.4 per cent rising to 8.8 per cent in 
1969. (Zß) Mexico has recently been purchasing large numbers 
of military aircraft - between 1950 and 1970 it purchased 
250 military aircraft from Canada and the United States, as well 
as 42 small naval vessels and 55 tanks. (LI) 
The relatively small allotment to the 
a consequence of a political struggle over 
the Revolution (1912-20). The progress of 
shadowed by tie decline in the budgetary a, 
military; in 19+0 it received 21 per cent, 
and in 196+ 7 per cent. 
(30) 
military in Mexico is 
several decades since 
that conflict is 
Llocation to the 
in 1957,12 per cent 
Conclusion 
The evidence does not suggest that high defence budgets 
necessarily are directly at the expense of welfare budgets. 
Neither does the political system appear to influence the 
amount spent on welfare, except in the Asian group where the 
average annual percentage expenditure on welfare for military 
regimes is 15.2 per cent compared to an annual average of 
26.3 per cent for non military regimes. (See Table Eight). 
Table Eight 
Average Annual Percentage Allocation on Welfare for Major 
Regional Groups by Political System 
Political System 
Grou Non-Military Military 
/o 
Asia 26.3 15-2 
Africa 20.6 21.2 
Middle-East 13.2 18.7 
Notes: Asia: Pakistan; Korea; Burma; Thailand; India; 
Malaysia; Sri Lanka; Philippines. 
Africa: Ghana; Togo; Uganda; Zambia; Tanzania; 
Malawi; Nigeria. 
Middle-East: Egypt; Iraq, Syria; Turkey, Israel; 
Lebanon; Jordan. 
In the African group military regimes have a slightly 
greater military allocation than welfare allocation compared 
to non-military regimes. . In the Middle-East the military 
regimes have a greater average allocation on defence compared 
to the non-military regimes. These averages are taken from 
small samples for which data is available. They do not 
necessarily represent the whole picture and they cover countries 
at different stages of development. 
The information regarding the relationship between defence 
and welfare expenditures does not produce evidence to support 
the normal value judgement that military spending is depriving 
the Third World countries of resources that could be directed 
to the highly valued ends of raising educational levels and 
improving public health. The evidence suggests that the 
relationships between these items of government expenditure is 
much more complex not to say ambiguous. 
The proposition for such a competitive relationship is, 
however, unexceptionable, in the form that argues that whatever 
is allocated to welfare could be increased if there was less 
defence spending. But the evidence for low defence spenders 
does not confirm that the result is to automatically increase 
welfare spending. In theory the case is sound (reduce one item 
and you can increase another) but in practice something may 
interfere with the equation. The political bargaining system 
has to resolve the desire for increased welfare and the 
necessity for security. The evidence suggests that governments 
increase expenditures on all items rather than reallocate between 
them. 
;- 
CHAPTER TEN 
DEFENCE AND GROWTH 
a) Introduction 
This Chapter takes the argument about defence allocations 
a stage further. It concentrates attention on two indicators 
of economic performance, the growth rate of Gross Domestic 
Product and the growth rate of per capita incomes. The propo- 
sition, implicit in much of the disarmament and development 
literature is that the defence allocations of the Third World 
countries interfere with the development programmes. In the 
case of India, for example, the wars of 1962,1965 and 1971, 
had important effects on the Five Year Plans. Resources were 
directed into defence activities and fiscal measures were taken 
to finance these expenditures. In Pakistan the wars also had 
effects on the development programmes. For example in 1965 the 
war with India set up shocks in the economic system which the 
economy never really recovered from. 
The analysis of the effects of wars on development is a 
large and neglected area of development economics. We look 
into this problem in later chapters. The present exercise is 
less ambitious. It is simply an attempt to relate the defence 
spending of Third World countries to their growth rates. If 
there is a direct relationship (implicitly a negative relation- 
ship) between defence as a burden and economic performance it 
should show up in the comparative growth rates of the high and 
low defence spenders. 
Developing countries regard economic growth as a major 
priority. Security considerations apart, economic growth 
remains the one index of performance by which a developing 
country will measure its successes or failures and be so judged 
by other countries. Countries that start off from a low level 
of economic activity, with the associated low per capita income, 
unexploited resources, and desperately pressing social problems 
and deprivation, must find ways to expand the economy if these 
indices of economic backwardness are to be improved. 
The Third World is also in a hurry. The material conditions 
of the opulations of these countries would be less intolerable 
but for the evident affluence of other parts of the world, and, 
it must also be said, the conspicuous affluence of the indigenous 
elite. Growth in the economy is necessary to spread the material 
advantages of a richer society to wider layers of the population; 
growht, at the highest feasible rate, by bringing these 
advantages nearer, takes pressure off the elite from the justly 
convetous. 
The declaration of the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 is typical of the growth directed 
outlook of the Third World: 
"The aims and purposes of the Association shall 
be: to accelerate the economic growth, social 
progress and cultural development in the region 
through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality 
and partnership in order to strengthen the founda- 
tion for a prosperous and peaceful community of 
South East Asian nations". () 
it is unlikely that much progress would be made towards any of 
the other objectives without an acceleration of economic growth 
and its maintenance at a satisfactory level. Development with- 
out growth is not possible. With growth the market widens and 
with a widening of the market prospects for an ending of the 
dual type of enclave modern economy co-exists with a backward 
subsistence sector. Cultural and political variations are 
possible but there are broad constraints imposed by the 
current technology. 
The gross national product is one measure of an economy. 
While it is a measure open to some criticsm, its use is 
sufficiently well established for it to be helpful in this 
context without anybody being misled into Equating economic 
progress, as measured by increases in the gross national product, 
with human happiness. The rate of growth is an arithmetical 
calculation found by comparing one period's"product with 
another's. Allowing for variations in national accounting 
practice, the growth rate is an approximation of what has 
happened taking one period with another. The trend growth rate 
is of some value in looking at the broader changes that are 
taking place, or not taking place, in an economy. 
The United Nations publishes statistics each year for most 
countries in the world and these have been used here liberally. 
These figures are provided to the United Nations by government 
agencies and are reproduced with minimal adjustment by the UN. 
statistical service. Thus there are two caveats for us if we 
use these figures. The first is that there may be errors in 
the collection of the data due to inefficient administrative 
procedures, or simply as a result of lack of coverage in a 
particular country. Not all countries have extensive civil 
administrations and consequently whereas in some countries the 
data is actually collected at source (census surveys) in others 
it may be estimated. Access may be difficult (and dangerous) 
and the figures can be over or under-estimated. The second 
caveat is that there may be in the computation of the data, 
largely for the same reasons as above. 
If the national income accounting system is still subject 
to criticism in countries where none of the above conditions 
apply it is obvious that the criticisms are proportionately 
more relevant in countries where they do apply. The basic 
assumption that is made by the United Nations statisticans is 
that the information they receive from the national governments 
is fairly accurate and exception is taken to particular figures 
only when the discrepancies are outstanding. It would, of 
course, be impolitic for the U. N. to suggest that individual 
countries are unreliable collectors of information from within 
their own border. Thus in using these figures caution is 
essential; in drawing conclusions from their manipulation 
caution is mandatory. 
b) Growth and Defence 
If growth is important to a country it is therefore 
important to reduce the influence of activities that inhibit 
growth. Military expenditures are generally regarded as waste- 
ful and it is worth examining the growth rates of countries to 
see if there is any obvious connection between military spending 
and the growth rate. 
Growth rates can change rather suddenly due to exceptional 
factors and therefore a period growth rate is more representative 
than an individual year's figure alone. Military expenditures 
are also subject to sudden fluctuations. Where possible then 
the data has been taken for a period of years rather than for 
a single year. 
Four countries, Taiwan, Israel, Syria and Egypt, have high 
proportions of their Gross National Product allocated to 
defence (all over 9 per cent) (See Table One). They also have 
widely divergent growth rates for the period; ranging from 
Taiwan, at 10.3 per cent to Egypt, at 1.8 per cent. Taiwan 
and Israel have received military assistance from the United 
States, though much of Israel's "assistance" has been purchased 
and Egypt and Syria have received military assistance from the 
Soviet Union. (2, ) Military expenditures are not influencing 
the growth rates in an identical way. Korea, for instance, 
receives substantial military assistance from America, and has 
allocated substantially less than these countries to defence 
(1+ per cent) and has a relatively high growth rate (9.2 per 
cent). Malawi allocates even less to defence (0.8 per cent 
of GNP) and has an even smaller growth rate than Egypt at 
1 per cent. 
Seventeen countries in the table cluster in a growth rate 
range of between 3 and 6 per cent and an allocation on defence 
of between 1 and 3 per cent. Of the countries in this cluster 
only six countries which allocated between 1 and 2 per cent on 
defence have growth rates between 3 and 6 per cent. This 
leaves eleven countries in this cluster that are allocating 
between 3 and 4 per cent on defence and which have the same 
range of growth rates. Four countries, Zambia, Nicaragua, 
Thailand and Ivory Coast are also in the same allocative range 
of military expenditures and have much higher growth rates 
(above 6- per cent). Panama and Kenya have had high growth 
rates with low military expenditures (under one per cent) but 
so has Iran with 4.8 per cent defence expenditure. There is 
no statistical relationship between growth rates and percentage: 
allocated to defence. 
Table one 
Growth of G. D. P. (5} and the Percentage of G. N. P. 
Allocated to Defence, 1960's 
Country Years Growth Rate % Military 
Expenditures (GNP) 
Taiwan 1960-69 10.3 11-. 5* 
Korea 1960-69 9.2 4.0 
Zambia 1960-68 8.2 1.3* 
Nicaragua 1960-68 8.1 1.6* 
Thailand 1960-70 8.0 2.6* 
Panama 1960-68 7.9 0.1 
Israel 1960-68 7.7 9.1 
Iran 1960-67 7. ,7 4.8 
Kenya 196+-69 6.8 0.9 
Ivory Coast 1960-69 6.6 1.6* 
Malaysia 1960-70 6.0 2.6 
Honduras 1960-68 5.8 1.3* 
Peru 1960-68 5.7 2.9 
Bolivia 1960-68 5.7 2.3 
Pakistan 1960-68 5.7 3.6 
Sierra Leone 1963-68 5.7 0.8 
Philippines 1960-70 5.8 1.5 
Guatemala 1960-69 5.3 1.2* 
Venezuela 1966-68 5.1 2.2 
Syria 1963-68 5.1 11.1 
Cameroon 1961-68 4.8 2.4* 
Colombia 1960-68 4.8 1.8 
N 
Country Years Growth Rate % Military Expenditures (GNP) 
Chile 1960-67 4.8 2.5 
Tanzania 1964-69 4-7 0.9 
Sri Lanka 1960-68 4.6 1.1 
Paraguay 1960-68 4.5 2.0* 
Ecuador 1960-64 4.4 2.1 
Brazil 1960-68 4.1 3.0 
Sudan 1960-65 4.0 2.5 
Tunisia 1960-68 3.9 1.8 
Uganda 1966-71 3.5 1.8** 
Zaire 1966-68 3.4 2.7* 
Argentina 1960-68 3.2 2.0 
Indonesia 1960-70 3.3 1.8 (est) 
Ghana 1960-69 2.2 1.7 
Egypt 1965-69 1.8 11.7 
Malawi 1960-63 1.0 0.8* 
Uraguay 1960-68 0.4 1.5 
Source: Growth of G. D. P., United Nations, Year Book of 
Statistics, 1970; Defence expenditure, United 
States, Arms Control and Disarmament A gency 
Report, 1967. 
(*) for 1967 only 
(**) for 1962-67. 
c) Per Capita Product 
If growth in national product can be used as a measure of 
a country's economic performance then per capita product can 
be used as a measure of the level of economic development 
(subject to the same caveats). There is no direct relationship 
between the amount of military expenditure and the per capita 
product. (3 ) (See Table Two). Countries with high per 
capital incomes (over U. S. 0500) had expenditures on defence 
ranging from 0.1 per cent (Panama) to 2.5 per cent (Chile). 
Altogether there are 43 countries within this range of defence 
expenditure as a per cent of national product, their per 
capita income runs from $50 (Upper Volta) to 0910 (Venezuela). 
The countries in the Table have low per capita incomes 
because they are under-developed not because they spend this 
or that amount on defence. The relationship between defence 
spending and per capita income is much more indirect. 
We have already noted the relationships between low per 
capita income and military interventions and between military 
spending as a proportion of the state budget and the political 
system of government. The increased proneness to military 
coups is noticeable among low income countries and military 
governments allocate more to defence out of their budgets 
than 
non-military governments. We would expect then some relation- 
ship between low per capita income and the proportion of the 
state budget spent on defence. But under this relationship 
For this exercise we are not considering the direct effect 
of belligerency on the defence budget. Governments, military 
and non-military allocate more to defence when they are engaged 
in, or anticipate being engaged ins direct military 
confrontation, than when they are not or do not anticipate 
being so. Belligerency is not a function of economic develop- 
ment or political system. 
The time period that has elapsed since most military 
governments came to power is quite small and it may be that 
the impact of the higher defence spending associated with 
military governments has not had time to make appreciable 
difference in a comparison with countries which have avoided 
military governments (and belligerency). The possible effect 
of the higher defence burden cannot readily be measured in 
terms of the per capita product until sufficient time has 
elapsed to allow the country's particular circumstances to be 
over-ridden by the defence factors. However, the defence 
burden may have a more immediate effect on the growth in per 
capita income. 
d) Growth of Per Capita Product 
Per capita product is a function of two variables: the 
growth in population and the growth in gross national product. 
If the population grows faster than the product the per capita 
product will fall; if product grows faster than population then 
the per capita-- product will increase. If defence spending is 
a burden on the economy and represents a diversion from 
productive activity - i. e. if it consumes resources rather than 
creates capacity - this might be reflect in a lower growth rate 
than would otherwise be achieved. 
Population growth is subject to factors which the government 
does not have control of (except in the longer term and even then 
this is subject to government influence rather than control. ). 
Population policy is not likely to be strictly related to 
defence, except in the longer term through such policies as 
populating isolated but strategically significant areas (Russian 
policy towards the population of Siberia has been partly penal 
and partly strategic). For these reasons any conclusions from 
this section must be tentative; the congruence of circumstances 
producing higher per capita growth rates in one country compared 
to another country may not be measureably related to that 
country's defence policies. 
Table Two 
Military Expenditure as a Per Cent of G. N. P. and Per 
Capita G. N. P. 
Country Military Expenditure ýG NP, Per Ci Per Cent G. N. P. (1967) 1967 U. S. A 
Laos 17.8 70 
Saudi Arabia 17.1 1+1+1+ 
Vietnam 14.1 177 
Jordan 13-4 286 
Iraq 12.0 265 
Egypt 11.7 184 
Israel 10.7 1501 
Taiwan 11.5 263 
Syria 11.1 203 
Somalia 6.1 50 
Cambodia 5.9 150 
Burma 5,7 70 
Iran 5.6 285 
Congo 4.8 145 
Guinea 4.5 83 
Korea 4.0 155 
Malaysia 3.9 315 
Mauritious 3.9 141 
Pakistan 3.6 113 
India 3.4 85 
Algeria 3.3 242 
Brazil 3.2 347 
Sudan 3.2 108 
Country Military Expenditure G. N. P. Per Capita 
Per Cent G. N. P. 967) 1967 U. S. $ 
Chad 3.0 79 
Morocco 2.8 188 
Zaire 2-7 80 
Thailand 2.6 149 
Chile 2.5 605 
Yemen 2.5 104 
Cameroon 2.4 11+2 
Venezuela 2.4 910 
Ethiopia 2.4 66 
Labanon 2.3 633 
Ghana 2.3 213 
Bolivia 2.3 164 
Dahomey 2.0 72 
Ecuador 2.0 249 
Upper Volta 2.0 50 
Uganda 2.0 93 
Paraguay 2.0 221 
Libya 1.9 909 
Senegal 1.9 215 
Zambia 1.8 297 
Indonesia 1.8 87 
Sri Lanka 1.8 154 
Uraguay 1.8 533 
Argentina 1.8 649 
Nigeria 1.7 107 
Malagasey 1.7 118 
Country 
Philippines 
Colombia 
Gabon 
Central African Rep. 
Ivory Coast 
Nicaragua 
Tunisia 
Tanzania 
Kenya 
Honduras 
Togo 
Liberia 
E1 Salvador 
Guatemala 
Afghanistan 
Niger 
Guyana 
Malawi 
Sierra Leone 
Mexico 
Panama 
Military Expenditure 
Per Cent G. N. P. (1967) 
1.7 
1.7 
1.7 
1.6 
1.6 
1.6 
1.5 
1.4 
1.3 
1.3 
1.3 
1.3 
1.2 
1.2 
1.1 
1.1 
1.0 
0.8 
0.8 
0.7 
0.1 
G. N. P. Per Capita 
1967 U. S. $ 
188 
288 
380 
130 
267 
360 
209 
73 
119 
216 
119 
216 
286 
288 
85 
79 
338 
52 
156 
528 
582 
Source: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Report, 
Table 11 (extracted and re-arranged). 
is extended to the proportions of the GNP allocated on defence 
it could be diluted by the influence of the overall relation- 
ship between G. N. P. and the percentage share of the total 
budget. 
In Tables Three, Four and Five the growth in per capita 
product and the allocation to defence have been collected for 
three regional groupings (the middle-east presents the problem 
that the belligerency status of the majority of countries for 
which data is available will obscure any straight relationship 
looked for in this section). The entries have been ranked 
in descending order of per capital product growth. 
The African group (Table TY}ree) all had under 3 per cent 
allocated to defence yet their growth rates varied between 
-0.4+ per cent (Ghana) and 
8.1 per cent (Zambia). Of the twelve 
countries in the table, six had a per capita product growth 
rate in excess of 3 per cent and six had a growth rate of 
under 3 per cent. If this is taken as a crude dividing line 
between the relatively high and the relatively low per capita 
growth countries it is interesting to note (if statistically 
not too meaningful) that the average of the expenditures on 
defence for the high per capita growth countries is 1.3 per 
cent and the same average for the low per capita growth 
countries is 1.8 per cent. The low growth countries seem to 
allocate on average slightly more on defence than the high 
per capita growth countries. 
The Asian group presents some contrasts. Taiwan with 
11.5 per cent allocated to defence had the highest per capita 
growth rate of 7.1 per cent. Vietnam with an even higher 
defence allocation (and a long war) had a per capita growth 
of under 3 per cent. Only four countries in the group had 
Table Three 
Average Annual Percentage Growth in G. D. P. Per Capita 
and Average Annual Percentage of G. N. P. Defence Expenditure 
Country 
Growth G. D. P. G. N. P. on 
Per Capita o) Defence %) 
Zambia 8.1 1.3 
Sudan 5.0 2.5 
Uganda 3.8 1.8 
Kenya 3.8 0.9 
Malawi 3.6 0.8 
Sierra Le one 3.6 0.8 
Ethiopia 2.9 2.3 
Nigeria 1.6 1.7 
Tunisia 1.5 1.5 
Zaire 1.0 2.7 
Tanzania 0.7 0.9 
Ghana -0.4 1.7 
Sources: Zaire, Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Sudan: United 
Nations, Year Book of National Income Accounts, 
1969, Table 4a; Malawi and Uganda, Year Book of 
National Income Accounts, 1966, Table 7a; Zambia, 
Nigeria, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Tunis ia, Handbook of 
Trade and Development Statistics, 1969. 
N. B.: Nigeria, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Tunisia and 
Uganda are given at factor cost and therest at 
market prices. Defence data from ACDA Reports 
for 1966 and 1967. 
Table Four 
Average Annual Percentage Growth in G. D. P. Per Capita 
and Average Annual Percentage of G. N. P. Defence Expenditure 
Country 
Growth G. D. P. 
Per , Capita o) 
G. N. P. on 
Defence (%) 
Taiwan 7.1 11.5 
Korea 5.6 4.0 
Sri Lanka 4.6 1.1 
Thailand 3.9 2.4 
Pakistan 3.5 3.6 
Vietnam 2.5 14.3 
Cambodia 1.6 6.1 
Philippines 1.1 1.5 
Burma 0.6 6.2 
India -0.1 3.6 
Indonesia -0.2 1.6 
Sources: United Nations, Year Book of National Account_ 
Statistics, 1969, Table l+a; Defence Data from 
ACDA Reports, 1966 and 1967. 
defence allocations of under 3 per cent (Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Philippines and Indonesia). India had a negative per capita 
growth rate but this may be due to demographic factors. 
The Pakistan per capita growth rate at 3.5 per cent is 
impressive but a considerable amount of discrepancy existed 
between the two wings of the country up to their separation 
in 1971; there were income transfers from the Easter wing to 
the Western wing throughout this period. The per capita income 
growth rate rose from -0.3 per cent in 1959-60 to 2.0 per cent 
in 1969-70 in East Pakistan but in West Pakistan in the same 
period the per capita income grew from an annual average of 
0.8 per cent to 4.8 per cent. The regional disparity in 
incomes which was about 20 per cent in 191+9 rose to 30 per cent 
in 1959 and thence to 61 per cent in 1969. West Pakistan was 
getting richer at a faster rate than East Pakistan, and the 
consciousness of this contributed to the separatist feelings 
among the Bengalis. 
Of) 
Using a3 per cent per capita growth rate as the crude 
dividing line the average defence allocation for the higher 
growth countries was 4.6 per cent of G. N. P. and for the lower 
growth countries it was 5.5 per cent which follows the pattern 
for the African group. 
Table Five 
Average Annual Percentage Growth in G. D. P. Per Capita 
end Average-Annual Percentage of G. N. P. Defence Expenditure 
Country Growth G. D. P. Per Capita o) 
G. N. P. on 
Defence 
_(J) 
Mexico 6.2 0.8 
Guyana 4.9 0.5 
Nicaragua 4.5 1.6 
Panama 4.4 0.1 
Bolivia 3.0 2.4 
Peru 2.5 2.9 
Chile 2.3 2.5 
Honduras 2.4 1.3 
Guatemala 2.2 1.3 
El Salvador 1.9 1.2 
Argentina 1.6 2.0 
Colombia 1.5 1.9 
Venezuela 1.5 2.2 
Paraguay 1.3 1.8 
Brazil 1.1 3.0 
Ecuador 1.0 2.8 
Costa Rica 0.7 0.5 
Uruguay -0.9 1.5 
Sources: United Nat ions, Year Book of National Account 
Statistics , 1966 and 1969, Table 
4a; Defence 
Data from ACDA Reports, 1966 and 1967. 
Latin America is a group with high population growth rates 
and these contributed to the lower level of growth per capita 
product. Three of the four countries with the highest per 
capita product growth rates had defence allocations of under 
1 per cent. Costa Rica which also had a defence allocation of 
under 1 per cent of G. N. P. is second from the bottom of the 
table for per capital product growth. (007 per cent for the 
years 1958-65). This is probably due to poor economic 
management in those years rather than a defence burden; the 
army was abolished in Costa Rica in 19+8 and defence is a 
small item in the budget. The growth rate for G. D. P. for 
1968-70 was 1.2 per cent, 5.3 per cent and 6 per cent respectively, 
indicating a dramatic improvement. (5 ) 
Thirteen of the eighteen countries in Table Five have per 
capita product growth rates of under 3 per cent and the average 
of their military expenditures is 1.9 per cent of G. N. P. The 
higher growth countries have an average defence allocation of 
1.1. per cent of G. N. P. 
The three groups do produce a crude relationship between 
defence allocations and the growth in per capita product but 
this may be due to varying rates of population growth in these 
countries as much asp or more than, any differences in military 
expenditures. If these differences are affecting the growth of 
per capita product then they will eventually influence the 
comparative levels of per capita product. These effects of 
different growth rates were not appearing in the levels for 
the time periods in the tables, but this may be due to the 
relatively small differences in growth rates which will 
require longer periods of time to show significant deviations 
in level and to the fact that a number of high defence spenders 
are also fast growers in terms of these indicators and that 
they are swamping the other effect of growth rate differences. 
Conclusion 
Is defence a burden? The statistical evidence does not 
produce an unambiguous answer to that question. The growth 
rates for G. D. P. of individual countries in the 1960's did not 
seem to have been affected by their defence allocations. 
There are clearly many influences working to produce the growth 
rate and to seek a relationship for one of them is probably 
asking too much from the information available. Not all of 
the defence spending is likely to have the same effects on the 
economy. For example, the pay and subsistence provided for the 
armed forces (consumption) has different effects on the local 
economy than, say, the use of foreign exchange to purchase a 
tank. Unlike the use of foreign exchange to purchase a 
tractor (many tractors could be purchased for the price of one 
tank) which increases the capital capacity, the purchase of a 
tank does not increase productive capacity. It does not 
necessarily become a burden by virtue of this alone. 
It may be as important to growth that the development plans 
can continue without interruption from Lawlessness, invasion and 
disorder. For example, in Nigeria after the serious tensions of 
1965, and before the outbreak of the Biafran war : the growth 
rate collapsed from 6 per cent per annum to under 3 per cent per 
annum. 
b 
The tribal disorders disrupted output and activity; they 
were in fact a burden on development. The import of tractors on 
a wide-scale into Nigeria in 1965 would not have reversed this 
burden for the economy, but we can speculate with some faith 
in our conclusions, that the existence of a force under the 
control of the central government, inevitably armed with 
weapons purchased by foreign exchange, put into action to 
restore law and order in the tension areas, might have been 
more useful than the purchase of productive capacity. It was 
the lack of such a force (the army was itself tribalistically 
divided) that allowed the disorders to develop into illegal 
military intervention and eventual civil war. The point being 
that the purchase of productive capacity cannot under all 
conditions be taken to be a sufficient condition for development. 
The burden of defence cannot be found in its intrinsic 
nature alone, anymore than there is the same positive return 
from all activities that can be described as educational on 
the grounds that they are education. The establishment of 
schools to teach religious observation will have a different 
effect on development than the creation of colleges of 
technology. In what way defence spending in a particular 
country is contributing to, or competing with, development will 
depend upon circumstances and will not follow some general law 
applicable to all times and places. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
THE ECONOMICS OF WAR: NIGERIA 
a) Introduction 
There will be little disagreement with the view that wars 
cost money and have economic, social and personal consequences. 
The dead and wounded are a more visible cost of a war than the 
diversion of resources. There have been a number of wars in 
the Third World and in this and the next two Chapters we will 
examine some of the economic consequences of four wars on the 
countries affected by them: Nigeria; Vietnam's neighbours; 
Israel; Egypt and Pakistan. Chapter Thirteen will bring 
together some of the conclusions from these studies by way of 
comparison between them. 
b) The Nigeria-Biafra War 
The Biafran secession on 30 May 1967 was the penultimate 
act in the struggle between the rival factions of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria over how Nigeria was to be governed. The 
issue was decided, in the finally when Biafra ceased to exist 
on 15 January 1970. Government of Nigeria as a nation was 
decided upon by force of arms. 
One of the advantages to Nigeria in fighting the civil 
war was the successful blockade of Biafran territory. This 
meant that inflationary pressures, expected in the military 
build-up) were curbed to some extent by the diversion of goods 
into Federal territory, and this went some way to reducing the 
inflationary gap. (2. ) From July 1967 the Federal side were 
able to enforce an effective blockade on Biafra and a consider- 
able amount of food imports, normally scheduled for the Eastern 
Region, were diverted to Federal territory. This had two side- 
effects3 apart from the anti-inflationary one; it exerted 
pressure on the Biafran population (in the process it caused 
widespread death by starvation) and it also relieved pressure 
in Federal territory on food supplies. This kept food prices 
down in Nigeria and created a burden on the secessionists and 
the populations they controlled. 
S 
The emergency financial measures imposed by the Federal 
Government enabled them to cut back consumer expenditure. The 
military spending, and the expansion of the armed forces to 
250,000 at the height of the war (1969), injected a flow of 
demand for goods into the economy which re-appeared in the form 
of higher growth rates in G. D. P. towards the end of the war. 
Table One 
Growth of Real Gross Domestic Products Nigeria 1958-70 
Year (April-March) 
1958-1965 
1965-1966 
1966-1967 
1967-1968 
1968-1969 
1969-1970 
Average Annual Growth Rate (I ) 
6.1 
2.6 
-4.8 
-0.2 
13.0 
9.6 
Source: G. D. P. of Nigeria, 1958/59 - 1966/67, Lagos, 1968; 
Second National Development Plane 1970-74, 
(Lagos, 1970); Economic Statistical Review, 1970, 
Lagos, 1971. 
The fluctuation in growth (and other indicators) is partly 
due to the exclusion of Biafran, or Eastern Region, figures by 
the Federal authorities. The Biafran figures for 1967-69 
were excluded, but thereafter they have been included, and 
this 
is bound to account for some part of the fluctuation. There is 
evidence, however, of a slowing donw in the growth rate from 
1958 to 1966 and the exclusion of Biafra in 1967 exagerates 
what was an already established trend. Similarly, as we shall 
see, the falling growth trend was reversed during the war and 
the subsequent re-inclusion of Eastern Region figures (when 
the Federal authorities regained control of the important areas 
of Biafra) merely supported an independent expansionary trend. 
For example, the exclusion of the Eastern Region in Nigeria's 
index of industrial production from the latter part, of 1967 
did not prevent that index from rising in the 1968-69 period. 
Import substitution brought about by the war and the 
expansionary policies of the Federal Government, contributed 
to this recovery and reversal of trend. (ý ) 
The two years before the outbreak of the war were 
characterised by severe political and civil disturbances. The 
economic uncertainty (not to mention the physical liquidation 
of minority tribal entrepreneurs and skilled workers and the 
exodus of survivors to safer regions) contributed to a downward 
trend in indicators of economic performance. The July 1966 
coup, bringing General Gowon to power, also brought to a head 
the tribal tensions in the country and the tribal military 
mobilisation to settle the issues by violence. Eventually 
this had the effect in the decisive victory of the Gowon 
leadership of re-creating economic confidence in the Federal 
territories. 
The re-capture of the Biafran-held oil fields in 1968 
provided the Federal authorities with the oil revenues and 
a fortuitous source of finance to pay for the mobilisation. 
This reduced the burden of the war on the population by 
providing a means to carry out the mobilisation without heavy 
sacrifices among the consumers, many of whom were also gaining 
from employment in the war associated, and war created, 
industries. 
With the successes of the Federal armies in the east the 
problems of the war for the Federal side increased. The 
devasted region required food and other supplies and this 
reduces the counter-inflationary effect of the previous period's 
diversion of these commodities'to the Federal Area. The cost of 
distribution of this food to the devastated region was 
exhorbitant; roads, rail, bridges, air strips and communications 
were in a state of chaos. The traditional food distribution 
system was disrupted and the (inevitably) bureaucratic relief 
organisations set-up to administer the area complicated 
the 
problem further. As a result, food prices in 1970 rose by 
21 per cent. (T ) 
Producer's income arising from commodities that passed 
through the Marketing Boards (and thereby subject to the 
increased Federal taxes for the war) showed a considerable 
drop - about 50 per cent - in all categories, 
for the war 
years 1967-69. Part of this fall is a result of climatic 
factors - poor harvests - but part was due to the black market 
operations of speculators trying to avoid the taxes and, as 
important, trying to meet an expected high demand. 
Table Two 
Producers Income from Marketing Board Commodities (U. S. 
0 million) (Constant Prices) 
Commodity 1967 1968 
Cocoa 16.5 22.0 12.5 
Groundnuts 87.8 47.8 24.3 
Seed Cotton 18.1 8.6 10.9 
Palm Kernals 
and others 15.7 9.4 10.2 
Source: Official and Central Bank of Nigeria; Nigerian 
pounds convered to U. S. dollars at rate of 
$2.80 = £N1; note data for January to June for 
each year. 
The balance of trade for the war years was positive 
(see Table Three) but this was almost certainly due to oil 
exports and rigid import controls, which did much to promote 
import substitution and an expanding economy. In 1968 the 
trade deficit on imports of non-oil goods had been reduced 
to a mere 03.9 million from the high 0160.7 million of 1965. 
From December 1968 oil exports recovered rapidly and reached 
the production rate of 1+41,285 barrels a day compared to only 
57,872 barrels a day in December 1967. 
Over two million tons of oil were exported in December 
1968 and this rate was to benefit the balance of payments in 
1969 by , 994 million. ((o ) 
The 1967 devaluation, of sterling hit Nigeria's balance 
of payments at a total cost of $59.6 million. This was made 
up of a 036.4 million loss in revenue from primary products, 
priced in sterling, and a further 023.2 million in a writing 
down of Nigeria's sterling balance held in London. (7 ) 
Nigeria's foreign reserves reached a critically low level in 
1968. They fell from 0235 million in 1966 to $108.2 million 
in 1967 (8) and were held at 0136.1+ million in mid-1968 (q ) 
only after the imposition of severe import restrictions and 
controls in January 1968. 
Import licences were required for non-essential and luxury 
goods and these measures replaced an earlier effort at import 
curbs using a surcharge system. Some commodities were banned 
altogether and domestic credits for import activity were also 
curtailed. Other measures to reduce foreign exchange costs 
were introduced, such as for foreign travel or for remittances 
abroad. Eventually the repatriation of profits or the interest 
on loans and capital transfers abroad were suspended. (10) 
Every possible measure was taken by the Federal authorities 
to reduce the foreign exchange costs in areas where they had 
discretionary powers, and the net effect of these measures 
was to reduce imports from $562.1 million to , 5484.5 million. 
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oil imports were also cut from . 
948.6 million to $37.6 million 
due to import substitution in the oil industry throughout 
1966-1969 made possible, of course, by the expanding Nigerian 
oil production. 
The economy wasp naturally, subject to distortions from 
these measures. Firms dependent on imports for their output - 
particularly those with a high import content in their 
products - were hit by the import restrictions policy. The 
licensing system and the inevitable bureaucratic tangle (plus 
the activity "tax" of corruption) worked against the expansion 
of the economy and created some unemployment. Given that 
structural changes in an advanced economy are not frictionless, 
even in times of peace and with relatively uncorrupt 
administrations, it is not exceptional in the case of 
Nigeria. ((1 ) 
In Table Four the commodity composition of Nigeria's 
imports for 1967 and 1968 is compared to show the effect of 
the import restrictions policies. Key imports of crude 
material manufactures 3 machinery and transport equipment and 
miscelaneous manufactures all fell substantially. 
The expansion of industrial production can be seen 
(1963 = 100) in Table Five. By 1965, the first year of the 
troubles, the index had reached 164.5 and had been growing 
by about 20 points each year. From 1965 to 1967 the index 
had reached 172.8, an increase of about 8 points over the 
Table Four 
Nigerian Imports by Commodity, January-August 1967-68 
(U. S. 
.9 '000) 
Import 1967 1968 Change 
Food 
Beverages and 
tobacco 
Crude Material 
Mineral Fuels 
Oils and Fats 
Chemicals 
Manufacture by 
materials 
Machinery and 
transport equipment 
Misc. manufactures 
Misc. transactions 
46138 23316 -49 
3692 2320 -37 
12834 9313 -27 
9494 28608 +201 
392 548 +39 
4487 39341 +774 
145181 90520 -37 
149971 98925 -34 
33986 14903 -56 
5472 10662 +94 
Source: Legum and Drsydale, op cit., p. 573. Converted 
to U. S. 0 and final column added. 
two years. These years covered the January and June military 
coups, the massacres of Ibos in the north, the exodus of 
people back to their tribal lands and the generally severe 
dislocation of commercial and industrial activity. By 1968 
the import restrictions were in full swing (also the Eastern 
Region was excluded from the figures) and the import 
substitution programme was picking up. This is reflected in 
the index leaping upwars by about 40 points and following 
this with similar rises in the following two years. 
The crucial role of oil exports is seen in the extremely 
rapid expansion of crude petroleum output. From the base year 
in 1963 (Table Five) it increased by 57 per cent in 196+, more 
than doubled in the following year, increased by 50 per cent 
the year after that. In 1966-67 oil output fell and again 
while the oil fields were in Biafran hands in 1967-68. The 
Biafrants had great difficulty in selling the oil abroad due 
to combined pressure from Federal and British sources. (12) 
But in the first year of production, after the re-capture of 
the oil producing areas by the Federal forces, output reached 
record levels, seven times the 1963 figure and went on in the 
following two years to even greater increases, reaching twenty 
times the output figure of 1963 in 1971. The role that these 
increases played in the balance of payments, and the earning 
of foreign currency, has already been mentioned; without the 
oil the Nigerian balance of payments, and its overseas 
indebtedness, would have created severe problems for the 
Federal forces. 
Table Five 
Indices of Activity in Manufacturing. Oil Production and 
Electricity Consumption, Nigeria, 1961-1971 (196 =_J00) 
Year Manufacturing Oil output. Electricity 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
100 
123.7 
143.7 
164.5 
171.8 
172.8 
211.9 
250.2 
280.1 
100 
157.6 
358.4 
51+6 
417.2 
185.3 
706 
1392.4 
2006.6 
100 
12906 
125.8 
138°5 
Source: Indices of Manufacturing and Oil Production, Nafziger, 
op cit., p. 235; Electricity Consumption, A. J. M. van de 
Laar, op cit., p. 3; Both sources from official 
statistics and Central Bank, Annual Reports, 1971. 
Motes: 1) production figures from 3rd quarter 1967 to last 
quarter 1969 exclude secessionist territory; 
2) electricity consumption figures are the arithmetic 
average for the quarters given in original source; 
3) indice for 1971, manufacturing is the average for 
the first two quarters. 
It may well be the case, on the other hand, that without 
the oil the issue may not have been pursued either by the 
Biafran forces in favour of seccession (it's hard to see what 
their economy would have been based upon) or by the Federal 
side (oil revenues were as substantive reasons for resisting 
secession as the issue of principle - this made the Federal 
side doubly determined to resist). (11) 
The indices for electricity consumption, -confirm the drop 
in activity in the first period of the Biafran war and also 
show the recovery that was taking place after 1968, both in 
domestic demand and in industrial demand. 
The effects of the war'on the sector origins of the Gross 
Domestic Product is shown in Table Six. A number of changes 
had been taking place throughout the period 1962-71, which the 
war interrupted (mining for instance) or gave an impetus to 
(manufacturing and crafts). In other cases the war appears 
to have had no impact at all. 
Agriculture continued its decline as a source of G. D. P. 
(one indicator of economic development), from 61.2 per cent 
in 1962 to 51.1 per cent in 1970. This sector was scheduled 
in the Second Development Plan to continue to decline to 
reach 44 per cent of G. D. P. in 1973-71+ at the end of the plan 
period. (I$) The mining sector, which covers the oil 
industry, increased from 2 per cent of G. D. P. in 1962 to 
7.9 per cent in 1971. The large fall in this sector in 
1967-68 is seen in the Table and its recovery in subsequent 
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years as already been commented upon. Manufacturing and 
crafts almost doubled as a source of G. D. P. in the period 
covered by the table. 
Oil extraction need not lead to development (as the 
Middle-East shows until recently) but it certainly can finance 
it. Nigeria's oil revenues financed the war by providing 
income to purchase essential imports (including military 
material) and averted a balance of payments crisis in concert 
with the import restriction policy. If the Biafrans had been 
able to hold onto the oil, and found markets, the civil war 
might have lasted longer and become even more bloody. Domestic 
manufacturing received a boost from the war but transport was 
hit on the other hand. Road and rail traffic were disrupted 
by the political instability before the war and by the programs 
against the Ibos who serviced much of the railways. During the 
war rail-stock, bridges, roads and vehicles were destroyed and 
this produced a fall in tonnages carried by the railways, as 
well as a fall in passenger traffic (estimated at about 
20 per cent) during 1965-67. The net tonnage calling at 
Nigerian ports between 1966 and 1968 fell by 53.2 per cent 
per year. () 
The Federal Budget was) of course, sensitive to military 
action and it was dislocated considerably by the war and the 
associated constitutional changes that broke the four state 
federation into a twelve state federation. A large transfer 
took place from capital expenditures by the Government to 
current expenditures, mainly to meet the expanded defence 
budget. The war raised the value of current consumption to 
preserve the central strategy compared to the present value of 
uncertain future consumption. 
Federal Government capital expenditures for 1965-68 are 
shown in Table Seven. Defence and law and order current 
expenditures increased from $+0.8 million to 0209.3 million, 
and this is probably understated. (11) The effect of this 
large increase in current expenditures on the capital account 
is shown in the 64 per cent fall in capital allocations to 
this heading in the table. 
Table Seven 
Federal Capital Expenditure 1965-68, Nigeria (U. S. $ Million) 
I= 1965 1966 1967 1968 Per Cent Change 
Capital Current 
Administration 
law and order 29.8 26.7 18.0 10.9 -64 +180 
Social Services 12.5 12.5 1+. 7 3.1 -76 - 34 
Economic 
Services 60.4 62.7 68.2 64.3 +6 - 42 
Transfers 4.7 42.3 52.5 18.8 +306 + 17 
107.4 144.3 143.5 97.2 -10 - 11 
Source: Nigeria's Post-War Prospects, West Africa, April 1970, 
p. 45 (table re-arranged). 
L 
Overall there was a 10 per cent reduction in capital 
expenditures, the two largest items cut were law and order 
and social services. The enormous increase in the transfer 
item is due to the increased public debt outlays which in 
1968 led to a deficit in the Federal accounts of $185.8 
million after several years in surplus. 
The final colum in the table shows the percentage change 
in current expenditures (ii) and this brings out quite clearly 
the transfer of expenditures in the budget by the emergency. 
Administration, law and order etc. rose by 180 per cent and 
both social services and economic services showed considerable 
falls in current expenditures. Transport and communication 
were the largest items in the economic services heading to 
fall and they were reduced by 2/3rds in 1965-68. 
Table Eight 
Allocation of Federable Budgets, Nigeria, 1967 and 1968 
Item 1967 (%) 1968 0) 
Administration 32 44 
(defence) (20.8) (35) 
Federal Contribution to 
States 37.6 33 
Social and community 
services 6.5 3.2 
Economic services 6.3 4.6 
Other transfers 
(public debts, pensions) 17.6 15.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Source: Calculated from A. J. M. van de Laar, op cit, p. 4. 
ýýý 
The shift in resources in the Federal Budget can be seen 
in Table Eight. Welfare services fell from 6.5 per cent to 
3.2 per cent and economic services from 6.3 per cent to 4.6 
per cent. The major increase occured in administration, mainly 
due to military outlays which rose from 20.8 per cent to 35 per 
cent, contributing to the rise from 32 per cent to 44 per cent 
for administration. These figures approach the normal for 
defence outlays in Middle-Eastern countries engaged in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Federal support for the states in the Federation is the 
second largest item in the budget. None of the states (with 
the exception of the former Eastern Region with its oil) are 
viable on their own and this is the key element in the political 
relations between the states and the central government. In 
1967 the Federal contribution to the states stood at 37.6 per cent 
and in 1968 33 per cent of the budget. Thus whatever differences 
the states had with their neighbours they were united in 
maintaining the Federation 
(unless they could find a way to 
collect more in revenue domestically than they needed to receive 
from Lagos). The secessionist attempt of the eastern region was 
defeated and therefore the central government's position as 
treasurer for-the Federation has been strengthened since it 
regained access to the oil revenues. 
The re-division of the states in the Federation from four 
to twelve also increased the power of the central government. 
It reduced the likelihood of new secessionist attempts because 
it made the individual states even less viable as small units 
than they were as larger units. It also added to the political 
problems of organising separatism because of the mechanical 
necessity for collusion across state boundaries if the states 
were to regroup before a secession was attempted. 
There will inevitably be disputes between the central 
authorities and the local administrations in a Federation but 
these disputes are less likely to become critical if the sub- 
states are divided than if they are united into geographic 
regions that correspond to tribal regions. This constitutional 
reform came too late to avert the Biafra secession (and the war) 
- in one sense it precipitated both - but the defeat of the 
secession re-started the constitutional clock and permitted a 
relative peace compared to the period before the war. 
If the political consequences of the war were on balance 
positive (ßg)ß what was the economic cost? We have seen that 
the economy and the state budgets were distorted by the war, 
and that the fortuitous expansion in oil extraction lessened 
the cost on the balance of payments. It is also clear that 
the special nature of the war and the way it was fought 
permitted the diversion of food supplies and other basic 
necessities into the Federal areas, holding back war inflation 
and damaging Biafra simultaneously and that the stimulus to 
manufacturing industry started an economic boom in the country. 
But what was the cost in lost output? If the 1966 conflicts 
had been settled peacefully, or not occured what would have 
been the peacetime growth rate in G. D. P.? 
The average annual growth rate for 1958-65 was 6.1 per cent 
and the 1965-66 disturbances contributed to a lower growth rate 
of 2.6 per cent. (See Table One). In 1966-67 the years of the 
coups and secession, the growth rate was negative (-1+. 8 per cent) 
and in the following year it was almost stationary (-0.2 per cent). 
In the midst of the war when the military campaign was stalemated 
the economy leapt forward by 13 per cent because all the positive 
economic effects of the war were operating at full blast and the 
negative effects were postponed until the Federal forces entered 
Biafran territory. The first year of peace produced a growth 
rate of 9.6 per cent. (I'f ) 
Table Nine 
f-roiected and Actual Performance of G. D. P., Nigeria 196-69 
(U. S. 0 Millions) 
Year 
6.1 Per cent Growth G. D. P. at Difference Growth G. D. P. recorded growth rates 
(1) (2) (3) ý4) 
(1-2) 
1963 3231.6 3231.6 0 0 
1964 3+28.4 3428.4 0 0 
1965 3636.7 3518.6 119.1 3.3 
1966 3859.6 3349.2 510.4 15.2 
1967 4092.5 3342.9 749.6 22.0 
1968 4344.9 3797.6 547.3 14.0 
1969 4609.9 4161.4 448.5 10.0 
2374.9 
Source: The original G. D. P. figure fo r 1963 has been incr eased 
at a compound rate of 6.1 per cent (first column) and 
by the reported growth rates (second column) and the 
difference taken. 
If the 1963 G. D. P. is taken in U. S. dollars and the compound 
growth rate of 6.1 per cent calculated the expansion of G. D. P. is 
as shown in Table Nine, It rises from $3231.6 million to 
$4609.9 million in 1969, at the end of the war (there is no 
allowance taken of course for price inflation or the devaluation 
in the Nigerian pound against the dollar). The reported growth 
rates are applied to this same G. D. P. for 1963 and the result 
is shown in column two of Table Nine. (Again the actual G. D. P. 
will be different due to price changes). The third column shows 
the differences between the first two columns. The notional 
costs of the war, and the political disturbances before the 
war, were $2374.9 million dollars. This is equivalent to 57 per 
cent of the 1969 hypothetical G. D. P. or the equivalent of just 
over six months output. It is as if the Nigerian economy stood 
still for seven months in economic terms. Of course this is 
making the heroic assumption that the 1958-63 growth rate of 
6.3 per cent would have been maintained throughout the entire 
period which is by no means certain. Nevertheless it does 
provide a rough estimate of the possible costs. Column four 
is the difference in column three as a percentage of column 
two. 
The actual amount that can be ascribed to the war itself 
is a very difficult exercise and involved difficult judgements. 
Akene Ayida, Permanent Secretary in the Federal Ministry of 
Economic Development2 is quoted (ZO) as estimating the cost of 
the military outlays by the Nigerian Government from September 
1967 to March 1969 as 0840.0 million. An addition 0700 million 
was calculated to have been lost in the destruction of physical 
assets which will reduce growth in the future and add further 
to costs and a further 0211.6 million through lost exports, 
though some of these export losses would have been due to the 
adverse climatic conditions and the British devaluation. 
Exports from Nigeria to Britain fell from $2293.2 million 
in 1966 to $1560 million in 1967 (total Nigerian exports also 
fell from $6212.4 million in 1966 to $ 5299 million in 1967). 
(ZL) The total cost of the actual fighting, according to 
Ayida iss $1751.6 million, or 74 per cent of the hypothetical 
total calculated from Table Nine. 
The loss to Nigeria in terms of the deaths caused by the 
war (mainly from starvation - though the war was relatively 
long the contact fighting was actually a small part of it) 
are estimated at about two million persons, or two per cent 
of the population. The effects of this loss are near impossible 
to quantify; even excluding the great personal loss to their 
families, the cost in terms of wasted education, investment 
and future productive activity is incalculable. The war 
casualties themselves, military and civilian, represent a burden 
on the community for maintenance andy in many cases, 
hospitalisation and medical treatment. Where these casualties 
were formerly economically active, or likely to have been in 
the future in the case of children, there is also a loss of 
output to the community as well as a cost of sustenance. 
Losses among scarce3 skilled and educated people will increase 
the economic loss to the community in the future. 
There are other problems arising from the period of the 
war which will have economic effects in the future. The most 
obvious is the size of Nigeria's military forces and its cost. 
In 1966 the army consisted of 10,500 men (511 officers) (22, ) 
and in terms of the size of Nigeria's population at 57.5 
million this was an extremely small armed force, even by 
Third World standards. 
The relative small size of the army and political elites 
contributed to the pre-war instability and in this respect the 
twelve state governments should create a more numerous 
political elite. In the 1966 coup, for example, the elimina- 
tion of a few key personnel at the highest level of Government 
completely broke the civilian political system. Subsequent 
murders within the army led to a complete change in army leader- 
ship, now without its cost in the armed force's level of 
competence. The larger the number of necessary targets the 
more secure a country's political and executive system must be. 
By 1969 the army had grown to 250,000 on the Federal side 
alone (Biafra had an army mobilised with as many troops but 
they were mainly an untrained and poorly armed militia). In 
1970 the Federal army had reduced to 163,500 (army: 160,000; 
navy 2,000 and airforce 1,500). (0) This still made it one 
of the largest armies in Africa. Such a rapid mobilisation 
in a country already divided and with a recently decimated 
officer corps must have diluted the leadership considerably. 
The lack of training facilities and the shortage of experience 
which characterises sub-Saharan armies must have worsened the 
already low efficiency levels of the military force. 
/ li 
To meet the heavy demands on leadership the army must have 
had to revert to the promotion of NCO's to provide officer 
material. This unavoidable aspect of Nigerianisation of the 
army in the late 1950ts contributed to the later crisis in the 
army. The improvements in educational standards among officers 
from direct recruitment to commissions that had been started 
before the war were reversed after it. One estimate suggests 
that the post-commission experience in the post-war army is 
about 18 months on average. (Z1) This is hardly conducive to 
efficiency or to professionalism and it will take some time 
for the competence level to match the size of the force mobilised. 
The cost to the budget of this number of men in wages alone 
is daunting. At 084 per man-month (Z5), 250,000 men cost 
X252 millions, 163,000 men cost 0161+ millions. The cost of the 
1969 Nigerian army in subsistence alone exceeded the budget of 
$210 millions claimed by the Federal authorities to have been 
allocated to the military (it is also over ten times the 1965 
military budget). In addition Nigeria has a 25,000 strong 
police force and this adds a further $25.2 millions to the wage 
bill. 
Conclusion 
The Biafran war did not have the disasterous economic effects 
on the Nigerian economy that it could have had. Nigeria was 
assisted by the strategic circumstances of the war and the 
georgraphical factors. If Nigeria had been fighting with a 
neighbour instead of an isolated secession these factors would 
not have been present and the damage to the economy may have 
been more severe. 
Biafra was landlocked from food, materials, international 
aid and military resources. Nigeria was not. The oil revenues 
were just beginning to provide the country with the foreign 
exchange that it needed to finance its development programmes. 
A hostile neighbour at war with Nigeria would have made the oil 
fields a major target for bombing attacks, if not land attacks, 
because their strategic role in Nigeria's war effort was obvious. 
The war imposed economic discipline and gave an impetus to 
local manufacturing and the emergency provided the kind of 
stimulus to economic nation-building that seven years of 
independence had failed to produce. The result was a cumulative 
force that provided the right conditions for the oil revenues to 
be used to push development positively. A report in 1972 
considered that the transfer from the war economy generated by 
the secession to development activity was a major contributor 
to the high post-war growth rates (running at 12 per cent in 
1971-72). (24) 
CHAPTER TWELVE 
THE ECONOMICS OF WAR: VIETNAM'S ASIAN NEIGHBOURS 
a) Introduction 
The Vietnam War is the subject of this Chapter. We are 
interested in the effect that this long war had on the economies 
of these countries that traded with it. The war is too recent 
to make definitive studies of the effect on Vietnam itself - 
there is the problem of the dearth of statistical information 
from a country that for long periods has had its territory in 
dispute. But other countries, not involved in the fighting 
directly, do provide statistical information on their trading 
links and in so far as these have been affected by the war we 
can examine what these effects have been. The broad conclusion 
that comes out of this Chapter is that whatever else the war 
did to Vietnam it has not inhibited the economic development 
of these Asian countries that supplied the imports for 
Vietnam's economy. We look at the Thai economy more closely 
to see what effects the war had due to the trading position 
with Vietnam and the intervention of the Americans. 
b) Asia and the Vietnam War 
The Vietnam war has had the most extensive effects on 
combatants and non-combatants of all wars in the Third World. 
The United States was riven with the political consequences of 
conducting the war (even more so than was the case when France 
was carrying the main burden of the ground fighting up to 
195+) and its economic effects on the American economy were in 
many ways closely bound up with the political issues thrown up 
during the period of the war. The social and political 
programmes that were argued for within the American political 
system inevitably ended in the issue of what priorities were 
sacrificable to the expense of the Vietnam war. This resulted 
in a diminishing credibility through time of making the war 
the major priority for which Americans should sacrifice the 
resolution of domestic problems. 
1 
The political leadership of America increasingly became 
divided. One side regarded the war as a moral commitment to 
a friendly government in a language reminiscent of the spirit 
of the Korean War years but sounding antiquated by the late- 
1960's. The other side raised the (other) moral issue of 
whether America should pour-in its resources to fight a war 
that was an interference in another country's internal 
political processes, the view that the Vietnam war was a civil 
war and that the coice between dictatorship from Hanoi or 
Saigon was one for the Vietnamese to make themselves. 
The vast American involvement had its effect beyond the 
battlefields, on the economies of Asian countries, and was on 
a sufficient scale to create shifts in the structure both of 
trade and economic activity. The economic effects of the war 
on the Vietnamese economy were of course substantial and will 
be felt for many years to come. 
The demographic balance has been altered by the losses of 
life and other casualties occasioned by the fighting. The 
proportion of dependents (young, aged and disabled) has grown 
and the productive proportion of the population inevitably has 
been reduced. The nature of the fighting meant substantial 
losses of life among non-combatants; guerilla war, and counter- 
i nsurgency3 do not allow for non-combatants as all are 
"involved" voluntarily or involuntarily, and therefore all 
are open to the punitive measures of both sides. It has also 
led to severe dislocation of substantial numbers of the popula- 
tion. The presence of large number of foreign troops also had 
its social effects on the population. The re-building of the 
shattered economies of North and South Vietnam will also have 
many problems. Very little work has so far been done on this 
topic, though considerable study has been carried out on the 
re-building of the European economies after the Second 
European War. (2 ) 
The European economies recovered remarkably quickly given 
the large-scale destruction carried out during the war. The 
Vietnamese economy has a different set of problems because it 
is a different type of economy. The infra-structure created 
for military purposes may or may not prove to be useful in this 
process as it does provide a stock of social-capital. South 
Vietnam has had a network of major highways built, as well as 
harbours and airfields. The disruption of the war has touched 
all levels of society and all corners of the country. The 
Traditional has been confronted by the Modern (sometimes in 
its most horrific form). The culture of Vietnam in now a hybrid 
of East and West. In this sense the war has disrupted the 
country's social, cultural and economic systems. It is not 
likely that aid from abroad (ironically, perhaps, from the 
Americans who contributed so much to the destruction) will have 
a similar effect on the economy as the Marshall Aid programme 
had in post-war Europe. 
Vietnam in 1963 was a predominantly agricultural based 
economy with 70 per cent of the population engaged in agricul- 
ture. Rice was exported and so was rubber. -3 Exports earned 
$85 million in 1960 but this had fallen away to $12 millions 
in 1970. In 1967 Vietnam imported 750,000 tons of rice, or over 
twice the amount of its former exports of this commodity. 
Agricultural output fell up to 20 per cent (either by abandoned 
production or insurgency "collection") but towards the end of 
the decade output levels in secure territory had returned total 
output to pre-war levels by virtue of vastly improved f arming 
methods (the Green Revolution). 
The import bill reached $700 million and this greatly 
assisted the economies of other Asian countries. (tf ) The 
military conflict also added to the expansionary force within 
these economies by bringing in American military spending in 
addition to the American military assistance provided under the 
aid programmes. This inflow of capital and demand into these 
economies ought to have had substantial economic effects and it 
is these that this Chapter will examine. 
The American military assistance delivered to Vietnam, 
Thailand, Philippines, Korea and Taiwan for 1060-1969 was 
i5.8 billion or 53 per cent, out of a Third World total of 
$10.9 billion. ( 6j) (See Table One). 
Table 1A 
U. S. Military Assistance to Five Assign Countries, 1962-69 (U. S. $ Millions) 
Country 1962 1961 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969% 196o-69 
Thailand 39.1 68.5 52.7 36.4 40.8 44.9 V6.5 73.5 481.0 
Vietnam 144 198.1 186.9 274.7 170 (300) (500) (600) 2509 
Philippines 21.5 24.5 10.7 18.2 26.0 21 29.1 18.8 212.9 
Korea 136.9 182.5 124.3 173.1 153.1 149.8 197.4 210 1709.5 
Taiwan 84.4 85.2 128.1 84.8 76.5 71.3 117.2 55.3 937.2 
Source: Table 1A: Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts, May 1967 and 
March, 1969; Military Assistance Facts, March 1968 and May 1969 in 
Table 3.6, S. I. P. R. I., op cit., p. 146-7. 
Table 1B 
U. S. Defence Expenditures Abroad for Goods and Services (1962-69) (UoS. 0 Millions) 
Country 1962 1961 1964 1261 1966 1967 1968 
C*) 
Thailand 28.5 34.0 70.0 183.0 286. 318.0 278.0 
Vietnam 44.5 64.0 188.0 408.0 564.0 558.0 606.0 
Philippines 48.5 58.0 81.0 147.0 167.0 169.0 180.0 
Korea 96.5 91.0 97.0 160.0 237.0 301.0 360.0 
Taiwan 21.0 21.0 21.0 60.0 70.0 76.0 84.0 
Total 239.0 268.0 457.0 958.0 1324.0 1422.0 1508.0 
Source: Table 1B: Shepler and L. G. Campbell, United States Defence Expenditure 
Abroad, Survey of Current Business, 1+93 December 1969, in 
Sei ja Naya, The Vietnam War and Some Aspects of its Economic 
xMpact on Asian Countries, The Developing Economies. 
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The rank order of the recipient countries for American 
military assistance is Vietnam (02509 million), Korea ($1709 
m. illion), Taiwan (0937 million), Thailand ($+81 million) and 
Philippines (0212 million). (6) Both Taiwan and Philippines 
maintained a relatively steady total of annual assistance, while 
the other countries show marked increases over the decade. The 
military assistance totals for the countries have been added to 
the military spending by the American Government for its war 
effort during the period and graphed in five diagrams. (7 ) 
In the cases of Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines and Korea, 
the additional expenditure has been a substantial additional 
influence to total American defence related spending. The 
defence related expenditures include such headings as the 
purchases of local goods and services for construction of the 
military infra-structure - bridges, roads, airbases, harbours, 
camps - the payments of wages to local labour in these 
installations and the expenditures of U. S. official personnel 
and their dependents in the local economies. In so far as these 
figures can be accurately estimated they show an American 
influence several times grater than the apparent influence of 
the military assistance programme. The Vietnam war effort led 
to substantial official defence related injections into the 
local economies, but the impact of the war did not end there. 
The turn around in trade balance of the Vietnamese economy, 
alluded to above, had the major effect of creating a massive 
trade deficit in Vietnam. To the extent that the Asian 
country pushing up the local defence expenditures due to the 
jierican military effort from 097 million in 1965 to 0160 
cillion in 1966 (Table 1B). 
The "Peublo: Incident" in 1968, where a United States Navy 
'spy' boat was captured by the North Koreans, raised military 
tensions considerably in the penninsular. The Americans 
responded by raising their military expenditures in Korea and 
also by supplying new naval and airforce equipment, partly to 
prepare for any emergency (it was possible that the Koreans 
could put pressure on the South while America was heavily 
engaged in Vietnam in 1968 was the year of the 'Teti offensive 
by the Communists) and partly to enable the sophisticated 
espionage activity, using electronic devices, to continue 
without the risks involved in highly armed naval craft such as 
the "Peublo". The tension created by the incident dropped 
away, however, but not before the extra outlays had been made. 
The Philippines were also offered special assistance in 
exchange for participation in Vietnam. The Government accepted 
an American commitment to equip a Philippines engineer 
task 
force for Vietnam (which would have uses when it rotated back 
to home base) and an American subsidy to cover overseas 
allowances in excess of Philippine regular army pay for 
the 
troops sent to Vietnam. Other offers to send extra patrol 
boats to the Philippines and also to fund the equipment of 
three engineer construction batallions and to pay for a complete 
replacement unit for the troops in Vietnam were turned down by 
President Marcos, even though this expense was to be met by 
the Americans out of its Vietnam war funds and not from the 
normal military assistance programme. (q) 
Thailand's support for American in Vietnam and its use 
of its strategic position close to the Ho Chi Min trial, was 
rewarded on an even more generous scale than went to either 
Korea or Philippines. Korea already had a substantial 
American ground involvement before the Vietnam war which pumped 
millions of dollars into the economy. Thailand's pro-American 
position was matched by the growth of U. S. personnel in the 
country from 300 in 1960 to 1+5,000 in 1968. The bases which 
the Americans operated from were technically under the control 
of the Thailand government and were financed directly out of 
the American Department of Defence budget rather than through 
a Military Assistance Programme. 
(I0) Thai forces were active 
in Laos and Vietnam and the Americans undertook to modernise 
the Thai army and train it in the use of Counter-Insurgency 
(COIN) techniques. In 1966 U. S. contractors of military 
installations began operations on a major scale. This meant 
a direct grant to the Thai Government of 086 million over 
the 
next five years, (LI) though an even large contribution to the 
Thai economy came from the personnel expenditures of the U. S. 
Army and officials ($800 millions). 
Other countries to gain from this kind of spending were 
the "Rest and Recuperation" centres for U. S. army personnel, 
such were set up in Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Japan and 
Australia. 
The expansion of exports from Asian countries to Vietnam 
is shown in Table Two. 
Table Two 
Exports to Vietnam by Asian Countries, 1962-63 and 1966-67 
Total Asia 
Taiwan 
Singapore 
Korea 
Thailand 
Japan 
Hong Kong 
Cambodia 
Malaysia 
India 
Philippines 
Pakistan 
1962-63 1966-67 Increase Exports to Vietnam as 
(1) (2) (2 - 1) Percentage of Total (1) Exports 
62-63 66-67 
103.8 385.8 272 0.9 2.1 
26.4 79.1 200 9.7 13.4 
18.8 91.8 388 1.7 8.2 
1.0 10.7 970 1.4 3.8 
2.0 14.7 635 0.4 2.1 
46.7 156.5 235 0.9 1.6 
2.9 21.0 624 0.4 1.5 
1.3 0.5 - 62 1.8 0.7 
0.0 3.4 0.0 0.3 
3.5 5.0 43 0.2 0.3 
0.6 2.1 250 0.1 0.3 
0.6 1.0 67 0.1 0.2 
Source: S. Naya, op cit., Table IVY adjusted and re-arranged; 
All numbers rounded. 
Korea increased its exports by a factor of 970 and 
Thailand by 635. With the exception of Taiwan and Singapore 
the share of exports to Vietnam in a country's total exports 
is quite small (under 4 per cent). 
Cambodia's trade with Vietnam fell during the period from 
the pre-war year 1963 to the mid-war year 1967. In every other 
case trade with Vietnam expanded. Japan was responsible for 
40 per cent of Asian trade with Vietnam, Taiwan 20 per cent and 
Singapore 24 per cent. (Singapore's exports to Vietnam were 
II ainly petroleum products - 70 per cent in 1968 and 88 per cent 
in 1969). (13) The total of 0385 million from Asian represented 
about half of Vietnam's imports and this is comparable with, 
for example, the share of Thailand's trade with Asian countries 
which was 54.5 per cent of its total trade in 1969. (If) The 
Vietnam war was not increasing Vietnam's dependence on the 
developed countries for imports during this period because 
antra-regigal trade was maintained at a high level. 
There were changes in the direction of intra-regional 
export trade. Taiwan, Korea1 Thailand,; Malaysia and Vietnam 
increased the share of their total export trade with the 
United States between 1962 and 1967 and, in the cases of 
Taiwan, Korea and Thailand, this was at the expense of Asian 
trade. Malaysia appears to have increased its American trade 
at the expense of its Japanese trade. (1ý) 
Playa (16) has examined the commodity composition of Asian 
trade with Vietnam to see if there are any pointers as to the 
economic effects of the war on their economies. His method was 
to take the Standard International Trade Classification, and 
using average export values for 1966 and 1967, to take each 
export item for Vietnam as a percentage of total exports to 
Vietnam and then as a percentage of total exports to all 
countries. By comparing these percentages it was possible to 
see if the item was more, or less, important in Vietnam trade 
than it was total trade. (11) 
He found that for most Asian countries there was a 
pronounced difference in the commodity mix in their exports 
to Vietnam and their exports as a whole. Thailand and Malaysia 
exports were concentrated in rice (Thailand, 74.7 per cent) and 
petroleum (Malaysia, 87.3 per cent). Pakistan, Philippines, 
Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong 2 Singapore and Japan were heavily 
concentrated on industrial products though both Hong Kong and 
Japan exported a more 'normal' mix to Vietnam in comparison 
with their total exports. Though Vietnam's market was limited 
the concentration of its imports from Asian countries in certain 
lines is quite marked. For example, Taiwan directed 85 per cent 
of its total exports of cement, 75 per cent of its chemical 
fertiliser, 73 per cent of its iron and steel and nearly half 
of its machinery to Vietnam. Korea sent 94 per cent of its steel 
products, 50 per cent of its transport equipment and 50 per cent 
each of its chemical products and non-electrical machinery. 
Philippines sent 100 per cent of its iron and steel sheets 
(worth , 933 million) and Singapore 53 per cent of its finished 
structural products. (19) 
These commodities are of importance to the economies of 
the countries of origin. They are manufactured goods and as 
such are important to the development of a domestic manufacturing 
capacity. Naya attempted to analyse the linkage effects of 
these products on the economies of Taiwan, Korea and Japan. 
His conclusions are that the type of products that have been 
exported in high proportions to Vietnam as a result of the 
hostilities had, in the main, high import inducing effects on 
the Asian economies. In other words, in order to produce these 
items for export to Vietnam these countries had to raise their 
imports of the inputs needed to produce them. This had the 
effect of introducing into these economies new imports, 
techniques and experiences that would otherwise not have been 
available. 
"The Vietnam conflict has provided Taiwan and Korea 
a greater learning effect in producing and exporting 
new industrial products than would have occured under 
normal conditions. Their production of these products 
is expected to be, at least in the beginning, more 
import-inducing than that of "normal" exports. ... 
But the large import content of these products 
substantially reduces their net export receipts. .., 
more than half the value of Taiwan's exports to 
Vietnam is spend for induced imports in comparison 
with 33 per cent for its total exports. Similarly 
for Korea, induced imports are 40.7 per cent of 
its exports to Vietnam but only 11.4 per cent of 
its total exports. In recent years the two 
largest suppliers of these countries' imports have 
been Japan and the U. S. ... Their imports from 
these developed countries, especially Japan, 
typically consist of producer and capital goods. 
Therefore, it is likely that a substantial share 
of Taiwan's and Korea's induced imports for exports 
to Vietnam comes from Japan and the U. S. ". (19) 
c) Thailand 
The effect of the war related American expenditures on the 
Thai economy can be seen by looking at some of the important 
indicators of industrialisation over the period of the war. 
The agricultural sector of Thailand fell steadily to 29 per cent 
in 1970. (See Table Three). In Third World terms this is a 
relatively low percentage share of G. D. P. for this sector 
(it approaches south European standards; compare it with 
Pakistan for example). Manufacturing was responsible for 
14 per cent in 1966 and this rose slightly to 11+. 9 per cent 
by 1970. In absolute terms Agriculture grew by about 16 per 
cent (1962 constant prices) and manufacturing by 50 per cent. 
The growth rates for the sectors are also shown in the table 
in brackets. 
Table Three 
Thailand: Gross Domestic Product by Sector Origin Percentage 
Distribution at Current Market Prices and Growth (Per Cent) 
at Constant 1962 Prices 
Source 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1. Agriculture 36.5 32.5 31.5 31.9 29.6 
growth (13.8) (-5.9) (7.3) (10.1) (2.9) 
2. Mining/Quarry 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.2 
growth (18.8) (14.9) (9.2) (7.4) (3.8) 
3. Manufacturing 13.7 14.8 15.0 14.7 14.9 
growth (11.7) (9.9) (10.1) (10.6) (7.4) 
4. Construction 6.1 6.8 7.0 6.6 7.0 
growth (21.5) (19.0) (8.9) (4.6) (5.5) 
5, Electricity/ 
Water supply 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 
growth (32.9) (21.4) (21.0) (20.1) (17.7) 
6. Transport/ 
Communication 6.2 6.3 6.2 6.1 6.3 
growth (7.2) (8.5) (5.2) (11.3) (6.5) 
Wholsesale and 
Retail 
7. Trade 16.8 17.5 17, 17.5 17.2 
growth (10.2) (12.3) (8.6) (9.1) (3.7) 
8. Banking/ 
Insurance 2.8 3.2 3.5 3.7 4.1 
growth (22.7) (17.1) (16.2) (15.7) (15.4) 
9. Ownership of 
Dwellings 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 
growth (3.9) (4.0) (4.1) (4.6) (5.4) 
10. Public Admin. 3.8 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.7 
Defence growth (2.4) (8.1) (14) (9.2) (12.6) 
11. Other 9.1 9.8 10.3 10.2 10.7 
growth (9.9) (10) (11.1) (7.4) (9.7) 
12. G. D. P. growth (12.2) (5.5) (9.0) (9.6) (6.0) 
Source: I. B. R. D., Current Economic Position and Prospects of 
Thailand, Volume III Statistical Appendix, January 
11 1972, Table 2.1a and Table 2.2a. 
On the expenditure side public and private consumption 
accounted for 85 per cent of the G. D. P. in 1960 and by 1969 
this had fallen to 78 per cent. Gross investment in the same 
period rose from 16 per cent to 25 per cent and expenditure on 
the trade deficit rose from 1.4 per cent of G. D. P. to 3.3 per 
cent. The rates of growth of consumption averaged 8.7 per cent 
for 1966-69 compared to 17 per cent for gross investment. The 
Thailand economy was clearly on the right allocative path for 
sustained growth as a result of the external trading relations 
and the inflows into the economy but these were threatened by 
the rundown in hostilities in Vietnam and the prospect of peace. 
The breakdown of imports into Thailand is of interest to 
this aspect of the analysis. In Table Four the increases in 
imports according to the headings and sub-headings are shown. 
From this table the following points can be made. Firstly 
that capital imports have doubled between 1966 and 1970 and 
also the imports of intermediate goods and raw materials 
(to 
be processes mainly for consumer goods) have also doubled. 
Secondly, consumer goods have increased by less than a quarter 
in the same period. The picture overall is a rapid expansion 
of imports for capital purposes, either as finished products 
or intermediate products, and a 
less rapid expansion in 
consumer imports. 
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The expanding economy with its rising incomes was working 
both to alter its structural composition, (for the generation 
of the national product) and to shift its import composition 
towards industrialising activity: imports of capital goods 
prepare the base for import substitution and imports of durable 
consumer goods widen the market possibilities for future 
nanufacutilring capacity. 
The problem with war expenditures is that they are sensitive 
not to the needs of an economy but to the strategic interests 
of the war. The American direct involvement in the war 
terminated with the signing of the "peace" agreement in January 
1973. But long before then the American military presence was 
being run down. Those expenditures that arose directly from 
the combat position of the United States were greatly reduced 
in the two years before the 1973 cease fire. With thousands 
of American troops being repatriated out of the Vietnam theatre 
the "Rest-and-Recuperation" spending of troops in other countries 
declined proportionately. Thus those countries that gained from 
this source of income had to face corresponding adjustments over 
which they had no control. The problems of peace however are 
not likely to mean a similar economic disengagement in Vietnam 
itself. The Vietnam trade deficit will probably require a 
continuation of the import-induced activity in the Asian 
countries looked at so far. 
The prospects for Thailand in 1969-70 did not look as 
encouraging as they did in 1973. The adjustment to a non- 
Vietnam war-induced economic boom raised serious fears of a 
slide into depression. () 
Table Five 
Thailand, Balance of Payments and International Reserves 
1965 196 6 196 7 1968 1969 1970 1971 19'72-* 
Trade Deficit 
(Million US 0) ** 115 211 384+ 500 538 576 451 153 
Foreign Exchange 
Reserves 705 861+ 916 938 894 767 766 877* 
(Million US 0) 
Deficit as % of 
Reserves 16.3 24.4 41.9 53.3 60.1 75.0 58.8 17.4 
Source: Bangkok Bank) Monthly Review, 13: 9: September 1972) 
p. 1+10, Bank of Thailand3 Monthly Bulletin, XII; 8; 
August 1972, p. 72. 
** Converted from Thailand Bhat at 01 = 20.8 Bhat and 
rounded. 
* Estimated. 
The trade deficit (excluding military imports) rose sharply 
from 1965 to 1970 but this was covered by the foreign exchange 
reserves though the deficit ratio rose alarmingly in 1970. The 
pressure on Thailand to expand its exports in the face of 
possible reductions in U. S. military spending was urgent because 
reserves were vulnerable if the capital grants from America were 
withdrawn. The foreign exchange reserves provided a possible 
cushion for the transformation period but this was dependent 
upon the managerial competence of the Government. 
There was a change in Government in 1971 with the object 
of getting these economic problems under control. A National 
Executive Council emerged with strong powers to conduct the 
economic transformation. This in itself set-off some new 
problems with particular reference to the massive Japanese 
intervention into the Thai economy. (14) Thai nationalism in 
economic affairs is not an entirely abstract concept, it is 
felt acutely among business and middle-class circles and is 
a source of criticism if the Government is not seen to be 
handling Thai interests with the diligence. As it 
was, several external events took place that gave the Thai 
economy some smaller boosts which, along with the not entirely 
unexpected decision of the Americans to continue their presence 
in Thailand beyond the termination of the Vietnam war, set the 
economy on an optimistic line of development. 
The Philippines experience severe flooding in 1971 
necessitating rice imports of 300,000 metric tons and this had 
a major impact on Thai exports of rice in the region. Thailand's 
rice exports rose 56.2 per cent in volume in 1971. (22) The 
Indo-Pak war in 1971 and food shortages in Cambodia had similar 
beneficial effects on Thai rice exports. Other benefits to 
Thailand's commidity trade were the jute scarcities from the 
Bangladesh war, a shortage of American maize (Thailand's exports 
rose in 1971 rose 33.4 per cent in volume and 21.2 per cent in 
value) and a shortfall in the Cuban sugar harvest. The 1971 
increases in Thai exports over 1970 are shown below: 
Table Six 
Thailand3Percentage Increases in Volume and Value of Major 
Exports 1971 over 1970 
Volume Value 
Rice 56.2 15.3 
Rubber 11.7 -14.8 
Maize 33.4 21.2 
Tin - 2.4 -3.5 
Jute 5.2 29.8 
Teak/Woods 38.2 30.6 
Tapioca -16.2 0.5 
Source: Bangkok Bank, Monthly Review, 13: 9: September 
1972, p. 411-3. 
The windfall gains of rising commodity export prices 
helped reduce the trade deficit in 1971 and this process 
continued in 1972. The other helpful push to the economy 
was the American decision to retain its airforce and army 
personnel in the country. This meant that the American 
economic input into Thailand in 1973 would be worth U. S. 
X201 million (12) which is comparable with the peak year 
of 1968 of U. S. , 9206 million and nearly double the 1971 
total of U. S. $115 million. 
Thailand's new strategic significance in South East Asia 
for American foreign policy, following the withdrawal from 
Vietnam, and the increased pressure on the Thai Government from 
the Communist insurgents in the north-east of the country, 
means that the Thailand economy is set to continue its 
insurgency generated economic inflow for the next few 
years. 
Conclusion 
Vietnam faces the enormous problem of redressing the 
deficit on the balance of payments and adjusting from a war- 
distorted economy to a peaceful line of development. In 1968 
the deficit on the balance of payments came to something like 
20 per cent of the G. N. P. (L3) and it was even larger in 1971. 
About a sixth of this deficit was made up on non-essential 
imports such as motorbikes, clothing, radios and television 
sets which accounted for nearly U. S. $100 million in 1968. (2y) 
The Government also announced a policy of utilising the social 
overhead capital provided as a by-product of the war (airfields, 
port facilities, warehouses, hospitals, barracks, communications 
equipment etc. ) by continuing it with the pool of trained and 
skilled men in the armed services to commence a programme of 
reconstruction. This programme would feature an austerity 
drive against consumer luxuries by heavy taxation of imports 
of these items along with determined efforts to modernise 
agriculture particularly in rice production. 
The plans are one thing and their implementation another. 
Vietmäm's notorious corruption may make the import tax policy 
ineffective. Increased rice production pre-supposes that the 
countryside is secure. The heavy capital investment required 
to meet the needs of development is bound to be a difficult 
problem for a country in which the political issues are not 
yet settled and where the destruction of human and capital 
resources by the war has created a major development gap 
between political and actual possibilities. This must make 
questionable the immediate future of economic development in 
Vietnam. 
This war certainly benefited Vietnams Asian trading 
partners (Korea, Japan, Malaysia) Singapore, Thailand, 
Philippines) economically and from the experience of Thailand 
the worst end does not necessarily signify an economic crisis. 
It will be some time before it is clear, however, whether 
Vietnam itself will be able to turn the positive benefits of 
the War into development against the overwhelming negative 
costs of the destruction wrought by the fighting. 
CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
ECONOMICS OF WAR: ISRAEL, EGYPT3 AND PAKISTAN 
a) Introduction 
The two wars discussed in this Chapter are both marked by 
their shortness; the 1967 Six Day Israeli-Arab War and the 
1965 Seventeen Day Indo-Pak War. But the effects of these 
wars on the countries concerned were much more long term. The 
Israeli War had an immediate and beneficial effect on the 
economy but the aftermath of occupation and continuous alert 
status for the armed forces has had less beneficial effects. 
The Egyptian economy neither gained nor lost economically from 
the war - it simply continued to lag in every field. For 
Pakistan the 1965 war was a costly mistake - the military 
imperatives over-rode the economic necessities. The 
in the economic indictors is marked by this war. In this sense 
the Six Day and Seventeen Day wars were misnamed. 
b) Israel: Saved by the Guns 
Military preparations and the nation-building process are 
inseparable in the Middle-East. The existence of Israel as a 
non-Arab state is a reference point for the nationalist and 
pan-Arab forces. In Israel the fragmented political groups 
are at least united on the issue of the survival of Israel. 
The record of achievement of the two opposing forces in the 
region is to some extent a measure of the relative successes 
of each side in the task of nation-building. The Israelis 
have shown a consistent capability in defending their state's 
right to exist (contrast this with the performance of the 
South Vietnamese) while the Arab states have shown a poorer 
record and are probably further away from success than they 
were in 1948. This does not mean that the current balance of 
capability will continue indefinitely. 
The older generation in Israel have been totally committed 
to the survival of the state; they have been divided, and some- 
times violently divided, but their over-riding concern was how 
to ensure the existence of Israel. With the younger generation 
the picture is less clear. A minority of them are not immue to 
world trends among politically motivated Leftwing youth and 
they are less committed to the survival of Israel by the old 
methods of victory in battle. They tend to support policies 
of reconciliation and, as significant, they may indulge in 
activities aimed at extending what they understand as social 
justice, secularism and social change, which in the context of 
be le agured Israel undermines the monolithic unity against the 
Arabs. It is by no means surprising that the Israeli public's 
reaction to the discovery of Jewish nationals involved with a 
Syrian spy ring in 1973 should be one of disbelief followed 
by dismay. (i ) 
In the Arab states a reverse process is at work. The 
older generation are identified with defeatism and the younger 
generation with militant opposition to Israel. The political 
leadership, facing the impasse of the poverty of their 
policies, are confronted by a rebellious youth demanding a 
policy of no concessions to Israel. The guerilla groups are 
staffed and inspired by young and educated arabs: the 
Governments are composed of the previous generation. 
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While 
the Israeli generation gap pushes against the monolithic 
determination to survive at all costs2 the Arab generation gap 
pushes the Arabs into greater intensities of hostility to 
Israel and more determined activity. The youthful Colonel 
Ghadafy of Libya has attempted to get to the head of this 
generation and in so doing fights for Arab leadership against 
the veteran Sadat of Egypt. The next years in the Middle-East 
will to a large extent be a contest between the new generations 
on either side of the divide and both will be working under 
different pressures than those faced by their forebears. 
In this section we will look at the economic effect of 
the 1967 war on the economics of Egypt and Israel. This war, 
in many ways was the crowning success of the first generation 
of Israelis - everything they represented in tenacity, valour, 
skill and superiority over the Arabs3 was epitomised in tho 
military successes of the Six Day War. In the same way the 
inability of the Government to get a political settlement after 
their military victory and the 'neither war nor peace' status 
of the belligerents that has continued to 1973, is also an 
expression of the weakness of the Israeli status as conceived 
in its current form. Israel has survived up to now against 
overt Arab hostility because its nationalism has proven superior 
in organisation and determination to Arabic nationalism. As 
long as this is true the Arabs cannot defeat the Israelis in 
battle. But Israel cannot get a peace, nor security, without 
the co-operation of the Arabs. 
3 
The Israeli economy was in recession for the two years 
before the 1967 war. ((J. ) The growth rate of G. N. P. has fallen 
from 10.8 per cent (1961-64) to 8.4 per cent (1965) and fell 
again to 1.5 per cent in 1966. In Table One the percentage 
change in some of the economic indicators is shown. 1967 is 
the dividing line in performance. The per capita G. N. P. gross 
and net investment, and employment either had negative growth 
rates. Other indicators, such as growth of output, growth of 
output per worker, and growth of public consumption compare 
unfavourably in 1966 with 1965 and the evidence for 1967 
supports the view that the economy was slowing down. After the 
Table One 
Israel: Average Annual Percentage Change in Selected Economic 
Indicators 1961-1969 
Pre-War Post-War 
Indicator 619 1_64 1965 1966 1967 1968 1965 
G. N. P. 10.8 8.4 1.5 1.4 14.2 12.0 
GN. P. per capita 6.5 4.8 -1.1 -1.8 11.0 8.0 
Private consumption 
per capita 6.5 4.6 0.5 -1.7 7.4 8.5 
Public consumption 10.6 10.5 8.3 26.8 13.4 10«0 
Output 15.2 9.9 1.4 -3.1 28.6 18.0 
Output per worker 6.3 8.3 3.4 2.4 11.9 6.0 
Gross investment 14.5 -1.3 -14.8 -28.1 45.2 25.0 
Net investment 12.9 -8.2 -25,3 -22.4 87.6 35,0 
Employment 5.2 3.0 -0.6 -4.2 9.0 11.0 
Diamond Exports 20.5 11.6 25.1 -4.4 22.9 13.0 
Other Industrial 
Exports 15.9 12.7 14.3 9.1 26.1 17.0 
Wages 12.0 18.4 19.8 3.3 -0.3 
Cost of living index 7.3 7.7 8.0 1.6 2.1 
Money supply 19.8 9.0 7.3 20.3 19.0 
Resources 11.6 6.0 -0.4 1.3 16.3 
Sources: Bank of Isr ael, Annual Reports, Israel; Israel's 
Economic Development - Past Progre ss and Pla n for 
the Future, Jerusale m, 1968; Central Bureau of 
Statistics, Monthly Bulletin of St atistics, September 
1969; quoted in Kano vsky, op cit. 3 Tables 11 3 and 41 
p. 87j 103 and 108. (Data re -arranged). 
Notes: Average annual changes 1961-64 refer to annual 
averages for these years; employment refers to 
changes in annual average number employed, including 
employers and self-employed but not to hours worked; 
the cost of living index refers to changes in 
annual average. 
war the 1968 growth rates of the indicators show strong 
recovery. G. N. P. leapt from a 1.4 per cent growth rate to 
14.2 per cent and in 1969 this was followed by a 12 per cent 
growth. G. N. P. per capita which stagnated into a negative 
growth in 1967 jumped to 11 per cent growth rate in 1968. 
Gross investment reached the staggering growth rate of 
1+5.2 per cent in 1968 while net investment hit 87.6 per cent. 
Output was up 28.6 per cent and output per worker up 11.9 per 
cent. Diamond exports which are important to Israel's trade 
balance raised their growth rate from -4.4 per cent to 22.9 per 
cent and other industrial exports trebled their growth rates. 
Public consumption rose dramatically in 1967 from 8.3 per 
cent to 26.8 per cent which is to be expected following the war 
mobilisation. High growth rates were also sustained for 
public consumption in the succeeding two years and this is 
also to be expected in the circumstances of the occupation of 
vast territory and the stand-by status of the military before 
and after the cease-fire. The expansion in the money supply 
is probably not unconnected with this situation. 
Resources is composed of the G. N. P. and the import surplus 
and this confirms the general picture of a slow down to 1967 
and a rapid expansion of available economic resources following 
the war. All in the picture of the Israeli economy in the post- 
war period is one of economic boom. 
The Government attempted to reflate the economy in the 
latter part of 1966 and authorised public works programmes to 
take up the slack in the employment sector. Without the war 
the time period from the recession to boom may have been 
stretched into 1968, or longer; (jj ) the war speeded the process 
up considerably. 
While the war may have had fortuitous consequences for the 
economy in moving the country from recession to an earlier boom 
it was not of course without costs. Table Two shows the costs 
of the Six Day war in non-recoverable losses. These totalled 
. 591.6 million and can 
be compared with the nominal value of 
captured munitions and military hardward, estimated at X167 
million. (& ) These costs do not include the defence costs 
themselves for the war nor the costs of the subsequent occupation 
nor the costs of continuing confrontation with the defeated 
Arab states. These magnitudes of these costs are uncertain 
but there is no doubt as to their upwards direction. 
The Finance Minister made various estimates of the total 
cost of the war during 1967: his July figure was $567 million, 
his November figure 0750 million and his December figure 
X950 million, all of them influenced by the occupation and 
associated costs after the six days of actual fighting. 
('j) 
In this sense the "costs" of the Six Day War is an inadequate 
calculation because the war created additional and burdensome 
costs to the economy which cannot really be separated. 
Table Two 
Israel: Non-Recoverable Losses of the Six Day W 
Item 
Compensation for war damage 
Damage to churches in Jerusalem 
To U. S. families for attack on U. S. Liberty 
Loss of Production in the economy 
Loss of tourist traffic by El Al 
Loss of exports (adjusted) 
Total 
U. S. 0 Million 
5.7 
2.9 
6.9 
60.0 
3.0 
14.0 
91.6 
Source: Kanovsky, op cit., p. 42,432 442 45; tourism is 
estimated to have fallen during 1967 but this 
was already falling in 1966 and the tourist 
earnings of $5 million have not been included 
in the above. 
In 1968 the Israeli defence budget reached $657 million 
or 18 per cent of G. N. P., and this rose to 0833 million for 
1970. The arms purchase abroad accounted for half of the 
balance of payments deficit in 1968 (standing at 0696 million). 
($ ) The post-war arms race in the region ensured that defence 
spending remained at a high level; the deficit rose to X880 
million in 1969, of which $450 million was due to arms 
purchases. (9) With about a fifth of the G. N. P. allocated to 
defence to meet the occupation costs, terrorist activity and 
the general alert for future hostilities, the economy, while 
bouyants, was, and still iss under strain. 
The Arabs are inflicting severer 
the Israelis by maintaining the postu 
peace' than they have been able to do 
or any of the sensational terroristic 
the tension in the region would be as 
economy as was the emergency provoked 
economic difficulties on 
re of 'neither war nor 
with outright hostilities 
actions. A reduction in 
helpful to the Israeli 
by the 1967 war. 
The growth rate in G. N. P. has been higher post-war than 
pre-war but this has brought with it problems of a different 
kind. Rising per capita incomes have maintained the share of 
private consumption in G. N. P. at the same time as the share of 
public consumption, mainly on defence, has risen. The 
adjustment has had to be made in the form of a deficit on 
the 
balance of trade and through foreign indebtedness and aid from 
abroad. A Israeli economist wrote in 
1970, after studying the 
economic boom of the post-war period: 
"The data demonstrates clearly that the "economic 
miracle" of a peace economy in times of war, with 
a rising standard of living, was no miracle at all: 
it was paid for by an ever increasing import surplus 
which resulted in a rapid increase of the foreign 
debt". (10) 
This is the problem of the Israeli Government today: it must 
maintain a credible defensive posture, sufficient to 
defeat 
determined armed attacks from all the Arab armies combined, 
even though the actual 
threat may only be located on any one 
border at a time, and it must also direct the economy into a 
growth path which means restraining the growth in consumption 
and directing resources into investment. The longer the full 
alert defence allocation is not tested - i. e. the longer 
there is no actual outbreak of fighting - the more resistence 
there is to restraining consumption. At some point in time, 
in the absence of peace, the external debt will reach a natural 
ceiling and the economy will have to choose, in effect, between 
guns and butter. For the Israelis there is a pressing reason 
for peace. 11 
c) Egypt: Ruined by the Guns 
Egypt's economy in 1967 was performing below capacity and 
was also suffering from mismanagement. The war did not produce 
a reversal of economic fortune as it did with the Israelis. In 
fact the war, and the defeat, only served to exacerbate the 
negative features of the bureaucratically managed economy. The 
Egyptian economy has known few periods of successful operation 
and the post-war situation did not change anything. The end of 
the Korean war hit the 1952 cotton boom and from then on 
depressed per capita income (which returned to the 1913-28 
levels) in the wake of a collapse in cotton prices to half their 
1950 level. (17. ) The new military government after the 1952 coup 
were able to starve-off part of the effects of this crisis at 
the expense of Egypt's Sterling balances. But reserves once 
committed and not replaced allow only a short-term strategy 
of economic management (as Israel in another context will have 
to face up to in the near future). 
In 1956 the Suez invasion was partly a cause of the policy 
of "Egyptianisation" of assets. It also coincided with a 
swing towards to Soviet Union and away from the West. In other 
developing countries the nationalisation of assets has not always 
been followed by a pro-Soviet foreign policy and the two events 
are not inevitably related - e. g. Uganda, 1972-73 or Thailand, 
1971. In 1960-61 Egyptianisation was taken a stage further by 
widespread nationalisation measures in line with Nasser's 
"Arab Socialism". The application of these measures to the 
Syrian part of the United Arab Republic provoked eventually 
to Syrian secession from the union. The living standards of 
the Egyptians had regained their 1952 levels just before the 
wave of "socialism" and this revoery is all the more remarkable 
when it is noted that these standards had dropped by up to 
about 18 per cent over their 1950 levels. (13) 
The nationalisation policy meant "in effect, the industrial, 
commercial, financial and landowner classes were dispossed of 
most of their property". (1') The problem for the developing 
country that embarks upon this type of social programme is that 
it does not have a surface of administrative and managerial 
talent which it can call upon to take-over and run the enter- 
prises. This either means importing foreign managers (in 
Egypt's case from the Soviet bloc) or accepting a lower level 
of managerial competence than was previously practical. As 
the socialisation measures are political in motivation rather 
than economic, they create an even more restricted layer of 
managerial talent than in an open society; managers are chosen 
for their political loyalty rather than their competence. 
Viewed from the top this is necessary and inexcapable; from 
below it is alienating - the brunt of scarcities and low 
quality are carried by the poorer sections of the community; 
and viewed from the outside it appears as wasteful and 
inefficient. 
The Government had ambitious plans for the future which 
became even more ambitious as time and the frenzy of the 
leadership tried to make up for the gap between plan and 
reality. The first Five Year Plan aimed to double national 
income in 20 years, this was revised on political grounds to 
a demand for a doubling of income in only ten years, followed, 
in 1965, with Nasser's demand to do the job in only seven 
years. (if) In the context of the managerial performances of 
the Egyptian bureaucracy these 'aims' were totally unrealistic. 
Productivity in industry and agriculture was well below any 
level that would make even the modest aims of the Plan realistic. 
One report put labour productivity increases in the first year 
of the plan at 7.3 per cent, and at only 0.9 per cent in the 
second year and nil in the third year. ()L) That this was 
representative of the trend is confirmed by semi-offical indices 
of productivity. 
Table Three 
Egypt: Productivity Indices 1959-65 (1959-60 = 100) 
Year Index 
1959-60 100 
1960-61 101.7 
1961-62 97.6 
1962-63 100.6 
1963-64 98.5 
1964-65 98.5 
Source: L'Egypte Contemporaire, July 1967; quoted in 
Kanovsky, op cit., p. 231. 
Agricultural productivity fell below the first year's 
performance in subsequent years, except for 1964-65 when 
productivity reached 1.2 per cent above the first year. (ý7) 
The Government with worthy intentions but disastrous 
consequences, adopted labour policies which were at variance 
with the economic realities. It cut the working week from 
48 to 42 hours and raised money wages by 31 per cent during 
the Plan. () It also adopted employment targets for each 
sector in a bid to reduce unemployment. This only served to 
extend the labour surplus in the country - calculated to be 
as high as 40 per cent in agriculture and services (tu) - 
into industry. Industrial employment expanded during 1959-65 
at an annual average rate of 8.1%. Employment targets are 
easier to meet than output targets - industrial output was 
25 per cent below target in the same period. 
The policy of industrial absorption of surplus labour 
contributed to rising costs in addition to the costs of a 
shorter working week and a money wage increase. This added 
to the burden of costs on the input side without creating 
additional output. It made domestic production even less 
competitive than it already was and did this in the context 
of expectations of doubling income in twenty or ten or seven 
years. Something, of course had to give, and the result was 
another round of inflation. 
1c1 
The Egyptian bureaucracy represents the major obstacle 
to achievement of the Plan targets. A bureaucracy is a 
complex organisation which creates and nurtures a system of 
delineation of tasks and decisions on principles that minimises 
initiative and maximises caution in decision taking. (20) 
Economic management is already subject to lags in the decision 
process -a problem has to be noticed, evaluated and deliberated 
upon, corrective policies have to be searched for, agreed upon 
and implemented. These policies take time to have their 
effects. If delays and buck-passing is introduced -a 
bureaucracy perfects this type of behaviour - the lags are 
extended. Another unwelcome feature of bureaucratic adminis- 
tration is that some problems are 'ignored' by the decision 
makets because of the implications for the lower level's areas 
of drawing the attention of decision makers higher up in the 
hierarchy to the failures lower down, ore what is as negative) 
the problem is covered up through corruption. This situation 
adds to the managerial costs of programmes apart from the costs 
of wrong decisions. Moreover wrong decisions are not 
necessarily corrected in this system by the right decisions. 
It is also extremely difficult for lower ranks to openly 
criticise the errors of upper ranks. The atmosphere of mutual 
deception permits mutual cynicism. 
In Egypt the nationalisations and the presence of the 
military in functions that they were not trained for, the con- 
flict between politically reliability and competence, insecurity 
from the political purges of the apparatus, together with all 
the normal problems of a developing country, increased the burdens 
on the system. The result contributed to the pre-war deteriora- 
tion in the economy. The foreign debt for example grew to 
14.3 billion, which according to one report exceeded the 
estimated G. N. P. for 1966 of 03.8 billion. (14) The debt pay- 
ments on this to foreign creditors (allowing for Soviet military 
grants and Kuwait "loans") were $200 million a year or 22 per 
cent of foreign currency earnings. The trade deficits were 
x+14 million in 1964, $328 million in 1965 and 0465 million 
in 1966. This forced Egypt to default on its loan repayments 
to the International Monetary Fund and to other foreign 
creditors. 
The only successful feature of Egyptian performance was 
in the Suez Canal. The net trade deficit was reduced considerably 
in each year up to the closure of the canal (See Table Four). 
The war resulted in the closure of the canal and this part of 
Egyptian enterprise ceased to make any contribution to the 
economy. While the future of the canal was under discussion 
at the time because the new Super-Tankers were excreeted to 
lead to a drop to some extent in canal revenue, the contribution 
of the canal in terms of foreign currency to the economy was 
likely to have been a major feature of the Egyptian economy 
Table Four 
Egypt: -Trade Deficit and the Suez Canal Operation Earnings 
1960-68 (U. S. Millions) 
Year Deficit Receipts Suez Canal Net Deficit 
1960 99 144 +45 
1961 215 147 -64 
1962 31f2 151+ -188 
1963 396 163 -227 
1964 416 180 -236 
1965 329 198 -131 
1966 466 219 -160 
1967 226 66 -70 
1968 70 - -70 
Source: United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics; 
National Bank of Egypt, Economic Bulletin, XXII: 
2; 1969; recalculated from data quoted in 
Kanovsky, op cit., p. 344. 
for many years after 1967. 
The Israeli occupation of Sinai cut-off another source.. of 
revnue for the Egyptians. Oil production was worth 956 million 
a year to Egypt from Sinai. Fortunately this was made up by 
the opening up of new fields and the increased output of current 
fields in the non-occupied part of the country and these 
restored income from oil by 1969. Egypt came-off worse in the 
post-war exchange of shell fire when the Suez oil refineries 
were hit by the Israeli's in October 1967. This cost a reported 
X230 million worth of damage. In 1969 the refineries were put 
out of action altogether. Israel attacks on Egypt up to the 
cease fire were aimed at economic targets and included bridges 
and a power station. 
The estimated cost of the war to Egypt was about $00 to 
. 5600 million up 
to 1969, a lot of this is in the form of hard 
currency earnings. (tit) To make up the loss Egypt was forced 
to lean heavily on Arab neighbours for subsidies (Kuwait and 
Libya for example have supplied help). 
Egypt's arms procurement was assisted by the Soviet Union 
with an estimated g2-3 billion worth of armaments. Nevertheless 
domestic defence expenditures have risen to match the Israeli 
arms programme. Defence budget in the early 1960's were 7 to 
8 per cent of G. D. P. and these rose to 13 per cent of G. D. P. 
in 1966 and 18 per cent in 1969. (23) 
In 1972 the Egyptian Chief of Staff, Lt-General Saad- 
Eddin Shazli, claimed Egypt was spending 23 per cent of its 
national income on defence and called upon the other Arab states 
to spend at least 15 per cent each or contribute the equivalent 
amount to those that were. (Zf) To describe these amounts as 
extremely high is no exageration. In the context of indifferent 
economic performance they are a heavy burden. Whereas Israel 
has been able to shoulder the burden with difficulty it is 
clearly beyond the Egyptians to do so without severe political 
stress and low efficiency. 
d) The Effect of the Indo-Pak 1965 War on Pakistan 
The economic performance of Pakistan before and after the 
196 5 hostilities with India will now be examined. (LT) The 
hostilities were of a short duration, 17 days (and only 21 days 
in the Bangladesh war), but the economic impact of the military 
posture was considerable. The economic distortions set-off by 
the War in 1965, plus the West wing's dominance of economic 
affairs in Pakistan, contributed in no small measure to the 
disintegrative tendencies between West and East Pakistan that 
finally surfaced into the separatist war for Bangladesh. (2L) 
From 19+ to 1960 the annual average growth rate of 
G. N. P. was 2.4 per cent and from 1960 to 1969 it was 5.4 per 
cent. The annual average growth of G. N. P. per capita in the 
same periods rose from nil growth to 2.7 per cent 
respectively. (2.7) The growth rate of G. N. P. in the two wings 
of Pakistan showed a disparity in the West wing's favour. The 
East wing's growth rate in the first decade 1949-50 to 1959-60 
was 0.2 per cent and in the second decade it was 5.4 per cent, 
compared to the West wing's performance in the same periods of 
3.6 and 7.2 per cent respectively. In per capita terms the 
1959-60 compound growth rate in the East wing was negative 
(-0.3 per cent) rising to 2 per cent in 1969-70, (before the 
war), compared to the West wing's 0.8 per cent and 4.8 per 
cent respectively for the same years. 
The sectoral growth rates show the changes that are 
essential for an understanding of the Pakistan economy. 
Agriculture grew at 1.4 per cent during 1954-60 and 3.4 per 
cent during 1960-69; in this latter period the agricultural 
growth rate is exceeding the population growth rate at 2.8 per 
cent. Large scale manufacturing (firms employing 20 or more 
persons and using power) contributed an 8.4 per cent growth 
rate in the first period and a 10.9 per cent in the second. (2) 
The sectoral contributions to G. N. P. are shown in the table for 
both wings separately for the three periods, 19+9-50; 1959-60 
and 1964-65. 
Table Five 
Percentage Contribution by Sectors to G. N. P., Pakistan 
(1959-60 Factor Cost) 
Agriculture 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
19+9- 50 
West East 
54 65 
0.2 
7.9 3.8 
1.4 0.4 
Electricity etc 0.2 0.05 
Transport and 
Communications 5.0 5.1 
Trade, Finance 
etc. 30.5 25.3 
1959-60 
West East 
'+7 58 
0.4 
1964-65 
West East 
'+3 56 
0.5 
12.8 6.1 13.7 
2.5 1.4 4.5 
0.5 0.1 0.7 
5.6 6.0 5.8 
7.9 
4.1 
0.5 
6.1 
31.8 25.8 31.8 25.8 
Source: Percentages calculated from T. M. Khan and W. A. Bergon, 
Measurement of Structural Change in the Pakistan 
Economy, Pakistan Development Review, Summer, 1966, 
in Kabir U. Ahmad, op cit., p. 32. 
The East wing is clearly more dependent on agriculture 
than the West wing, it is less industrialised and has both a 
smaller trade and a smaller financial contribution to G. N. P. 
It has near parity in electricity production and a slight 
advantage in transport and communications as contributors to 
G. N. P. Agriculture is a decling sector in Pakistan and has 
contributed less than 50 per cent to G. N. P. in the whole 
country since 1962; this fell to 45.4 per cent in 1968. 
Manufacturing, particularly through expansion in the West wing, 
grew from 8 per cent of G. N. P. to 11.8 per cent in 1969. The 
proportion of large scale manufacturing in the manufacturing 
sector grew, in the same period from 45.1 per cent to 71.4 per 
cent. ()a) 
The pre-war (1965) period from independence produced a rate 
of increase in investment in Pakistan sufficient to double every 
five years the amount of investment available to the economy. (s, ) 
By 1965 the proportion of gross investment to G. N. P. stood at 
18.8 per cent, having doubed twice from 9.2 per cent in 1951+ 
and 4.4 per cent in 191+9. (; Z) 
The 1965 war broke the growth trends in the Pakistan 
economy. The rate of growth in investment for the years 1964/65 
to 1968/69 was only 4 per cent, or under 030 million. The 
investment/G. N. P. ratio and the savings/G. N. P. ratio also 
fell in the same years. (See Table Six). 
Table Six 
Performance Indicators 3 Pakistan 1951+-1969 
Indicator 195+-55 1964-6 
% G. N. P. in Agriculture 56.1 48.1 
% G. N. P. in manufacturing 8.0 11.5 
Investment/G. N. P. (%) 9.2 18.8 
Savings/G. N. P. ($) 6.7 12.2 
Imports/G. N. P. (%) 7.1 11.1 
Exports/G. N. P. (f) 8.0 4.9 
1968-69 
45.4 
11.8 
13.3 
9.7 
6.2 
4.1 
Average increase 31. _1 11.3 7.4 
industrial prod. 
Source: Stern and Falcon, op cit., Tables 11-1; 11-2; 11-3; 
11-4; 11-6; 11-7; 11-8; and 111-33 adjusted and 
combined. 
The marginal savings rate which had been at a low 6.4 per 
cent between 1954 and 1960 increased to 24 per cent in the 
period of the second development plan, 1960-653 and this helped 
to double the contribution of savings to G. N. P. from 6.5 per 
cent to 12.2 per cent. One effect of the war was to reduce 
the proportion of savings in G. N. P. to 9.7 per cent and to 
reduce even further the marginal savings rate from 24 per cent 
to 5.7 per cent. 
Tax revenues were raised as a percentage of G. N. P. 
between 1960 and the war. In money terms they went up from 
1.6 million rupees to 5.4 million rupees. This was achieved 
by raising the rates for all categories of imported goods. (3Z) 
The increase in the tax revenues did not compensate for the 
fall in savings because expenditures on defence increased 
enormously in the period: in 1965-66 defence expenditures 
doubled. In fact, in 1965-66 the surplus for development 
expenditure in the Government accounts fell 45 per cent. 
Foreign aid funds fell and debt financing by the Government 
almost trebled,, 
The war, and its attendent consequences set up inflation- 
ary strains in the economy and these dominated the Third Plan 
period. Taking the fiscal year of 1959-60 as a base price 
changes up to 1968-69 were as shown in Table Seven. The pre- 
war position was relatively stable but after 1965 the rate of 
increase became substantially higher with jumpts in the G. N. P. 
price deflator; food prices; and raw materials prices. Fuel 
and manufacturing prices remained relatively steady. By 1969 
the increase was substantially higher than for the Second 
Development Plan period. The general five point increase for 
the years 1960-64 was replaced by increases of 22,292 192 
20 and -5 points respectively. 
Table Seven 
Prices Indexes , Pakista n 1960-69 
FY G. N. P. 
P 
Food Fuel Manufactures R aw Materials 
1960 100 100 100 100 100 
1961 105.1 100.5 99.2 101.2 119.2 
1962 104.1 106.6 98.7 102.1 107.3 
1963 106.5 104.9 99.0 104.9 105.1 
1964 105.1 104.9 1o4.8 105.8 105.3 
................................... .................. ............ 
1965 110.9 112.1 1o4.8 107.1 121.4 
1966 115.6 117.3 108.5 113.4 125.2 
1967 129.0 139.6 118.0 116.7 124.8 
1968 126.9 134.7 120.0 120.2 106.4 
1969 132.5 141.8 123.2 127.8 116.7 
Source: Stern and Falcon, op cit., Table 11-7, p. 17 (the 
table has been re-arranged and abridged). 
(Dotted line indicates 196 5 War). 
The 1965 war was followed by two very bad harvests in 
1966 and 1967 to which was added the burden of a reduction 
in food imports. Export performance in the Third Plan period 
did not meet expectations and the rise of the price index was 
partly a cause of the blunting of Pakistan's competitive edge 
in world markets. The reduction in foreign aid and the decline 
in the increase in exports contributed to a shortage of raw 
materials which pushed up prices and re-inforced the negative 
effects on the economy. 
The cumulative trade deficit for the two plan periods 
created a difficult situation for the economic managers. The 
deficit in 1960-65 was 9.4 billion rupees and for 1965-69 it 
was 6.8 billion rupees. The balance of payments were 
continually worsened by the burden of foreign loan repayments, 
equivalent to 20 per cent of Pakistan's export earnings in 
1968-69. The loan element in foreign assistance, with future 
repayment burdens, rose from 86 per cent in the Second Plan 
period to 94 per cent in the Third Plan period. (34) It is 
little wonder that the new Bangladesh government was advised 
not to include heavy foreign loans in its development 
plans. (3i) 
Pakistan made some attempts to redistribute the foreign 
aid burden. The aid consortium countries (United States, 
Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, France, 
Netherlands, Belguim and Sweden) were responsible for 95.1 per 
cent of aid during the Second Plan and 87.7 per cent in the 
Third Plan. There are two groups of "non-consortia" countries 
(Denmark, Australia) New Zealand, Switzerland and Turkey in one 
group responsible for 1.3 per cent and 1.9 per cent in each 
period) and the communist bloc, which raised its aid contri- 
bution from 3.6 per cent to 13.4 per cent. The rise in total 
aid from non-consortia countries of from 
4.9 per cent to 
15.3 per cent reflects Pakistan's policy of trying to spread 
the aid sources as widely as possible. 
The economic difficulties set off by the 1965 war have 
not been controlled in the Third Plan period, if anything 
they got worse. The decline in investment, and in growth 
r ates2 with, at the same time, an increase in inflationary 
p ressure3 brought strains inside the economy that were felt 
disproportionally in the country. The poorest sections and 
the poorest (east) wing being most adversely affected. The 
large scale disturbances and industrial strikes in late 1968 
eventually brought a change in the military leadership. 
Ayub Khan who had ruled since 1958 gave way to General Yaha Khan 
in March 1969. The new regime cracked down hard on the disorders 
but did not resolve the economic crisis - in fact the evidence 
shows that the burden was pushed onto the Eastern wing of the 
country, eventually driving it into secession, when the impact 
of a series of natural disasters on top of the Government's 
policies finally broke the religious ties that had held 
Pakistan together. 
Pakistan's Kashmir gambit in 1965 had proven a serious 
error of judgement, for not only did it fail in its immediate 
objectives but it was the single most important event in 
creating a situation whereby the inherent weaknesses of the 
191+7 State of Pakistan were brought to the surface. 
Conclusions 
The economic impact of war is not uniform. In Israel, 
Nigeria and the countries that traded with Vietnam, the 
economies were not disrupted by the hostilities in any way that 
could be described as deteriorated to development. Egypt and 
P akistan2 however2 can be seen to have come out of their wars 
with their economic programmes severely damaged. It may be 
coincidental that they were both on the losing side militarily. 
The connection between war and development may not be simply 
a matter of whether the country wins or losses. A country can 
win a war but at immense cost, such as, for example, the economic 
cost of the Second European War to the United Kingdom. The First 
European War weakened all of the European combatants but 
strengthened the position of the United States. In the Second 
European War the British economy was severely damaged, and a 
large part of British overseas investments had to be liquidated. 
The political strain of the war on the Empire was enough to make 
inevitable its separation into independent countries. 
The wars discussed in these three Chapters were in no way 
of comparable dimensions to the European Wars 
3* 
The largest, 
and longest, the Vietnam war has been confined to a relatively 
small area and a relatively small population. The war was 
costly, from the American point of view, mainly because of the 
expensive technology assembled by the Americans to fight the war, 
but it was not a war fought on a European or Pacific scale. 
Engagements in the field were confined mainly to small numbers 
of men on either side and were not battles between 20 or 30 
divisions. The South Vietnamese thrust into Cambodia in 1970, 
probably the largest mobilization of troops into one campaign, 
was a short campaign over in a few weeks. There were few 
sustained ground combat battles, such as in the 1971 and 1972 
communist offensives which were stand-up battles of a 
conventional kind but of limited durations. 
Counter-insurgency warfare is expensive but it is not as 
expensive as a logistically sustained front to front war. The 
Third World countries ares in the main, unsuited to conventional 
front-to-front campaigns. There are a number of reasons for 
this. Few of the combatants are willing to fight in this way. 
It takes considerable organisation, discipline and training to 
mobilize tens of thousands of troops to fight this kind of war. 
The logistical problems of placing these larges forces into a 
particular geographical place, and sustaining them are enormous. 
These problems increase if the troops move even limited 
distances let alone if they move under combat conditions. The 
organisational skills required to sustain an army is a temporary 
place - the front and rear areas will cover tens, if not 
hundreds, of square miles - are a formidable drain on managerial 
resources. It is no accident that a number of wars in developing 
countries have been reduced to armoured thrusts a few miles in 
one direction and then have stalemated or have seen the use of 
aircraft to drop "terror" bombs on undefended civilian targets. 
Guerilla warfare is partly a response to this problem. 37 
The guerilla losses are not just fighting units but administra- 
tive training areas. The central army has all the trappings of 
a modern conventional army and it is a formidable instrument 
against urban or isolated rural disorder. In engagements 
against armed attacks from small groups it has the advantage in 
fire power. But it is not as formidable a fighting force as it 
appears on paper for sustained engagements of a conventional 
type. The insurgents do not have the resources to fight these 
kinds of wars - the Vietcong for example had to be supported by 
the bulk of the North Vietnamese regular army after 1967 - and 
the central authority does not have a fighting force with the 
experience for that kind of warfare either. Guerilla warfare 
iss in effect, a product of the organisational inadequacies of 
the Third World in general rather than some special characteristic 
of revolutionary strategy. Guerilla warfare is otscaeaAc 
for revolutionaries: it is a necessity. A mobile response to 
guerilla warfare, which strikes at the administrative functions 
of the guerilla losses is more likely to be successful than the 
search for military "victims". It is not dead guerillas that 
decimate an insurgency movement but the administrative 
deprivations. Guerilla warfare is an opportunity for insurgents 
and central authorities to develop administrative capacity. In 
a sýaýý political situation the central authority can 
relax and rely on its para-military forces to maintain order. 
The outbreak of guerilla operations will force it to change. 
Either the central state sets up its administration (complete 
with the welfare services, justice, law and order) or the 
guerilla's will do it instead. Populations give loyalty to 
such "states". If the guerilla movement succeeds in this work 
the actual fighting between it and the central authority is a 
detail. The converse is equally true. 
For these reasons the wars discussed above have had 
differential effects on the countries concerned. The countries 
with the least ability to product an effective convertional 
army and to create the administrative apparatus to sustain it 
is conventional battle have not only lost in a military sense 
but this organisational inability has been part of the economic 
mismanagement of the country. 
Egypt and Pakistan did not abort their development programmes 
because of war alone. The seeds of disaster were already well 
established in each country. In Egypt the economy was distinctly 
unhealthy before the war. In Pakistan the economic crisis was 
hidden by the exploitative relationship between the West and East 
wing of the country. Egypt had no means of financing its 
economic incompetence - the Suez Canal provided too small a 
revnue due to the limitations of traffic - and consequently the 
situation was clearly unsatisfactory before the war. Of course, 
if both countries had kept out of their respective wars they 
would have been better off financially but low grade managerial 
ability is often accompanied at the centre by fanatical problem 
shifting cadres. The wars were diversionary adventures of 
failed political leaders. 
The Vietnamese case is different. The war itself was (and 
is) a civil war between competing elites. Which elite will 
prove superior will eventually be settled. It does not follow 
that either side will win due to "history" or such like - 
basically it is a question of which side deploys its violence 
most effectively. In civil wars there can be no calculus of 
economic gains or losses. But for the trading partners who have 
gained from the war and its economic consequences (the large 
trade deficit in Vietnam and the American involvement) the 
calculus of advantage was positive. 
Nigeria's civil war is a different case to Vietnam's. The 
opposing elites in Nigeria fought along tribal lines in a frontal 
confrontation. We have already noted the unsuitability of Third 
World military forces for such a role. But it must also be 
noted that in such a conventional role the balance of advantage 
must be with the central authorities especially in conditions 
where the insurgents are landlocked and blockheaded. Bringing 
the Federal army to a single place to fight created enough 
technical problems for the Federal authorities - for the Biafrans 
it was a near impossible. The fact that the war dragged on so 
long was in many ways due to the organisational and logistical 
incompetence of both sides, but particularly the Federal side. 
As the advantages were with the Federal side delays in getting a 
decision in battle must be taken as a criticism of them rather 
than their opponents. The economic consequences of the war were 
in every sense beneficial. It provided the shock needed to the 
system to set Nigeria on a growth path. In this the oil played 
a large part. Above all the war Nigerianised Nigeria's 
political structure. Without this element an exploitative 
relationship of the Eastern Regions similar to that of 
Pakistan may have been created and certainly the political 
instabilities of the past would have continued. 
CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
LOCAL ARMS RACES 
a) Introduction 
This Chapter looks at the arms trade with the Third 
World. The industrialised countries are the main suppliers 
of armaments and there is a thriving trade between these 
countries and the developing world. Armaments spending is 
a relatively small part of its defence budgets of Third World 
countries - in the main the major item of expenditure is on 
manpower. There is a large element of politics in the arms 
trade as suppliers have tended to use their weapon exports 
as part of their foreign policy. 
b) Overall Situation 
Seven countries (Russia) China, America, Canada, Britain, 
France and Germany) produce eighty-five per cent of the world's 
armaments. (1) The military procurement decisions made in 
these seven countries determine, directly and indirectly, the 
trends in military spending in the bulk of the remaining 
countries in the world. These countries are also inter-related 
and interdependent in their military decisions and each 
country's actions have to take account of possible reactions 
by the others - this is the classic oligopoly relationship. 
The oligopolistic nature of international arms supplies 
arises because armaments policies are extentions in effect of 
the policies of Governments. The Governments in the arms 
business are in an oligopolistic relationship of a special 
kind (not often duplicated in private oligopolistic industries). 
The oligopolistic participants in the international arms business 
are divided into two broad coalitions. The Russian and Warsaw 
Pact countries form one coalition and the American and NATO 
countries another. (China is at present a "coalition" of 
itself). The major competitive tensions are between the three 
powers Russia) China and America. 
Triadic competition played an important role in the post- 
war arms trade. For example, American military support for the 
(south) Vietnamese was balanced by Chinese and Russian support 
for the (north) Vietnamese and Vietcong but Russian and Chinese 
support was subject to their mutual hostility, and it reached 
the stage during the war of the Chinese refusing overland 
facilities for Russian war material across Chinese territory, 
forcing the Russians to extremely inconvenient detours to 
supply a friendly Government. Chinese support for Pakistan 
against India endorsed by Chinese opposition to Bangladesh 
separatism was matched by Russian support for India. and 
Bangladesh. The Americans regarded Pakistan, in spite of 
its Chinese affinities, as a major ally, and supplied it with 
large amounts of military material. Pakistan was also a 
member of American dominated military alliances (the Baghdad 
Pact and CENTO) and at the same time a friendly power to 
China. Russian and Chinese arms supplies to Indonesia were 
restricted by their competition in the Pacific rather than 
their estimations of the political progress of Communism in 
Indonesia. 
Within the American coalition there is supplier competition 
between the members. British and French competition in arms 
supplies took place in Biafra, Nigeria and South Africa where 
France has sought to replace Britain as an arms supplier. 
Britain competes with America in the Middle-East (Saudi Arabia) 
and Latin America. The arms supply policies of the two blocs 
take into account the activity and likely activity of the 
members of the other bloc, and increasingly the possible moves 
of China. Arms policies are therefore bloc orientated. In 
addition the members of the coalition decide their individual 
arms policies taking into account the policies and potential 
gains of other members of-the coalition. This may lead to 
members of the same bloc coalition being on opposite sides in 
a Third World conflict. Arms policies are therefore partly 
nationally orientated. In the American coalition there is 
more room for competing national arms policies than in the 
Russian coalition. France in this context is the most tenuous 
of members of the American coalition. As war is a continuation 
of politics by other means, an arms supply capability is one of 
the main instruments of political intervention. 
In 1966 world military expenditures were $159 billion 
compared to $111 billion spent on, education, 052 billion spent 
on public health and 08 billion spent on foreign aid. 
(Z. ) The 
Third World with 72 per cent of the world's population spent 
only 11 per cent of the world's education budget and 10 per cent 
of the world's health budget. The military spending of the two 
major military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, is shown 
in 
Tjb1e One3 for 1961+ to 1969. The percentage share of the two 
blocs has remained steady at around 87 per cent. The 'Other' 
category includes the Third World and the developed part of 
the 
world not in either of the two blocs, such as Australia, New 
Zealand, China, the Asian Communist Countries2 Japan, South 
Africa, and the neutral European countries. The share of the 
Third World in this category is approximately 53 per cent, or 
7 per cent of the world's defence expenditures ($13 billion). 
(S) 
Table One 
World Military Expenditures, 1964-69-(, g-Billions) 
1961+ 19 65 1966 1967 1968 1969 
NATO 73 74 86 100 105 108 
% 52.5 52 53.5 55.2 55 51+ 
Warsaw Pact 49 51 5+ 57 60 63 
% 35.2 35.6 33.7 31.5 31.4 31.5 
Other 17 18 20 24 26 . 
29 
% 12.2 12.5 12.7 13.3 13.6 14.5 
TOTAL 139 143 160 181 191 200 
Source: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Report, 1969, pl 
(N. B.: since 1967 most of the increases are due to 
inflation). 
Disarmament is fundamentally a problem of the relations 
between the major blocs and not a problem that can be solved 
in the Third World. The NATO and Warsaw Pact countries take 
up the bulk of the world's defence expenditures, they account 
for the largest share of the world's supplies of armaments 
and they dominate the political institutions that could 
sponsor disarmament. 
The security problems of Third World Governments are 
relatively more serious than those of the major supplier 
countries. (4) Many of the governments of the developing 
world are under constant pressure from insurgency of the 
territorial claims of neighbours. Some of the conflicts are 
part of the Cold War and others have a localised origin (the 
Israeli-Arab conflicts). These security problems are reason 
enough for expenditures on defence and their continuation. 
Without security no nation will disarm. 
It cannot be assumed that a bilateral arrangement between 
the Russians and the Americans to de-escalate their commitments 
to preserve their spheres of influence in the Third World would 
reduce tension in these countries to the point that they could 
curtail their defence expenditures significantly. The 
withdrawal of the Americans from Vietnam will not prevent the 
civil war from continuing. Until the issue separating the 
communists from the non-communists is resolved there is a basis 
for war and insurgency. The same applies to Thailand and South 
Korea. The withdrawal of the British from India did not lead 
to a peaceful independence and the withdrawal of the bloc powers 
from their foreign bases and client relationships is not likely 
to be a prelude to lower defence expenditures. 
The presence of the bloc powers is bound up with the way 
in which the conflicts in these territories unfolds at any 
particular period of time but the conflicts are not dependent 
on the role assigned to these countries in the large conflicts 
between the major powers. The vulgar myths of "American 
imperialism" and "Russian Communist conspiracy" (or Chinese 
or Cuban) as explanations of the violence in the Third World 
survive all the counter-evidence that is there for all to 
see. For this reason it is unlikely that an arrangement 
could be devised in which the blocs themselves guaranteed 
the integrity of the developing countries and thereby, as the 
argument goes, enables them to reduce their defence 
expenditures. (S ) 
The developing countries as independent political units 
have to survive against internal and external threats and 
they require an effective security force against potential and 
actual challenges to their right to rule. This monopoly of 
violence is an inescapable part of the burden of government. 
To this end they devote a portion of their available resources$ 
or sacrifice some of their political independence, or both, to 
acquire military hardware and know-how from the world's 
suppliers. It is the purpose of the Chapter to examine this 
trade in arms with the Third World. 
c) The Major Suppliers 
In the Table the percentage of total Third World supplies 
of major weapon exports from Russia and America have been 
calculated. There are some interesting points. The Far East 
(including Vietnam). has received over a third of the Russian 
supplies and 51+ per cent of American supplies during 1950- 
1969. This region has been a high tension region throughout 
this period. The Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Indo-Pak 
and Sino-Indo Wars, Laos, Thailand and Cambodia, the Formosa 
'war' with mainland China, and the military build-up through 
the CENTO, SEATO Pacts and the armament of Indonesia by Russia 
and America, contributed to this concentration of war supplies 
from the two major powers on this region. 
The Middle-East was the second largest customer for Russia 
and America. Russian supplies were exclusively delivered to 
the Arab countries while American supplies were divided between 
a major portion to Israel and smaller supplies to Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. 
The relative importance of the India Sub-continent to 
Russia is shown by the share of 16 per cent delivered to this 
region compared to only 7.2 per cent from America. Britain was 
the traditional Western supplier to India and Pakistan. In 
contrast whereas America sent 14 per cent of her arms supplies 
to Latin America (including pre-Castro Cuba) the Russians sent 
5 per cent of theirs (almost totally to Cuba). Russia has a 
'special relationship' with Cuba and its weapon exports to this 
Table Two 
Major Weapons Supplies by Region from U. S. S. R. and U. S. A. 
(1950-1969) as Percentages of their Total Third World Supplies 
Far East (including Vietnam) 
Indian Sub-Continent 
Middle East 
North Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Cuba 
Latin America 
U. S. S. R. U.. AS 
W (4) 
37.3 ý+. 4 
16. o 7.2 
37.5 19.9 
3.0 1.0 
1.2 1.4 
5.4 - 
0.0 14.7 
100.0 100.0 
Source: S. I. P. R. I., op cit., p. 190-1 and 144-5 
(The American percentages have been adjusted 
to exclude American aid to Greece and Turkey). 
small island exceeded by a considerable margin all its weapon 
exports to Africa (1+ per cent). A similar balance between 
American weapon exports to Latin America and its exports to 
Greece and Turkey can be drawn: America sent almost twice as 
much arms to these two countries than to the whole of Latin 
America. As Greece and Turkey are on Russia's doorstep, and 
Cuba is on America's, it is not difficult to draw the interence 
that the strategic interests of the major powers plays the 
crucial role in the determination of export policy. Both these 
powers must have regarded these particular customers as 'forward 
strategic areas' to justify the size of the arms deliveries. 
Africa, north and south, (excluding Egypt and south 
of the Zambezi) is a relatively neglected ara for arms exports 
from the major powers. There are two main reasons for this 
'neglect'. Firstly, the African continent is not regarded as 
a strategic zone in the Cold War. The case of South Africa 
and the shipping routes round the Cape introduced a strategic 
element into the area but this is a 'frozen' factor. The 
Russians have no interest in arming South Africa and the 
Americans, for all kinds of delicate political reasons cannot. 
Therefore, while the strategic imports of the Cape routes 
increased because of the closure of the Suez Canal and the 
growing popularity of the giant oil tankers, the Americans 
cannot respond to Soviet naval patroling of the Cape routes 
by aiding South Africa without creating political problems 
domestically and with other African countries. The north 
African coastline is also closed to the Americans and therefore 
their naval response to the Russians has to be handled by 
the NATO Mediterranean fleet. 
Secondly, the newly dependent African powers already 
have traditional links with the European suppliers and this 
relationship has been of sufficient (if waning) strength to 
reduce the Russian and American opportunities to establish 
footholds. Nigeria, during the Biafran emergency, was an 
exceptional opportunity for the Russians in this respect. 
The five major arms suppliers are America, Russia, Britain, 
France and China and in the period 1950-1969 they delivered to 
the Third World regions 014.7 billion (1968 prices) worth of 
major weapons. (L) This was distributed between the regions 
in the following way: 
Far East Middle-East Indian Sub-Cont. Latin America Africa 
5.6 4.3 2.6 1.9 0.4 
(U. S. $ Billions) 
The arms have flowed to the regions most affected by hostilities. 
Africa's weapons deliveries have only been counted for when 
the countries became independent and thus the total Is probably 
understated for this region. Most of the independence changes 
did not take place until after 1960 and this region will take 
some time to reach weapon delivery levels comparable with other 
regions that have not been affected by outright hostilities, 
such as Latin America. 
For the years 1950-69 the annual average major weapon 
deliveries of the major suppliers to the Third World has been 
distributed as follows: (1) 
U. S. A. U. S. S. R. U. K. 
322 264 121+ 
France Other (Inc. China) Total 
56 111 9877m. 
(U. S. Millions) 
The United States led the field over the period but to some 
extent this position was due to the later arrival of the 
Russians as major weapon exportes. Their real impact as a 
major supplier did not take place until after the mid-1950's 
(post-Suez). Soviet weapons were exported to Korea during 
the Korean War and there were substantial deliveries to the 
new Chinese Peoples Republic. But supplies to non-communist 
developing countries did not get under way as early as American 
supplies. Recent (post-1965) Russian delivery trends suggest 
that Russia will be the premier arms supplier overtaking 
America in the 1970's. 
Table Three 
M aior Weapon Supplies by Region and Supplier, 1950-69 M 
Refýion 
Far East 
Indian Sub- 
Continent 
Middle-East 
Africa 
Latin America 
U. S. S. R. U. S. A. U. K. France China Other 
34+. 9 49 2.8 0.8 6.2 6.3 100 
31.4 
45.8 
15.1 
15.0 
13.8 36.9 9.9 1.1 
23.5 12.4 11.6 
16.7 30.2 11.1 
39.2 21.1 3.2 
6.9 100 
6.7 100 
26.9 100 
21.5 100 
Source: S. I. P. R. I., op cit., p. 405,469,508,582,608,689; 
the figures have been rounded; Africa, excludes 
Rhodesia, South Africa, Portuguese Africa, and north 
Africa; Latin America, includes Cuba. 
The distribution of the major arms deliveries in each 
region among the major suppliers is shown in the Table. The 
former British imperial connection with the Indian sub-continent 
and sub-Saharan Africa is shown by Britain's major share in arms 
exports to these regions. The importance of India to Russian 
interests after the 1962 war with China is seen in Russia's 
31 per cent share in arms deliveries to this region. Bearing 
in mind the extremely short time which Russia had to develop 
its arms exports to India (five years) compared to Britain's 
(since independence) the Russian performance is both significant 
and remarkable. India's allignemtn with Russia for arms 
supplies in such a short period of time must be regarded as a 
success for the Russians. In Africa the British domination 
was complete. The north African situation (not covered in 
the Table) was one of competition between France, America 
and Russia. Latin America was dominated by American exports 
(39 per cent), followed by Britain. The Russian interest was 
mainly confined to the Cubans but the Allende Government in 
Chile presented them with a new potential customer. In the 
Middle-East the Russian domination of arms supplies was 
complete. 
d) The Regional Balance 
The changes in the importance of particular regions as 
recipients of arms supplies followed the changes in the 
hostilities, and threats of hostilities, throughout the post- 
war years. This can be seen by examining Table Four. The 
largest shift in importance was from Latin America and Greece 
and Turkey to the Middle-East and Vietnam. The Latin American 
countries have been a war-free region throughout the post-war 
years and the "forward area" status of Greece and Turkey in 
the early 1950's assured them of priority in the restructuring 
of their armed forces with modern American arms. 
The Far East, excluding Vietnam3 received 34 per cent of 
world arms exports at the height of the Korean war (1950-54), 
dropping to 25 per cent in 1955-64 and to 12 per cent in 1965- 
1969. This region would have been a relatively 'normal' region 
for arms supplies if it had not been for the Vietnam war. The 
first two rows in Table Four show conclusively the role that 
Vietnam war played in keeping this region a major weapon 
importer. As the percentage share of the Far East, excluding 
Vietnam, fell the percentage share of Vietnam rose and the 
total share of the Far East, including Vietnam, as a result 
remained at about 32 per cent for 1950-69. World arms imports 
in the Third World rose from an annual average of 0349 million 
to 01421 millions. 
Regional Imports 
Table Four 
of Major Weapons b y Third World Cou ntries 
as a Per centage of the Tot al Arms Imports 
(five year moving averages) 
1950_54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1950-69 
Far East 34.1 25.8 25.6 12.1 20.9 
Vietnam 0.6 1.5 6.7 22.4 11.1 
(34.7) (27.3) (32.1) (34.5) (32.0) 
South Asia 12.0 18.5 15.5 13.4 14.9 
Middle- 
East 10.6 23.3 20.7 31.3 24.5 
North 
Africa - 0.6 1.4 3.0 2.4 
Africa 2.0 1.2 3.6 2.6 2.4 
South 
Africa 2.3 2.0 2.7 3.8 2.9 
Latin 
America 18.3 12.1 16.0 5.3 10.8 
Greece 
Turkey 20.1 15.0 7.9 6.1 10.0 
100.0 100 100 100 
Total U. S. 
100 
X8 Millions 349 
855 864 1421 877 
annual average 
Source: S. I. P. R. I., op cit., p. 16 (extraced from Table 1.4); 
North Africa average in final column is for 1956-69; 
'Africa' is sub-Saharan Africa. 
The growth of the Vietnam arms imports was not at the 
expense of imports into the rest of the Far East region but 
in addition. The region without Vietnam imported an average 
of $119 millions per year in the first five years, 1950-55, 
and at the end of the period, 1965-693 the annual average 
import of arms was 0172 million. Vietnam raised its imports 
of arms from , 92 millions per year in the first five years to 
$318 millions in the last five years. In other words its 
annual average imports in 1969 were not far short of the 
total imports into the Far East in 1950. ($) 
South Africa imported the same amount of arms as black 
Africa in 1950 ($7 million) but by 1960-64, the five years 
during which many black African states became independent, 
its annual average imports were about $10 millions less than 
black Africa's. However, in the years 1965-69, South Africa 
overtook black Africa and was importing nearly 020 millions 
more arms per year. On a population basis this discrepancy is 
quite remarkable. 
There is an obvious relationship between the importance of 
a Region as a major arms importer and the incidence of hostili- 
ties. Both the Middle-East and Vietnam have increased their 
shares of the imports of arms throughout 1950-69 and both have 
been areas of high military tension. All regions have been 
increasing their military imports by value but these regions 
have also increased their shares. The expansion of military 
sales from the industrialised suppliers has been due to a large 
extent to the demands of these regions and their military needs 
(as perceived by them). 
e) The Middle-East 
The arms trade with the Middle-East has both increased 
In volume and changed in source of supply. The British 
dominated this region's arms supplies up to the mid-1950's, 
providing 5+ per cent of its requirements. After Suez (1956) 
and the formation of the Iraqi Republic (1958) Britain was 
replaced by Russia which exported almost $2 billions worth 
of arms from 1955-1969 compared to Britain's 9535 millions 
between 1950-1969 (almost the same figure as France's at 
$+98 millions). America's exports of arms have totalled 
$1 billion in the period. 
The Russian arms exports to this region have been 
stimulated by the military failures of its clients. The 
Egyptians, Russia's main customers, have lost two wars since 
they switched suppliers. The losses of equipment have been 
on a scale not matched in any other Third World country, not 
even Vietnam, and this contrast is very much to the point 
given that the Egyptian armed forces count their fighting 
literally in hours while the Vietnamese can count in years. 
Replacements for military equipment used up in general 
service are an accepted part of military costs. Equipment 
deteriorates by use, misuse, accidents and low maintenance 
standards. In one report, the estimates of replacement 
equipment to meet attrition due to all reasons placed the 
rate as high as 60 per cent for combat aircraft and 33 per 
cent for armoured fighting vehicles in the developing world 
between 1965 and 1969. This period spans the Six Day War and 
takes into account the substantial Arab losses incured in 
1967. The more normal rate of attrition is calculated to be 
10 per cent for combat and trainer aircraft, 7- per cent for 
transport and utility aircraft and 5 per cent for armoured 
fighting vehicles and naval vessels. (9) 
Arms imports and therefore not cumulative - there is 
always some element of replacement for attrition and also 
for obsolescence. Israel, which has developed an efficient 
maintenance, repair and recovery capability, (necessary for 
a domestic capability in aircraft production), has not had 
enormous losses in combat, and has therefore less need to 
import to merely replace and replenish equipment. Moreover, 
the Israeli domestic arms capability which provides it with 
030 million per year in export earnings for small arms, 
ammunition, spare parts and explosives - exceeding the annual 
French exports to the region for 1965-69 - has meant that her 
dependence on outside supplies is confined to the sophisticated 
weapons, such as soiic combat aircraft and missiles. 
(10) 
Table Five 
Eryp. tian and Syrian Combat Aircraft Losses. June 1967 
Egypt 
Pre-War Losses Replace- Number ments 
Seri a 
Pre-War Losses ol e- Number monts 
HIG-21 
fighter/ 
interceptor 110 95 175(1) 36 32(2) 110 
MIG-19 
interceptor/ 
4 3) fighter 120 0 50 - - - 
MIG 15/17 
fighter 168 82 - 101 23 50 
Su-7 
ground attack 
fighter 14 10 64(4) - - -(5) 
Tu-16 bomber 25(6) 30 - 
(7) 
- - - 
IL-28 bomber 89 27 20 7 2 - 
Totals 526 27)+ 309 144 57 160 
Sources: S. I. P. R. I., op cit., p. 838-9,850-1 for pre-war 
deliveries and replacements; Interavia, International 
Defence Review, Geneva, November 1967, p. 1638, for 
losses in June War. 
(1) A further 150 MIG-21's (J) were delivered in 1970- 
(2) S. I. P. R. I., op cit. 3 quotes 33 for losses but 
Interavia figure used. 
(3) Interavia (1967) gives only 20 lost but S. I. P. R. I. 
(1970) gives 40. S. I. P. R. I's later figure taken; 
R. and W. Churchill's Six Day War, London 1967 
quotes 20 lost. 
(4) A further 20 Su-7s were delivered in 1969-70- 
(5) 20 Su-7s were delivered in 1969. 
(6) The S. I. P. R. I. delivery total is 5 less than the 
Interavia losses total. 
(7) 10 Tu-16's may have been delivered in 1970. 
The reported combat aircraft losses of Egypt and Syria 
are shown in the above table. Egypt lost 274 aircraft and 
Syria 57) and most of them were destroyed while on the ground 
in the early minutes of the war. A further 36 aircraft were 
lost by Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. Soviet deliveries after 
the war had to make good these losses. Israel lost 50 air- 
craft and these included French Mirage III's, Sud-Vautour 
fighter/bombers and Magister Strike Trainers (being used in 
a combat role). (11) The French imposed an arms embargo on 
Israel which was particularly difficult for Israel as almost 
all its aircraft were of French origin. Fifty Mirage fighters 
ordered and largely paid for were cancelled unilaterally by 
the French, which obligingly lifted its other arms embargo 
on the Arab states, and this forced the Israelis to purchase 
combat aircraft from the United States at a much higher 
financial cost. (IL, ) 
General De Gaulle was able by this switch in policy to 
divert potential Arab hostility towards France as the major 
supplier of the aircraft that did so much decisive damage 
to the Arab's military position in the fighting. The result 
of the French shift in arms policy towards the region is 
shown in Table Six. 
Table Six 
Period 
pre=War 
A, rab 
Countries 
Israel 
Post-War 
Ar. ab 
Countries 
Israel 
French Arms Supplies to Middle-East to 1969 
Combat Utility Helicopters Armour MissIles Naval Aircraft Aircraft Cr 
18 14 15 82 15 4 
247 65 66 330 902 6 
167 8 36 360 48 0 
25 0700 12 
Source: Compiled from S. I. P. R. I., op cit., Country Registers 
for Syria, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, 
Libya, Egypt and Israel, p. 838-852. 
Israel was clearly France's major customer in the region 
before the 1967 war. In all weapons except naval craft it 
received substantially more from France than all the Arab 
countries combined together. It was particularly dependent on 
France for combat aircraft, armoured fighting vehicles and 
missiles. After the embargo the position was reversed. The 
Arab countries became France's major customers for combat air- 
crafts armoured fighting vehicles, missLles and helicopters. 
These French deliveries also had the advantage of being the 
most up to date versions in the French range. 
The helicopters included the Sud Super Frelon and the 
Alouettee III; the combat aircraft the Dassault Mirage and 
the Fouga Magister; and the armour the world rated AMX-30 main 
battle tank and the Panhard AML-90. These are the kind of 
weapons that the Arab's needed most - the AML-90, for example, 
is suitable for anti-aircraft activity which in the past has 
been a notorious weakness in the Arab armies. The combat air- 
craft figure for the Arab states included the programmed 
deliveries to Libya scheduled for 1970-74. France was also 
reported to be negotiating the sale of 50 Dassault Mirage F1 
fighters to Iraq for 1974-75 deliveries. (13) 
Israel switched from French to American and British supplies 
after the war and the French embargo. The 25 combat aircraft 
delivered from France in 1968 were actually ex-German Bundeswehr 
Fouga Magisters that had been refurbished under a contract in 
France. Israel also produced a local version of the Magister 
under licence - the Potez/Badek CM 170 Magister. Twelve gun- 
boats (Saar type) were "smuggled" out of France by Israeli 
agents as their delivery was contrary to French declared policy 
at the time. These were effectively the terminal deliveries 
in the French arms relationship with Israel. 
There have been large scale Russian arms exports to the 
Arab states and this does not leave a great deal of room for 
the French suppliers to grow in. The Russian interest in the 
region has always been political. Table Seven shows the 
numbers of major weapons delivered from the Soviet Union to 
the Arab states pre- and post-war. Deliveries of combat 
aircraft and armour after the debacle of 1967 were at a higher 
rate of delivery than pre-war. Half as many aircraft were 
delivered to the Arab Countries listed in the three years 
1967-1970, as were delivered in the previous ten years and 
for armour the comparable proportion is 60 per cent in three 
years of the amount delivered in ten. 1- 
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Egypt, Syria and Iraq are of political importance to 
Russia because of their geographical positions in the regions. 
They flank Turkey, American's regional 'Forward Defence' area 
and lie in a belt across the region between the pro-Western 
powers of Turkey, Iran, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The eastern 
Mediterranean is important to Russian policy because it is a 
gateway to the southern flank of NATO. Friendly governments 
on the north African coast suit Russian interests if only to 
keep out America but also have the additional attraction of 
providing naval base facilities. To this end Russian arms 
exports have been generous to those governments that wanted 
them. The fact that this was a high tension area due to the 
local dispute between Arab and Jew made this aspect of Soviet 
policy dangerous. 
The regional division created the possibility for a 
Russian interest - the super powers had either to remain 
neutral or take sides and in taking one side this left the 
other side free to align with the other power. The conflict 
in the Middle-East is by no means big power initiated and it 
would continue if the powers withdrew. But the intervention 
of the big powers for their own ends, or through force of 
circumstance, does add another dimension to this potentially 
explosive situation. The post-Gaullist policy of President 
Pompidou continued the policy of not sending arms to 
belligerent countries but the French readiness to meet arms 
requests from the Arabs, and the difficulties that the Russians 
have recently had with the Arabs, and the emergence of the 
Libyan leadership as a counter to post-Nasser Egypt, does 
create the possibilities for major French inroads into the 
big power's current positions in the region. 
f) Indian Sub-Continent 
The hostilities that have taken place on the Indian sub- 
continent have played a role in the demand for weapons in both 
India and Pakistan and, of course, now Bangladesh The Soviet 
Union has been able to use its armaments industries to make 
its presence felt across the Himalayas. The picture is the 
same to some extent as in the Middle-East. Britain, the major 
imperial power in the region, dominated politically and 
militarily in the early post-independence years. Up to 1959 
British arms sales accounted for 65 per cent of the total 
imported into the region (worth , 102 millions a year in arms 
exports) but by 1969 this share dropped to a mere 13 per cent 
(or £24 million in value). That this was a real transfer of 
interest is indicated by the fact that the total arms imports 
into the region rose in the same period from $158 million per 
year for 1955-59 to $191 millions per year for 1965-69. Arms 
imports went up by $33 million per year but Britain's share 
dropped by 078 million. American exports fell even more 
dramatically from $24 million per year to $1 million in the 
same period, or from 15 per cent to a derisory 0.5 per cent. 
France also dropped its share of the arms market from 
X22 million to 014 million, though the percentage fall was not 
as high as for Britain and American 
(from 14 per cent to 
17 per cent). 
It was the Soviet Union that made the big gains in the 
period. It raised its share from a low 3 per cent to 68 per 
cent in the ten years, or from an annual average of $5 million 
to $129 million in value terms. (14. ) Russian arms diplomacy 
made these gains by skillfully playing its cards in support 
of India, the major power in the region. For the Indians the 
relationship was just as fruitfull. It assured them of needed 
arms and technical know-how which they were able to turn to 
domestic advantage in their national arms industry. 
The basic tension in the region is between India and 
Pakistan. The states formed at the end of the British rule 
in 19+7 did not create the differences between the Muslim and 
Hindu peoples - they only provided a modern vehicle for 
centuries old antipathies. The Pakistan state, geographically 
divided, was a religious state that attempted to over-ride 
comunal differences with a common religion. The secession 
of Bangladesh was the product of the failure of the religious 
state to permanently bind together peoples with fundamentally 
opposed interests. (15) There have been other sources of 
tension in the years since independence. India has had 
considerable border difficulties with China and with some of 
its northern neighbours. Afghanistan has also had differences 
with the Pakistan government over the rights of Pathans resident 
in its territory. 
India's military strategy was based on the assumption 
that it would not be attacked by its neighbours with a force 
of sufficient strength to create problems for the armed 
forces. India also regarded itself as being 'above' the use 
of force in the settlement of differences between nations. 
Somehow India's prestige as a neutralist country dedicated 
to world peace was supposed to ensure its invulnerability to 
aggressive designs on its integrity. The Sino-India war of 
1962 rudely put paid to these illusions. 
Pakistan was not regarded as a major threat militarily. 
India had acquired the bulk of the armed forces and their 
equipment upon partition through the segragation of army units 
into Hindu and Moslem components. Pakistan acquired the major 
British military installations in the north west frontier 
region and in west Pakistan but these were immobile defence 
installations and presented no threat to India, especially 
when manned by depleted army units. From this disparity major 
differences in arms procurement policies emerged between the 
new states. Pakistan regarded India as a major threat. The 
geographical separation of Pakistan presented defensive and 
logistical problems. The population balance was also in India's 
favour. 
Pakistan sought and found a friendly power (America) to 
provide it with the arms it felt it needed and in return 
accepted the need to be bound into alliances, which had the 
political aims of mutual security. The American interest in 
these alliances was that they formed a barrier to Russian 
expansion; the Pakistani interest was that they helped guarantee 
its integrity against India. Whether in fact the alliances 
could have achieved either, or both, the objectives of America 
and Pakistan is not as important as the fact that they were 
thought to be able to achieve them. That Pakistan was not 
pursuing a consistent ideological foreign policy is evidenced 
by its close relations with China. The Chinese had their 
difficulties with India over the border issues and was competi- 
tive with India over broader issues of influence among the 
developing world. Russia's aid to India after the 1962 war, 
and the fact that the Chinese were hostile to India, pushed 
Pakistan into alliance with both America (against the Russians) 
and China (against both the Russians and the Indians). 
The Indians dropped their neutralist strategy after the 
1962-war. Up to then India had relied on its international 
prestige, its weight of numbers and its feelings, moral 
superiority to prevent major incursions into its territory. 
Moreover, it responded to threats to its territory and 
challenges in disputed areas (Kashmir, Nagaland, northern 
borders) with a passionate zeal that belied its actual military 
position. The governing elite was civilian/intellectual biased 
(it was also backed by the Indian Civil Service) and had a 
corresponding conviction in its superiority over other elites 
in India. The position of the army reflected this attitude. 
It was treated as a second class necessary evil, with low 
status, low pay and low budgets. Nothing that the army could 
achieve by violence could not be achieved by the politicians 
by speeches and good intentions. 
India began independence 
British Army of India. Throu 
years this became a shadow of 
of 1962, when the Indian army 
a less naive attitude towards 
elite. 
with the lion-share of the old 
gh neglect in the intervening 
its former self. The humiliation 
broke before the Chinese, forced 
infallability upon the political 
In Pakistan the leading elite was less experience than the 
Indian in the crucial middle-ranks. The Indian political 
tradition had produced a more successful political force and 
the administrative competence of the Indian Civil Service, 
which India held onto after independence, provided it with a 
first class state apparatus (probably unmatched in the Third 
World). Pakistan got the smaller part of the army, the 
remnants of a civil service and political force based more on 
separatist xerophobia than an all round political position. 
The army in Pakistan was to play a greater role because 
of this situation. While India's army languished through 
neglect, Pakistan's moved into central government. The Indian 
army was defeated outright in 1962 but the Government learned 
the lessons of the defeat quickly. Pakistan's army was 
built-up by generous American aid and after the 1962 defeat 
of India it considered itself superior. If it had struck in 
1962 it might have been able to take advantage of its 
superiority (on paper). But it attacked in 1965 when the 
Indian Army had been receiving assistance from abroad for 
three years. 
With the Chinese attack in 1962 a number of things altered 
in this region. In the first place the defeat of the Indian 
army (which in many places did not put up a creditable 
performance but given the circumstances it is surprising that 
any units managed to make a fight of it) brought a reversal 
of priorities. The army was re-equiped on a large scale. 
This brought to a head the Pakistani issue. The arms build-up 
against the Chinese was interpretated as a threat to Pakistan. 
The resulting interaction was an arms race by both countries. 
The Indian defeat in 1962 exposed the lamentable 
deficiencies of the Indian army. "The army was short of 
60,000 rifles, 700 anti-tank guns, 200 two-inch mortars. Supply 
of artillery ammunition was critically low; 5,000 field radio 
sets were needed3 thousands of miles of field cable, 36,000 
wireless batteries. If vehicles of pre-1948 vintage were 
considered obsolete (and most were below operational require- 
ments) the army was short of 10,000 one-ton trucks and 15,000 
three-ton trucks. Two regiments of tanks were unoperational 
because they lacked spare parts". (16) 
The S. I. P. R. I. estimation of the Indian army's fitness 
for combat echoes this view: The army still possessed World 
War II mortars) artillery and howitzers and its standard 
rifle was the . 303 Enfield, a weapon which entered service 
during World War I... India possessed no radar, except the 
systems at Delhi and Calcutta airports. Harvard trainers and 
Vampire fighters were grounded through lack of spares. The 
aircraft base repair depot at Kanpur did not have sufficient 
foreign exchange for spares and was unable to perform its 
primary function of repair... The navy was in an even worse 
state. The Government did not provide funds for spares and 
repairs. The only adequate repair and docking facilities were 
at Bombay and Cochin on the west coast". (1'7) 
The re-equipment of the armed services was undertaken with 
the assistance of the U. S. A., the British, other Commonwealth 
countries, France and the Soviet Union. It was a rapid 
delivery schedule in the early days. Eight flights a day of 
twenty-two tons of equipment was flown in by the Americans 
alone. (I1) The switch from a neo-pacifist non-aligned posture 
was not direct and in defference to the previous image the 
appeals for helpt went out to all friendly nations, including 
Russia and Israel. 
The major emphasis of the arms build-up was in the field 
of transport. Short take-off aircraft and helicopters were in 
great demand for they were most suited to the rugged terrain 
on the Sino-India border. A determined effort was made to sot 
up a domestic arms industry. The multi-national sources of 
supply - balanced between East and West - and a domestic 
capability were to be the bridge between naive non-allignment 
(re-affirmed by Nehru a few weeks before the policy was 
reversed) and sophisticated non-allignment. (19) 
The Pakistan Government, sensitive to Indian military 
c apability3 was not willing to regard Indian re-armament as 
a purely isolated action to contain the Chinese. The view was 
that what India could deploy against China she could also 
deploy against Pakistan. The Americans who were helping India 
under the programme of containing world communism matched 
their aid to Pakistan's potential enemy with the delivery to 
Pakistan of 12 supersonic fighters (the F104) in 1962. The 
Russian's delivered 6 supersonic MiG-21's to India. 
The Indians set up six new infantry divisions, specially 
trained and equipped for fighting in mountainous border 
country. This did not pass unnoticed by Pakistan whose army 
faced the Indians across this type of terrain in Kashmir. 
The Indian capability to fight the Chinese in that type of 
country was transferable to Kashmir. The Indians also took 
measures to integrate Kashmir into the Indian state and in 
the circumstances this was regarded as provocative by Pakistan. 
In 1965 war broke out on this front between the two sides. 
In the 1965 war Pakistan lost 250 tanks (including 
advanced Paton tanks) and 20 combat aircraft (including some 
F104 starfighters) in the 17 days of fighting. (7.0) The peace 
forced some serious re-thinking in both countries. The 
Pakistanis had attempted a pre-emptive strike against India 
which was visibly growing stronger militarily. It was only a 
matter of time before India would have the balance of advantage. 
The incompetence of the Pakistani army in the use of their 
sophisticated American equipment was exposed by their perform- 
ance. This lack of relative competence counter-balanced the 
Indian tactical disadvantages. India was vulnerable to attack 
on two fronts (three if China joined in) and had to deploy 
considerable troops to block an armoured thrust across the 
plains to the capital as well as to engage a possible Chinese 
attack on the northern borders. 
American aid to Pakistan between 195+ and 1965 amounted 
to over ; ý1 billion, largely in the form of combat aircraft 
(120 F-86 Sabres, 26 Canberra Bombers and 12 F104 Starfighters), 
armoured fighting vehicles (460 Patton tanks, 200 Shermans) 
50 Bulldogs and 50 M-113 personnel carriers) and financial 
assistance to pay for the defence forces. (21) The Americans 
imposed an arms embargo on both sides during the 1965 war but 
they both turned to other suppliers to replace the lost 
equipment. This suggests that unilateral arms embargoes are 
not necessarily useful instruments of foreign policy. The 
Chinese sent into Pakistan 80 T-59 main battle tanks (a Chinese 
version of the Russian T-5+), 40 MiG-19's, 61L-28 bomber/ 
transports, 4 MiG-15' s and 5 Mi-6 helicopters. Even Russia 
sent Pakistan 100 T-5+ main battle tanks. The result of the 
American embargo policy was that the Pakistan and Indian 
armies were supplied with Soviet designed armour. Behind the 
arms follows influence and, of course, its converse. In 1970, 
Indian sources were claiming that Pakistan was trying to 
acquire 50 MiG-21's from Russia which suggests that the felt 
need for arms will drive countries into unpredictable 
alliances. (11) 
The Russian policy on arms exports proceeds entirely from 
its foreign policy objectives. Its relationship with India 
was the most fruitful and it gave them a greater opportunity 
to extend their influences than a similar relationship with 
Pakistan would. It had no need to rush arms to Pakistan. 
China's interest in Pakistan was clearly aimed at keeping 
India off-balance - every division tied down along a hostile 
border with Pakistan was one less on China's border. The 
Russian "exchange" in tanks with Pakistan coincided with the 
deterioration in Pakistan's relations with America. Pakistan 
became a less secure member of the American alliances against 
Russia. It moved, in effect, from alignment towards non- 
alignment. Meanwhile, Russia's exploitation of the Chinese 
attack on India3 helped to move India from non-alignment 
towards alignment with the Soviet Union. On both counts the 
Russians made progress in their diplomatic activity. They 
weakened the American ring around their country and drew a 
friendly power into closer ties through the shipment of 
weapons and expressions of sympathy. 
Set alongside the arms diplomacy a programme towards the 
Arab and the Indonesians, both of whom were to prove poor 
clients (the Arabs lost twice and the Indonesian Communists 
fluffed their chances) 2 the Indian record from 1965 to 1972 
must surely make them the most popular friendly power to 
Russia outside the communist bloc itself. (Zy) It is as if 
the 'Jewell of the British Empire has become the 'Jewell of 
the Russian foreign ministry. 
g) Africa 
The situation regarding arms supplies to black Africa has 
already been noted. The countries that make up this group 
became independent relatively later than other Third World 
countries. That this has affected the rate at which arms have 
been supplied to these countries can be seen in Table Eight. 
Table Eight 
Black Africa: Share of Increase (%) in Major Arms Imports 
by Groups of Independent Countries, 1955-64 
Percentage Share of Increase 
in Arms Imports 
Countries Achieving 1955-59 619 0_64 1965-69 
Independence 
1955-59 47 52 -138 
1960-64 - 63 217 
Source: S. I. P. R. I., op cit., adapted from Table 19.3, p. 602. 
A newly independent country faces the task of running its 
armed forces, which have recurrent costs (pay, allowances, etc. 
) 
and equipment costs. It can choose to run the army on a low 
priority budget (India) and to equip it with limited means of 
violence. But even the most restricted view of an army's role) 
such as an accessory to the civil authorities for civil order, 
would mean that some equipment would need to be purchased. 
This inevitably would mean purchasing from without the country3 
either direct from a manufacturer or indirectly on the used 
arms market. The group of countries that achieved their 
independence during 1955-59 accounted for 47 per cent of 
the increase in arms imports during that period. In the 
following period, 1960-64, they accounted for 52 per cent. 
The next group of independent countries, during 1960/64 
accounted for 63 per cent of the increase in arms imports 
and 217 per cent of it in 1965-69. (The countries that were 
already indpendent before 1955 had a falling share of the 
arms import increase in the 1960-64 period). The arrival of 
new states led to more arms imports but to regard this with 
dismay iss in effect, to regret the fact that these countries 
became independent. 
The major influence on arms procurement in Africa (and 
elsewhere) is the possibility, and actuality, of military 
conflict. Africa has had its share of military conflicts; 
Sudan (1960-71), Ethiopia (1960-69), Somalia (1960-69), 
Zaire (1960-64), Nigeria (1967-69) and Uganda (1972). There 
has also been localised activity in some of the former French 
colonies and, of course, there is the sustained guerilla 
warfare going on in Guinea, Angola and Mozambique and the 
occassional outbreaks of fighting in Rhodesia and South 
Africa. These conflicts affected arms procurement as can be 
seen in Table Nine. 
Table Nine 
Black Afric a: Relationship Between Co nflict and Arms Imports 
Annual % of Total Annual % of Total 
Recipient Average African Arms Average African arms 
prior to Imports Pre- during Imports during 
Conflict Conflict Conflict Conflict 
, %m A 
Ethiopia 2 1.8 4 11.2 
Somalia - - 2 6.0 
Zaire - - 5 16.4 
Nigeria/ 
Biafra 2 6.9 10 36.6 
Source: S. I. P. R. I., op cit., Table 19.5, p. 604. 
Black Africa's conflicts are mainly internal conflicts 
between the central Government and secessionist or insurgency 
challenges. This has not been the case in the Middle-East and 
the Indian sub-continent. Vietnam and Latin America are closer 
to African experience in this respect. 
The arms "races" have been one-sided affairs because of the 
nature of the conflicts. The central government increased their 
official arms imports from whoever would sell to them whenever 
they had to deal with emergencies. The 'rebels', on the other 
hand, had to make do with what they could get from friendly 
sources or with what they could steal from the central govern- 
ment. The expansion in arms imports was therefore kept below 
comparable arms races in other parts of the world. The 
suppliers were not competitively bidding for customers - 
either they had a relationship with the recipient Government 
or could develop one, while supplying the irregular forces 
is generally such a difficult logistical problem that the 
natural barriers to supply acted as a brake on the race 
becoming two-sided. There is however considerable evidence 
of Russian and Chinese weapon supplies to insurgency movements 
in Africa. Libya also became a source for supplies on a con- 
siderable scale. 
Ethiopia has received substantial military aid from the 
United States. Between 1953 and 1969 this aid totaled 
$11+7 million. Before 1962 this was almost the entire American 
aid programme to Africa and even after 1962 it was running at 
70 per cent of this programme. (L*) Total U. S. military aid 
from 1953 to 1963 to 13 other tropical African countries was 
only $34.8 million. ('s) Thts preference for Ethiopia is 
difficult to explain in military terms. It is true that the 
Americans operate a high frequency radio communications 
station at Kagnew in Ethiopia (leased until 1978). The base 
cost 060 - 070 million to set up and is sited on a former 
Italian radio station. It cost 013 million a year to operate 
and employed 1800 U. S. military personnel. 
(1)*) The base 
plays a role in the America world wide communications system 
but it is not regarded as a major priority in American defence. 
American military assistance may be concentrated on Ethiopia 
for the simple reason that European suppliers are still the 
major source for military hardware for most of the other 
independent countries. It is likely that the American interest 
in Ethiopia is promoted more by the Ethiopian need for arms 
than from American's strategic needs of world defence. 
Ethiopia has faced secessionist activity on two fronts 
since the 19601s. Eritrea and Somali separatists have caused 
a heavy drain on Ethiopia's military budgets. The Eritrean 
problem reflects religious differences - the separatists are 
Muslim and the central authorities Christian. The Arab 
nationalists have aided the Eritrean separatists through 
religious identification. Sudan gave the rebels the right of 
sanctuary up to the late 1960's and arms were passed through 
Arab sources to keep the rebellion going. Ethiopian - Sudan 
relations improved sufficient to make the border more secure 
and the rebels had to re-direct their arms routes to seaward 
rather than landward routes. (17) 
The irredentist claims of the Somalis on the south-eastern 
border to wide areas of Ethiopia (and also to parts of northern 
Kenya) led to a two-day war between Ethiopia and Somalia in 
February 1964. The result from a military point of view was 
inconclusive and a cease fire was arranged by the Organisation 
of African Unity. U. S. military aid had given a paper 
superiority to the Ethiopians. The Imperial Ethiopian Air 
Force (IEAF) had 14 F-86 Sabres and some squadrons of SAAB 
bombers. Against them the Somalis had some ex-World War II 
Mustangs (ex-Italian) and 6 Mig-15 trainers. The armoured 
fighting vehicle disparity was also in Ethiopia's favour. 
They had over 100 tanks and armoured personnel carriers and 
Somalia had only 35 personnel carriers and 5 obsolescent tanks. 
Neither side was prepared for a campaign and neither had the 
logistical ability to sustain fighting on any scale for any 
length of time. 
To make a serious attack requires considerable planning 
and organisation. In the absence of such an objective, or more 
correctly, in the absence of an ability to back up such an 
objective, the 'fighting' must degenerate into spoiling 
engagements rather than determined pursuance of a military 
strategy. It is reported that both sides ran out of fuel for 
their aircraft and armour and that the fighting came to an end 
on a face-saving formula. (It) But before it is concluded 
that this performance was actually a success in that the 
futility of war would become obvious to all concerned it would 
be well to see what the consequencies of this situation were 
for both sides. 
After the two-day war the Somalis increased their arms 
imports rapidly. Presumably they were determined not to be 
let down by the lack of material in the future. They planned 
to increase the army from 4,000 to 20,000 with Russian 
assistance. (Its strength in 1972 was 13,000 (L9)). Its 
airforce was to be modernised by Mig-15/17's. The progress 
of the Sovetisation of the Somali armed forces can be seen below: 
a) Aircraft 
(1960-63) 
Fighters 8 WWII Mustangs, ex-Italy 
Transports 7 ex-Italy 
Trainers 10 ex-Italy and ex-Egypt 
Helicopters 2 ex-Italy 
(1963-71) 
Fighters MiG-15/17 20 ex-Soviet 
Trainers MiG-15 22 ex-Soviet 
Transports 84 ex-Italy, 4 ex-Soviet 
b) Naval 
(1963-71) 
Patrol Boats 14 ex-Soviet 
c) Armour 
(1960-63) 
TES 5 ex-U. K. 
APCIs 35 ex-Egypt and ex-U. K. 
(1963-71) 
Tanks 82 ex-Soviet 
APC's 65 ex-Soviet 
Source: S. I. P. R. I., op cit., Country Registers, p. 859; 
IISS, The Military Balance, 1971-72, London, p. 37. 
The Somalis ended up with the fourth largest combat air- 
force in black Africa, the highest proportion of military 
expenditure to the G. N. P. and also had one of the lowest per 
capita incomes of the group of countries with substantial 
combat airforces. (See Table Ten). 
Table Ten 
Black Africa: Combat Aircraft and Economic Indicators, 1971 
Number of U. S. $ Military Expenditure 
Combat Per Capita as a Percentage of 
Aircraft Income G. N. P. 
Ethiopia 48 66 2.4 
Nigeria 32 107 1.7 
Zaire 32 80 2.7 
Somalia 20 50 6.1 
Uganda 19 93 2.0 
Zambia 12 247 1.8 
Guinea 5 83 4.5 
Source: IISS3 Military Balance, 1971-72, op cit., taken from 
country tables; Per Capita Incomes from ACDA)Renort3 
op cit.; Military expenditures percentages from ACDA, 
Ibid. 
The Ethiopians also increased their arms imports, but not 
on such a large scale as they already started off from quite an 
advantage. They imported about 30 helicopters after 1965 which 
are the mainstay of counter-insurgency type of warfare. The 
Americans provided the LEAF with a squadron of F-5 'freedom 
fighters' and Britain sent a squadron of Canberra bombers 
(surplus RAF). The imports were in direct response to the 
separatist pressure and its relations with Somalia. The 
Somali imports were directly related to its irredentist 
claims and the failure in 1961+. That the Russians supplied 
Somalia was probably inevitable given the American's supplies 
to Ethiopia. Both sides now have disproportionate military 
capabilities compared to other African countries. 
Following the 1972 Uganda-Tanzania 'war' where the 
vulnerability of Tanzania to Ugandan air attacks and the 
difficulties of making decisive land attacks against each other 
were clearly exposed it is to be expected that both sides will 
build-up their armed forces in the next five years. A 
Government must defend its people from attacks and Tanzania's 
open skies situation (it had no combat aircraft to protect its 
skies in 1972) put the Government under pressure from its own 
people. From the Ugandan point of view the bombing and 
straffing at will of undefended Tanzanian villages exerted 
enormous leverage on the Tanzanian Government. The 'invation' 
by Obote (10) supporters was contained by the Ugandan army but 
this highlights the weakness of the kind of wars that Africa 
is capable of fighting. To put together a fighting force, to 
direct its efforts at a point, to supply it with ammunition, 
fueld and leadership over distances even as small as five 
miles, is often beyond the logistical organising ability of 
most African military machines 
(regular and irregular). 
War exposes inefficiency in professional instruments of violence. 
Just as the 1962 War taught a lesson to India, and the 1964 war a 
lesson to Somalia, it is to be expected that the 1972 war has 
taught a lesson to Tanzania. In this situation the arms sales- 
men are bound to be called upon. 
The military experience of Nigeria in the Biafran war 
brought Russian arms imports into the country in a big way. The 
hostilities mobilised tens of thousands of men on both sides, 
caused high civilian casualties (by bombing, straffing, ground 
fighting and starvation) and led to a heavy demand for weapons. 
The British Government responded to the Nigerian request for 
arms on a large scale but the Nigerian needs (as seen in Lagos) 
exceeded even what the British Government willingly sent. To 
some extent the British were forced to match whatever the 
Russians were willing to deliver in order that the-Russian 
influence did not entirely replace that of the British. 
Whatever the reasons for the British arms policy the 
Nigerians responded to the emergency with massive demands. 31 
Major weapons imports were running at an annual average of 
$2.4 million before 1967 and this rose to $8.8 million during 
the war. If all arms imports are included (small arms and 
ammunition etc. ) the arms import for the years 1968-69 rose 
to , 164 million a year. The British share of this was reported 
to be 06.8 million in 1968 and 025 million in 1969. (11) The 
bulk of the balance was provided by Russia, Czeckoslovakia 
and Egypt. There was some specialisation between the British 
and the Russian suppliers to Nigeria. The Soviet bloc tended 
to supply the combat aircraft and the British and French the 
small arms and armour. (France played a dual role in the War - 
for a large part of it the French were unofficially supplying 
Biafra). The Russian group sent 63 aircraft to the Federal 
Government between 1967 and 1970. These were composed of 42 
MiG-15/17'sß 12 L-29'sß 5 IL-28's and 4 Su-7's. (W These 
were collected from Russia, Czeckoslovakia, Egypt and Algeria, 
with the latter providing pilots and ground crews. 
Biafran arms imports were comparatively modest. Many arms 
suppliers placed an embargo on arms to both sides but the open 
door policy of the British and the Russians made this a one- 
sided form of 'neutralism'. In this context an arms embargo 
can be seen to be indirectly aiding the side that can get some 
arms. The Federal authorities got all the arms they could 
handle but the Biafrans had to make do with what they could 
get by quasi-legal means. 
The Russians complimented their arms drive with economic 
aid to the Federal authorities. Soviet exports to Nigeria 
increased from 020 million to 028 million, a rise of 35 per 
cent. ( *) The Biafrans were left to their own devices. One 
report claims that the French supplied up to 10 per cent of 
the Biafran arms in 1968 and up to 50 per cent in 1969. (W1 
Once they lost the oil fields and were blocked from using the 
revenues the Biafran cause was doomed. 
The campaign highlighted the potential of counter- 
insurgency aircraft as effective weapons against ground and 
air attacks. Led by Count Gustav von Rosen, a Swedish pilot, 
Biafra put into the air 5 Swedish Malmo light planes in May 
1969. The highest number of these aircraft operation was 
16-18 and they were adapted to their new role by field engineer- 
ing and modest little six-round rocket launchers on each wing. 
These little planes were up against what ought to have boon a 
totally Federal dominated sky. The morale boosting psychological 
shock to the Federal side was only matched by the apparent 
incompetence of the Federal airforce. Lagos lost 20 planes in 
flying accidents alone to one plane in hostilities between 
1967-69. ('k) The multi-national personnel flying for 
Nigeria (Egyptians, Russians, English, Nigerians and South 
Africans), the hurried training, the poor liaison (they shot 
at their own aircraft regularly), low maintenance standards 
and the general terrain, contributed to the ineffectiveness 
of the Federal airforce. But in spite of this the sheer 
weight of the Federal side and the isolation of the Biafrans 
led inevitably to a victory for Lagos. Without the arms 
imports the war may have dragged on even longer. In this 
sense the arms imports shortened the war. 
conclusion 
Arms imports are available from the major supplier 
countries for a number of reasons. They can be commercially 
advantageous to the supplier either because the dispose of 
surplus requirements, thus reducing the cost of replacement, 
or because they permit economies of scale in production. 
Arms sales are also politically advantageous and can be used 
as part of a foreign policy. Major weapons sales to a Third 
World country create openings for influence. The training 
programmes to enable a Third World army to operate the 
equipment, at home or in the supplier country, are bound to 
have influence, even if unintentional, on the service 
personnel. The provision of spares and replacements enhances 
the relationship. The selection of weapons itself can assist 
a foreign policy objective in that some weapon systems fit 
into certain strategic concept but not into others. For 
example, the provision of COIN equipment rather than super- 
sonic fighters is probably more relevant in some countries 
(e. g. Latin America, Africa) than others (Middle-East, India) 
but this may conflict with commercial interests. 
Increased imports are likely following independence and 
also following a war emergency, especially if the inefficiency 
of the armed services is exposed in the engagements. There is 
little evidence that arms imports promote military situations: 
the relationship appears to be the other way round. 
CHAPTER FIFTEEN 
ARMS PRODUCTION: THE ISSUES 
a) Introduction 
The domestic production of military hardware in the Third 
World can be looked at from two angles. From one view the use 
of resources of capital, management, technical skills, labour 
and raw materials, the foreign exchange costs of imports and 
licenses to manufacture certain items and the high risk 
investments necessary to develop sophisticated weapons, can be 
regarded as a diversion of critically scarce inputs available 
to the economy. From this point of view the whole exercise is 
wasteful, and, given the urgent human problems of the developing 
world, probably criminally wasteful as well. Even if it is 
conceded that defence itself is necessary to some extent, the 
establishment of a domestic defence industry is seen as a 
broadening out of wasteful expenditure beyond the already 
committed resources of manpower and foreign exchange which are 
the two major items in Third World defence budgets. (1) 
The other viewpoint would regard the establishment of a 
domestic defence industry as part of the programme of industri- 
alisation. Without the industrialisation programme the country 
cannot become independent politically. A defence industry helps 
achieve the former - it develops administrative skills in modern 
management - and guarantees the latter. The great costs in 
terms of resources used up in a domestic defence programme 
compared to the costs of purchasing the weapons from abroad 
is no different from the problem faced in developing any other 
manufacturing capacity. If the least cost approach is sacrosanct 
i. e. only produce domestically if the import cost is greater than 
the domestic production cost there can be no arguments about the 
inevitable status of a peripheral region as an importer of 
manufactured goods. 
The major arms suppliers as we have seen use their arms 
sales for political ends. The fact that overseas arms sales 
have a sound economic justification is often of secondary 
importance to the political weight that those sales give the 
producer in foreign policy. Arms sales can be wrapped around 
a political purpose, either to bind a country to a particular 
line of policy or to counter-balance the influence of a rival 
major power. The United States, Britain, France and Russia 
have a long record of tempering commercial interests with 
their political objectives. After twenty or more years of 
this policy operating in the Third World it is not surprising 
that some countries regard the power which the arms sellers 
have unashamedly exercised with something less than equanimity. 
The new independent countries are sensitive to what they 
regard as continuing dependence on the metropolitan powers. 
The arms trade is an acutely sensitive area in this respect. 
The counter policy of an arms industry under their own control 
is extremely attractive. Of course, the wish is not sufficient 
to create a domestic arms capability any more than more wishing 
will create any other kind of domestic manufacturing capability. 
But once the political will is present, especially if it is 
brought to life by some local tension of an inconvenient 
embargo, the country may attempt to bring together the necessary 
resources. The (few) successes (and many failures) of the 
experiments in this type of policy are not being considered 
here, we are only concerned with the long-term potential 
consequences. 
The original objective for domestic arms production may 
have been political independence from foreign suppliers, it 
may have been to save foreign exchange costs, or to simply 
increase the war potential of the country, but it is not 
necessary for the economic managers to be aiming at industrial- 
isation, nor for them to have any recognisable objectives. 
A domestic arms capability requires pre-requisite condi- 
tions and implies probable consequences. Movement from one form 
of dependence to another may result instead; from dependence 
upon foreign suppliers of weapon systems to dependence upon 
foreign suppliers for parts. This may also be accompanied by 
increased foreign exchange costs rather than lower ones - parts 
may cost more than systems. The war potential and efficiency 
of the armed forces may be reduced through lower quality or 
through insufficient quantity. But in this and the next 
Chapter we are not looking at the efficiency by which a country 
achieves the objectives of the ruling elite. Instead we will 
look at the consequences of a policy of import substitution 
(for whatever objective), in the specific case of the defence 
industry, on the potential development of the countries 
concerned. But first we must look at some general matters. 
b) Some Problems of Development 
Let us look at some of the more obvious problems facing 
a Third World country that is anxious to import substitute in 
manufactured goods. The industrialised economies are complex 
and sophisticated structures that have been build-up over many 
decades. The markets for their products are extensive within 
these countries, and they are produced by workforces that are 
literate, skilled, trained and socialised within that type of 
production system. Few of these circumstances exist in Third 
World (which is why it is developing). The industrial 
structure that exists is a minority activity that is often 
isolated from the rest of the economy. It is often dependent 
on the peripheral needs of an extractive type of activity 
which exist in enclaves (not always foreign owned) within the 
subsistence (majority) economy. 
The market for manufactured articles is limited by the low 
per capita income (and the even lower actual incomes of the bulk 
of the populations) and in the case of capital goods the market 
is even more limited. Much of the economic activity of the 
country is in subsistence agriculture, with low yields and 
backward technology. The land system varies from landlordism, 
with its debtor blight on peasant iniative, to small-holding 
farming and its reactionary attachment to traditional methods. 
Over-population (and its accompanying under-employment) on the 
land is a burden which the agricultural surplus, such as it iss 
has to carry before any remainder is passed to the city or 
overseas as a cash crop. Rising agricultural yields are 
essential if living standards are also to rise and without 
an increase in dietary intake there can be no increase in 
physical effort to conduct a modern agricultural work 
programme. (1-) Abject poverty produces physical incapacity 
for work and this incapacity is a barrier to change. The 
manufacturing base is extremely narrow and often tends to be 
dominated by a few monopolistic families who naturally eschew 
the development of the broad entrepreneural base which is 
necessary to administer a development programme. Political 
solutions to this problem may do little to help and much to 
hinder. (5) 
Contrary to a popular impression the Third World is not 
universally over-crowded. Most of the black African countries 
have population totals of under 10 million. The G. N. P. that 
these countries have at their disposal is far below that which 
is necessay to finance industrialisation. This reduces the 
potential market even further. 
The population of black African states is shown in Table 
One. While population statistics should be used cautiously 
they nevertheless show that the population base of many of 
these countries is extremely narrow. There are 16 countries 
with under 3 million in the population and, even allowing for 
inaccuracy in the data given the low per capita income this 
does not leave much scope for developing a market. Thirty- 
four of the countries have populations under 10 million and 
only Nigeria stands out-with 51+ million. 
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Table One 
Black-Africa : -Population of 
th e Independent Stat es (1969) 
Country Population Country Population 
(Millions) (Millions) 
Angola 5.36* Malawi 4.4 
Burundi 3.48 Mali 4.8 
Botswana 0.6 Mauritania 1.14 
Cameroon 5.74 Mauritous 0.8 
C. A. R. 1.52 Mozambique 7.27* 
Chad 3.62 Niger 3.9 
Zaire 17.03 Nigeria 53.7 
Congo (B) 0.92 Guinea (P) 0.55 
Dahomey 2.62 Reunion 0.11+ 
Ethiopia 24,77 Ruwandi 3.48 
Gabon 0.48* Senegal 3.78 
Gambia 8.74 Sierra Leone 2.51 
Ghana 8.74 Somalia 2.73 
Guinea 3.83 Sudan 15.31 
Eq Guinea 0.29 Swaziland 0.4 
Ivory Coast 4.21 Togo 1.82 
Kenya 10.51 Uganda 8.36 
Lesotho 0.89 Tanzania 12.93 
Liberia 1.15 Upper Volta 5.28 
Malagasey 6.6 Zambia 4.3 
Source: United Nations, Demographic Year Book, 1970, Tablo 4. 
(*) figures for 1968. 
The available labour force is pityfully small. This must 
not be confused with the numbers living in the urban centres. 
Men must be both available and able to work, even supposing 
jobs were open to them. The urban masses of the Third World 
are often illiterate and untrained and would require substan- 
tial investment to prepare them for adaptation from peasant 
working relationships, or prolonged when idleness, to modern 
factory and manufacturing relationships. 
Illiteracy rates in some Third World countries is shown 
in Table Two. These rates of illiteracy per hundred persons 
are often crude estimates (the decimal points ought not to 
be taken too seriously) but like population statistics they 
show the general pattern. At illiteracy rates over 50 per 
cent the decimal point is not important anyway - the situa- 
tion is desperate enough. A poor illiterate population is a 
crushing burden for a developing country. 
Table Two 
Illiteracy Rates Per 100 
-Persons, over 
15 Years 01d Estimat©s 
and Census Da ta3 Various Years 1965-70 
Country Percenta ge Country Percent o 
Mali 97.8 Cambodia 59.0 
C. A. R. 97.9 Honduras 55.0 
Sudan 95.6 Turkey 54.0 
Dahomey 95. x+ Zambia 53.5 
Chad 94.4 El Salvador 51.0 
Cameroon 94 Nicaragua 50.2 
Morocco 88.8 Singapore 50.2 
Nigeria 88.5 Burma 42.3 
Iraq 85.6 Brazil 38.9 
Zaire 84.6 Mauritious 38.4 
Congo 83.6 Peru 38.9 
Algeria 81.2 Reunion 37.4 
Pakistan 81.2 Venezuela 36.7 
Libya 78.3 Vietnam 35.5 
Iran 77.2 Ecuador 32.7 
Malawi 77.9 Thailand 32.3 
Malaysia 76.5 Korea 29.8 
Uganda 74.9 Philippines 28.1 
Egypt 73.7 Taiwan 27.6 
India 72.2 Colombia 27.1 
Guatemala 70.6 Paraguay 25.5 
Syria 69.2 Sri Lanka 24.? 
Tunisia 67.8 Mexico 23.8 
Jordan 67.6 Chile 16.4 
Malagasey 66.5 Uruguay 9.4 
Indonesia 61.0 Argentina 8.6 
Bolivia 60.0 
Source: United Nations, Demographic Year Book, 1970. 
The result of poverty and illiteracy is paucity in the 
market and a miniscule administrative elite. It produces 
external dependence, and, in some cases, a violent political 
structure with a savagery of its own - for example, Papa Doe's 
Haiti, or the tribal bestiality of Ruwandi and Burindil and, 
latterly, Amin's Uganda. (5) But a large population and high 
illiteracy can be accompanied by problems no less serious. 
The food crisis diverts scarce administrative talaent to face 
the constant pressures of ignorance and hunger: a situation 
summed up as running fast to slow down the slide backwards. 
The magnitude of the difficulties involved in industrial- 
ising a country are a measure of its backwardness. No social 
and economic system so far devised has been able to overcome 
these problems by reliance on a purely primary economy, whether 
agriculturally based or confined to the extraction of raw 
materials. These types of economies must, sooner or later, 
face up to the need for a domestic manufacturing capacity. The 
ideal of the world economically segmented according to the 
principle of comparative advantage - in which each country 
specialises in those products for which it has a relative 
advantage over other possible suppliers, exchanging its surplus 
for the specialised outputs of other countries - is not suitable, 
nor probably even attainable. The theory of comparative 
advantage, ignores the costs of specialisation. Raol Probisch 
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has shown how the specialist structures are a cruel deception 
to a developing country and how attempts to organise world 
production on the basis of comparative advantage enhances the 
peripheral dependence of the Third World on the industrialised 
economies. (1) 
One of the obstacles to industrialisation is the relatively 
inelastic supply of manufacturing capacity to meet demand. To 
overcome this the economic managers must induce (or introduce) 
domestic manufacturing capacity. This sector will have to 
increase in size, proportionately and absolutely, throughout 
the development period. (This is recognised implicity in the 
arguments for 'infant industry' protection). 
Even the most vigorous land reform programmes will disperse 
insufficient numbers of urban unemployed to make much difference 
to the cities back to the land. Modernisation of agriculture 
through the use of fertilisers, new strains of seed, mechanisa- 
tion and irrigation technology not only raises yields but also 
reduces manpower. The net effect may be a continuation of 
urbanisation. In these conditions to raise income per head it 
is necessary to broaden the base of the modern manufacturing 
sector. BQththe output per head of food production and the 
income per head from activity have to grow faster than the 
natural rate of population growth if the economic market is 
to expand to justify domestic manufacturing capacity. It is 
not so much a necessary circle as an imperative spiral. 
Developing countries are constrained by these problems. 
There are other problems. Import substitution reaches natural 
limits for every stage of technical ability. The simpler and 
more basic products can be substituted relatively quickly. 
For example, in Thailand, domestic manufacturing of cement 
represents a major proportion of the manufacturing capacity 
of the country. But the barriers of technological complexity 
are reached rapidly. One way round this problem is to use 
tariff protection on a cascade basis, as in Mexico. A programme 
of tariff levels for different stages of manufacture is 
introduced and the level is raised through time to induce 
domestic manufacturing processes to take over the process of 
assembly until the whole product is produced locally. The 
local price of the product will be higher in the initial stages 
than the import price to consumers but the employment results 
may be considered to counter-balance this effect. (8) 
Regional common markets have also been tried - East Africa, 
South-East Asia, Central and South America - but these have 
often been plagued with political problems, largely over the 
issue of the imbalance between the gains and losses anticipated 
by members. The ideal solution is for a group of developing 
countries to form a common market to combine their markets for 
manufactured goods and to assign production roles to each other 
for specific products. The division of the production rights 
has to be by political bargaining and this is where some of 
the agreements have foundered. 
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The proposition is quite simple though: where a single 
country does not have a viable market potential to justify 
import substitution, several countries together may roach 
the critical level. Tariff free entry to each other's 
markets may make competition with non-member imports a 
possibility. Each member should gain something from the 
employment creating aspects of the agreement. The reality, 
however, is that the industrialisation process has uneven 
effects - different industries do not have the same input mix, 
technological level, investment requirement and so on. The 
strains of the transition period during the re-direction of 
trade flows invite conflict. These problems are not unknown 
to the industrialised powers in the E. E. C. 
c) Features of Military Development 
Military production introduces new dimensions to the 
solution of the industrialisation problem, at least for those 
countries that have reached some level of domestic manufac- 
turing capacity and have had some experience of import 
substitution. Firstly, in the nature of the product. The 
Government exercises a monopoly of violence and therefore the 
instruments of violence have a ready and assured monopsonistic 
market. The low-per capita product is no longer a constraint 
because the market for arms is dependent on the budget not 
the individual. That governments have large markets for 
weapons can be seen in the`size of some of the military 
establishments of the Third World. (See Table Three). 
Table Three 
Size of t he Armed Forces in Some Developing Coun tries, 1970 
Numbers in 1000's 
Country Army Navy Airforce Para-Military 
India 860 40 80 100 
Korea 593 16 24 1 million 
Vietnam 429 31 40 555 
Taiwan x+25 35 80 
Turkey 1+20 38 50 75 
Pakistan 365 10 17 280 
Egypt 275 14 25 120 
Israel* 275 8 17 10 
Indonesia 250 34 35 100 
Nigeria 240 5 7 
Iran 150 9 22 40 
Thailand 130 21 23 18 
Burma 130 7 6 25 
Syria 100 1 10 6 
Source: I. I. S. S., The Military Balance, 1971-721 London, 
1971, Part One. 
(*) When fully mobilised. 
The military procurement sector of the Governments of 
these countries must have a substantial domestic impact. 
Large numbers of men have to fed and clothed, sheltered, 
trained and supervised. The administrative systems required 
just to control their location and their movement will require 
all kinds of inputs from the economy. The arming and supplying 
of these troops with even simple weapons, and maintaining and 
repairing them, should provide a substantial market for a 
domestic industry, even if confined to small arms and ammunition. 
Secondly, because military security is a prime objective 
of a government the production of weapons for the national 
forces is automatically protected from competition. The new 
industry does not face competition of the kind which a local 
durable consumer goods factory would have to face. The armed 
services, for all kinds of obvious reasons, are limited in the 
range of weapon systems that they can absorb and remain 
effective with. Thus long production runs are assured once 
the government decides to purchase locally. If the weapons 
are produced under licence the country can also combine the 
benefits of modern design and performance standards and the 
advantages of establishing domestic manufacturing activities. 
Thirdly, because the decision to set up, or support, a 
domestic defence industry is partly a political one it is not 
subject to normal competitive commercial criteria. The object 
is some kind of self sufficiency and therefore mistakes and 
failures are likely to be set against the hoped for future 
r 
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political benefits of independence. Where a commercial project 
in difficulties would be terminated it may be that the arms 
project will be 'adjusted' by the political leadership when it 
runs into trouble. This is also where the main weakness of 
political control can do the most damage. The politicians may 
be chasing something unattainable in the time scale, and on 
the budgets, available. Instead of concentrating on 
technologically feasible projects the government may insist on 
prestigious projects which succeed only in diverting resources 
into wasteful projects. The contrast between Israel and Egypt 
in this respect highlights the two extremes of capability. 
Fourthly, the arms industry both diverts labour, 
especially skilled and technically competent labour, and also 
produces a demand for this type of labour which makes large 
scale training programmes fe asible. 
9 Labour divtttion has to 
be set against labour creation. This is probably the most 
important dimension in domestic arms production: it is not 
present with a policy of arms imports or a policy of reliance 
on commercially induced domestic manufacturing - the former 
uses the labour of foreign countries and the latter is subject 
to all the difficulties already mentioned. Because the 
government gives priority to arms production it also has to 
face up to the real shortages in human resources. To meet its 
military ambitions it has to tackle some of the social barriers 
to development. 
d) The Arms Producers 
Twenty-two countries in the Third World are known to be 
producing small arms, i. e. hand-guns, rifles, automatics, 
mortars and light artillery. This is about a third of the 
countries that import these weapons. Eighteen countries have 
produced naval craft of one sort or another and ton countries 
have produced aircraft either under licence or from their own 
designs. (Five of these countries have worked on missile 
projects). Four countries have also produced armoured vehicles 
or have substantially modified vehicles imported or captured. 
r 
Table Four 
Domestic Arms Pr oduction in the-Third-World, 1 969 
Country Arms Naval Craft Aircraft 
Argentina * * 
Brazil * * * 
Chile") * * * 
India * * 
Indonesia * * * 
Israel * * 
Turkey * * * 
Egypt(4) 
Burma * 
2) Cubaý * * 
Dominican Republic * 
Korea (north)(3) * 
Korea (south) * * 
Mexico * * 
Peru * * 
Thailand 
Sri Lanka(s) 
Pakistan 
Taiwan 
Colombia * 
El Salvador 
Iran 
Nigeria 
Sources: S. I. P. R. I., op cit., p. 725; Frank, op cit. 
(1) Frank, Ibid, p. 138: "Chile has no indigenous arms 
production" but S. I. P. R. I., op cit, lists it for 
all three categories. 
(2) Frank op cit., lists Cuba as shown but not confirmod 
by S. I. P. R. I. 
(3) Frank, op cit., p. 143: Korea (north) "may have 
constructed some submarine chasers recently". 
(4) Frank, op cit., p. 136: "There is one major 
shipyard at Port Said (Castro) which reputedly 
built a Soviet-type "Komar" patrol boat in 
1963". S. I. P. R. I. does not list Egypt for 
naval construction. 
(5) Not listed in S. I. P. R. I., see Frank, op cit., 
P"138. 
In Table Four, the known domestic arms producers in the 
Third World are listed and the discrepancies between the sources 
are noted. 
The levels of skills required for the production of small 
arms, naval vessels and aircraft will vary considerably. Small 
arms production requires machine shop skills such as found in 
machinists, tool-makers, fitters, drillers, borers, lathe- 
operators, forgers, reamers, press-workers, heat-treatment 
specialists and so on. The workers would need to work to fine 
tolerances and, for operational effectiveness, the parts would 
need to be inter-changable. Naval 
hull production is a 
relatively easier type of work covering the metal fabrication 
trades. The power sources, however, unless imported, will 
require highly skilled workers of an even more technically 
advanced type than those necessary for producing small arms. 
In the case of aircraft production the requirements are much 
higher than for both the other sectors. The metal fabrication 
is more critical and the instrumentation and power source much 
more advanced. 
It is also a fact that those products (such as light 
naval craft) which are within the competence of many Third 
World countries to produce are also products which the 
industrialised economies can offer at very competitive 
prices. ((0) 
e) The Manufacturing Base 
As manufacturing capacity in Third World countries is a 
small proportion of their total economic activity it is 
impossible, on the information available, to make judgements 
on the size and growth of the arms sector. For example, ton 
African countries had under five per cent of their Gross 
Domestic Product produced in the manufacturing sector and only 
four could show a share above 14 per cent. (II) The share of 
manufacturing in the formation of G. D. P. ranged from 1 per cent 
(Mali, Togo and Upper Volta) to 17 per cent (Egypt). The range 
for Asian countries was from 6 per cent to 28 per cent and for 
Latin American it went from 12 per cent to 34 per cent. (Ita 
The manufacturing base in Africa was smaller than either Asia's 
or Latin America's. A relatively large manufacturing base was 
approximated by only two countries (Nigeria and Egypt) in 
Africa, and both had a domestic defence industry, but by nine 
countries in Latin American and twelve countries in Asia. (D 
Does this suggest some relationship between arms production 
and manufacturing share of G. D. P.? Intuitively this would seem 
to be the case. To produce weapons requires manufacturing skills 
and this presupposes some experience, or minimum threshold of 
capacity, even for the most simple weapons. 
The United Nation's classification of manufacturing industry 
in 1969 covered thirty-three sub-categories. The groat bulk of 
them have no obvious connection with the production of small 
arms, naval craft or aircraft. The sub-categories do not list 
ar aments in an identifiable way and therefore to got some idea 
of the relationship between arms production and manufacturing 
an indirect, and necessarily approximate, method had to be used, 
Armaments 3 naval craft and aircraft are all heavily 
dependent on the metal trades. They have a high dependence on 
metal processing, metal fabrication and metal machining. 
Therefore we can assume that where armaments production is 
undertaken there will be some call upon the metal manufacturing 
and engineering sectors of the manufacturing sector. There are 
seven sub-categories of the United Nations manufacturing 
classification which are possible contributions to the defence 
programme. These are: 
1. iron and steel 
2. non-ferrous metals 
3. metal products, not machinery 
4. machinery, not electrical 
5. electrical machinery 
6. 
., shipbuilding and repa.; xing 
7. motor vehicles. (h1 
If we call this metal and engineering group the potential 
defence capacity (PDC) of the country we can take it as a 
percentage of the country's total manufacturing capacity and 
see if it is relatively important in that country's output. 
Then the countries that were known to have a domestic defence 
industry can be compared with those that did not. As we are 
assuming that defence production is heavily biased towards 
this group of metal and engineering trades we can soo if the 
defence production is associated with any obvious differences 
between the defence producers and the defence importers. The 
method is crude and therefore insensitive but it is a guidon 
and, while not conclusive, may point to the general trends in 
each group. 
The share of the PDC in the total manufacturing capacity 
of a country can be measured in several ways. The United Nations 
data for 1969 gives several measures such as the wage bill for 
each sub-category, the contribution to fixed capital formation, 
the proportion of the value added, the numbers employed and the 
value of the output produced. The last two were chosen for this 
exercise because they indicate two important aspects of economic 
activity which are likely to be more meaningful than the others 
given the general poor quality of the data available from the 
Third World. Summing the numbers employed is a reasonably 
unambiguous task. Estimating the wage bill for different grades 
of labour, or the fixed capital formation and value added for 
different definitions of capital, would present statistical 
and conceptual problems even for an industrialised economy. 
In conditions where the deta is unreliable it makes the already 
crude procedure of this exercise even less meaningful. As 
employment and output are the least difficult figures to 
estimate they are used here. 
Information was available for thirty developing countries 
and seventeen of them are known to be arms producers. The data 
was taken for the years 1965 to 1968 inclusive for each category 
in the metal and machinery trades. The totals for each year were 
then taken as a percentage of the total manufacturing capacity 
and the arithmetic mean calculated. This shows the percentage 
of total manufacturing capacity that is credited to the PDC for 
each country. Table Five shows the results for the known defence 
producers and the arms importers. 
The lack of data for arms imports limits the value of the 
striking visual difference between the two columns, for there 
is a clear tendency for arms producers to have a larger propor- 
tion of their manufacturing capacity in the metal and machinery, 
or PDC, group than for the arms importers, expressed in terms of 
percentage employment and percentage output. Metal working 
activity is an essential part of the industrialisation process 
and countries with a small share of their manufacturing sector 
in the metal trades are not likely to be able to diversify into 
arms production. But small countries, like Dominican Republic, 
Cuba, El Salvador, who have had a specialist interest in small 
arms, and have been able to pursue these interests for some 
years without significant metal manufacturing activity. 
The next thing to look at is whether the arms producers 
have tended to hold back their metal manufacturing capacity by 
the diversion into arms production, and what effect, if any the 
PDC may have had on the growth of the metal and machinery sectors. 
Table Five 
Percentage Relationship Between Potential Defence Capacity and Total 
Manufacturing Capacity, 30 Countries, Annual Averages 1965-1968 
Country 
Chile 
India 
Israel 
Brazil 
Taiwan 
Turkey 
Korea 
Colombia 
Egypt 
Pakistan 
Iran 
Nigeria 
Sri Lanka 
El Salvador 
Dominican 
Republic 
Peru 
Arms Producers 
PDC % of PDC % of 
total total 
Manufacturing Manufacturing Country 
Employment Output 
24.1 28 Tnrdan 
23.9 
23.7 22.1 
23.3 28 
23 18.4 
20 22 
16 14.9 
15.9 12.1 
13.7 11.7 
13.4 11.4 
12.7 10.6 
11.7 24.4 
9 9.6 
4.4 6.2 
2.2 2.2 
1.7 18.6 
Philippines 
Algeria 
Malaysia 
Tunisia 
Libya 
Iraq 
Honduras 
Malawi 
Ethiopia 
Arms Importers 
PDC % of PDC % of 
total total 
Manufacturing Manufacturing 
Employment Output 
15.5 
14.6 
14.5 
13.9 
7.3 
7.3 
6.6 
4.2 
2.9 
1.8 
Source: Calculated from United Nations, Growth of World Industry 
Volume II, 1969m 1971. 
8,2 
9.4 
4.2 
2.2 
4.4 
(--) indicates no data available. 
In Table Six the growth performance of the manufacturing 
and PDC sectors for fifteen countries is shown for countries 
where information was available. Thirteen of those countries 
had defence industries and only two were from the group of 
arms importers. It is clearly insufficient information to 
make even a crude comparison. Of the arms producers nine of 
them have a PDC sector growing faster than their manufacturing 
sector. Arms production is not apparently inhibiting the 
expansion of the metal and machinery categories. Israel, 
El Salvador, Colombia, and Peru show the reverse relationship. 
Taking Israel on its own, as it can be argued that the other 
three countries are special cases of minor arms producers, 
the relationship is interesting because Israel has been the 
most successful of all countries in the Third World in arms 
production. This creates some ambiguity in the picture; 
defence industries do not seem to slow down growth by 
diverting resources but Israel's case weakens the implications 
of this conclusion. Though it will be noted that the 
differences in Israel's case are marginal - 11.3 per cent for 
manufacturing and 10.6 per cent for the PDC sector. 
Table Six 
Annual Average Rates of Growth of Manufacturing Output and 
PDC, 15 Countries, 1960-68 
Country Total Manufacturing Pot ential Defenc© Sector Ca pacity Sector 
Sri Lanka 5.2 21.9(1) 
Taiwan 16.6 21.7 
Turkey* 13.6 21.2(2) 
Korea 18.2 19.4(3) 
Egypt 11.7 18.1 
Iran 11.7 12.24' 
India 5.8 11.5(3) 
Israel 11.3 10.6(3) 
Dominican Rep. 1.5 9,4(5) 
El Salvador 11.5 8.2(1) 
Peru 8.2 8.1 
Chile 4.9 6.9(3) 
Colombia 6.0 5.2 
Ecuador** 11.4 20.5(6) 
Honduras*** 11.9 17.9(7) 
Source: United Nations, Growth of World Industry, op cit. 
(*) 1960-66 
(**) for ship building and repair 1961+-68 
('p**) 1960-66. 
(1) Iron and Steel, Non-Ferrous Metals and metal products 
only 
(2) Iron and Steel and Non-Ferrous Metals 
(3) Excludes shipbuilding and motor vehicles 
(4) Excludes Iron and Steel and Non-Ferrous Metals 
(5) Excludes metal products and machinery groups 
(6) Excludes Iron and Steel, Non-Ferrous Metals and 
machinery 
(7) Excludes machinery. 
i 
Conclusion 
Domestic military production is not necessarily a diversion 
from the industrialisation programme of a Third World country. 
There is no evidence that it wastes resources or holds back 
growth of the manufacturing sector. From an economic point of 
view it has a number of attractive features because it tackles 
some of the structural obstacles to development. The market 
in monopsonistic and the technology transferable. The potential 
defence sector is integral with the metal and engineering 
sectors and there appears to be some positive association 
between the expansion of both sectors. 
CHAPTER SIXTEEN 
ARMS PRODUCTION: THE PRODUCTS 
a) Introduction 
In this Chapter the products of the arms producers in the 
developing world will be look at more closely. In examining 
some of the products we will be able to bring out some of the 
policy issues involved and some of the consequences for the 
industrial structure of taking on aircraft, armour and naval 
construction. 
By using a estimate of the normal maintenance requirements 
for the weapons that are used in the Third World we can estimate 
the labour inputs needed to keep these weapon systems opera- 
tional. As these modern military products require considerable 
maintenance and repair facilities it seems intuitively sensible 
to look for a connection between the estimated size of the 
maintenance and repair workforce that a country might need and 
its ambitions as a defence producer. 
The skills and technical know-how that a country 
accumulates from the maintenance of super-sonic aircraft, 
modern fast surface boats and destroyers and from large forma- 
tions of heavy armour are a necessary first stage in creating 
the minimum ability to produce some of the weapons domestically. 
The evidence seems to confirm this commonsense view of the 
connection between current military maintenance capability and 
the establishment of domestic arms production. 
b) Small Arms 
About a third of the Third World countries produce somo 
of their own small arms and ordnance. Of these India, Israel, 
Egypt, Pakistan and North Korea claim to be self sufficient. 
From the technical point of view small arms and their 
ammunition are the simplest weapons to produce. The basic work 
involves light machining (lathe, drill, bore, ream, grand and 
press machines) and metal forming. A country that has a metal 
manufacturing sector has the basic resources to go into small 
arms production. Countries such as Dominican Republic, 
Argentine, Turkey, India and El Salvador have considerable 
experience in the production of small arms; in Turkey's case 
since 1890. 
The large armies and para-military forces of the Third 
World constitute a large and constant demand for small arms and 
ordnance and each country has to meet this demand out of the 
budget and has to import unless they are produced locally. The 
full-time work of gunsmiths in keeping these stocks operational 
is a first-step towards the setting up of workshops to manufacture 
parts and assemble them. For some countries this may not be an 
attractive alternative wherever they have open access to 
supplies from the major manufacturing nations and relatively 
peaceful situations. But other countries such as India, Pakistan, 
Israel and Egypt, which have considerable access to the major 
arms suppliers but have also been engaged in military action, 
have taken the political decsion to achieve self-sufficiency 
in small arms production. 
Some of the weapons are produced under licence from 
foreign manufacturers, but some are indigenously designed such 
as the Israeli Uzi sub-machine gun and the Argentinian sub- 
machine gun series. (') The Egyptians produced a Swedish 
designed and modified rifle (renamed the Hakim 7.92mm. ) and 
after this experience they went on to produce their own rifle, 
the 'Rashid', and a sub-machine gun, the 'Port Said'. Dominican 
Republic produces the Cristobal . 30 carbin in a plant established 
by the Italian Beretta company. India's small arms experience 
was gained under the British and the Ishapore factory produces 
a local rifle as well as the Belgian FN Nato 'assault' rifle. 
During the Second World War over 690,000 Enfields and thousands 
of Vickers machine guns were manufactured in India. In Indonesia 
the work of re-boring thousands of captured weapons started the 
national small arms industry and in Iran the experience gained 
from manufacturing Czeckoslovakian small arms in the 1930's and 
the licensed manufacture of Russian sub-machine guns during the 
Second War, (similar arrangements still continue) established 
the small arms industry which continues its activities today. 
Mexico's arms industry produces the Obregon . 
45 hand gun and 
the Mendoxa 7mm. machine gun. Turkey produces a German designed 
hand gun (the 'Walther PP'). (7. ) 
It is likely that this trend will continue. A country 
that uses its monopsonistic buying status to develop a local 
arms capability can realise wider ambitions by exports to 
other Third World countries. The Egyptian leaders in 1972, 
for example, were strongly in favour of all the Arab countries 
pooling their resources to establish an Arab defence industry 
capable of producing enough arms to outpace Israel's arms out- 
put by 1977. The motivation was clearly political rather than 
economic as the Egyptians were in favour of arms production 
"even if the cost of production is double the price of imported 
arms". 0) Israel, however, is considerably further advanced 
in domestic arms production and already exports some of its 
models, earning the ultimate accolade for design and performance 
in that some of its weapons are manufactured under licence in 
Europe. (k) 
c) Armour 
The conventional armies of the Third World have strong 
armoured elements. Many of the para-military formation also 
are heavily armed with tanks, armoured personnel carriers, 
helicopters and even ground attack aircraft. In many cases 
the kind of weapons that the army of the para-military forces 
have at their disposal depends upon the roles that the 
government assigns to them. Internal security is a more 
pressing problem in most countries than external threats and 
armour is a key element in controlling cities. It tends to 
make or break an attempted military coup. 
Some of the countries with large armoured forces have been 
engaged in conventional tank battles. Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Syria, India and Pakistan have made substnatial use of their 
armour in their wars especially India and Israel who have done 
this to devasting effect. Somalia is extremely well endowed 
with armour compared to its neighbours. Its 13,000 strong army 
has four tank-battalions and nine mechanised infantry battalions, 
which have 150 medium tanks and over 200 armoured personnel 
carriers between them. ($) Most of this armour is of Russian 
origin and arrived after the border war with Ethiopia in 1964. 
Heavy armour deteriorates quickly. Operating the vehicles 
has a punishing effect on the mechanical efficiency of the 
moving parts. If they are also being shot at or mined this 
makes the problem much worse. Even under the ideal conditions 
of peace-time training, using skilled operators, the costs of 
maintenance are extremely high. The ideal conditions seldom 
exists in the Third World. The terrain is difficult, the 
climate unsuitable, the operators inexperienced and the main- 
tenance function almost non-existent, at least at near normal 
standards of efficiency. This situation gives the country with 
well trained, and disciplined troops using properly maintained 
armour striking advantages over potential opponents. To a 
large measure this explains the failures of the Arabs and the 
Pakistanis in their military confrontations - it is not a 
question of valour but of preparation; the Israelis and the 
Indians simply worked harder at being operationally efficient. 
S. I. P. R. I. has compiled estimates of the maintenance costs 
and manpower requirements for armour, aircraft and naval craft 
to keep them operational to Swedish standards. Now there are 
few countries in the Third World that are able to match Swedish 
standards but we can nevertheless use these figures to estimate 
what these countries would require if they were to maintain and 
operate their military equipment at these standards. By using 
these model standards we can set them against the registered 
military hardware that the country has credited to it in the 
various international publications and see what this would mean 
in terms of man-hours of skilled work to keep these pieces 
operational. We can convert the estimated maintenance hours 
into man-year equivalents for ease of manipulation. Man-year 
equivalents are not a real world requirement - this would 
assume that every hour in a working year was used on mainten- 
ance by an extremely dedicated workforce - but it makes 
comparisons between countries easier. 
The Third World puts its vehicles through quasi-combat 
conditions. In Combat the maintenance function is disrupted 
by organisational breakdowns, enemy actions and fatique. The 
climatic conditions of the Third World - heat, humidity and 
dust - intensify the wear and tear on the vehicles. The 
absence of proper roads means that the vehicles are being driven 
over rough country for most of their working life and the lack 
of systematic maintenance, necessary in warfare conditions, is 
a permanent condition of peace. 
An efficient armoured unit requires 150 trained mechanics 
for every 100 tanks, another 50 mechanics for every 100 APC's 
and 5 mechanics for every 100 trucks. (C, ) The cost in spare 
parts alone for tanks is estimated to be %10 for every 
kilometer that they are driven. 
Few Third World armies will reach these manpower standards. 
Some armies are nowhere near these standards, The Indonesian 
army for example had a large part of its equipment non- 
operation in 1969. Only a third of the navy was seaworthy, 
42 of the 122 aircraft were grounded and about a third of the 
army was engaged in non-military duties. (1) This kind of 
situation will lead to steady deterioration of performance. 
The burden of service will fall on a smaller number of vehicles 
which will raise the rate of wear and tear and put yet more out 
of action. The result is to reduce the military effectiveness 
of the forces. 
The difference in the number of mechanics needed to maintain 
a hundred tanks and those needed to maintain a hundred trucks is 
a measure of the tanks greater mechanical complexity. Tanks will 
use up the services of skilled mechanics even after they Co for a 
drive along a city road. The training costs of maintenance 
mechanics are very high - excluding upkeep it costs $6,000 in 
Sweden to put a man through a six month training programme. ($) 
There might be some additional return to the economy if the 
skills are ultimately transferable to the civilian sector. 
Vehicle maintenance has an important role in the development of 
mechanised agriculture and transport. 
"... training in repair of tank transmissions may 
be valuable to a man who will repair Mack trucks 
when he returns to civilian life, but the training 
will not have been nearly as valuable as it would 
have been had it been training in repairing Mack 
trucks". (, ) 
The question is not as simple as that. 
Countries have, and, for the foreseeable future, intend 
to keep armed forces. They are going to continue to equip 
their forces with mechanised vehicles which will require main- 
tenance. The real issue is not whether the civilian spill-ovor 
effects could be achieved by different methods - that they 
clearly could - but whether, in spite of the existence of a 
theoretical alternative, the necessity to allocate resources 
to internal and external security leads to spill-over effects 
and, if it does, whether these spill-over effects are 
qualitively greater in countries that have the largest invest- 
ment in military security. In this case we are measruing the 
potential contribution to the civilian goods of society by 
means of the amount of military capability that a country 
purchases or acquires, though the amount of military investment 
does not directly related to the amount of security that a 
country achieves from such acquisitions. 
A large armoured force requires mechanics. It must also 
have available the means to train considerable numbers of 
mechanics and, of course, the facilities for them to carry 
out their functions. The issue, therefore, is whether this 
process will have any spill-over effects, intended or otherwise, 
on the civilian sectors either from the trained men leaving the 
army at the end of their service or for the work opportunities 
it creates for private and public firms. If there is a spill- 
over from military activity and military activity is irreplaceable 
in the world as we know it, then the spill-over is a positive 
contribution in itself and ought not to be sot against 
alternatives that are not available. 
Is there a relationship between military strength and the 
potential defence capacity of a country (i. e. theoretical and 
engineering manufacturing sectors)? Five countries in the 
Third World are known to have some domestic manufacturing 
experience of armoured fighting vehicles. These are: Argentina, 
Brazil, Israel, India and Egypt, Turkey is also reported to be 
planning to produce tanks and other armoured vehicles. Argentina 
has assembled 30 French designed AMX-13 tanks; Brazil has 
designed its own armoured reconnaissance vehicle (for counter- 
insurgency operations); India produces a version of the Vickers 
tank, the "Vijayanta"; Israel had produced a hybrid tank -a 
Sherman (U. S. ) chassis with a AMX-13 (French) 75mm. gun; and 
Egypt has also modified Sherman tanks. ((0) 
Where information is available on the armoured fighting 
vehicle strengths of countries it is possible to calculate the 
manpower equivalents to maintain the vehicles to Swedish 
standards, using the S. I. P. R. I. figures. (With the exception 
of truck production because the figures are not available). 
A country with domestic truck production or assembly facilities 
can easily switch to military production with a few modifica- 
tions. These trucks tend to be designed for 'up country' use 
and they are adaptable for military purposes with little effort. 
As trucks require the least manpower to maintain the absence of 
the truck maintenance figures will not effect the figures a 
great deal. 
Using the Swedish figures - 150 mechanics for 100 tanks 
and 50 mechanics for 100 APC's - Table One has been constructed, 
The countries are ranked by the estimated number of man-years 
equivalent to maintenance required for their known tank 
strengths in 1970. The administrative personnel and managerial 
staffs that are necessary to establish and operate maintenance 
functions have not been included in the figures. The figures 
show what is required to repair, service and maintain the tanks 
from a purely technical function. 
The first three countries in the Table Egypt, India and 
Israel, which have the largest maintenance requirements in 
manpower, happen to be countries which also have some domestic 
armour production or substantial modification capabilities. 
India has carried out domestic production on the largest scale. 
The "Vijayanta" tank, a modified version of the Vickers 
Armstrong Chieftain is scheduled to be produced at a rate of 
200 tanks per year from the Madras works in the early 1970's. 
Between 1967 and 1970 India produced 280 tanks of this typo 
which makes India the Third World's foremost producer of 
armoured fighting vehicle. Approximately 43 per cent of this 
tank has been made domestically and the rest is imported. 
Table One 
intenance Man-Years Equivalents Beau 
Stength at Swedish Standards i n the Developing World. 1970 
Country Maintenance Man- Years Required Country 
Mainten', nco Mnn- 
Years Ron vd 
Egypt 3075 Somalia 401 
India 2175+ Saudi Arabia 390+ 
Israel 2120 Cuba 340 
Iran 1995 Sudan 257 
Korea (N) 1600+ Peru 240 
Pakistan 1455+ Libya 181+ 
Iraq 1445 Brazil 150 
Syria 1225 Lebanon 150+ 
Algeria 850 Vietnatg (S) 125 
Vietnam (N) 600+ Thailand 100+ 
Jordan 5ý+7 Argentina 90 
Morocco 490 
Sources: S. I. P. R. I., op cit., p. 806 for the maintenance 
standards per 100 vehicles: IISS, The Military 
Balance 1971-72 and The Military Balance, 
1970-71, London, 1970 and 1971, for the 
armoured strengths of the countries. 
(+) for incomplete details. 
Israel armoured production was exclusively from the 
canabalisation of ex-American Shermans. The technical aspects 
of this effort is ingenous (a combination of welding and 
fitting skills) but the domestic production side has not been 
developed. The useable debris of the 1967 war gave Israel 
considerable numbers of tanks, including the capture without a 
fight of a whole brigade of Russian T-51+'s in Sinai. (11) Such 
windfall gains do not encourage the use of Israeli resources to 
produce tanks though there is little doubt that they could do 
so if they felt it necessary. The Egyptians have relied on 
imported Soviet armour rather than develop their own tank 
production and this decision not to produce domestically is a 
consequence of easily acquired material. The modification of 
heavy and medium tank bodies, their tracks, engines and firing 
systems is probably within the capability of most of the 
countries in the Table. 
The interesting positions in the Table are occupied by 
Brazil and Argentina. Brazil's tank force is relatively large 
by Latin American standards - about 100 tanks - but given the 
size of the country it is relatively modest in comparison with 
other large developing countries, e. g. India, Yet Brazil is 
the only developing country to attempt to design and build 
an armoured personnel vehicle, the Cutia "Veto" T 111. APC's 
are much lighter than tanks, more manoevroable and much faster, 
- the Vete T 1A1 can reach 
80 m. p. h. on paved roads. (i1, ) The 
design and construction of APC's is quite different to that of 
tanks and it is not so anomolous that the Brazilians have mado 
these efforts in view of their place in the armour maintenance 
table. 
Brazil's transport sector produces about 6 per cent of the 
manufacturing output. These APC's would be a compatible part 
of that kind of commercial and light vehicle experience. The 
political estimates of the Brazilian Government as to whore the 
major threat to their security is coming from might have led to 
the development of the APC rather than the heavy battle tanks. 
Imported tanks probably meet the needs of the Government for 
heavy armour to back-up the civil authorities against disorders 
in the cities. APC's have specifications, such as high speeds 
and long range, which are ideal for urban troops deployments in 
counter-insurgency operations. The experience gained in 
producing a reconnaissance vehicle is a first step to developing 
a vehicle for the counter-insurgency. This aspect of domestic 
arms production in the Third World is likely to grow in 
importance. 
Third World governments face internal security problems on 
a growing scale. The arms they need are not necessarily of the 
same type so far sold to them by the industrialised countries 
where different strategic considerations determine the 
feasibility of weapon systems. Arms imports of obsolete weapon 
systems from areas with different requirements are loss likely 
in future to look attractive to security conscious Third World 
governments. Argentina's work on the IA 58 counter-insurgency 
aircraft is part of this trend of switching to weapons more 
suitable to local needs. 
Heavy tanks, super-sonic aircraft and aircraft carriors 
have been imported on a grand scale into the Third World and 
probably provide less security per dollar than more expensive 
domestically produced security equipment that at least has tho 
design advantages of being made to order. Those countries that 
have been engaged in conventional warfare no doubt need the 
traditional type of weapons but other countries, such as found 
in Latin America and Africa, would have much to gain from a 
change in emphasis; they might also discover that there is a 
lucrative export potential in this type of equipment. 
Argentina's armoured vehicle programme developed from its 
domestic commercial automobile industry. There has also boon 
a close linkage in Argentina between the aircraft industry and 
the motor vehicle industry. The state-owned Fabrica Militar 
Aviones which sponsored some of the post-war aircraft projects 
went over almost entirely to motor vehicle production in its 
plants in 195+. This shift in output was significant enough 
to 
show up a spurt in Argentinian manufacturing industry in the 
early 1950's. Up to 1951+ employment in the vehicle sector was 
almost entirely in garage and maintenance work but after 
1951+ 
it grew dramatically as a result of the expansion of vehicle 
manufacturing. (Is) This was due to the shift from aircraft 
to motor vehicles production decided upon by the FMA. The 
skills, techniques, plant and experience of the one field were 
useable in the other - and presumably in reverse too. This 
process is underlined by the experience of Industries Kaiser 
Argentina which also switched from aircraft to motor vehicle 
production. Through a French acquisition of this company 
(by Ranault) an arrangement was made for it to diversity into 
production under licence of the French AMX-13 tank. 
The situation appears to be one where the major armour 
users in the Third World as well placed by virtue of the largo 
scale technical maintenance requirements of heavy tanks to go 
over to the production of armoured vehicles if they decide 
politically to do so. In India's case this has been undertaken 
successfully. India has large territories to defend and has 
used tanks in the three conventional wars she has fought in 
the past ten years. Israel and Egypt have the capacity but so 
far they have used it only to modify vehicles because the 
alternative supplies are fairly open - Israel from war booty 
and Egypt from Russian generosity. Countries with substantial 
mechanical experience from motor vehicle production such as 
Brazil and Argentina have been able to develop a domestic light 
armour industry, suited to their security needs. 
d) Naval Construction 
Argentina and India have produced some sophisticated naval 
vessels, such as destroyers and frigates, but the normal typo 
of craft produced in the Third World as patrol boats and light 
craft. Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Thailand and 
Turkey produce patrol type craft ranging in size from the 37 
ton Polimar in Mexico to the Turkish 412 ton Kochisar. But 
the major portion of the naval supplies come from abroad in 
every case. Sri Lanka imported 19 small patrol boats between 
1955 and 1967 (and two frigates and a minesweeper) but assembled 
12 motor launches in 1968. It has the ability therefore to 
replace some of its imports of naval craft but has not choosen 
to become self sufficient. India's imports between 1950 and 
1970 included an aircraft carrier, a cruiser, six destroyers, 
nine frigates, seven submarines, eighteen patrol boats and some 
smaller craft but its own yards built three frigates and some 
light boats between 1960 and 1968. This pattern was followed 
by Indonesia which imported 23 heavy ships, 14 submarines and 
185 light patrol boats between 1950 and 1965 and built only 
28 patrol boats domestically. Thailand and Turkey similarly 
imported the heavier craft and built some local patrol 
boats. () 
The small proportion of local shipbuilding that is under- 
taken in the Third World is partly explained by the smallness 
of their shipbuilding facilities. In Table Two tho sizo of the 
shipbuilding facilities as a proportion of total manufacturing 
Table Two 
Shipbuilding Facilities as a Percentage of Mnnufncturlnr 
Capacity, 14 Countries, 
---1965-68 
Nav al Constructors Non -Constructors 
Country Employment Output Country Employment Output 
Chile 2.1 0.7 Algeria 0.4 0.2 
Colombia 0.3 0.1 Ecuador 0.6 - 
India 0.7 - Ghana 1.1 0.01 
Korea 1.4 2.5 Iraq 1.2 0.3 
Peru 0.6 - Nigeria 0.6 0.03 
Turkey 1.3 0.4 Pakistan 1.4 0.6 
Egypt 0.9 0.4 
Source: United Nations, Growth of World Industry, op cit. 
capacity for 14 countries Is shown. Those countries that do 
build some of their naval requirements domestically tend to 
have a larger share of their manufacturing capacity in ship- 
building than those that do not. The naval construction 
countries have a marginal lead of 1.04 per cent of manufacturing 
employment and 0.82 per cent of output in shipbuilding against 
0.93 per cent for employment and 0.23 per cent for output for 
the non-naval constructing powers. 
Countries like Ghana (1.1 per cent), Iraq (1.2 per cent), 
Pakistan (1.4 per cent) and Tunisia (1.2 per cent) with 
comparable employment levels to the constructors probably had 
the potential to become viable domestic producers of military 
vessels. But for most countries the proportion of G. D. P. 
arising from shipbuilding is quite small and it is not apparently 
an activity that the Third World has undertaken in a substantial 
Way. 
The techniques and skills required for shipbuilding and 
repairs are relatively simple (compared to much of the metal 
manufacturing sectors, such as vehicles and aircraft). They 
are also skills that must be present if the industrialisation 
process is to be undertaken. The metal trades of fabrication, 
welding and metal forming are needed primarily, as well as 
draughting and design. The need for a power source is the major 
problem and this is probably the major obstacle to Third World 
naval construction. The engines and their parts can be 
imported and assembled but the benefits from domestic manufac- 
ture of the hulls and superstructure when the high-valued 
components still have to be imported are marginal. 
Countries with some naval capacity have a base upon which 
to build. Naval vessels require considerable maintenance to keep 
them seaworthy. The standards of maintenance in the Third World 
vary from abysmal to tolerable. (15) We can carry out the same 
exercise on shipping as we have on armour. In the case of naval 
vessels the maintenance in manhours varies considerably for each 
type of vessel. The Swedish standards have been set out bolows 
Table Three 
Maintenance Man Hours for Naval Vessels 
Type 
Destroyers 
Submarines 
Minecraft 
Motor torpedo boats (small) 
Motor torpedo boats (large) 
Gunboats 
Source: S. I. P. R. I., op cit., p. 807. 
45,000 
19,000 
56 , 000 
11,250 
10,000 
12,250 
The details of the naval strengths of the Third World given 
in the source publications create a special problem for this 
type of exercise. The vessel types do not always fith clearly 
into the maintenance categories in the Table. For example, 
corvettes, cruisers and frigates have to be treated as if they 
were destroyers, and patrol boats which come in a whole range 
of sizes have to be lumped together. Many other ships such as 
tankers, oilers, supply ships, landing craft and training ships 
are not listed in the Swedish data. In the case of aircraft 
carriers, also not listed, this has a significant effect on the 
totals for they require large scale maintenance programmes. 
Only a handful of countries have aircraft carriers (India, 
Brazil, Argentina) and they have large navies as well. This 
reduces their totals for maintenance, though they are still 
near the top of the table. 
The annual maintenance hours for each country's naval force 
have to be converted into man-year equivalents required. This is 
arbitrarily chosen to be a working year of 50 weeks at 45 hours 
per weds (2250'. hours) which was divided into the annual total 
man-hour maintenance requirement for the fleets that each country 
had. This calculation is subject to all the qualifications 
already mentioned; maintenance standards are not the same in 
every country; the fleets have a different composition and some 
of their craft have been assigned arbitrarily; the ships are of 
varying age and design and therefore the hours of work even for 
similar jobs will be different; and the annual hours of work 
figure assumes a constant workpace at a fixed working week for 
50 weeks. It is nowhere suggested here that the figures in 
Table Four are the actual or even realistic maintenance hours 
for any of the countries. The calculation is aimed at a rough 
index to order the different countries; the order is more 
important than the figures. 
The maintenance workforce figures produced in the table 
will vary considerably with the composition of the fleets. 
Naval firepower is not directly related to maintenance. Sub- 
marines require 19,000 hours a year to remain operational which 
is about one third that required by minesweepers (56,000 hours). 
Table Four 
Workforce Requirements in Man-Year Equivalents to Maintain 
Declared Naval Strengths of 48 Developing Countrios 1970 
Country 
Man-Years 
Equivalents 
Required 
Country 
Man-Years 
Equivalont3 
lioguirod 
Indonesia* 1503 Syria 143 
Taiwan* 1176 Uruguay 143 
Brazil* 849 Tunisia 142 
India* 717 Iraq 122 
Argentina* 705 Nigeria 120 
Korea (S)* 666 Ecuador 109 
Korea (N)* 658 Cambodia 88 
Egypt* 634 Morocco 75 
Pakistan 423 Tanzania 65 
Burma* 380 Saudi Arabia 58 
Philippines 378 Paraguay 43 
Cuba* 360 Zaire 43 
Malaysia 341 Somalia 32 
Colombia* 339 Sudan 32 
Peru* 338 Guinea 32 
Thailand* 335 Guatemala 27 
Iran 319 Lebanon 27 
Algeria 304 Nicaragua 26 
Venezuela 281 Kenya 21 
Chile* 251+ El Salvador 20 
Mexico* 240 Honduras 16 
Donimican Republic* 217 Ivory Coast 10 
Libya 196 Malagasey 10 
Israel* 187 Senegal 9 
Source: IISS, Military Balance, 1969-70 and Ibid, 1970-71, 
London. 
(*) Known naval craft producer. 
Gunboats have more maintenance hours than heavy torpedo boats. 
Thus a country with minsweepers and gunboats may have a larger 
maintenance input requirement than another country armed with 
destroyers and submarines, though the firepower difference 
would reverse the relationship. 
Indonesia tops the table for maintenance requiremonts. It 
was also reported to be a country with only a 33 per cent sea- 
worthiness in its fleet. (14) The seventeen naval producers in 
the table (marked by an asterisk) are all in the top twenty- 
four countries. The average man-year equivalent workforce 
requirement of the naval producers is 562 men and the average 
for the non-producers (i. e. the importers) is 118. The average 
is reduced considerably by the range of the importers, from 
9 men in Senegal to 423 in Pakistan. If we exclude all the 
smaller navies in countries below Libya in the table and take 
the average for the remaining countries (i. e. those above 
Israel) the average for the importers rises to 320. The con- 
clusion is therefore the same: naval producers have on average 
naval forces which require higher maintenance inputs than naval 
importers, and thereby, at least on paper, more extensive 
maintenance and repair experience. Seven countries, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Malaysia, Iran, Algeria, Venezuela and Libya, have 
maintenance requirements on one measure comparable to the naval 
producers and are potentially capable of moving into naval 
construction. The strategic placement of some of these 
countries (Malaysia, Algeria, Iran) suggests that the trend for 
them towards to year 2000 will be to develop sorao ©xperio nco in 
this field. (117)) 
A criticism of Third World countrios in tho past is that 
they have based their naval development on an immitative modal 
of the conventional navies of the industrialised powers. Brazil 
and Argentina are two cases in point. In 1956 Brazil paid 
035 million for a second-hand British Aircraft carrier. The 
delivery of the ship provoked a civil war between tho navy and 
the airforce as to which service was to control the carrier. 
The crisis caused trouble for four Presidents and led to the 
resignations of ten admirals and ministers. On several occasions 
pitched battles actually broke out between the two services. 
The eventual compromise was arrived at in 1965: the navy ran 
the carrier and the airforce the aircraft. But this was not 
the only reprecussion. Within weeks of the original sale 
Argentina followed suit and bought another reconditioned ox- 
British carrier. Its only problem was "that the ship was so 
obsolete that it could not accommodate modern jet aircraft". (18) 
Apart from these aspects of the fiasco the purchases themselves 
were open to grave criticism as being of little use to either 
country in dealing with its security problems. Carriers have 
limited use in dealing with insurgency in urban centres. 
Developing countries can build up their naval interests on 
a more modest scale by gaining experience on small craft. As 
their maintenance function increases carefully prepared orders 
for smaller craft from the Government can set up a shipbuilding 
facility that can turn to larger craft, and commercial craft, 
in due course. If the government works for industrialisation 
on a sound basis, rather than get diverted into presitgious 
exercises, it can assist the programme along in this way. The 
fact remains, however, that even the acquisition of prestige 
vessels and the need to keep them operational will also provide 
a pool of experience for the industrialisation programme. It 
is not entirely negative but acquiring naval vessels that have 
a useful security role as well as a training role clearly is 
more advantageods the acquisition of "useless" 
vesso1i. 
e) Aircraft Production 
Aircraft production is the highest stage of the military 
industrialisation process; the technology represented by the 
aircraft is for a Third World country the Matterhorn of 
sophistication. The airframe construction is similar in concept 
to that of a boat, but the tolerances are much finer and the 
fabrication process is much more complex and has to moot rigid 
design standards. The airborne failure of aero-engines have 
fatal consequences and therefore the maintenance standards are 
critical. Aircraft maintenance is measured in hours of flying 
time rather than on an annual service basis. Because air 
traffice is international the ground systems and the maintenance 
facilities tend to approach a common standard throughout the 
world. 
Almost all developing countries have airforces. These can 
vary from the huge combat forces of India (625 planes) and 
Egypt (523 planes) to the tiny forces of Tanzania (12 non-combat 
planes) or Senegal (10 non-combat planes). (19) As with the 
navy the composition of the airforce will determine the 
maintenance requirements. The larger the combat element in an 
airforce the larger the airforce itself tends to be, but large 
numbers of utility planes can alter the ranking for maintenance. 
Maintenance hours are assigned according to flying time but as 
flying times for a country's airforce are not available wo have 
to use a circuitous route to carry out the calculations. 
The S. I. P. R. I. estimates show a ratio of 30 hours main- 
tenance for every hours flying time for intercoptrs, ground 
attack and reconnaissance aircraft. For trainers and transports 
the ratio is 20 hours per hour of flying time. ilolicoptors also 
have 20 hours. (20) On this basis two mechanics would have to 
work for a year just to allow Algeria's 142 combat aircraft to 
fly for one hour. 
S. I. P. R. I. makes the further point that it takes four 
mechanics to maintain one aircraft and six to completely over- 
haul it. (71) We can use this rough measure to rank the main- 
tenance requirements of the airforces in the Third World. 
Allowing for the fact that different types of aircraft have 
different requirements we can nevertheless arrive at some 
indication of the maintenance inputs of these airforces. Again 
these figures do not include the back-up organisation to set-up 
a maintenance function. This is estimated to be about 50 men 
per aircraft. Airforces are clearly consumers of manpower. 
These figures were applied to the declared air strengths 
of 60 developing countries, taking into account combat and non- 
combat aircraft and helicopters. The results are sot out in 
Table Five. The known aircraft producers are indicated by an 
asterisk. From the table the aircraft producers tend to have 
the largest airforces and therefore the largest maintenance 
forces as measured by the S. I. P. R. I. figure. Eleven of tho 
highest workforce requirements belong to countries with some 
domestic aircraft industry. The average required workforce of 
Table Five 
Aircraft Maintenance Requirements for Declared Air 
Strengths of 60 Developing Countries, 1970 
Country Required Workforce Country 
Required 
Workforce 
Egypt* 5466 Philippines 612 
Brazil* 5142 Malaysia 600 
India* 4632 Libya 588 
Korea (N) 4110 Uruguay 576 
Argentina* 3672 Bolivia 486 
Vietnam (S) 3450 Burma 468 
Israel* 2976 Zaire 402 
Taiwan* 2772 Nigeria 396 
Pakistan* 2400 Sudan 351+ 
Turkey* 2160 Tunisia 342 
Venezuela 1920 Ecuador 324 
Iraq 1800 Uganda 324 
Iran 1782 Ghana 312 
Chile* 1746 Zambia 300 
Cuba 1740 Singapore 300 
Peru 1740 Nicaragua 294 
Korea (S) 1620 Honduras 282 
Thailand 1452 El Salvador 276 
Syria 1416 Cambodia 258 
Vietnam (N) 1368 Paraguay 246 
Indonesia* 1272 Jordan 240 
Country 
Required 
Workforce C Cdr 
Required 
Wo kforci 
Algeria 1230 Lebanon 216 
Mexico* 1140 Kenya 210 
Morocco 1098 Somalia 198 
Colombia 984 Guatemala 192 
Afghanistan 888 Ivory Coast 126 
Saudi Arabia 732 Tanzania 108 
Ethiopia 684 Guinea 66 
Domican Republic 636 Malagasey 60 
Laos 618 Senegal 60 
Sources: Air Strengths from IISS, op cit., 1970 and 1971; 
maintenance conversion figures from S. I. P. R. I., 
op cit., p. 808. 
these countries is 3034 compared to an average for the aircraft 
importers (in the top twenty-three countries) of 1969 men. 
Taking all the airforces into account the importing countries 
average falls to 811 men. Aircraft production capability is 
clearly related to aircraft industry activity. The larger the 
aircraft maintenance requirements the more likely that the 
country will be developing some local capacity to assemble or 
even design its own aircraft. 
Some countries have a maintenance requirement for their 
airpower commensurate with that of countries that have domestic 
air production in some form or another, yet choose to import 
aircraft rather than attempt their own output. Eight of those 
countries Korea (north and south), Vietnam (north and south), 
Iraq, Thailand, Syria and Cuba are in relative tension areas - 
they perceive some threat externally. Venezuela, Peru and 
Algeria are not in any obvious way threatened externally and 
their large airforces defy justification on those grounds. 
Iran is coming under increasing pressure from its neighbour 
Iraq as each challenges for the leadership of the Gulf. (11) 
At the end of the 'European war in 191+5 a number of German 
designers became refugees and this gave an opportunity to some 
of the Third World countries to acquire highly qualified design 
teams with proven records of ability. Argentina, Brazil, India 
and Egypt made use of these services. Indonesia appears to 
have been an exception and to have developed its aircraft pro- 
duction from its own resources. However, the success rate for 
indigeneous designed aircraft has not been very good. The 
developmental costs for new aircraft are very high and their 
lead-times were often beyond that which some of those governments 
had the patience for. The government needs a strong political 
will to carry through a development programme in such high risk 
ventures. These difficulties were made worse by the habit of 
concentration on prestige projects - jet aircraft before they 
had experience of non-jet technology - which were not within 
the available technology nor the available capacity. The planes 
were within the design capabilities of the designers - afterall 
they were previously part of the world's foremost aircraft 
producing teams - but were outwith the local capacities of the 
plants set aside to manufacture them. Egypt, Argentina and 
Brazil fell victim to this problem for many years. Israel and 
India tried a different route. They went for planes within 
their capabilities and gradually extended themselves into 
higher technology. 
The political difficulties of the aircraft ventures are no 
less serious for the sponsors. Attracted by the prospect of a 
modern jet industry they are vulnerable to the set-backs and 
failures which are an inescapable part of a development programme. 
The pressure is put on to produce quick results but the reality 
of this technology is for results to be delayed. This provides 
political ammunition for opposition; in democracies this is a 
gift to the opposition parties and in dictatorships it is a 
gift to conspiring rivals within the bureaucracy. 
India set itself the target of self sufficiency in air- 
craft production for both military and civilian use within a 
period of 20 years (1967). Argentina under Peron, went through 
a similar nationalistic fervour until it was re-directed into 
more modest, and eventually more successful, projects after 
1951+. The result by 1972 was not self sufficiency, or anywhere 
near its but both countries had built a substantial capability 
in aircraft production which is beginning to bear fruit in the 
1970's. 
The Hindustan Areonautics Company (HAL) grow out of the 
maintenance work and repairs to British aircraft during the 
Second War. It assembled its first aircraft in 1948 and 
subsequently produced Vampire fighters and Folland Gnat trainers 
for the Indian airforce. In 1969, HAL, is reported to have boon 
making a profit of $5 million on a gross turnover of 087.4 
million. (? 3) 
But the early attempts at producing fighters 
were total failures. The ill-fated HAL HF-24 started off as 
a low cost fighter at $1.5 million in 1956. By 1969 only 16 
had been produced and the individual cost had risen to $7.4 
million, with three major changes in engine. HAL achieved much 
more success with its licenced production of Russian MiG-21's 
and delivery began to the Indian airforce in 1970. Local 
inputs into the MiG's is about 60 per cent. 
The most successful Indian built aircraft is the Folland 
Gnat powered by imported Bristol Siddoley Orpohus turbo-jots. 
Over 85 per cent of the components are manufactured in India, 
including 60 per cent of the engine. This must have had a 
beneficial effect by spreading technology and guarantooing 
risk projects in India's manufacturing sector. (2. 'f) 
The Argentinian case history is like India's but with loss 
successful results. It started during the Second War but wont 
straight into local design and prototype production. The power 
of airpower was demonstrated by the combatants in the war and 
the acquisition of this power was an attractive proposition to 
Argentina. But eight of the thirteen aircraft built in 
Argentina were cancelled before the production stage. (i) Two 
of the planes that were successful were the IA-35 multi-purpose 
aircraft of which 100 were built and the IA-46 light agricultural 
mono-plane of which 114 had been built up to 1970. 
Other activities 
production of foreign 
counter-insurgency ai: 
tested in 1970 and it 
was pinning its hopes 
American countries in 
of the Argentinians included the licencod 
designed aircraft, mainly trainers. The 
rcraft, the IA-47 and the IA-55 were field 
was upon these that the aircraft industry 
for large export sales to othor Latin 
order to break into major production. 
Argentina uses its military aviation to extend and maintain 
communication links with outlying areas of the country which arc 
not easily accessible, by or commercially profitable for, civil 
air companies. A similar task is given to the Colombia airforce 
by the government. Once airstrips are constructod and tho 
country opened to air-traffic the routes can be handed over 
to commercial operators. (_`) 
The major lesson from these cases is that liconcod 
assembling is the best first stage activity for a developing 
country wishing to set up an aircraft capability. The arrival 
of emigre designers from Europe was not the fortuitous gift 
that it appeared to be. Ambitious projects beyond the 
capability of the country's technology are likely to be wasteful 
of resources. The Brazilian Government appeared to have taken 
this point when they set up a joint state-private company to 
assemble the Aeromacchi MB 326G light strike/trainer in 1969. 
Israel's state-owned aircraft industry (IAI), like India's 
grew out of maintenance capability and is an organisation 
employing over 10,000 people in 1972. (t'1) Israel has had the 
advantage of a large pool of ex-patriate labour to draw upon 
plus the pressure of external threats to security. It took a 
route from repair work to production that used glider work to 
learn the basic aero-dynamics. This type of thoroughness has 
paid off in exports of the IAI Avra light transport and its 
executive jet. It is suggested that the next project will be 
a small interceptor. (t ) Although the light transport has 
commercial selling points it should be noted that its short 
take off - 590 feet - in temporary land strips and its adaptable 
pay load - including a jeep and occupants - has military 
applications which have not been missed by the Israelis nor for 
that matter by the Arabs. 
Egyptian aircraft production seems to be still in the 
early Argentinian stage. It used German designers (including 
Willy Messerschmidt) but their projects have boon cancelled 
for cost reasons. Its successes have been in modest light 
mono-planes but its greatest disasters have boon in attempts 
at missiles and rockets. (These were also subject to Israeli 
sabotage). By 1969 the Egyptians had advanced no further than 
where they were in the 1950's with the light aircraft and 
their ambitions in jet planes and missiles had boon frustrated. 
Egypt has all the advantages of the aircraft producers in the 
other countries of the Third World -a large airforce and 
resident skills - but it has not managed to overcome the 
political direction from the government that provides the will but 
not the means for setting up consistent domestic production of 
aircraft. 
Conclusion 
Third World countries have accumulated experience in 
military technology through the use of imported weapons in 
a relatively short space of time. The largest users of 
military equipment have been the first, in the main, to go 
in for domestic production. There seems to be some associa- 
tive, if not causal, link between the maintenance function 
and the attempt at domestic production. This is probably 
because maintenance, by its very nature, is residential oven 
if the weapon system is sophisticated and imported. The use 
of ex-patriate engineers in the early stages does not present 
a permanent solution to the maintenance problem. Sooner or 
later local maintenance terms must be trained. The combina- 
tion of expericnce and ambition will suggest to the 
government that it considers seriously proposals to develop 
their own weapon systems. 
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN 
a) Introduction 
In this final Chapter we will consider the question of 
disarmament as it relates to Third World countries. This is 
an obvious question to consider in a thesis on the military. 
It is not, however, the obvious solution to the problems of 
the Third World that it appears to be. World disarmament is 
an indivisible problem, affecting all countries and not just 
some of them. It also presupposes the solution of conflicts 
of right and interest by some hitherto untried method that 
breaks completely with the recorded history of human society. 
If this millenarian peace is to be established within the 
time-scale that the Third World will benefit from it in a 
developmental sense, i. e. within the next twenty or thirty 
years, the first stages of the peace will have to start 
appearing within the next decade. It is not being too cynical 
to describe the prospects of such a development in international 
relations, and, from the Third World's point of view, the 
parallel development in societal relations, as being founded 
more on hope than experience. 
It does not follow, of course, that the world co=unity 
ought to abandon efforts to find new ways of resolving 
conflicts. It is certainly not the task of this Chaptor to 
argue that proposition. But, what must be faced up to is the 
question of whether these efforts confined to Third World 
countries would be meaningful in the short term and, given 
the likely time scale of the change over from violence to 
non-violence, whether the Third World need wait so long 
before the natural development process will raise their 
economies to comparable levels with the industrialised 
countries. 
b) The World Armarnents Situation 
Total world expenditures for military purposes rose from 
X120 billion in 1960 to 9216 billion in 1971. This was equal 
to about 9 per cent of the world's annual output of goods and 
services. The bulk of this spending (over 90 per cent) was in 
the world's industrialised countries (including China). It 
represented the equivalent of two thirds of the entire national 
income of all underdeveloped countries. (1) The burden of this 
defence spending was carried in the industrialised countries. 
This must be borne in mind when considering the case for 
disarmament on the grounds of the economic plight of the Third 
World. 
U. Thant, then Secretary General of the United Nations, 
discussing the costs of world defence expenditures, wrote in 
1970: 
"This unproductive and wasteful diversion of the 
world's resources and energy has extracted a heavy 
toll on the living conditions of the peoples of the 
world both in the developing and developed 
countries". (2) 
But the underdeveloped world has spent only one tenth of the 
amount of defence as the non-communist world and it cannot 
follow from this that the defence burden is equally shared 
between the countries that make up the Third World and the 
industrialised world (including the European communist 
countries). It is only an assumption that dofonco sponding 
in the developed world has an opportunity cost outsido of 
these countries. If the resources allocatod to dofonco aro, 
in the main, non-transferable (due to political realities) 
outside of the countries that make those expondituros, then 
it is not relevant to ascribe to these expenditures opportun- 
ity costs for other parts of the world. 
General disarmament between the major powers would 
certainly release resources within these countries but whether 
their political systems would tolerate massive shifts of 
resources to other countries is a matter upon which the 
gravest doubts must exist. 
The studies that have been conducted of the economic and 
social effects of disarmament show considerable strains upon 
the economies concerned in the transition period (even assuming 
that all the political issues are resolved between the super- 
powers). Any large scale unemployment arising from disarma- 
ment will have repercussions - it is naive to assume that a 
spirit of goodwill will flow so freely that the political 
oppositions in these countries (however formed) will refrain 
from making political capital out of the transitional 
difficulties. The life-span of governments in the party 
democracies is shorter than the feasible transition period 
that disarmament would require. It is not just a technical 
question of how to dismantle the weapon systems but also a 
political question of how to lower tension and ensure security 
for all concerned. Even in the dictatoships the difforoncos 
between life-span of the bureaucracies and the length of the 
transition period is a problem for the personnel concerned. 
Thus the process will create periods of vulnerability for the 
governments and they are likely to try to off-sot those with 
domestic programmes that will take up most of the resources 
as they are released. 
The studies by Seymour Melman on the defence conversion 
tasks suggest that the problem is somewhat different from that 
faced by the economies involved in the European and Pacific 
War in 1945. These countries had war economies converted 
from civilian economies at the outbreak of hostilities. 
Today's problem is altogether different: 
"At the present time, the bulk of military production 
is concentrated in industries, firms or plants that 
have specialised for this work, and frequently have 
no prior history of civilian work". (3) 
There is no reason to believe that the situation is any 
different in the Soviet defence plants. 
Melman calculated the cost of the kind of alternative 
spending programmes that were desperately urgent within the 
United States. These came to $76 billion alone, or twice 
what the United States was spending on defence at the time 
(1960); it is also the equivalent of the entire 1970 Federal 
budget. Moreover, as the $76 billion was an annual cost and 
Ad 
as the disarmament programme would be phased over sovoral 
years it would mean a considerable movement of resources from 
other budget headings if the programme was to bo mot. 
Experience of public discussions on alternatives to current 
spending is that the list of alternatives rapidly outpaces the 
funds that would be released. In the context of a world 
disarmament programme, which could hardly be carried out in 
secret, the domestic pressure from the pressure groups in the 
political hobbies to allocate the released resources could 
create severe social tension through the inevitable disappoint- 
ments. Now the issue for us is this: would there be much loft 
over, if anything, for the Third World? 
This is not an argument against the major powers trying to 
get agreement on weapon and force levels, though such an 
argument has been made. (f) The Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks (SALT) have been aimed at something along these lines; 
that 'something' needs close scrutiny, however, for the 
evidence so far from the talks is that the Soviet Union and 
America are in reality only drawing up a set of rules to 
conduct their own arms race at a lower cost to themselves. 
Nor is it an argument against attempting nuclear disarmament 
or curtailment of future production of nuclear and chemical 
weapons. The issue that we are attempting to look at is 
whether there is anything in such activity that will manifestly 
benefit the Third World, or whether, in fact, the whole issue 
is of marginal importance to those countries and the problems 
they face. 
c) Disarmament and Development 
The great bulk of the saving from disaramont and defence 
expenditures as a result of general disaramont would bo 
concentrated in a few, already rich, countries. The major 
expenditures in the developing countries tends to be on manpower 
rather than equipment. Savings in foreign exchange for the 
purchase of military equipment could also be mado but the main 
effect would be to discharge into the labour market skilled and 
unskilled meng which, as the United Nation's report notes, may 
"aggravate the already difficult problem of unemployment and 
under-employment". (5j) The irony is that the resulting social 
tensions arising from general disarmament may require 
additional para-military forces to maintain order. 
The report links the solution to these problems to the 
goodwill of the industrialised economies: 
"The realisation of the great potential gains from 
disarmament in the underdeveloped countries would 
depend on a major intensification of efforts to 
promote economic development. Such efforts would 
be facilitated in so far as military spending wore 
channelled to development expenditure and as scarce 
foreign exchange reserves were freed for development 
purposes; and still more to the extent that aid were 
forthcoming 
-from 
the industrially advanced countries 
in the form of both caritnl oauirmont and tochnicca 
assistance". (`) 
For some countries with high defence budgets (the Middle-East 
for example) there would be an undoubted impact from the 
re-allocation of their defence funds to development projects. 
For many other countries the benefit would be marginal. If 
the real gain would come from an increased assistance from 
the industrialised countries (and the gains from this assistance 
are by no means so obvious as to be unchallengeablo, Cl) then 
this could theoretically be achieved without disarmament. If 
general disarmament is not likely to provide funds in itself 
for the--Third World the likely gains for the Third World are 
less impressive. 
Why a policy of "goodwill" should achieve what manifest 
self-interest (i. e. the gains from tying Third World countries 
by aid to the political blocs of the competing industrialised 
countries) has failed to do is not explained. The assumptions 
behind the United Nations Report are themselves suspect. The 
authors assume that the shortages of capital and foreign 
exchange are the major barriers to development and that the 
industrialised countries only have to pour in resources 
(released by disarmament) and the Third World countries would 
develop. These are assumptions clearly accepted by vast 
numbers of people but they are none the loss questionable for 
that. No amount of capital will make less necessary the 
change in the social structure and it is in this process that 
the political and social tensions manifest themselves. 
Cross national studies have shown that the rato of socio- 
economic change is an important contributory factor to political 
instability. In one study 70 per cent of the countries that 
were experiencing high rates of socio-oconomic change were 
politically unstable and 63 per cent of the countries with low 
rates of change were politically stable. ($) 
To disarm and step up the pace of change is a contradictory 
policy. It might call for intervention on a largo scale by the 
armed forces of other countries (imperialism? ). To disarm and 
stop the process of change - assuming that a policy of stagna- 
tion can be brought about deliberately or oven that it could 
be imposed - is also eventually likely to lead to violence duo 
to disparities in aspirations and reality. Disarmament is not 
feasible in conditions of violent challenge to the existing, 
or the incoming, order. Because the armies of the Third World 
play a much more central role in maintaining internal order 
than they do in the advanced countries their absence following 
disarmament will have more serious effects on political life 
than their absence in the industrialised countries. But even 
this difference is changing fairly rapidly in the industrial- 
ised countries. 
Urban violence and confrontation in the industrialized 
countries can reach levels of intensity where only the inter- 
vention of troops in a para-police role has any change of 
containing the conflicting forces. In Northomlroland this 
situation has existed for several years; France in 1968 was 
poised for the intervention of the French Army if the para- 
military riot police showed signs of wavering. The threshold 
of intervention by heavily armed and organised troops in Third 
World countries is much lower than in the developed countries 
in general and there is no reason to assume that disarmament 
arranged through the United Nations is likely to raise that 
threshold in current circumstances. 
If the gains from disarmament depend on the aid programmes 
of the industrialised countries then the implications of this 
have to be made clear. Disarmament, it may be argued, releases 
resources in the developed economies, some of which can be 
diverted to the Third World. There is no evidence to suggest 
that this would in fact be the case. On the contrary there is 
much to suggest that the political case for disarmament in the 
developed countries will prove acceptable only on the basis 
that the diverted resources can be seen to be of direct benefit 
to the domestic economies and the social lives of the people 
within them (this is after all what Melman and his colleagues 
have been concentrating their attentions upon and showing to 
informed American opinion). If the urban crisis is making 
disarmament more palatable, and this is what is achieved when 
the trade-offs are written about then the amelioration of the 
problems of the urban crisis must inevitably be shown to be 
the major result of a disarmament programme and not the 
amelioration of the problems of the Third World. 
Disarament is often written about as if it in a statu of 
nature that modern man has been diverted from by fallacious 
politics. It is nothing like this at all. It is an entirely 
new arrangement in human society, never tried before in recorded 
history. It is not likely to come about within the next few 
years, or even decades. In the Third World it is not even an 
option. There can of course be a lowering of tension between 
countries and this alone would make significant contributions 
to the lowering of the proportions allocated to defence in the 
budgets of many countries. But the lowering of tension, say, 
in the Middle-East, is not a problem that will find an easy 
solution. The end of the Korean war did not lead to a drop in 
the military budgets; fear does not wither away whole its 
cause remains. Nor does the "umbrella" strategy offer an 
alternative. 
The argument for the umbrella strategy is as plausible 
as it is false. The idea is that the developing countries need 
only so much defence as is necessary for them to handle internal 
security problems. Their external problems, which contribute 
the larger part of the heavy defence budgets of the high 
military spenders and promotes the arms races, can be defused, 
it is believed, if the major powers were to make it clear that 
they would 'guarantee' each and every country against external 
aggression. The full might of the big powers would be brought 
to play against any power which used military force to inter- 
vene in another country. With this umbrella guarantee, the 
argument goes, the developing countries could withhold from 
massive military budgets, put the resourcos to work for 
development and live in peace. It may be that somo pooplo 
believe it would work but a listing of the difficultios that 
the strategy ignores surely exposes its hopoloss naivoty. 
The the first place the border line between external 
aggression and insurgency is extremely blurred, and the examples 
of Vietnam and Palestine only have to be mentioned to illustrate 
the point. How the major powers could 'guarantee' anything in 
such situations is open to question. °1 
The second obstacle to the umbrella plan is that agreement 
is unlikely by the big powers on which countries and whoso 
integrity they were jointly guaranteeing. In the Middlo-East, 
Asia and Latin America they have conflict loyalties to most of 
the contenders. Even if America and Russia miraculously found 
agreement the presence of China (and the emerging European 
alliance) would stretch the incidence of miracles to a degree 
where the whole idea is hypothetical and utopian. 
The third obstacle is that the plan requires the racogni- 
tion of the status quo - all countries and all boundaries are 
recognised as permanent. It is precisely the inability for a 
status quo to emerge, except by force of arms, that will 
prevent the umbrella plan from implementation. 
The fourth obstacle, is that countries that are independent 
are loath to hand over their protection to others. Where this 
happened, Korean, Taiwan, and Vietnam for example, the protection 
of the military power is accompanied by the supply of the moans 
of self protection. It is a debateable proposition whether the 
tax payers of the developed countries are likely to be persuaded 
to support the military protection of other countries where a 
self-help contribution is negligible or non-existent. It must 
always be borne in mind when devising schemes to solve the 
world's problems that solutions which expose those in power to 
challenge from oppositions, or rivals, are not really viable. 
If some degree of self-help is necessary, and partisanship 
in allocating protection inevitable, it follows that the power 
providing the umbrella of protection is more than likely to 
provide the means for self-help. This situation is the one 
that obtains at the present i. e. the umbrella system is the 
one that the big powers already operate. The goneralised 
umbrella plan iss however, unrealisable for the reasons we have 
suggested. The partial umbrella system has nowhere reduced the 
arms race (in fact it is part of it). This route to a quasi- 
disarmament is clearly not open as it flies in the face of 
reality. 
The final argument against the umbrella strategy is that 
it presupposes that the major powers remain armed and everybody 
else disarms. This is not a very feasible proposition. Many 
Third World countries feel threatened as it is by one, or both, 
of the major powers and they are unlikely to accept that their 
enemies, or potential enemies, should have the means to viultStICC 
and they should not. Racial, and political, differences are so 
easily disposed of. 
Violence is endemic and takes a variety of forms in 
different parts of the world. Human conflict is pervasive; 
governments and insurgents alike resort to violence because it 
is the normal means of settling human conflict. To ascribe to 
violence, and to the means by which violence is institutionalised, 
the status of a major barrier to development is to re-write the 
political realities of human experience. This is the final 
dilemma of mankind: war and violence have been man's way of 
resolving conflicts and the search for alternatives is rational 
man at his finest but also at his most impotent. The conquest 
of hunger, disease and want, the conquest of space and environ- 
ment; the solution to every technical problem that intelligence 
can dream ups are minute problems compared to the solution to 
the problem of war and violence. 
A world disarmed, what every else it might achieve, may 
become the most dangerous place for life that man could create. 
It might also become something more pleasant but the pessimists 
have over 25,000 years of experience on their side. Robert Ardr©y 
summed the dilemma up most pointedly in his book Africnn 
Genesis: 
"Deprived of the contest of weapons that was the 
only bough he knew, man must descend to the cane- 
breaks of a new mode of existence. There he must 
find new dreams, new dynamics, now experiences to 
absorb him, new moans of resolving his issues and 
of protecting whatever he regards as good. And he 
will find them; or he will find himself lost. 
Slowly his governments will lose their force and 
his societies their integration. Moral order, 
sheltered throughout all history by the judgement 
of arms : will fall away in rot and erosion. 
Insoluble quarrels will rend people once united by 
territorial purpose. Insoluble conflicts will 
split nations once allied by a common dream. 
Anarchy, ultimate enemy of social mane will spread 
it grey, cancerous tissues through the social corpus 
of our kind. Bandit nations will hold the human will 
a hostage, in perfect confidence that no superior 
force can protect the victim. Bandit gangs will 
have their way along the social throughf are, in 
perfect confidence that the declining order will 
find no means to protect itself. Every night we 
shall build our nostalgic family next in tribute to 
ancestral memories. Every day we shall pursue 
through the fearful cane-breaks our unequal struggle 
with extinction. It is the hard way, ending with a 
whimper". ((0) 
There is no sign anywhere on the planet that anybody 
is prepared to risk extinction with a whimper to avoid 
extinction with a bang. And this is probably the best 
place to let the argument rest in the meantime. 
APPENDIX A 
Military Interventions in the Third World 1945-72 
The lists for the four regions, Middle-East, Latin America, 
sub-Saharan African and Asia, have been compiled from various 
sources (books, articles, newspapers) and notes). They are not 
exhaustive; some of the alleged coup attempts arc doubtful and 
owe more to the propaganda needs of the Governments against whom 
the alleged coups were directed than to any basis of fact. Also, 
some other incidents which are listed as coups or attempted 
coups are loose interpretations of what a coup dietat consist 
of and therefore require subjective agreement on when a sudden 
change in leadership or a local insurrection changes to being 
characterised a coup. 
The army mutinies in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania are listed 
as attempted coups though the evidence suggests that they wore 
not motivated by a desire to change the Government. The removal 
of Nasser from the leadership of the Free Officers in 1951+ and 
then his counter-stroke against Neguib a few months later are 
counted as coups. But the guerilla actions against King Hussein 
in Hordan in 1971 are not listed as attempted coups. All those 
reflect the subjective judgement of the author. Differing 
views of readers will be welcomed though whether a definitive 
list could be agreed which would secure universal endorsement 
is open to doubt. 
1. Latin American 1945-72 
Raite_ Comtry 
October 1945 
October 1945 
October 1946 
May 1947 
May 191+8 
May 1948 
June 1948 
October 1948 
November 1948 
December 1948 
December 1948 
191+9 
November 1949 
1950 
May 1951 
March 1952 
1952 
May 1954 
June 1954 
November 1955 
1955 
May 1957 
January 1958 
May 1958 
Venezuela 
Brazil 
Argentina 
Nicaragua 
Columbia 
Costa Rica 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Venezuela 
Paraguay 
El Salvador 
Paraguay 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Panama 
Cuba 
Bolivia 
Paraguay 
Guatemala 
Brazil 
Argentina 
Colombia 
Venezuela 
Bolivia 
Bgn-nri-, r, otttcQmo 
S 
S 
S 
Anti-Army S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
Police-led s 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
U. S. aid s 
S 
S 
S 
S 
F 
e Country $__ 
October 1958 
April 1959 
April 1959 
1959 
December 1959 
May 1960 
January 1960 
January 1960 
October 1960 
November 1960 
November 1960 
January 1961 
February 1961 
November 1961 
November 1961 
January 1962 
May 1962 
May 1962 
June 1962 
August 1962 
September 1962 
March 1963 
April 1963 
March 1963 
March 1963 
October 1963 
Bolivia 
Panama 
Bolivia 
Cub a 
Paraguay 
Paraguay 
El Salvador 
Dominican Rep. 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Nicaragua 
El Salvador 
Venezuela 
Ecuador 
Dominican Rep. 
Dominican Rep. 
Argentina 
Venezuela 
Venezuela 
Argentina 
Argentina 
Argentina 
Argentina 
Peru 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Socialist 
Cuban aid 
Castro 
Cuban aid 
Invasion 
Anti-Frondizi 
Naval mutinies 
Marines 
Rightwing 
Factional 
Rightwing 
Anti-Peron 
F 
F 
F 
5 
F 
F 
S 
F 
3 
F 
F 
S 
F 
S 
S 
F 
S 
F 
F 
S 
F 
F 
F 
S 
S 
S 
Dat8_ Country Rn nrk 
__ 
_ 
July 1963 
September 1963 
November 1964 
April 1964 
May 1965 
May 1965 
January 1966 
March 1966 
June 1966 
October 1966 
January 1967 
July 1968 
August 1968 
October 1968 
October 1968 
1969 
December 1969 
June 1970 
June 1970 
August 1970 
October 1970 
October 1970 
January 1971 
March 1971 
March 1971 
April 1971 
Ecuador 
Dominican Rep. 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Bolivia 
Colombia 
Bolivia 
Ecuador 
Argentina 
Venezuela 
Nicaragua 
Bolivia 
Bolivia 
Panama 
Peru 
Bolivia 
Panama 
Ecuador 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Bolivia 
Bolivia 
Bolivia 
Ecuador 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Factional 
Factional 
Military Cabinot 
Mty Junta 
Rightwing 
Foilod 
u 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
F 
F 
S 
F 
S 
S 
S 
F 
S 
s 
F 
F 
S 
F 
F 
S 
F 
Country Bcmqrki t2utcoma 
May 1971 Argentina F 
August 1971 Bolivia g 
October 1971 Argentina F 
February 1972 Ecuador g 
March 1972 El Salvador F 
December 1972 Honduras S 
2. Asia 19+5-72 
Data Comtry Remark 3 tcomo 
1947 Thailand Army Counter coup S 
January 1949 Cambodia F 
February 1949 Thailand Naval F 
February 1949 Cambodia F 
1949 Pakistan 'Pindi' plot F 
June 1951 Thailand Marines F 
November 1951 Thailand Army 5 
October 1952 Indonesia F 
1955 Indonesia Anti-Cabinet S 
1956 Indonesia F 
1957 Indonesia Sukarno 6 
September/ 
November 1957 Thailand S 
September 1958 Burma S 
October 1958 Pakistan S 
October 1958 Thailand Factional S 
August 1959 Laos $ 
March 1960 Indonesia Anti-Sukarno F 
April 1960 Korea Anti-ghee S 
May 1961 Korea S 
January 1962 Ceylong Police/army F 
March 1962 Burma Anti-Unu S 
June 1962 Korea Foiled F 
December 1962 Brunei U. K. aid F 
March 1963 Korea Factional F 
1e Country Romiirks tr, oe 
November 1963 Vietnam Anti-Diem a 
January 1961+ Vietnam 
February 1964 Burma Socialist S 
April 1964 Laos RightwinC F 
January 1965 Vietnam g 
January 1965 Laos Rightwing F 
March 1965 Laos F 
April 1965 Laos F 
October 1965 Indonesia Cotumunist F 
October 1965 Indonesia Army S 
March 1966 Indonesia Fall of Sukarno S 
February 1969 Pakistan Anti-Ayub S 
March 1969 Thailand S 
March 1970 Cambodia S 
December 1970 Laos Rightwing F 
March 1971 Thailand S 
April 1971 Laos F 
December 1971 Pakistan Army quit 3 
3. Middle-Ensta 1945-72 
pate Country to . ý. , 
March 191+9 Syria 
July 1949 Lebanon Syria aid F 
August 1949 Syria Pro-U. K. S 
December 1949 Syria S 
November 1949 Syria S 
July 1952 Egypt 
September 1952 Lebanon 
August 1953 Iran Anti-Cabinot S 
February 1951+ Syria S 
February 1951+ Egypt Pro-Neguib S 
March 19 + Egypt Pro-Nasser S 
April 195+ Jordan F 
January 1958 Syria Pro-Egypt S 
July 1958 Jordan Foiled F 
July 1958 Iraq S 
October 1958 Lebanon Civil War S 
November 1958 Sudan S 
March 1959 Iraq Anti-communist F 
March 1959 Jordan Foiled F 
May 1959 Sudan F 
November 1959 Sudan F 
May 1960 Turkey Anti-Handeros S 
November 1960 Turkey Anti-socinlist S 
September 1961 Syria Anti-Nasser S 
December 1961 Lebanon Syrian Aid F 
Onto Country 
___ 
Remarks 011tcome 
February 1962 Turkey F 
March 1962 Syria Pro-Halsor S 
March 1962 Syria N assert-2t F 
June 1962 Algeria Anti-Boumedionno 3 
July 1962 Algeria Pro-Bella 3 
September 1962 Syria 3 
September 1962 Yemen Republican S 
December 1962 Tunisia Foiled F 
January 1963 Syria Nasserist F 
February 1963 Iraq Nasserist S 
March 1963 Syria Ba'ath/N asser S 
May 1963 Turkey F 
July 1963 Iraq Communist F 
July 1963 Syria Ba'athist S 
July 1963 Syria Nassorist F 
July 1963 Morocco Foiled F 
September 1963 Algeria F 
November 1963 Iraq Ba'athist F 
November 1963 Iraq Anti-Ba'athist S 
1964 Egypt Muslim F 
June 1961+ Algeria Islamic F 
September 1964 Iraq Ba'athist F 
October 196+ Sudan Anti-army S 
June 1965 Algeria Anti-Bella S 
September 1965 Iraq Nassorist F 
October 1965 Iraq Nasseri; t F 
Da te Country Remarks tc: om 
December 1965 Syria Ba'athist 3 
February 1966 Syria Factional S 
March 1966 Iraq Ba'athist F 
June 1966 Iraq Nasserist F 
September 1966 Syria Anti-Ba'ath F 
December 1966 Sudan Communist F 
August 1967 Egypt Amer F 
November 1967 Yemen g 
December 1967 Algeria Colonel Zbiri F 
February 1968 Syria Batathist S 
March 1968 Syria Factional S 
March 1968 Yemen Leftist F 
July 1968 Iraq Batathist S 
July 1968 Iraq Factional 5 
August 1968 Syria Factional F 
August 1968 Yemen Leftist 
November 1968 
January 1969 Yemen Leftist F 
March 1969 Iraq Anti-Ba'ath F 
May 1969 Sudan S 
September 1969 Libya Republican S 
June 1970 S. Yemen S 
July 1970 Sudan Communist F 
November 1970 Syria Nationalist S 
March 1971 Turkey Anti-cabinet S 
April 1971 Egypt Anti-Sadat F 
Dula CQuntcrv PeMftrka- Outcome 
Juno 1971 Syria F 
June 1971 Morocco Republican F 
July 1971 Sudan F 
September 1971 Iraq Leftist 5 
August 1972 Morocco Republican F 
November 1972 Egypt F 
November 1972 Jordan Republican F 
4. Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960-72 
Date Countrv Rtýmark 0L1LQQM0 
April 1960 Guinea Foiled F 
December 1960 Ethiopia Republican F 
1961 Liberia Corvunist F 
September 1961 Zaire (K) Mobutu S 
November 1961 Guinea Foiled F 
September 1962 Nigeria Awolowo plot F 
December 1962 Senegal F 
January 1963 Togo S 
January 1963 Ivory Coast Foiled F 
February 1963 Liberia Foiled F 
August 1963 Congo (B) 8 
1963 Chad Foiled F 
September 1963 Ivory Coast Foiled F 
October 1963 Dahomey S 
1963 Zaire (K) S 
December 1963 Dahomey S 
December 1963 Niger French aid F 
January 1964 Kenya Mutiny F 
January 1964 Tanzania F 
January 1964 Uganda F 
February 1964 Gabon French aid F 
January 1965 Burundi F 
October 1965 Burundi Republican S 
November 1965 Guinea Foiled F 
Date Country llomnrks Q tco 
ý 
November 1965 Zaire 
November 1965 Dahomey 5 
December 1965 Dahomey 
January 1966 Central African 
Republic S 
January 1966 Upper Volta S 
January 1966 Nigeria s 
February 1966 Ghana Anti-Nkrummah S 
February 1966 Uganda F 
June 1966 Zaire F 
July 1966 Nigeria Counter-coup S 
July 1966 Burundi S 
July 1966 Zaire Gendarmarie F 
September 1966 Liberia Foiled F 
November 1966 Chad Foiled F 
November 1966 Burundi S 
November 1966 Ethiopia Foiled F 
January 1967 Togo S 
March 1967 Sierra Leone g 
March 1967 Sierra Leone Counter-coup S 
April 1967 Ghana F 
October 1967 Malawi 'Invasions F 
December 1967 Dahomey S 
March 1968 Guinea Mty led F 
April 1968 Sierra Leone NCO led a 
September 1968 Congo (B) 5 
November 1968 Mali 5 
Date Country Rum arks Ot; t! 
March 1969 Eq. Guinea F 
April 1969 Central African 
Republic F 
August 1969 Mali F 
September 1969 Burundi F 
October 1969 Somalia Army/polic S 
November 1969 Ethiopia Foiled F 
December 1969 Dahomey S 
January 1970 Lesotho g 
April 1970 Somalia Factional F 
August 1970 Togo Foiled F 
September 1970 Kenya Foiled F 
October 1970 Sierra Leone Foiled F 
November 1970 Guinea 'Invasion' F 
January 1971 Ghana Anti-Busia S 
January 1971 Uganda Anti-Obote S 
March 1971 Sierra Leone F 
March 1971 Malagasey F 
April 1971 Mali F 
May 1971 Somalia F 
July 1971 Guinea Foiled F 
July 1971 Uganda F 
July 1971 Burundi Foiled F 
August 1971 Chad Foiled F 
February 1972 Ghana Anti-Busia S 
February 1972 Congo (B) Leftist F 
nute Country 
February 1972 Dahomey 
May 1972 Malagas©y 
1972 Burundi 
November 1972 Dahomey 
Rem {n 
Monarchist 
Qtn risi, 
F 
F 
S 
APPENDIX B 
The following table has been constructed from details in 
the Times (London) Index for the years 1968-1971. Under the 
headings a list was made of the reported incidents that would 
be broadly described as political: Riots and Demonstrations; 
Guerilla activity, Judicial Executions and Estimated Numbers 
Killed. A strike in itself was not included as a political 
act unless it led to a riot or violent demonstration in which 
police or troops were involved. Guerilla activity curved 
incidents such as kidnapping, arson, jail break or law defiance. 
Judicial Executions covered both those executions by due legal 
process or those where state authorities killed guerillas in 
unspecified incidents. The Estimated Numbers Killed were those 
numbers reported killed and the plus sign (+) indicates that an 
additional unspecified number were killed. 
Two points must be made about the table. Firstly, it is 
not a scientifically accurate table in the sense that it does 
not represent the whole picture. The published news reports in 
an (albeit) eminent British newspaper are subject to the 
Editor's bias as to what to report on and what not to report on. 
Thus, because British readers of the Times appear to be 
interested in Indian events, judging by the newspace accorded 
to India, greater detail on Indian political violence is 
available. India may therefore appear to be an exceptionally 
violent country in contrast to other countries which receive 
less attention in the Times. 
Secondly, because of the inevitable bias and tho soloction 
of news for publication the table shows only a sample of the 
facts and it is therefore an underestimate of political violonco 
rather than an overestimate. 
The table is then a guide to the trend of political 
violence in these Third World countries. It shows that doaths 
from political conflict are quite substantiall that guerilla 
action is fairly widespread and that judicial executions are 
also a common features of public life. 
The table for death does not include those killed in wars 
or civil wars. Thus the deaths caused by the Vietnam war, 
Indo-Pak wars, the Arab-Israeli wars and the Nigerian-Biafran 
wars have been excluded. 
Political Violence in the Third World) 41 Countri©s, as Ronortod 
in The TIMES (London) 1968-1971 
Incidents 
Riots/ Guerilla/ Judicial Country Demonstrations Terrorism Executions 
Algeria 
Afghanistan 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Bolivia 
Burma 
Chad 
Chile 
Cameroon 
Congo (B) 
Dahomey 
Ecuador 
Ethiopia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Jordan 
2 
1 
14 
11 
3 
1 
2 
9 
1 
3 
If 
5 
I 
55 
8 
If 
1 
3 
1 
20 
21 
13 
10 
10 
12 
1 
3 
8 
1 
4 
20 
2 
22 
8 
6 
4 
21 
7 
7 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
Estimated 
Numbora 
CSC 
9+ 
2 
18 
184 
13 
101 
16+ 
5 
4 
3 
4 
7 
12 
59+ 
16+ 
1+ 
92,3+ 
33+ 
11 
122 
54+ 
NOTES - CHAPTER ONE 
(1) Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations, 
Book V. 
(2) Costa Rica abolished its armed forces in 1948, but 
left an armed police force which carries out the 
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